Very interesting book from the father of Mechanized warfare.
He drew much from the British and French Tank use during WW1, he synthesized all of their Tank theories, added some revolutionary
ideas of his own and shocked the world at the time with a new kind of warfare.
This book is very enlightening, the common story is that the French folded easily when Germany invaded, but the
truth is that nobody was ready for what Guderian was about to unleash. No country would have survived the
Blitzkrieg then, not even the US. He created something revolutionary and nobody was ready for it.
This book also pointed out that Guderian was about to take the British Exp. at Dunkirk, but Hitler gave the
order to halt, allowing the British to evacuate thousands of troops and saving a massive allied disaster.
The book does start off a little slow as one reader below pointed out, but overall its an amazing book by a
man who seems to overlooked in History for some reason. Any fan of WW2 history will love this book.
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Achtung-Panzer!: The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential Paperback – August 1, 1995
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Heinz Guderian
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Heinz Guderian
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There is a newer edition of this item:
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Print length220 pages
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LanguageEnglish
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PublisherArms & Armour
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Publication dateAugust 1, 1995
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Dimensions6.25 x 0.75 x 9.5 inches
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ISBN-101854092820
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ISBN-13978-1854092823
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Product details
- Publisher : Arms & Armour; New Ed edition (August 1, 1995)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 220 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1854092820
- ISBN-13 : 978-1854092823
- Item Weight : 13.8 ounces
- Dimensions : 6.25 x 0.75 x 9.5 inches
-
Best Sellers Rank:
#1,552,079 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #226 in Armored Vehicles Weapons & Warfare History
- #16,468 in World War II History (Books)
- #47,645 in Engineering (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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4.6 out of 5
13 global ratings
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Reviewed in the United States on December 8, 2015
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Reviewed in the United States on December 16, 2012
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"Vigorous writing is consice"--Guderian is not. Compound his verbose style with an awkward translation that suffers from poor editing (which gets worse after the first chapter), and what would otherwise be a gem of military history becomes a chore to read. Needs a lot of copy editing. I hope this was addressed in the 1999/Cassell version.
Reviewed in the United States on December 6, 2017
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An easy to read book which lays the very foundations of the Blitzkrieg. Any student of armored warfare should read this.
Reviewed in the United States on October 29, 2014
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He was as great as the Desert Fox was any day.
Reviewed in the United States on June 18, 2018
I thoroughly enjoyed this text, but believe you would have to be a student of WWI/WWII history, or at least have some background into the basics of armored combat to get the most out of it. Guderian wrote this work for a specific reason--to promote the development of armored forces during the interwar period of extreme fiscal frugality, and shortly following Hitler's abdications of the Treat of Versailles' military restrictions. Accordingly, he is writing for a largely German, and militarily informed audience. A novice reader might find his descriptions & analysis of the WWI battles hard to follow. He also uses maps only sparingly. There are some maps of the specific orders of battle, but they do not take the reader from the strategic, to the operational, to the tactical realms.
These points notwithstanding, Guderian's genius definitely shines through. The 'lessons learned,' & 'lessons that should have been learned,' are truly enlightening. Though he writes solidly for a Gernan audience, and displays a hearty amount of German military pride, he certainly does not display a German bias. Guderian gives hearty praise to the British and French for the early development of armored theory, regardless of their initial mistakes. He faults both the Allies & Central Powers for not initially using their new technology (tanks for the Allies & Gas for the Germans) 'en mass,' leading to their initial poor showings. Both the British and French suffered early disappointments when they used small numbers of dispersed tanks to augment infantry attacks, rather than as a large armored force capable of spearheading a large combined arms offensive.
Guderian analyzes the 1917 Battle of Cambrai as a tactical learning point--the 1st tactical battle showing the future potential of armor. Even here, however, lack of depth in the attack (mobile reserves to exploit the breakthrough--i.e, lack of mobile exploitation forces); and the early tanks' poor reliability, prevented the tactical breakthrough from becoming an operational victory. Again, he faults the Germans for not realizing and reacting to the potential of armor during the end of WWI. Both the Allies (and the Germans with their extremely limited armored forces--a few German machines &~100 captured tanks), reverted to using tanks in small 'penny packets,' following Cambrai. The results for both sides was again disappointing.
It would take the interwar military theorists' advocacy during the turbulent post Depression, post-Versailles, and early Nazi years, to properly develop armored warfare doctrine, which would be tested during the early WWII blitzkrieg offensives. Guderian covers this interwar debate in detail. Again, Guderian fairly assesses both the future Allied and Axis developments which lead to the forces arrayed during the outbreak of WWII. Germany's tactical and operational victories in the early campaigns of WWII validate the majority of Guderian's observations & analysis. His post-war text, 'Panzer Leader,' takes the reader through these, and the later, WWII armored campaigns.
