Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature (MIT Press)

David Buller, a philosopher, has written a book critiquing the scientific work of a subgroup of evolutionary psychologists who adhere to a doctrine first clearly articulated in a series of brilliant articles and books by D. Symons, L. Cosmides and J. Tooby. Their work was immeasurably enhanced by its uptake by popular science writers R. Wright and S. Pinker.

I think the philosophy of science is quite important, but I cannot think of a case where philosophers, qua philosophers, have added anything substantive to the critique of a scientific theory. I read this book only because of the extravagant praise afforded it by prominent behavioral scientists, including David Sloan Wilson, Linnda Caporeal, and Kim Sterelny. While I think this book does have a lot to offer the interested lay reader, it certainly does not violate my generalization about the worthlessness of philosophers criticizing scientific theories.

The author is clear in stating that his contribution is not a critique of evolutionary psychology in general, but only of this particular subgroup, which he distinguishes by capitalizing the name. For a general description of evolutionary psychology and Evolutionary Psychology (which I call EvPsych), please see my review of Scher and Rauscher, Evolutionary Psychology.

Much of Buller's effort goes to criticizing a few prominent examples of the empirical research of EvPsychers, including D. Buss's analysis of mate preference, M. Daly and M. Wilson's analysis of parenting vs. step-parenting, and C. Cosmides and J. Tooby's analysis of cheater detection modules. I think this was an unfortunate choice because the general EvPsych approach does not stand or fall on these examples in any way. Despite Buller's strong critique of Daly and Wilson, I suspect that their data analysis will emerge superior to Buller's, if only because they are consummate professionals in the area and he is a rank amateur. But, either way, their predictions do not depend in any way on the particular doctrines of EvPsych, but are broadly based on the evolutionary psychology paradigm. Buss's analysis of mate choice is impressively broad-based and thorough, but he has not been able to show that his results are due to EEA adaptations as opposed to strong cultural uniformities across societies, based on male dominance of modern political and economic hierarchies. Cosmides and Tooby's analysis of cheater detection modules is directly related to a major EvPsych proposition (the modularity of mind), but the only people convinced by their cheater detection argument are themselves and their disciples.

In dealing with the theoretical basis of EvPsych, Buller is very successful only one point, albeit a major one: the existence and nature of mental modules. His success is based on a highly cogent critique of the EvPsych position that the human mind is composed of a set of distinct, complexly organized and independent modules, each of which evolved as a solution to a particular evolutionary challenge to our species. The critique, however, is not philosophical but scientific, based on the work of contemporary developmental neurobiologists. This is perhaps the best part of the book.

Buller also critiques somewhat effectively the notion that there has been little development in the human gene pool, vis-à-vis mental development, in the past 50,000 years, and hence that we possess "stone-age minds." The arguments Buller uses are plausible, and take the form of noting that genetic change is much faster in many cases than assumed by the EvPsychers. Nevertheless, this point has not been nailed down by population biologists or quantitative geneticists, as far as I know.

Buller also deploys the argument that there was no single EEA, and hence there is no basis for the notion that human nature is homogeneous. This is a correct, but well-known argument. Only the EvPsychers themselves stick adamantly to the Orthodoxy on this point.

Doubtless the least effect part of this book is Buller's extended attempt to deny that there is a such thing as "human nature." Borrowing an argument from Hull, he asserts that species are "individuals" rather than "natural kinds" and only "natural kinds" have the sort of being that allows us to discuss their "nature." This, to my mind, is exactly the type of philosophizing that renders the philosophical critique of science so bizarre and ineffective. Ducks have duck nature. It is what we learn when we study the character and behavior of ducks. Mosquitoes similarly have mosquito nature. Humans being are no different. The philosopher is not allowed to define the terms of science in his own bizarre way and then claim to have detected a synthetic a priori inconsistency in the scientific use of the term.

In short, I do not believe this book is an important contribution to the development of evolutionary psychology or to the critique of EvPsych, although it is a great introduction to the literature for an interested lay person, since Buller develops his themes carefully and lucidly, never leaving even the most uninstructed reader behind.

This is not a book attempting to debunk evolutionary psychology, broadly speaking. It is a book that attempts to debunk a number of ev psych's specific theses about human psychology, for example, the existence of a cheater-detection module. Buller's critique of the latter is quite good, though the chapter on mate preferences I didn't find as convincing. I was pleasantly surprised to find that the philosopher Buller relys more on empirical studies than airy philosophical argument to create doubts about the veracity of ev psych's claims. He is best when building cases for alternate explanations of the experimental results prominant evolutionary psychologists claim support theirs.

Buller does not deny that the evolutionary perspective is the correct one through which to view human psychology. He simply argues that the conclusions drawn by many prominent evolutionary psychologists have reached too far and are without sufficient evidentiary support. Those who, from a visceral feeling of repulsion at the thought that humans are evolved animals whose minds are products of natural processes, simply loathe the evolutionary perspective of human psychology, will not find this book comforting.

I read Robert Wright's celebrated "Moral Animal" some 10 years ago, and was thoroughly impressed. Finally I had found a theory of human nature and psychology I could wholeheartedly believe in. Now along comes David Buller and says it's not so? Well, not so fast. This book is not so much a dismantling of the theory of evolutionary psychology as it is an assertion that the original evidence used in forming evo/psych (EP) - may have been overinterpreted.

Disclaimer: For those who were offended by the very suggestion that our behavior is just a more sophisticated version of similar behavior by our primate ancestors - you won't like this book, either.

Buller's complaints about EP:

EP theory is off-base in considering the brain to consist of thousands of evolved "modules." Instead, in his version, the mind is "adapted to adapt" to highly variable and rapidly changing environments.

He differs from EP thought, also, in that he thinks we are not psychological relics of our stone age ancestors - we have continued to evolve. Buller cites studies suggesting that N/S can overhaul species adaptations in 18 generations (450 years for humans) - concentrating on "cortical plasticity," thus his title "Adapting Minds."

He questions (among other things) the evidence for EP's conclusions about the human sexual behaviors of infidelity and jealousy, and the different (male vs female) manifestations of these traits.

He questions statistics that suggest step-children are frequently and almost predictably mistreated (compared to genetic children) by step-parents. EP absorbed completely the step-parent/step-children studies of Daly and Wilson, and Buller is particularly critical here.

He is negative about the EP advocacy of the "cheater-detection" module, an important section of EP studies.

I am not an expert in this field, but my feeling is that EP will weather this tropical disturbance. Psychology in general is a difficult field for data analysis - the same data in psychology can easily be logically interpreted in several different ways - much more so than data in, say, chemistry or physics.

I realize the following assessment of mine is anecdotal, but here goes: I have seen step-children treated differently than genetic children. I have seen how men and women pair off in society according to commonly accepted determinants of status, differing depending on sex. I have read about and subsequently observed how people (unconsciously?) score each other during their social interactions, rating relationship values for the future. I have observed how cheating (generic sense) is more rampant in very large groups where peer-pressure ceases to be such an important deterrent. Finally, game theory concepts utilized in EP are widely adapted and used in self-help books. In short, I'm a sucker for EP.

At the same time, if some of the conclusions of EP are not right on target, books like Buller's can be valuable in order to stimulate more finely-tuned studies and to verify those conclusions that are valid. Nobody in science would suggest that every discipline always gets all the nuances just right the first time around. Perhaps this is the take-home message of Buller's book.