179 of 216 people found the following review helpful
What is old is very good. What is new is disappointing.,
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This review is from: The Idea of Justice (Hardcover)
Amartya Sen, recipient of the Nobel prize in Economics in 1998, is a very special economist. He has first-rate technical skills, he is a fine interpreter of the empirical evidence on the causes of famine and poverty around the world, he has a deep commitment to egalitarian social change, and he is a looming figure in modern political philosophy. Sen is a key contributor to the current movement towards integrating the insights of the various social sciences towards better understanding of society and increasing our capacity to improve social policy interventions in to economic and political life.
The Idea of Justice is a large, meandering book that is accessible to the novice in social theory and political philosophy, and includes most of the ideas Sen has championed in his long and productive career, plus a new idea that leads him beyond such established contemporary political philosophers as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.
In much the same way as German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, Sen's commitment to freedom and democracy is based not on distributional issues, but rather on a deep understanding of the importance of communicative discourse and public debate in making the good society. This commitment fits well with Sen's major contribution to welfare economics, which is providing an alternative to the selfish and materialistic Homo Economicus of standard neoclassical economics. For traditional economics, well-being is a function of the goods and services and individual enjoys. For Sen, well-being is a function of how fully and vigorously an individual exercises his human capabilities. Democracy, then, is less about who gets what, and more about how people come to craft both their personal life-meaning and their collective destiny through political participation and discourse.
As an indication of the power of Sen's reasoning, he shows clearly how a commitment to a capabilities orientation to human welfare helps understand why income and welfare are conceptually and factually distinct and only somewhat correlated. Sen treats poverty as an inability to develop and exercise one's personal capacities. Thus, a family in the United States can have much higher income than another in a third world country and yet suffer from poverty while its third world counterpart does not. This is because the US family may be socially dysfunctional, or may live in a community that fails to provide the social relations and cooperative institutions that allow people to develop their capacities even though lacking in income.
Sen's innovation in this book is to critique the "transcendental institutionalism" of such traditional moral philosophers as Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Dworkin and Rawls, who seek to define a set of social institutions that foster "perfect justice," Sen argues that perfect justice is not capable of attainment, and it is better to focus on how society can be improved from its current state, give its actual pattern of injustices.
I have two major criticisms of this book. The first is that Sen has not updated his model of the individual or his critique of the neoclassical model of economic man since his important contributions of thirty or forty years ago. You would not discover by reading this book that there has been a virtual revolution in economic thought concerning human nature starting in the 1980's with behavioral game theory, experimental economics, and more recently, neuroeconomics. We can now go far beyond Sen's rather diffident and anemic argument that people are not always completely selfish. Perhaps Sen considers this new research deficient in some way. Or, perhaps such empirical findings do not belong in the same league as the venerable Western and Indian philosophers he quotes so liberally. We simply do not know what Sen thinks about this, or what his motives were to ignore this rich vein of research of obvious relevance to his argument.
My second problem is a bit more fundamental. I am extremely skeptical concerning the whole approach to justice that has dominated analytical philosophy since Rawls' seminal A Theory of Justice. Sen critiques John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen and other left-liberal thinkers on grounds of the impossibility of perfect justice. However, the real problem with these thinkers is that they believe justice is a matter of the distribution of wealth and income. This is not at all what justice means to most voters and citizens, who rather follow Robert Nozick in believing that justice consists in individuals getting that to which they are entitled by virtue of legitimate production, exchange, and inheritance. Serious thinkers must find the idea that ideal justice consists of complete social equality to be deeply repugnant.
In this view, justice is not fairness at all. Nevertheless, we can accept an entitlement view of justice and yet recognize that poverty, not some abstract inequality of income and wealth, is a real enemy of social wellbeing, not because it is unfair but because it is a preventable disease, like malaria, that we should not permit to inflict the young and innocent. Full social equality, then, is not a lamentable unattainable ideal state, but rather a thankfully unattainable monstrosity because it presupposes the absence of personal accountability and effectivity.
Sen's critique of the Rawlsian tradition is anemic and trivial. For this reason I find this book deeply disappointing. It is altogether too genteel in dealing with a philosophical tradition that deserves to be bitterly criticized, not gently reproached for its excessive zeal in the pursuit of an unattainable ideal.