In sum, 'Achtung Panzer' is a superb account for the development of armored theory--but, I recommend it for the informed reader. For the novice reader, recommend reading some general histories of WWI & WWII before tackling 'Achtung Panzer.' Then, I would follow it up with his sequel, 'Panzer Leader,' and other well known authors (Manstein's Lost Victories,' etc).
These points notwithstanding, Guderian's genius definitely shines through. The 'lessons learned,' & 'lessons that should have been learned,' are truly enlightening. Though he writes solidly for a Gernan audience, and displays a hearty amount of German military pride, he certainly does not display a German bias. Guderian gives hearty praise to the British and French for the early development of armored theory, regardless of their initial mistakes. He faults both the Allies & Central Powers for not initially using their new technology (tanks for the Allies & Gas for the Germans) 'en mass,' leading to their initial poor showings. Both the British and French suffered early disappointments when they used small numbers of dispersed tanks to augment infantry attacks, rather than as a large armored force capable of spearheading a large combined arms offensive.
Guderian analyzes the 1917 Battle of Cambrai as a tactical learning point--the 1st tactical battle showing the future potential of armor. Even here, however, lack of depth in the attack (mobile reserves to exploit the breakthrough--i.e, lack of mobile exploitation forces); and the early tanks' poor reliability, prevented the tactical breakthrough from becoming an operational victory. Again, he faults the Germans for not realizing and reacting to the potential of armor during the end of WWI. Both the Allies (and the Germans with their extremely limited armored forces--a few German machines &~100 captured tanks), reverted to using tanks in small 'penny packets,' following Cambrai. The results for both sides was again disappointing.
It would take the interwar military theorists' advocacy during the turbulent post Depression, post-Versailles, and early Nazi years, to properly develop armored warfare doctrine, which would be tested during the early WWII blitzkrieg offensives. Guderian covers this interwar debate in detail. Again, Guderian fairly assesses both the future Allied and Axis developments which lead to the forces arrayed during the outbreak of WWII. Germany's tactical and operational victories in the early campaigns of WWII validate the majority of Guderian's observations & analysis. His post-war text, 'Panzer Leader,' takes the reader through these, and the later, WWII armored campaigns.
In sum, 'Achtung Panzer' is a superb account for the development of armored theory--but, I recommend it for the informed reader. For the novice reader, recommend reading some general histories of WWI & WWII before tackling 'Achtung Panzer.' Then, I would follow it up with his sequel, 'Panzer Leader,' and other well known authors (Manstein's Lost Victories,' etc).
Reviewed in the United States on June 2, 2017
Achtung Panzer, one of the major works in Military Science was first published in 1937. The author, Heinz Guderian, has severely rebuked the skeptical and reactionary opponents of armor and placed it squarely in the forefront of military operations and plans.
The text has been divided into 10 chapters. In the opening chapters, he has explained how World War I descended into positional war. Trenches appeared everywhere as the western front congealed and petrified; battlefield mobility was lost. Therefore to break the stalemate tank was born. Guderian has shared his experiences of conflict and has provided an incisive analysis on what went wrong with Allied tank tactics.
Guderian went on to develop German tank doctrine which was governed by his experiences of fighting on the western front. He was driving force behind mechanization of German army with a caveat this would not have been possible without Hitler’s encouragement and support.
I don’t hold the view Guderian’s thinking on tank warfare was molded by British military thinkers: Fuller. Hobart, Martel, Liddell Hart. Unlike the British, he realized tanks cannot fight on its own. To fight effectively it needed the support and help of other arms: motorized infantry, artillery(Fliegerabwehrkannon called FLAK) anti-tank guns(Panzerabwehrkannon called PAK) airplane. This was the genesis of German Combined Arms Doctrine. A typical panzer division was a flexible all-arms unit. British doctrine on other hand was too tank-centric.
Some striking features of Guderian’s thinking:
Choice of the ground is essential before conducting tank offensive. Tanks need wide open spaces for maneuver. Tanks must not be used in built-in areas, terrain laced with water bodies.Armor should be massed against a carefully chosen sector of enemy’s defense. Schwerpunkt ( place of main effort) should be where resistance was least expected. During operation Case Yellow or Fall Gelb ( German attack on France and Low Countries) massed German armor ( 7 divisions) assaulted the weakest sector of Allied defenses. However, this became possible after Allied attention was distracted by a diversionary maneuver which pulled the cream of their armies towards Holland and Belgium. The maneuver embodies the significance of holding attack at some other point of the front for the main attack to succeed. I don't think Guderian has incorporated this element in his thinking.
After the enemy line is breached armor would bypass resistance and penetrate quickly into rear areas spreading panic to strike at the ‘brain of command’. To ensure decisive operational success it was absolutely essential to maintain the momentum of advance, for under no circumstances enemy must be given any chance to stabilize the front. With the advance in progress, there must close co-operation of all arms in panzer division.
Luftwaffe served as flying artillery. It provided fire support to smoothen the advance of panzers besides interdicting the movement of enemy res from rear areas. Guderian also advocated the insertion of airborne forces behind enemy lines to remove obstacles from the path of advancing panzers.
