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Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise That Almost Triggered Nuclear War Hardcover – November 1, 2016
| Nate Jones (Editor) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
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What the West didn't know at the time was that the Soviets thought Operation Able Archer 83 was real and were actively preparing for a surprise missile attack from NATO. This close scrape with Armageddon was largely unknown until last October when the U.S. government released a ninety-four-page presidential analysis of Able Archer that the National Security Archive had spent over a decade trying to declassify. Able Archer 83 is based upon more than a thousand pages of declassified documents that archive staffer Nate Jones has pried loose from several U.S. government agencies and British archives, as well as from formerly classified Soviet Politburo and KGB files, vividly recreating the atmosphere that nearly unleashed nuclear war.
- Print length320 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherThe New Press
- Publication dateNovember 1, 2016
- Dimensions6.5 x 1.25 x 9.25 inches
- ISBN-101620972611
- ISBN-13978-1620972618
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Twenty-one years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, a NATO exercise, Able Archer 83, came terrifyingly close to precipitating an accidental nuclear war. Nate Jones's brilliantly researched and gripping history of government miscalculations and misjudgments on both sides of the iron curtain during this war game, poses the 21st century's most serious existential question: How many nuclear bullets can humanity dodge? Read it and reckon! I don't think you will like the answer."
―Martin J. Sherwin, University Professor of History at George Mason University and author of A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies
"Able Archer 83 is an invaluable resource on one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold War. The book contains an unmatched collection of previously secret documents about the War Scare of 1983 and the Able Archer exercise at the center of it. If you want to learn from history, this is the place to start."
―David E. Hoffman, author of The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy
"Able Archer 83 brings us back to a moment when we all came close to becoming cinders or radioactive corpses. It's an important contribution to our understanding of how the Cold War played out, and how erroneous assumptions routinely become institutionalized policy, which then becomes almost irresistible."
―Glenn L. Carle, a former CIA officer and author of The Interrogator
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Product details
- Publisher : The New Press; Illustrated edition (November 1, 2016)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 320 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1620972611
- ISBN-13 : 978-1620972618
- Item Weight : 1.45 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 1.25 x 9.25 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #903,220 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #277 in Arms Control (Books)
- #568 in Nuclear Weapons & Warfare History (Books)
- #1,180 in Conventional Weapons & Warfare History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Nate Jones is the Director of the Freedom of Information Act Project for the National Security Archive. He oversees the thousands of Freedom of Information Act and Mandatory Declassification Review requests and appeals that the Archive submits each year. A two-term member of the Federal FOIA Advisory Committee, he acts as liaison between Archive analysts and agency FOIA offices, and serves as the Archive's FOIA counselor to the public.
He is also editor of the Archive's blog Unredacted where he writes about newly declassified documents and FOIA policy. He has authored the Archive's past eight government-wide FOIA Audits, including "Saving Government Email an Open Question."
He earned his MA in Cold War History from The George Washington University, where he used FOIA to write his thesis on the Able Archer 83 nuclear war scare. He has also produced The Able Archer 83 Sourcebook, the comprehensive declassified collection of documents on the 1983 nuclear war scare. His book Able Archer 83 examines the intersection of Cold War animosity, nuclear miscalculation, and government secrecy.
He's on twitter as @NSANate
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However, after buying & reading this book, I'm at a loss as to why in the world they bothered with it. Much of the book is simply poor reproductions of the material they obtained & posted on their web page, and then Nate Jones basically repeating "The Soviets were really, really worried about Able Archer in particular, & President Reagan in-general. The US government didn't know or believe that the Soviets actually thought that the USA could or would ever initiate a first-strike, so they had no idea that a strategic nuclear war exercise like Able Archer would greatly alarm them" over many pages.
Usually when it comes to strategic command & control, nuclear operations, etc. I'm excited to read the book & then keep it for future reference in my library, but with this book, I'm trying to decide if it's even worth the postage to mail it off to a friend, since I have no desire to make room for it in my book case.