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Showing 1-10 of 55 posts in this discussion
Initial post: Sep 9, 2009 12:58:46 AM PDT
Michael L. Maas says:
Can you recommend a current book that covers the empirical understandings developed since Sen's earlier work?
Posted on Sep 9, 2009 6:38:19 AM PDT
Daniel L. Farber says:
This is the most incisive, succinct review I have ever read on the internet. The reviewer should make himself known to the New York Review of Books, although his positions seem antithetical to that journal's apparent bias.
In reply to an earlier post on Sep 9, 2009 5:18:21 PM PDT
You can look at papers on my web site, http://people.umass.edu/gintis, or take a look at I book I helped edit, Moral Sentiments and Material Interests (MIT Press, 2005).
Posted on Sep 11, 2009 11:46:45 AM PDT
D. Stern says:
I agree completely with Mr. Farber's comment. This is an extraordinarily helpful review.
Posted on Sep 12, 2009 1:20:43 PM PDT
Thank you for a succinct yet very informative review. Curiously, you close with the criticism that Sen's book "is altogether too genteel in dealing with a philosophical tradition that deserves to be bitterly criticized, not gently reproached for its excessive zeal in the pursuit of an unattainable ideal." Who do you think offers an, or even the most, effective criticism of this tradition?
Posted on Sep 13, 2009 1:02:45 PM PDT
Last edited by the author on Sep 13, 2009 1:04:44 PM PDT
D. J. Taylor says:
From one point of view a lucid and to the point review cannot avoid being helpful, if only because it provides something definite to disagree with. Here the reviewer refers to what he sees as "a virtual revolution in economic thought concerning human nature", but then cites four fields which a little research reveals to be entirely based on human reactions to money, as if economics were about nothing else. The real revolution in the analytical understanding of human nature (although anticipated by St Paul at 1 Cor 12:1-12) began in the 1920's with Jung's personality theory (since elaborated, grounded empirically and explained in terms both of neurological function and information systems theory). This reveals how the people have four very different types of aim which, on the whole, correspond to the role they are likely to play in the economic system as a whole. In the completely abstract form devised c.1890 by Heaviside for electric circuit theory, both human nature and economics reduce to a control system wherein if one type of aim is chosen the others are reduced to corrective feedbacks. When those whose aim is making paper "money" dominate, nature as a whole is sacrificed to them, whereas if the aim is working to sustain the well-being of nature (including individual human welfare), the accounts are no more than what they are fitted to be: a source of information feedback about what is being done.
So, one can agree with Gintis that the impossibility of perfect justice is too weak a critique, and the existence of the Nozick (Aristotelian) interpretation a better one, but what will justify the "bitter criticism" he seeks of the philosophical tradition is its (i.e. his own rather more than Sen's) failure to look for fruitful methodological advances outside its own front door.
Posted on Sep 13, 2009 3:26:49 PM PDT
I echo Daniel Farber's appraisal. Your review was amazing.
In reply to an earlier post on Sep 15, 2009 10:30:05 PM PDT
David J. Taylor: "...a little research reveals to be entirely based on human reactions to money, as if economics were about nothing else."
HG: You should do a little more research, read the papers, before state this conclusion, which the exact opposite of the truth! This work shows that people care about moral values and are willing to sacrifice material gain in order to meet ethical standards. See my book, "Moral Sentiments and Material Interests."
Posted on Sep 18, 2009 7:35:56 AM PDT
A slight quibble. Re your first criticism. It has to do with Understanding (with a capital `D') the author's position. There is a clear separation between the individual's obligations (that reap rights) and its congregation (`society'). The advances in economics which may or may not have occurred (see DJT's comment and HG's reply) are inappropriate in Understanding the individual's choices. The latter are private the former social. [Simplistic, but you get the idea.] Re your second criticism. Could not agree more. plato.
In reply to an earlier post on Sep 18, 2009 8:13:28 PM PDT
I do not understand the difference between "understanding" and "Understanding" (I assume you meant "with a capital `U', not capital `D').