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Thomas H. Kean

Lee Hamilton

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Official Edition) Paperback – March 25, 2010

by National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Author)

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2010 printing of the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission (Official US Government Edition).

Print length

586 pages
Language

English
Publication date

March 25, 2010
Dimensions

6 x 1.47 x 9 inches
ISBN-10

1441408312
ISBN-13

978-1441408310
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Product details

Publisher ‏ : ‎ CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform (March 25, 2010)
Language ‏ : ‎ English
Paperback ‏ : ‎ 586 pages
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 1441408312
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1441408310
Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 1.87 pounds
Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6 x 1.47 x 9 inches

Best Sellers Rank: #4,395,098 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #5,291 in Political Intelligence
- #6,154 in Terrorism (Books)
- #7,501 in National & International Security (Books)

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689 ratings

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4 star		11%
3 star		7%
2 star		2%
1 star		5%

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Michael Griswold

Tough, but Necessary Reading

Reviewed in the United States on August 28, 2021

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The 9/11 Commission Report is not easy reading. Both from a subject matter perspective, I can’t think of too many people who are eager to relive the September 11th terrorist attacks and from a content perspective. The writing is rather formal and dense as one would expect from such an important document, but it has the effect of making it a slog. I think this was written for a more general audience than this reader who has several years of experience in terrorism and national security courses. Still it was like looking back in time to the pre-9-11 world.

The 9/11 Commission Report is another one of those books where you are almost just sitting there waiting for the really bad thing to happen, which is not a good feeling. Even worse, reading page after page of things and moments of opportunity that went wrong. That just twists the knife in deeper. Reading as a student of the field, almost twenty years later, the question that kept sticking with me was “Have we learned the right lessons from the events outlined in this report”?

I don’t know if we have.

12 people found this helpful

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Michael Saulsby

Great product

Reviewed in the United States on June 26, 2019

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Exactly what I wanted. Gives very accurate description of 9/11

10 people found this helpful

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Amazon Customer

Informative

Reviewed in the United States on April 19, 2019

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This is a must read for anyone studying homeland defense and security. Provides pivotal information on how America responded to the 9/11 attacks.

4 people found this helpful

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D. Isaacs

A must read & research tool

Reviewed in the United States on August 27, 2019

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Wow! Great read.

One person found this helpful

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Hottie Pepper

Five Stars

Reviewed in the United States on October 18, 2018

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good

One person found this helpful

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David Russell

careful reading of the report only draws attention to this impression and leads one to believe that there should now be a fuller

Reviewed in the United States on November 17, 2015

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The problem is that the report is quite well written and succinct in so far as it goes but the real problem rests with the Commission itself. They clearly ignored so many very disturbing questions that have been raised since the attack and they failed to call many witnesses that would have given extremely important evidence. I would include potential witnesses such as Susan Landauer in this category. These omissions are very serious indeed and tends to give independent minds such as myself the distinct impression that we have been conned. On a positive side, careful reading of the report only draws attention to this impression and leads one to believe that there should now be a fuller enquiry that with the perspective of time might be better able to find and inform the world of the real truth behind the circumstances of the attack and its aftermath. The fact that this report and the veritable library of books related to this subject still enjoys a huge world-wide readership indicates the importance of gaining a clearer indication of what really happened. The book has these faults but should still be read by a serious enquiring reader if just to think about the Commission's omissions.

33 people found this helpful

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schexO2

As comprehensive as possible...

Reviewed in the United States on July 1, 2012

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An in-depth study of the 9/11 tragedy and the state of affairs within the nation's various security apparatuses leading up to it. The recommendations of this commission, while seeking to absolve any of the political leadership, still have managed to provide at least a beginning to workable solutions to our various problems regarding the prevention of terrorism. As the commission states, no defense can be perfect, but it should be cooperative, layered, focused, and able to respond both before and after attacks by Islamist fundamentalists are perpetrated against the American people.

The writing style takes the form of a narrative throughout the majority of the book, making it surprisingly easy to follow. Recommended if you want to understand the terrorist threat and the inter-agency developments that have followed 9/11.

What did the commission get right about interagency operations?

