The reviewer writes, "...it immerses the reader in the flow of information that actually existed for the president an his closest advisors."
But in fact it conceals vitally important elements of the historical record so as to give the reader a highly distorted impression of that flow of information.
In particular, despite having ample space to publish all the declassified MAGIC Diplomatic Summary text concerning the famed "peace feelers to the Soviet Union" message exchange between Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo and Ambassador Sato in Moscow, it reveals only a tiny, cherry-picked sliver of it. Moreover, it does not inform the reader of vitally important context necessary to understand why US intelligence advised US leaders that of three possible interpretations of the import of that message exchange, the most likely was that it was just an attempt to promote rumors of Japanese willingness to negotiate so as to exploit war-weariness in the Allied nations' and heighten opposition to a final invasion.
In addition, "The Decision" conceals from its readers the fact that just weeks before the "peace feelers" exchange began. the MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries had reported on another message in which Tokyo informed Sato of the Hirota-Malik talks in which Japan had proposed, in essence, that the USSR form an alliance with Japan against the US and Britain.
Nor does "The Decision" inform its readers that in the "peace feelers" message exchange Sato repeatedly advises Togo that there is no way that Stalin will allow a visit from the emperor's Special Envoy (Prince Konoye) unless Japan first submits in writing a detailed and concrete description of what the Special Envoy will propose, but Togo never sends one. Nor is there any mention of the fact that Togo never responds to a Sato question which asks, in essence, whether the military (which held four of the six seats on the all-important Supreme Council for Direction of the War) is on board with Togo's willingness to end the war on terms nearly equivalent to unconditional surrender.
Nor does "The Decision" make clear to its readers that a change in the wording of the Potsdam Declaration which it presents as evidence of a secret Truman-Byrnes' conspiracy to forestall Japanese surrender was in fact heavily influenced by input from State Department officials who were among the most politically liberal people in the administration (who apparently were aware, unlike others involved, that the Japanese emperor already was a constitutional monarch, such that Stimson's proposed wording would have given the Japanese grounds to resist meaningful political change).
The above are just a small sample of the ways in which "The Decision" egregiously misinforms and misleads its readers.