Jones provides evidence that indicates that the days of the exercise of 1983 had the highest probability of reaching nuclear war of any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. He shows that the Soviets were very uncertain and fearful of NATO actions, but doesn't really say much to indicate how an actual exchange was likely to have been triggered, when the Soviets were unsure about the situation and Able Archer didn't plan for any major aggressive operations that could have been perceived as an attack. It's just up to the reader to imagine what could have happened if a stray bomber entered Soviet airspace or if forces went to escalating higher alerts.
Jones briefly states that one of the conclusions of the scenario is that game theoretic models don't apply to nuclear deterrence. This was actually the kind of research that I read this book for, and I think he oversteps there. Deterrence theory would adequately predict that introducing faster IRBMs with short times of flight would make the situation more risky with a greater advantage for and probability of first-strike strategies, as well as the Soviet fears and responses they displayed. The individual actions of political and military leaders affected the subtleties of the crisis, but it's not clear that they changed much of the structure of the overall situation. An American general kept his forces on low alert to avoid escalation, which was fortuitous, but again it's not clear that the Soviets would have actually initiated the tremendous step towards war either way. And since the Americans poo-pooed Soviet fears of an American first strike as huffing and puffing, it's plausible that they would not have perceived further Soviet escalations as a real threat. So again it's up to the reader to imagine.
The book includes some good analysis and examination of the analyses of the crisis which have been conducted already. Overall, I think it's good, I liked it. It still makes a good case for the risks of 1983 as well as the persistent global danger of having a diplomatically incompetent president.
Top reviews from other countries
Excellent presentation of facts and events in pages 1-66.
And in pages 67-302, an incredible collection of secret official papers (many in infuriatingly small print and smudged typewriter script) related to the actual events.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was not dangerous at the top levels: both Kruschev and Kennedy had actually been in a real war(WW 2, where Kruschev had vastly more experience than Kennedy). This gave them the overriding drive to stop war breaking out, especially Kruschev.
There was danger in Cuba, but it was at a lower level, and not known at the time:
-unknown to the US Navy, one Russian sub it was hounding had a nuclear torpedo which it was authorized to use under the existing
conditions; the cool reserve of the Russian sub captain saved the day;
-unknown to the Chiefs of Staff, who were demanding an invasion of Cuba at Guantanamo Bay because the Cubans had no weapons
there, the Russians actually had short range nuclear missiles just over the hill, ready to fire; the cool determination of President
Kennedy in facing down the Chiefs (his 'finest hour') saved the day there.
Michael Dobbs (ONE MINUTE TO MIDNIGHT, 2008) has written a marvelous book on the Cuban crisis.
President Reagan tried to so overawe the USSR leaders that they would give up their (in his opinion) dream of destroying the United States. In a gruesome irony, the Russian leadership held an exactly mirror-image view of the United States: it lusted to destroy the USSR.
It was a case of two powerhouses looking past each other.
By the 1980s, the Russians realized the superiority of the US military, and the inferiority of their own: in a battle they would lose.
So the only option they had was to go down fighting.
Russian fear was raised when President Reagan announced the European deployment of Gryphon cruise missiles and Pershing ll intermediate range missiles: these could reach Moscow in mere minutes, and kill the Russian leaders, leaving Russia defenceless.
Unfortunately, the various military exercises in Autumn 1983 played into the Russian sense of inferiority and paranoia.
- Autumn Forge 83 was the blanket name for over a dozen exercises;
-Reforger 83, the largest exercise, simulated conventional warfare, with the US actually moving troops from the US to Europe;
-Able Archer was the final exercise, a command post exercise where top-level leaders would initiate the changeover
from conventional warfare to chemical/nuclear warfare. This was so convincing, the Russians moved forces to border positions
ready to invade Europe.
These exercises were intentionally made realistic to IMPRESS Russian leaders that they dare not go to war.
And here was the greatest danger point in the Cold War: they almost CONVINCED the Russian leaders that they had to go to war first.
Some experts pooh-pooh this interpretation.
In rebuttal,I would cite the "Damascus Road Conversion" of President Reagan after he read a secret report of the Russian reaction to Able Archer 83:
-before Able Archer 83, President Reagan talked forcefully of war;
-after Able Archer 83, President Reagan talked only of peace.
And he acted for peace: perhaps his greatest performance.
This is a "I should not have bought" book. I should have been more cautious with the "edited by" mention on the cover.








