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Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the practices of War in Imperial Germany Paperback – Illustrated, January 1, 2006
| Isabel V. Hull (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
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In a book that is at once a major contribution to modern European history and a cautionary tale for today, Isabel V. Hull argues that the routines and practices of the Imperial German Army, unchecked by effective civilian institutions, increasingly sought the absolute destruction of its enemies as the only guarantee of the nation's security. So deeply embedded were the assumptions and procedures of this distinctively German military culture that the Army, in its drive to annihilate the enemy military, did not shrink from the utter destruction of civilian property and lives. Carried to its extreme, the logic of "military necessity" found real security only in extremities of destruction, in the "silence of the graveyard."
Hull begins with a dramatic account, based on fresh archival work, of the German Army's slide from administrative murder to genocide in German Southwest Africa (1904–7). The author then moves back to 1870 and the war that inaugurated the Imperial era in German history, and analyzes the genesis and nature of this specifically German military culture and its operations in colonial warfare. In the First World War the routines perfected in the colonies were visited upon European populations. Hull focuses on one set of cases (Belgium and northern France) in which the transition to total destruction was checked (if barely) and on another (Armenia) in which "military necessity" caused Germany to accept its ally's genocidal policies even after these became militarily counterproductive. She then turns to the Endkampf (1918), the German General Staff's plan to achieve victory in the Great War even if the homeland were destroyed in the process―a seemingly insane campaign that completes the logic of this deeply institutionalized set of military routines and practices. Hull concludes by speculating on the role of this distinctive military culture in National Socialism's military and racial policies.
Absolute Destruction has serious implications for the nature of warmaking in any modern power. At its heart is a warning about the blindness of bureaucratic routines, especially when those bureaucracies command the instruments of mass death.
- Print length400 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherCornell University Press
- Publication dateJanuary 1, 2006
- Reading age18 years and up
- ISBN-100801472938
- ISBN-13978-0801472930
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Editorial Reviews
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"'Brilliant' is an adjective that should be used sparingly by reviewers, so that when a truly brilliant book like this one comes along it can be properly designated. Using the concept of organizational culture as her analytical framework, Isabel Hull lays out a coherent explanation for the fact that the Prussian-German army of 1870–1918, in most respects the world's best, functioned so disastrously at the task of formulating strategy in support of rational state policy."
― Journal of Military History"Absolute Destruction is a stimulating, scholarly, fluent, and important book.... Almost everything Isabel V. Hull says about German military thought, about Germany's institutional weaknesses in the formulation of strategy, and about the result in war itself―particularly that tactical skill and operational art did duty for strategy―is shrewd and sensible. However, the originality of her book resides elsewhere: in the links between colonial war and European war, and between the German Army and other European armies."
― Times Literary Supplement"Hull writes with passion as well as exactitude. From the first sentence her target becomes institutional extremism, here meaning the military culture that dominated Germany from 1870 through World War I.... She analyzes the presuppositions and implicit assumptions behind military institutions that lead more to particular choices regarding the use of violence during war than do explicit policies or detailed planning."
― History: Reviews of New Books"Isabel V. Hull has written a powerful analysis of the Prusso-German military between the founding of the German Empire in 1871 up to the end of World War I.... It is not difficult to predict that Hull's analytical framework will generate debate and further research.... This is a rich and thoughtful book that will lead historians of modern Germany to reexamine the decade prior to 1918, and it may also push scholars of the military in other European societies to test again the relationship between military-political institutions and the resort to extreme violence."
― American Historical ReviewReview
"This brilliant and conceptually innovative book examines the organizational culture and military practices of the Prusso-German army between victory in 1870 and defeat in 1918. Isabel V. Hull subtly analyzes the cumulative internal pressures on the army to resort to the use of extreme violence in facing its military challenges. She finds that the weakness of external constraints (such as government and public opinion) which might have curtailed such violence distinguished the German army from its European counterparts. Building on its triumph in the Franco-Prussian War, the army insisted on total victory based on the annihilation of the enemy, thus subordinating both strategy and diplomacy to the military conduct of war. A comparative discussion of how British military brutality in the South African War was curbed by public opinion, and ultimately the government, demonstrates the argument in the colonial sphere. Hull's discussion of the Great War focuses on the harshness of occupation practices in Belgium and France as well as in eastern Europe and on the complicity of some German officers in the Turkish genocide of the Armenians. She also highlights the refusal by the military leadership to distinguish between the fate of the nation and that of the army. It was this extremism that proved the real legacy of the Imperial Army to Nazi Germany. Combining wide reading in the historical literature with intensive use of archives, Hull has provided the most compelling analysis so far of the distinguishing features of the Imperial German army over the span of its existence. Historians of Imperial Germany, colonialism, the First World War, and the role of the military everywhere are in her debt for a fine and thought-provoking book."