The most obvious answer to this question is that the commission report exposed shortcomings within the IC which were already common knowledge, but that had not been acted upon due to a self-serving environment which provided little incentive to engage in activities carrying inherent political risk. There were a host of assumptions in play during the decade prior to 9/11, but the IC had chosen to focus on the wrong things, the old threats, while largely ignoring the developing threats like Al Qaeda that defied convention. It was not only the IC, however, which suffered from these conditions. Every aspect of US bureaucratic infrastructure seems to have been stricken with this short-sighted malaise.

Early on, the commission points out that protocols in place just prior to 9/11 for interagency collaboration between FAA and NORAD for hijacking events were "unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen" (9/11 Commission, 17). This was due to popular presumptions that hijackings would continue to assume their traditional form and would not become suicide missions. A similar presumption, that terrorism would remain a foreign threat best suited to the domain of the CIA, was correctly identified as having prevented the FBI from responding to the several Al-Qaeda miscues in hijacker travel to the United States and their activities within US borders. The Wall of regulation between the intelligence and domestic agencies was erected on the common belief that securing sensitive information from prying eyes was far more beneficial than widely sharing it within the appropriate communities. This attitude only served to maintain an overly cautious attitude of interagency turf warfare, "blocked the arteries of information sharing", and did little to augment collective anti-terrorism capabilities beyond that of each particular organization (9/11 Commission, 79).

The 9/11 Commission also correctly recognized the problem of stove-piping in intelligence organizations and the inadequacy of the DCI to oversee all of the functions and budgeting of the IC, while still maintaining the objectivity needed to excel in the role of the lead national intelligence analyst. As a whole, "the agencies and the rules surrounding the intelligence community have accumulated to a depth that practically defies public comprehension" (9/11 Commission, 410). The commission rightly called for an overarching intelligence framework, the Director of National Intelligence, which sought to operate free of the systemic failures of the DCI arrangement and exert the control necessary to direct the IC on an aggregate level.

Most critical of all, the commission firmly grasped the underlying cause of the US's inability to act in a collectively forceful manner in the years leading up to 9/11. It is not additional resources or personnel which are needed to defeat the current terrorist threats. Rather, "the government should combine them more effectively, achieving unity of effort" (9/11 Commission, 399). Unity of effort has both structural and spiritual components. In terms of information sharing, these two sides must complement each other. Need-to-know can no longer be anticipated, and the commission calls for a "culture in which the agencies instead feel they have a duty to the information--to repay the taxpayers' investment by making that information available" (9/11 Commission, 417). The same sense of duty and cultural grit that propelled America through WWII has the potential to be reborn in a successful interagency fight against Islamist terrorism.

What did the commission get wrong about interagency operations?

The most obvious answer to this question is that the commission focused primarily on the symptoms and not the disease. In other words, the political developments leading up to 9/11 were not meaningfully questioned. This is, however, quite understandable. The commission's efficacy to affect any type of interagency restructuring was largely dependent on its being viewed as an impartial, bipartisan effort. Due to these limitations, no significant degree of responsibility was assigned to policy makers within the Reagan, Bush Sr., Clinton, or George W. Bush administrations. A truly objective assessment, above and beyond the political entanglements the commission found itself immersed in could not have afforded to ignore this other critical side of the interagency equation. As the commission states, "while we now know that al Qaeda was formed in 1988...the intelligence community did not describe this organization...until 1999" (9/11 Commission, 341).

The Reagan administration successfully countered the Soviet threat by allying itself with Saudi Arabia and the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan but apparently gave little thought to the long-term consequences of empowering their "Arab" allies once the politically satiating objective of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed (Clarke, 52). The Bush Sr. administration moved strongly in a conventional military manner against Saddam Hussein's incursion into Kuwait, and utilized the US's budding relationship with Saudi Arabia to this end. They did not perceive, however, that the presence of US troops in the most sacred of Muslim nations, even though protecting the House of Saud from Iraq's aggression, also served to further inflame the religious sensibilities of Islamist Wahhabi extremists such as Osama bin Laden, propelling al Qaeda forward in terms of resonance with the Muslim population.

