What you call the challenge to conventional wisdom is fairly standard thinking these days.
Read Frank at page 25 or so, he states very clearly that after Midway, the Imperial Navy had lost four carriers. The rest of the navy was largely in tact and superior in almost every measure to the US Navy including materiale , training, and tactics. In particular, the surface ship engagements near Guadalcanal demonstrate this. Japan's torpedos and night surface ship training were superior to those of the US navy. The IJN remained lethal.
Japan's failure in the aftermath of Midway was to consolidate its positon in many theaters--most notably isolate Australia through the use of these resources. Japan squandered its advantage through incompetence, inter-service rivalries and a complete failure to understand the stratgic import of the theater in mid-1942 and act on it. These are themes that are found in both Becke and Pearl's works.
The Prado book is hardly ground breaking.