-- John Horne, Professor of Modern European History, Trinity College DublinAbout the Author
Isabel V. Hull is John Stambaugh Professor of History at Cornell University. She is the author of Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany, 1700–1815 (also from Cornell) and The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888–1918, and the coeditor of German Nationalism and the European Response, 1890–1945.
Product details
- Publisher : Cornell University Press; 1st edition (January 1, 2006)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 400 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0801472938
- ISBN-13 : 978-0801472930
- Reading age : 18 years and up
- Item Weight : 0.988 ounces
- Best Sellers Rank: #880,274 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #2,161 in European Politics Books
- #2,989 in German History (Books)
- #24,071 in Military History (Books)
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Hull uses the German colony in Southwest Africa (SWA) during the early 1900's as an example of brutal tactics utilized by the German war machine. The General Staff was given nearly complete control of orchestrating policy in SWA by the Kaiser. The "Wilhelminian government was not integrated under civilian leadership" (12). Rather, Kaiser Wilhelm II had the authority to appoint the apparatus of his choosing to implement policy in the colony. Because the Herero revolt was considered one of "national security," Wilhelm chose the General Staff. Moreover, the constitution allowed for the Kaiser to fund the army without Reichstag approval. Thus, the colony fell under the auspices of German military doctrine rather than civilian doctrine. Military patrols lacked government oversight, leaving generals and subordinate commanders in charge of implementing policy on the ground. Courts-martial and the arbitrary shooting of civilians suspected of practicing guerrilla warfare ("francs-tireurs") were, therefore, carried out by the military apparatus. Because the military identified "the entire people" in SWA as enemy combatants, all were susceptible to execution. Executions were "not random atrocities but accepted methods of warfare" preached in German military doctrine (20). This brutal approach regarding civilians was implemented previously during the Franco-Prussian War, "the first German 'national' war," which generated and "galvanized" German military doctrine and later in Belgium and France during WWI (110). Because this policy of annihilation seemed to "work" in SWA, the military leadership convinced itself that it was indeed the correct tactic for military victory.
How did a policy of killing civilians in warfare become part of German military doctrine? Hull utilizes a sociological approach, arguing that such a policy became protocol as a result of "trauma-learning" from the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War. The Franco-Prussian War was, in a sense, Germany's war of revolution. The autonomy of a future unified German state "hung in the balance" (117). Because the French did not surrender after the massive battle of Sedan, in which the enemy was "annihilated," a core precept of German-Clauswitzian military doctrine, the General Staff could not see how to clearly end the war. Civilians, Hull contends, became the enemy because many committed to guerrilla warfare. The General Staff came to the conclusion, out of irrational fear, that annihilating civilian populations was a fundamental condition for victory. Thus, despite international prohibitions against killing civilians, the German army trained its burgeoning officer corps to essentially disregard such regulations. Hull compares this policy to the British policy in South Africa during the Boer War in which the British Army, constrained by a powerful Parliament and press, was kept from committing such atrocities against civilians through civilian oversight.
The General Staff's policy of annihilation led it to create irrational and impractical military strategies such as the Schlieffen Plan, which eventually led to disastrous results for the German war machine in the first two years of the Great War. The German military entered WWI with no real goals other than the total annihilation of the enemy, which consisted of countries with much larger armies and populations (Russia, France and, later, Britain). By 1917, WWI had become a war of attrition, for which the German military had no supplies or manpower. A nation forged in war was destroyed by war.
The author uses an extensive amount of primary resources to present a very compelling case, yet, also draws unsubstantiated conclusions from incomplete records and entries. Despite the attempt to remain objective, there is a readily detectable tone of bias.
As a military analyst and instructor I felt the book was useful as a tool for comparing the lessons of the German experience with the US Military experience over the last 10 years. For instance: is the US Military only capable of thinking in Military terms? In light of Joint and Combined Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, has the US Military morphed into a "polycratic" institution? Does the Diplomat stand with the soldier? Is there a set of mutually reinforcing values and characteristics that inhibit decision making?
Regardless if these lessons are German, Indian or American, the questions for any Military are the same, are essential and must be asked.
All in all, a good book that is a little heavy to read with some very compelling evidence, yet, also some bias and speculation in presentation.
Dr. Terry Tucker
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan








