In this overarching analysis, Bostom provides an engrossing and encyclopedic catalog of ideology and history of the naked totalitarianism of Islamic religious and political doctrines -- a diametric opposite to free Western social structure. Sharia prohibits political freedoms, freedoms of conscience, faith, and expression (both oral and written). As applied throughout its history and expressed in internal jurisprudence, Bostom shows, Mohammed's intractable creed suppressed and oppressed all with whom it interacted -- especially non-Muslims.
Intrinsically totalitarian jihadist and Islamic canon neither concerns nor governs only "believers." By Muslim belief, according to scholar Joseph Schacht (d. 1969), the "clear path to be followed" establishes divine, global Islamic order and cannot "be penetrated by the intelligence ... i.e., man has to accept it without criticism." It governs Muslims, and also "activities of the tolerated members of other faiths so far as they may not be detrimental to Islam."
Sharia code requires Muslims to mount regular jihad attacks on unvanquished non-Muslims and permanently, deliberately humiliate "inferior" jihad survivors. Their incorporation into Islamic polity subjects non-Muslims to sharia (pp. 110-112) and its inheritance statutes, requirements and prohibitions and draconian hadd penalties --- including death (by stoning) for adultery, apostasy, and highway robbery (whose victim was murdered); loss of limbs for simple robbery; loss of right hand for simple theft; 100 lashes for "fornication" and 80 lashes for wine drinking. Muslims understand sharia, tracing to Quran passages (like 45:18, 42:13, 42:21, and 5:48) and other Islamic texts, primarily hadith (Mohammed's reputed sayings and deeds) -- as "the totality of Allah's commandments" governing man, Schacht notes.
Islam cements "religion" to its 7th century totalitarian dogma, Bostom shows. For openers, while the Arabic word "hurriyya" translates to "freedom," it refers to "freedom as perfect slavery to Allah," as prescribed by highly dogmatic sharia laws engineered by the same dictatorial chief (Mohammed said, by divine instructions delivered via the angel Gabriel). It means something diametrically opposite to the same word in English -- study of which is now off limits for U.S. military and security officials.
Like Bostom's two previous landmark studies on Islamic jihad
, his third adds significantly to our knowledge base. Often, contemporary scholars contend that Islam grew hateful upon absorbing Nazi anti-Semitism in the 20th century. Yet even in the Nazi era, Bostom shows, intellectual luminaries saw the truth as quite opposite. Like "Islam of old," noted a Protestant theologian Karl Barth in 1939, National Socialism's political experiment promised to those willing to participate; but when resisted, it could "only crush and kill." Nazism was best understood as "a new Islam, its myth a new Allah and Hitler as this new Allah's Prophet."
Terror also pervaded "heavenly," peaceful Andalusia. Spain's purportedly enlightened Umayyad conquerors were notoriously brutal, and established fierce, "immobile" Malikite Sunni doctrine and that "suspected and condemned in advance for the slightest attempt at rational speculation" (p. 368). In 1914, Miguel Asin Palacois saw Muslim Spain similarly, as had Cordovan "scholar of Spain par excellence" Ibn Habib (d. 853) and his student Muslim al-Kinani (d. 901), the latter noting that Jews must wear patches bearing the image of an ape, and Christians, patches picturing a pig. (pp. 368-375).
In Granada, Jewish viziers appointed to protect their community were assassinated between 1056 and 1066, after which a fiery anti-Jewish "ode" by Muslim jurist and poet Abu Ishaq filtered through Muslim Granada that very possibly incited the Muslim pogrom that then annihilated Granada's entire Jewish population of up to 5,000 -- as many or more than the number of Jewish people reportedly killed during the First Crusade's pillage of the Rhineland some thirty years later (pp. 176-177).
In Ottoman Turkey 400 years later, celebrated Hanafi jurist and court cleric Molla Khosrew (d. 1480) rested his jihad directives on Islamic totalitarian dogmas. Based on Q 9:5 and Q 9:29, Khosrew instructs, religious obligation (fard al-kifaya) requires jihad, which one must "begin the fight against the enemy, even when he [the enemy] may not have taken the initiative to fight." (p. 178).
In 1948, English-speaking Arab League Office member Aboul Saud described Islam to investigative journalist John Ray Carlson as "a religious form of State Socialism," granting the state "the right to nationalize industry, distribute land, or expropriate" those rights and property. (p. 256). After interviewing Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al Banna, Carlson understood the sensational MB rise and near universal popularity of Nazism in Egypt. Average Egyptians, he concluded, "worshiped the use of force" since "terror was synonymous with power."
The Ottoman empire's 1918 demise only raised Muslim fervor for a new, stronger translational religious superstate -- and with it, individual and Islamic societal yearning for a totalitarian, sharia-based cultural regimen, including discriminatory governance of non-Muslims.
A 1979 treatise on jihad by Pakistani Brigadier S.K. Malik reflected bedrock Islamic ideology and its preface described the "bipolarized" Islamic world view designed by Hanafi school founder Abu Hanifa (d. 767) -- of "two opposing camps-- Darul-Salam (Islam) facing Darul-Harb," one submissive, the second "engaged in perpetuating defiance" of Allah (p. 201). Muslim historian and Quranic commentator Abu Ja'far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (d. 923) cites Hanafi, "affirming the impunity with which non-combatant `harbis' -- women, children, the elderly, the mentally or physically disabled -- may be killed" (p. 62).
Modern Muslim jurists also espouse foundational doctrines, Bostom shows. In July 2003, revered "moderate" Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader chief Yusef Qaradawi approved pillage, noting that "Islamic law [determined] the blood and property of the people of Dar al-Harb [the Domain of Disbelief where the battle for domination of Islam should be waged] is not protected." All Muslims should mobilize, aid war and provide its "material and human fuel..." (p. 64).
Muslim public opinion avidly supports such views. An April 2007 University of Maryland/ WorldPublicOpinion.org survey of 4,384 recent interviews with Muslims reported, nearly 2/3 (2,872) wanted: "To unify all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state or Caliphate"; 65.5% also wanted "every Islamic country" to require "strict application of Shari'a law."
A Dec. 2010 Pew poll in Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and Nigeria also documented support for hadd punishments: 82% of Egyptians and Pakistanis wanted adulterers stoned, as did 70% in Jordan and 56% in Nigeria; 82% of Pakistanis, 77% of Egyptians, 65% of Nigerians, and 58% of Jordanians supported whipping and amputation for theft. Most Muslims also want execution for apostates (Jordan, 86%; Egypt, 84%; Pakistan, 76%; Nigeria, 51%). A concurrent secret cable from London's U.S. Embassy revealed of 600 British Muslim students polled, 40% want to replace British law with sharia.
--- Alyssa A. Lappen