Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Learn more
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
1914: Fight The Good Fight: Britain, the Army and the Coming of the First World War Hardcover – International Edition, September 9, 2013
| Allan Mallinson (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
| Price | New from | Used from |
| Hardcover, International Edition, September 9, 2013 | $10.50 | — | $10.48 |
|
Paperback, International Edition
"Please retry" | $15.22 | $2.34 |
- Kindle
$12.99 Read with Our Free App - Hardcover
$10.5010 Used from $10.48 - Paperback
$21.2810 Used from $2.34 9 New from $15.22
An ex-infantry and cavalry officer, Mallinson brings his experience as a professional soldier to bear on the individuals, circumstances and events and the result is a vivid, compelling new history of the beginnings of the conflict -- and one that speculates -- tantalizingly -- on what might have been.
- Print length528 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherBantam Press
- Publication dateSeptember 9, 2013
- Dimensions6.25 x 1.56 x 9.5 inches
- ISBN-100593067606
- ISBN-13978-0593067604
Popular titles by this author
Editorial Reviews
About the Author
Product details
- Publisher : Bantam Press (September 9, 2013)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 528 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0593067606
- ISBN-13 : 978-0593067604
- Item Weight : 1.88 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.25 x 1.56 x 9.5 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #6,444,745 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #10,554 in World War I History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more
Customer reviews
Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Learn more how customers reviews work on Amazon-
Top reviews
Top reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
" trenches". His very detailed recount of the stumbling Governmental efforts to prepare for coming chaos on the continent almost subdues the reader who may not be familiar with the personalities. However as many of these enter into the fracas and interact with the French military, that same reader is tempted to re -read the lead-up to become better acquainted. There is a blend of the despair of military errors with the heroic British fortitude related in this tale. The journalists and poets that emerged from this, the largest involvement of the British Army ever, are multiple. Mallinson blends their sentiment into the mix of with appropriate presentation. Finally one is touched by the willingness of English, Irish, and Scottish men to volunteer to fight for "King and Country" in the Territorial and PALS outfits. The reader is moved to speculate whether that same total commitment exists anywhere today. That message came to me clothed in subliminal drapings. If only the footnotes were published, they would be a wonderful addtiion to the detailed history of this "War to End All Wars." Pick it up if your interests lie in this important period of history.
Top reviews from other countries
As Mallinson himself says, Fight the Good Fight is an Anglocentric perspective of the BEF’s first twenty days, and of what came before – specifically, Britain’s wishful detachment from the affairs of continental Europe, notwithstanding the implied alliance of the Entente Cordiale. It was a full month after the shooting in Sarajevo before the cabinet properly discussed the situation in Europe; and even once the fighting began, a mood of semi-detachment persisted. The book shows the developments, mostly positive, in the training and doctrine of the British Army brought about by the lessons learned from the South African Wars. Haldane’s reforms in organisation go hand in hand with these. Ironically the strenuous efforts to reform the army after the Boer War had an unintended consequence: they brought the army to an unprecedented pitch of efficiency, but in August 1914 they also brought it to the wrong place, at the wrong time, and trusting in an ally – France – whose own army, in its obsession with the overwhelming moral power of the offensive, had put its trust in the wrong generals and the wrong strategy.
At the same time the strategic drift, and detachment from European politics of the various governments, distracted as they were by constitutional crises over the ‘peoples budget’ and later (as late in fact as summer of 1914) Irish Home rule along with the emerging social programmes of the Liberal Government to improve the lot of the ordinary people. The lack of Strategic direction to the Army in the years just before the war is well chronicled. The upshot of this was that without direction from above, the relatively junior Major General Henry Wilson effectively committed Britain to fight alongside France without the government’s instruction. Wilson effectively decided the what and the where if not the when of British military commitment to the defence of France whilst the Government was struggling to decide whether the Entente with France was an alliance or simply a statement of friendship (thus supporting both Germany’s belief that Britain would not get involved in the war and France’s confidence in her support!). The British political detachment is clear even throughout July 1914 to recognise the growing continental crisis. Even as late as the War Council meeting in the Cabinet room in Downing St at 4pm on 5 August ‘an historic meeting of men, mostly entirely ignorant of their subject’ (Maj Gen Wilson) the government could only resolve to send the BEF to France, in a strength to be decided, to a place to be determined, and to operate along lines as yet unspecified (though as mentioned Wilson had in reality decided it for them).
As the BEF embarked for France it was ‘incomparably the best trained, best organised and best equipped British Army that ever went forth to war’. By midnight on 22 November it had fought ferociously at Mons, Le Cateau where Smith Dorrien delivered a checking blow to Kluck’s 1st Army, the Marne and at Ypres. It was however a shadow of the army that had left Britain in August. These engagements are well recorded by Mallinson and he is no fan of FM Sir John French the C in C of the BEF for whom he has few good words. The II Corp commander, Smith-Dorrien, whose troops bore the brunt of fighting at Mons and Le Cateau is treated with more sympathy in doing the best that could be done against much superior numbers whilst the French 5th Army failed to attack on his right and Haig’s I corps (on the left) was only partially engaged.
In the retreat to the Marne, Joffre regained the balance of his French armies and defeated the German advance, with help from the BEF that had been constantly on the move and in contact with the enemy for 3 weeks. It is not surprising, though Mallinson is a little harsh here, that given casualties and exhaustion Smith-Dorrien did not seize the one possible opportunity to open a gap in the enemy armies after the Marne. In truth the BEF and the British army was tiny compared to the continental powers but it performed superbly. Corps commanders Smith-Dorrien, Haig performed well and were brilliantly supported in logistics by Wully Robertson whose positioning of supplies in the advance to and then retreat from Mons would have made Wellington proud. The BEF was under-equipped in High Explosive shells and was just smaller than its enemy but it was well trained, generally well equipped and adaptive to new technologies (the 1st squadrons of RFC aircraft were in France before the ground troops and were used from the outset for reconnaissance).
At the beginning of this book, Mallinson asserts that the War ‘was decided in the first twenty days of fighting, and all that happened afterwards consisted in battles which …were but desperate and vain appeals against the decision of fate.’ At the end he offers an interesting, though unproveable counter factual of a lost opportunity that if instead of dashing the BEF against the might of the German invasion in August, what if Britain had waited until other Empire troops, in particular the Indians, had become available from late September ? We will never know but the tantalising possibility the author holds out is that a then much larger, fresh, well trained and supplied BEF may well have been able to smash the flanks of a German army attempting to wheel around France in pursuit of Schlieffen’s strategy.
This is military history at its best, covering strategy, operations and tactics. Mallinson tells the story with a staff officers eye to the importance of effective command and identifies with laser precision where those areas where this was lacking in the decade before and 1st month of the war. He also has a wonderfully wry soldier’s sense of the ridiculous which is used to great effect here. A great read this.