Author has stressed the importance of ground reconnaissance prelude to an offensive, for no army can blindly thrust into enemy territory. Aerial reconnaissance has its limitations. There are so many unknowns. Information is required on road networks, rivers ( whether fordable) bridges ( whether it could support the movement of tanks) natural or man-made obstacles, equipment types, unit identities, forward area deployments, enemy outposts, main lines of resistance down to the subunit level. Armored reconnaissance troops were called ‘ Aufklarungsabteilung’. Information gathered should be quickly made available to commanders. They report by sending dispatch riders, telephones, R/W ( radio wireless)Installation of radios opened a new level of command. It became possible to control, co ordinate the movement of different units in the panzer division. Commander of the spearhead can constantly be in contact with Luftwaffe and request fire support if needed.
Equally important is the psychological dimension. Tanks restored battlefield mobility. Mobility, speed, surprise are interlinked and self-sustaining. Surprise is the outcome of speed made possible by mobility. Sudden appearance near an enemy line at a time and place of our choosing can paralyze an opponent.
So new German Wehrmacht launched an unprecedented revolution in warfare. World War I fighting methods became outdated forcing a revision in strategy and tactics. Conservative, hidebound French military establishment refused to appreciate the significance of this development. As a result, the Third Republic got consigned to the dustbin of history.
The text has been divided into 10 chapters. In the opening chapters, he has explained how World War I descended into positional war. Trenches appeared everywhere as the western front congealed and petrified; battlefield mobility was lost. Therefore to break the stalemate tank was born. Guderian has shared his experiences of conflict and has provided an incisive analysis on what went wrong with Allied tank tactics.
Guderian went on to develop German tank doctrine which was governed by his experiences of fighting on the western front. He was driving force behind mechanization of German army with a caveat this would not have been possible without Hitler’s encouragement and support.
I don’t hold the view Guderian’s thinking on tank warfare was molded by British military thinkers: Fuller. Hobart, Martel, Liddell Hart. Unlike the British, he realized tanks cannot fight on its own. To fight effectively it needed the support and help of other arms: motorized infantry, artillery(Fliegerabwehrkannon called FLAK) anti-tank guns(Panzerabwehrkannon called PAK) airplane. This was the genesis of German Combined Arms Doctrine. A typical panzer division was a flexible all-arms unit. British doctrine on other hand was too tank-centric.
Some striking features of Guderian’s thinking:
Choice of the ground is essential before conducting tank offensive. Tanks need wide open spaces for maneuver. Tanks must not be used in built-in areas, terrain laced with water bodies.Armor should be massed against a carefully chosen sector of enemy’s defense. Schwerpunkt ( place of main effort) should be where resistance was least expected. During operation Case Yellow or Fall Gelb ( German attack on France and Low Countries) massed German armor ( 7 divisions) assaulted the weakest sector of Allied defenses. However, this became possible after Allied attention was distracted by a diversionary maneuver which pulled the cream of their armies towards Holland and Belgium. The maneuver embodies the significance of holding attack at some other point of the front for the main attack to succeed. I don't think Guderian has incorporated this element in his thinking.
After the enemy line is breached armor would bypass resistance and penetrate quickly into rear areas spreading panic to strike at the ‘brain of command’. To ensure decisive operational success it was absolutely essential to maintain the momentum of advance, for under no circumstances enemy must be given any chance to stabilize the front. With the advance in progress, there must close co-operation of all arms in panzer division.
Luftwaffe served as flying artillery. It provided fire support to smoothen the advance of panzers besides interdicting the movement of enemy res from rear areas. Guderian also advocated the insertion of airborne forces behind enemy lines to remove obstacles from the path of advancing panzers.
Author has stressed the importance of ground reconnaissance prelude to an offensive, for no army can blindly thrust into enemy territory. Aerial reconnaissance has its limitations. There are so many unknowns. Information is required on road networks, rivers ( whether fordable) bridges ( whether it could support the movement of tanks) natural or man-made obstacles, equipment types, unit identities, forward area deployments, enemy outposts, main lines of resistance down to the subunit level. Armored reconnaissance troops were called ‘ Aufklarungsabteilung’. Information gathered should be quickly made available to commanders. They report by sending dispatch riders, telephones, R/W ( radio wireless)Installation of radios opened a new level of command. It became possible to control, co ordinate the movement of different units in the panzer division. Commander of the spearhead can constantly be in contact with Luftwaffe and request fire support if needed.
Equally important is the psychological dimension. Tanks restored battlefield mobility. Mobility, speed, surprise are interlinked and self-sustaining. Surprise is the outcome of speed made possible by mobility. Sudden appearance near an enemy line at a time and place of our choosing can paralyze an opponent.
So new German Wehrmacht launched an unprecedented revolution in warfare. World War I fighting methods became outdated forcing a revision in strategy and tactics. Conservative, hidebound French military establishment refused to appreciate the significance of this development. As a result, the Third Republic got consigned to the dustbin of history.
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