Achtung-Panzer!: The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential Paperback – August, 1995

Very interesting book from the father of Mechanized warfare.
He drew much from the British and French Tank use during WW1, he synthesized all of their Tank theories, added some revolutionary
ideas of his own and shocked the world at the time with a new kind of warfare.
This book is very enlightening, the common story is that the French folded easily when Germany invaded, but the
truth is that nobody was ready for what Guderian was about to unleash. No country would have survived the
Blitzkrieg then, not even the US. He created something revolutionary and nobody was ready for it.

This book also pointed out that Guderian was about to take the British Exp. at Dunkirk, but Hitler gave the
order to halt, allowing the British to evacuate thousands of troops and saving a massive allied disaster.
The book does start off a little slow as one reader below pointed out, but overall its an amazing book by a
man who seems to overlooked in History for some reason. Any fan of WW2 history will love this book.

"Vigorous writing is consice"--Guderian is not. Compound his verbose style with an awkward translation that suffers from poor editing (which gets worse after the first chapter), and what would otherwise be a gem of military history becomes a chore to read. Needs a lot of copy editing. I hope this was addressed in the 1999/Cassell version.

He was as great as the Desert Fox was any day.

Achtung Panzer, one of the major works in Military Science was first published in 1937. The author, Heinz Guderian, has severely rebuked the skeptical and reactionary opponents of armor and placed it squarely in the forefront of military operations and plans.

The text has been divided into 10 chapters. In the opening chapters, he has explained how World War I descended into positional war. Trenches appeared everywhere as the western front congealed and petrified; battlefield mobility was lost. Therefore to break the stalemate tank was born. Guderian has shared his experiences of conflict and has provided an incisive analysis on what went wrong with Allied tank tactics.

Guderian went on to develop German tank doctrine which was governed by his experiences of fighting in the western front. He was driving force behind mechanization of German army with a caveat this would not have been possible without Hitler’s encouragement and support.

I don’t hold the view Guderian’s thinking on tank warfare was molded by British military thinkers: Fuller. Hobart, Martel, Liddell Hart. Unlike the British, he realized tanks cannot fight on its own. To fight effectively it needed the support and help of other arms: motorized infantry, artillery(Fliegerabwehrkannon called FLAK) anti-tank guns(Panzerabwehrkannon called PAK) airplane. This was the genesis of German Combined Arms Doctrine. A typical panzer division was a flexible all-arms unit. British doctrine on other hand was too tank-centric.

Some striking features of Guderian’s thinking:

Choice of the ground is essential before conducting tank offensive. Tanks need wide open spaces for maneuver. Tanks must not be used in built-in areas, terrain laced with waterbodies.

Armor should be massed against a carefully chosen sector of enemy’s defense. Schwerpunkt ( place of main effort) should not be where resistance was encountered. Enemy defenses cannot be uniformly strong. Massing strength against weakness is an important principle in strategy. During operation Case Yellow or Fall Gelb ( German attack on France and Low Countries) massed German armor ( 7 divisions) assaulted the weakest sector of Allied defenses.

After the enemy line is breached armor by following lines of least resistance would penetrate into rear areas spreading panic to strike at the ‘brain of command’. To ensure decisive operational success it was absolutely essential to maintain the momentum of advance, for under no circumstances enemy must be given any chance to stabilize the front. With the advance in progress, there must close co-operation of all arms in panzer division.

Luftwaffe served as flying artillery. Besides providing fire support it kept enemy rear areas under observation by reporting on forms of resistance which lay ahead.

Author has stressed the importance of ground reconnaissance, for no army can blindly thrust into enemy territory. Aerial reconnaissance has its limitations. There are so many unknowns. Information is required on road networks, rivers ( whether fordable) bridges ( whether it could support the movement of tanks) natural or man- made obstacles, equipment types, unit identities, forward area deployments, enemy outposts, main lines of resistance down to the subunit level.

Armored reconnaissance troops were called ‘ Aufklarungsabteilung’. Information gathered should be quickly made available to commanders. They report by sending dispatch riders, telephones, R/W ( radio wireless)

Installation of radios opened a new level of command. It became possible to control, co ordinate the movement of different units in the panzer division. Commander of the spearhead can constantly be in contact with Luftwaffe and request fire support if needed.

Equally important is the psychological dimension. Tanks restored battlefield mobility. Mobility, speed, surprise are interlinked and self-sustaining. Surprise is the outcome of speed made possible by mobility. Sudden appearance near an enemy line at a time and place of our choosing can paralyze an opponent.

So new German Wehrmacht launched an unprecedented revolution in warfare. World War I fighting methods became outdated forcing a revision in strategy and tactics. Conservative, hidebound French military establishment refused to appreciate the significance of this development. As a result, the Third Republic got consigned to the dustbin of history.

The development of armoured warfare in the 20th century simply cannot be fully understood without reading this book. Guderian's writing style is terse yet lucid, and his analysis is superb and easy to follow. The lessons that he deduces from armoured combat in the First World War are as applicable today as they were then. For a true military historian, an opportunity to follow the thought process of such an influential soldier is priceless. It is especially eye-opening in light of the prevalent, Anglocentric view of W.W.I tank development. Guderian's analysis gives far more credit to the French military than any contemporary historian would imagine.

This book shows just how intelligent and far-seeing Guderian was. Initially the book provides an overview on weapons and tactics in the first world war, before moving on to Guderian's own ideas for the needs and tactics needed for a successful tank force. What suprised me most was how relevant his thoughts are in a modern context. This is a very interesting read for anyone interested in the late (1916-'18) WWI or tank tactics. Although I enjoyed it, I was rather put off at first as I was not expecting the in-depth analysis of WWI, however this was only momentary and I soon got really into the book.

Colonel-General (final rank) Guderian's insight into the lessons of WWI tank tactics is a must read for anyone who wants to understand German combined arms tactics employed from 1939-42. He praises British and French use of tanks and critically presents the lessons to be derived from the "war to end all wars" to current (1937)tactics. These lessons are just as applicable today. Heinz Guderian practiced what he preached as well. He was known as "schnelle Heinz" (fast Heinz). I would recommend this as a classic textbook.

There is much value in this work from a historical and professional point of view. To say, however, that this is a book simply about the development of armored forces is a shallow view. The historical vignettes are excellemt; Guderian also describes how technology outran the thought process for integration and employment of armored forces---the technology and equipment changed but the tactics didn't. I found his logic and thought process applicable to today's gap between technology and our race to understand and use it efficiently.