The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I Illustrated Edition
by
Mark Ethan Grotelueschen
(Author)
ISBN-13: 978-0521169097
ISBN-10: 0521169097
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This book provides the most comprehensive examination of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) combat doctrine and methods ever published. It shows how AEF combat units actually fought on the Western Front in World War I. It describes how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. General John Pershing and other AEF leaders promulgated an inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas that retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on the modern battlefield. However, many AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine and operational methods as they fought, preparing more comprehensive attack plans, employing flexible infantry formations, and maximizing firepower to seize limited objectives.
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Mark Grotelueschen has written one of the most important works on the AEF, and indeed on the history of the modern US Army, to appear in the last twenty years."
-Dennis Showalter, Professor of History, Colorado College
"I find this to be an invaluable work..."
-Douglas V. Johnson, The Journal of Military History
"The book dutifullly raises the age-old question of how an army must go about evaluating and validating its doctrine."
-Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II, Parameters
"This is a compelling and important book. [Grotelueschen's] research is deep, his writing is lucid and presentation sound, and his main points are intriguing and relevant..."
-William Thomas Allison, Reviews in American History
"Grotelueschen's book goes beyond the well known stories of Belleau Wood and the Argonne Forest to describe how the AEF adapted to combact in France...With the final veterans of the "Great War" passing away, Grotelueschen provides a distinguished critique of their battlefield success. His book is a must for anyone interested in World War I and the development of US Army doctrine."
-Maj. Jeffrey P. Joyce, Air Power History
"Grotelueschen does an excellent job of describing the problems that soldiers in this conflict had to face." -Stephen A. Bourque, H-War
"A valuable look at the Doughboys." -A. A. Nofi, The NYMAS Review
Selected for the 2012 US Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List
"An excellent study of how [the] lack of military preparations affected actual battlefield operations... Not only does Grotelueschen offer a nuanced study of these very different AEF divisions showing the AEF's flaws and strengths, but he also contextualizes its role in the Allied operations." Bernadette Whelan, War in History
-Dennis Showalter, Professor of History, Colorado College
"I find this to be an invaluable work..."
-Douglas V. Johnson, The Journal of Military History
"The book dutifullly raises the age-old question of how an army must go about evaluating and validating its doctrine."
-Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II, Parameters
"This is a compelling and important book. [Grotelueschen's] research is deep, his writing is lucid and presentation sound, and his main points are intriguing and relevant..."
-William Thomas Allison, Reviews in American History
"Grotelueschen's book goes beyond the well known stories of Belleau Wood and the Argonne Forest to describe how the AEF adapted to combact in France...With the final veterans of the "Great War" passing away, Grotelueschen provides a distinguished critique of their battlefield success. His book is a must for anyone interested in World War I and the development of US Army doctrine."
-Maj. Jeffrey P. Joyce, Air Power History
"Grotelueschen does an excellent job of describing the problems that soldiers in this conflict had to face." -Stephen A. Bourque, H-War
"A valuable look at the Doughboys." -A. A. Nofi, The NYMAS Review
Selected for the 2012 US Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List
"An excellent study of how [the] lack of military preparations affected actual battlefield operations... Not only does Grotelueschen offer a nuanced study of these very different AEF divisions showing the AEF's flaws and strengths, but he also contextualizes its role in the Allied operations." Bernadette Whelan, War in History
Book Description
This 2007 book provides the most comprehensive examination of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) combat doctrine and methods ever published.
Book Description
This book examines the training and combat operations of four American divisions that fought extensively on the Western Front in World War I. It exposes the problems associated with the anachronistic combat doctrine tactics advocated by AEF leaders as well as how the officers and men in the combat divisions developed a different combat doctrine and adapted their operational methods to fight more effectively.
About the Author
Mark E. Grotelueschen is a Lieutenant Colonel in the USAF. He holds degrees from the USAF Academy, the University of Calgary and Texas A&M University. He is the author of Doctrine Under Trial: American Artillery Employment in World War I (2001). He has twice served as a professor of history at the USAF Academy in Colorado Springs, holding the positions of Deputy for Military History, Deputy for American History, and Chair of the Africa Area Studies Group.