The Clinton administration, with Richard Clarke's ascendance as the counter-terrorism czar, finally began to confront elements of al Qaeda militarily, but failed to respond to direct provocations such as the U.S.S. Cole bombing, sending mixed messages and further emboldening bin Laden. Despite a 1995 NIE stressing the potential for Islamist terrorist attacks, Clinton did not make any significant moves against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, constrained as he was by the political implications of his actions in the Monica Lewinsky affair. Despite intelligence reporting pointing to al Qaeda as the primary threat to the US, the George W. Bush administration had a myopic focus on Iraq as a conventional military threat (9/11 Commission, 333) and seemed to dismiss terrorism as a priority until after 9/11 had already taken place.

Finally, the 9/11 commission's fixation with developing unity of effort through joint operations and bureaucratic restructuring misses the mark in understanding that it is the very diversity of disciplines and ways of thinking found interspersed throughout the IC as a whole which should be leveraged and preserved. While joint structures have served the military generally well, intelligence is a far more esoteric endeavor. This is a case where the catch-phrase "strength through diversity" really has substance, not referring to ethnicity, but to discipline and experience. Standardization should be devoted to high payoff targets of the moment, such as Arabic name standardization for travel documents. Instead, the commission has suggested standardizing education and training, trying to develop generalized rule-based systems to fight terrorism. We don't need everyone to think the same way; we need tools everyone has the potential to use.'
References

9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Clarke, Richard. 2004. Against all enemies: Inside America's war on terror. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc.

5 people found this helpful

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Avert Inc

As a report it has some bias

Reviewed in the United States on August 7, 2008

Verified Purchase

As a report of a difficult period of time in the United States it gives a fair accounting of the facts. With some distortions of accuracy and now with the benefit of hind-site some omissions a true accounting may never been told. What is told is of a country so incapable of making a quick decision and painfully slow to put the pieces of the puzzle together in time to prevent further destruction. While there are still questions as to if flight 93 was shot down not, don't look here for an answer. Clearly there were people in control in our government that should not have been there. This report was more forgiving of them then I wound have been. Two many mistakes were made, In the air, on the ground, fighters lost over the water. Besides the heroic efforts at the towers and the Pentagon, grounding all flights over the U.S., however late, and keeping the President airborne in Air Force One, would prove to be the correct choices.

8 people found this helpful

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Mindledindle

Really bad quality.

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on September 15, 2020

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Book in terrible condition. Take some pride in what you sell!! Disgusting.

AJCBLACKSWAN

Great thanks

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on March 14, 2019

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Great thanks

One person found this helpful

Shaun rhatigan

Book arrived very dirty with marks on the front and back cover

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on August 16, 2021

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A. Mather

I must have the wrong document... and a troubling fact

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on May 9, 2016

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When I downloaded the commission report and first looked through it, I was convinced I must have the wrong document. This could not possibly be the incisive review of all the events of 9/11, particularly as to what precisely occurred.

And of course it isn't, nor is it intended to be, so it has the role of electronic toilet paper.

In addition to the abundance of material (eg: New Pearl Harbor) out there, I would offer one simple analysis that will eliminate any possible belief that either a B757 hit the Pentagon as described, or that the US Government told the truth.

The US DoD when it released the security gate camera images and used them in US vs Moussaouri achieved three unintentional goals:
a) it proved that the government lied by about 90 degrees as to the path of the vehicle
b) it proved that the government lied about the presence of a B757 as being the vehicle involved
c) it involved itself in a criminal act by tampering with evidence in a criminal trial, itself a criminal offence

The 'vehicle' in the forward gate cam shot isn't a vehicle, but smoke. There is no vehicle. The image is a composite with the vehicle edited out.

For the only proof you'll need, courtesy of the US DoD, see "9/11 Pentagon Flight 77: Creating a New Pearl Harbor"

9/11 Pentagon Flight 77: Creating a New Pearl Harbor: The only proof you need, authorized and published by the US DoD

14 people found this helpful

Marco

Ottimo libro

Reviewed in Italy on October 31, 2016

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Ottimo libro, ottimo report, spedizione velocissima, prezzo competitivo, libro da non perdere assolutamente da leggere, ben fatto ottimo compratelo tutti

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