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Product details
- Publisher : Cambridge University Press; Illustrated edition (October 4, 2010)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 398 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0521169097
- ISBN-13 : 978-0521169097
- Item Weight : 1.3 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 1 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,415,471 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1,235 in Military History (Books)
- #2,750 in World War I History (Books)
- #2,995 in United States History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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Reviewed in the United States on January 9, 2008
Verified Purchase
Grotelueschen has written the best book so far at describing the way that the AEF functioned during the First World war. Groteluechen believes that AEF commaders at the lower level ignored Pershings advice about open warfare and practiced more of a European combined arms approach with set set piece attacks that used massive amounts of artillery. The 1st division almost constantly used European type tactics beginning with the defense of Cantigny and ending with the Meuse Argonne offensive. The 26th division used European methods but soon fell apart due to bad leadership and lack of replacements. The 2nd division at first adopted Pershings open warfare doctrine but changed its approach after suffering a large amount of losses in the summer of 1918, and it soon became effective once John Lejeune took over and implemented a doctrine based upon set piece attacks. Finally the 77th division practiced European warfare even though its commander, Robert Alexander, was a firm advocate of Pershings open warfare doctrine. The only weakness of this book is that Grotelueschen leaves out the 42nd and 35th divisions that were less successful in combat, nevertheless this is an excellent book at describing how the AEF operated in the First World War.
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Reviewed in the United States on September 2, 2013
Verified Purchase
Good solid analysis of AEF on the tactical level. As a Connecticut resident particularly was impressed on the chapters on the 26th Yankee division.
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Reviewed in the United States on June 27, 2008
This is simply one of the best books ever written about the AEF and ground combat during World War I. It is an outstanding and unique reference that should be in every public library in America, and every military exchange bookstore. It deals primarily with AEF planning and execution at the Division level, with some discussion of tactics at Brigade and below. The opening chapter addresses the dichotomy between "open war" doctrine and "trench war" doctrine. In subsequent chapters the author comes down in favor of trench warfare, which he clearly demonstrates was not resigned or ignorant slogging through the mud against the thickest part of the wire, but was in fact a deliberate application of all available technology to aid the approach of the infantry toward well-defined and limited objectives, followed by small unit maneuver and employment of specialized weapons (rifle grenades, mortars, automatic rifles, etc).
The author provides four Divisional case studies (1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) to illustrate how AEF Divisions trained, executed combat ops, learned, and adapted for subsequent battles. Each case study is comprised of two chapters. The first covers training and baptism of fire (Cantigny, Belleau Wood, Aisne-Marne, etc) with the second covering the Division's role in the AEF's final battles (St.Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne). Maps are good to excellent and staggered throughout the text. There are also a number of interesting anecdotes and themes, such as the fielding of the BAR, AEF GHQ favoritism toward the Regular Divisions vs. the National Guard, use of machinegun barrages, and Pershing's devotion to open war doctrine long after costly experience should have dissuaded him. All of this is meticulously researched through primary documents such as training memorandums, contemporary after action reports, and letters between senior leaders.
I couldn't help but be impressed by the professionalism, adaptability, and technological sophistication of most of the AEF commanders as they struggled to craft a workable doctrine on the fly. Frequently derided as "donkeys" in popular history, the author demonstrates that they were anything but.
The price of this book is steep, but worth it for the enthusiast. One addition that could complement future editions would be diagrams that show how infantry formations, artillery employment, and actions on contact evolved over time. I hope the author considers tackling the subject of how the AEF fought at battalion and below in a follow on book some day.
The author provides four Divisional case studies (1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) to illustrate how AEF Divisions trained, executed combat ops, learned, and adapted for subsequent battles. Each case study is comprised of two chapters. The first covers training and baptism of fire (Cantigny, Belleau Wood, Aisne-Marne, etc) with the second covering the Division's role in the AEF's final battles (St.Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne). Maps are good to excellent and staggered throughout the text. There are also a number of interesting anecdotes and themes, such as the fielding of the BAR, AEF GHQ favoritism toward the Regular Divisions vs. the National Guard, use of machinegun barrages, and Pershing's devotion to open war doctrine long after costly experience should have dissuaded him. All of this is meticulously researched through primary documents such as training memorandums, contemporary after action reports, and letters between senior leaders.
I couldn't help but be impressed by the professionalism, adaptability, and technological sophistication of most of the AEF commanders as they struggled to craft a workable doctrine on the fly. Frequently derided as "donkeys" in popular history, the author demonstrates that they were anything but.
The price of this book is steep, but worth it for the enthusiast. One addition that could complement future editions would be diagrams that show how infantry formations, artillery employment, and actions on contact evolved over time. I hope the author considers tackling the subject of how the AEF fought at battalion and below in a follow on book some day.
22 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on March 5, 2011
Mark Grotelueschen's balanced, nuanced assessment of American combat performance in World War I not only advances our understanding of the AEF but also sheds light on key aspects of contemporary military affairs.
The not-so-simple process of learning in large military organizations ... the ambivalent role that training and hard-won experience play in shaping future combat performance ... how leaders take the ideas and concepts of doctrine and adapt (or fail to adapt) them to the often unexpected reality of the modern battlefield. All of these perennial issues receive careful, thoughtful treatment in Grotelueschen's well-structured study.
In a readable blend of narrative and analysis, the author looks at the training and battlefield experiences of four U.S. divisions and, in particular, explores how these units each adapted their tactics and techniques over time and across a number of campaigns on the Western Front throughout the summer and fall of 1918. The tension between two competing "ways of war" takes center stage in Grotelueschen's interpretation. On the one hand, there was the trench warfare refined over a number of years by the British and French and characterized by tightly controlled set-piece attacks supported with heavy machine-gun fire and meticulously planned artillery barrages in order to secure limited objectives. In stark contrast stood the uniquely American style of open warfare preferred by the AEF's senior leaders. Open warfare minimized fire support in favor of mobility and unrestrained maneuver--a way of fighting thought to be best suited for the aggressive American infantryman and one that (according to its relentless and eager advocates) unleashed the incalculable moral force of rifle and bayonet. As it turned out, open warfare minimized common sense in favor of dogma. It proved to be a way of fighting at odds with reality and well beyond the capabilities of the relatively inexperienced AEF in any case.
Almost from the start, American infantrymen doing the actual fighting knew better. Grotelueschen shows how, for the most part, units up to division level gradually shunned open warfare and its basically ineffective (and dangerous) tactics. Instead, from the bottom up, they adopted the methods of trench warfare with surprising--if mixed--success. The AEF Way of War is not another overview of World War I military operations. Grotelueschen's principal aim is to uncover the war of ideas taking place within the AEF's subordinate organizations. The author convincingly explains how units learned "to fight by fighting" and then adapted their tactics to meet the similar challenges of future campaigns.
The not-so-simple process of learning in large military organizations ... the ambivalent role that training and hard-won experience play in shaping future combat performance ... how leaders take the ideas and concepts of doctrine and adapt (or fail to adapt) them to the often unexpected reality of the modern battlefield. All of these perennial issues receive careful, thoughtful treatment in Grotelueschen's well-structured study.
In a readable blend of narrative and analysis, the author looks at the training and battlefield experiences of four U.S. divisions and, in particular, explores how these units each adapted their tactics and techniques over time and across a number of campaigns on the Western Front throughout the summer and fall of 1918. The tension between two competing "ways of war" takes center stage in Grotelueschen's interpretation. On the one hand, there was the trench warfare refined over a number of years by the British and French and characterized by tightly controlled set-piece attacks supported with heavy machine-gun fire and meticulously planned artillery barrages in order to secure limited objectives. In stark contrast stood the uniquely American style of open warfare preferred by the AEF's senior leaders. Open warfare minimized fire support in favor of mobility and unrestrained maneuver--a way of fighting thought to be best suited for the aggressive American infantryman and one that (according to its relentless and eager advocates) unleashed the incalculable moral force of rifle and bayonet. As it turned out, open warfare minimized common sense in favor of dogma. It proved to be a way of fighting at odds with reality and well beyond the capabilities of the relatively inexperienced AEF in any case.
Almost from the start, American infantrymen doing the actual fighting knew better. Grotelueschen shows how, for the most part, units up to division level gradually shunned open warfare and its basically ineffective (and dangerous) tactics. Instead, from the bottom up, they adopted the methods of trench warfare with surprising--if mixed--success. The AEF Way of War is not another overview of World War I military operations. Grotelueschen's principal aim is to uncover the war of ideas taking place within the AEF's subordinate organizations. The author convincingly explains how units learned "to fight by fighting" and then adapted their tactics to meet the similar challenges of future campaigns.
9 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on July 8, 2015
Excellent history. Proper context. Solid analysis. What military history should be. If you are interested in WWI and the AEF, don't miss this.
2 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on November 17, 2021
Great knowledge about field artillery in WW1. Very well done.






