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Antulio J. Echevarria II

After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War Hardcover – March 6, 2001

by Antulio J. Echevarria II (Author)

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The writings of Carl von Clausewitz loom so large in the annals of military theory that they obscure the substantial contributions of thinkers who came after him. This is especially true for those German theorists who wrote during the half century preceding World War I. However, as Antulio Echevarria argues, although none of those thinkers approached Clausewitz's stature, they were nonetheless theorists of considerable vision.

The Kaiser's theorists have long been portrayed as narrow-minded thinkers rigidly attached to an outmoded way of war, little altered since Napoleon's time. According to this view, they ignored or simply failed to understand how industrialization and modernization had transformed the conduct of war. They seemed unaware of how numerous advances in technology and weaponry had so increased the power of the defensive that decisive victory had become virtually impossible.

But Echevarria disputes this traditional view and convincingly shows that these theorists—Boguslawski, Goltz, Schlieffen, Hoenig, and their American and European counterparts-were not the architects of outmoded theories. In fact, they duly appreciated the implications of the vast advances in modern weaponry (as well as in transportation and communications) and set about finding solutions that would restore offensive maneuver to the battlefield.

Among other things, they underscored the emerging need for synchronizing concentrated firepower with rapid troop movements, as well as the necessity of a decentralized command scheme in order to cope with the greater tempo, lethality, and scope of modern warfare. In effect, they redefined the essential relations among the combined arms of infantry, artillery, and cavalry

Echevarria goes on to suggest that attempts to apply new military theories and doctrine were uneven due to deficiencies in training and an overall lack of interest in theory among younger officers. It is this failure of application, more than the theories themselves, that are responsible for the ruinous slaughter of World War I.

Print length

350 pages
Language

English
Publisher

University Press of Kansas
Publication date

March 6, 2001
Dimensions

6 x 0.94 x 9 inches
ISBN-10

0700610715
ISBN-13

978-0700610716
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Editorial Reviews

Review

""Echevarria's provocative study on the role of theory in warfare is as valuable and applicable today as it was when it was written. I recommend it highly."--Military Review

"A tour de force. Compels the reader to rethink long-cherished notions about the 'German way of war.𔳡"'Holger Herwig, author of The Outbreak of World War I

"Demolishes the conventional view that Germany's and Europe's soldiers of the period willfully and culpably ignored material and intellectual developments in the craft of war." --Dennis Showalter, author of Tannenberg: Clash of Empires

"A major addition to the history of military theory and doctrine in the twentieth century and a must read for those interested in German history, World War I, and military thought."--James Corum, author of The Roots of Blitzkrieg and The Luftwaffe

"An indispensable work, not only for experts on the Prussian-German army, but also for scholars working in the general field of military affairs."--Arden Bucholz, author of Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871

From the Back Cover

"A tour de force. Compels the reader to rethink long-cherished notions about the 'German way of war.'"--Holger Herwig, author of The Outbreak of World War I

"Demolishes the conventional view that Germany's and Europe's soldiers of the period willfully and culpably ignored material and intellectual developments in the craft of war."--Dennis Showalter, author of Tannenberg: Clash of Empires

"A major addition to the history of military theory and doctrine in the twentieth century and a must read for those interested in German history, World War I, and military thought."--James Corum, author of The Roots of Blitzkrieg and The Luftwaffe

"An indispensable work, not only for experts on the Prussian-German army, but also for scholars working in the general field of military affairs."--Arden Bucholz, author of Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871

Product details

Publisher ‏ : ‎ University Press of Kansas (March 6, 2001)
Language ‏ : ‎ English
Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 350 pages
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0700610715
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0700610716
Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 1.61 pounds
Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6 x 0.94 x 9 inches

Best Sellers Rank: #2,198,478 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
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Antulio J. Echevarria II

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Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II, a former US Army officer, is currently the Editor-in-Chief of the US Army War College Press and Parameters. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College. He holds a doctorate in modern history from Princeton University, and is the author of six books, including After Clausewitz (Kansas 2001), Imagining Future War (2007), Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford 2007), Reconsidering the American Way of War (Georgetown 2014), Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 2017), and War’s Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (Cambridge 2021) as well as more than one hundred articles and monographs on strategic thinking, military theory, and military history. He completed a NATO Fulbright Fellowship in 2000-01, and a Visiting Research Fellowship at Oxford University in 2011-12; he is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and an Adjunct Fellow at the Modern War Institute. He is the winner of five book awards and twelve article awards, and formerly held the US Army War College Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies.

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Terry Tucker

Stunning, Captivating, Classical

Reviewed in the United States on August 16, 2006

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This Book explains and compares the theories of Germany's military writers before the First World War. Dr. Echevarria dispels myths and provides fresh and clear insight of the historical understanding and the idea's and theories that were debated.

This book is a must read for any serious student of Military History and Military Studies. Dr. Echevarria's exploration of the "tactical crisis", "initial solutions" through the "struggle for resolution" to "tactical synthesis" culminating in the present is a brilliant tour de force. This book will also help provide some clarity in understanding the American amalgamation of doctrine and warfighting.

Dr. Terry Tucker, Adjunct Prof Military Studies/Military Science and Doctrine Developer for the Afghan National Army

4 people found this helpful

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MartyMoose

Great book

Reviewed in the United States on June 7, 2013

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LTC Echevarria provides some great insight for the period after Clausewitz and before WWI. He breaks the book down into three perspectives, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, and then follows them thru chronologically.

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David Fallas - Redondo

Monumental work!

Reviewed in the United States on October 14, 2002

Being a text of the Modern War Studies by the University Press of Kansas already indicates this is a great book. Actually, I bought it for that reason and because the subject attracts my attention. After reading it, I can only say this book is fantastic. After Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806 on the hands of Napoleon, it took several years for the German peoples to again have a respectfull army. This books deals with this process. This book reveals why the Germans succeded on creating a new and powerfull army, while its neighbors (France and Russia, although Great Britain is also treated) decreased in power. The creation of a High Command and a General Staff are decisive factors on such evolution. Wargaming, modernization (this means, using all technological advantages on railroads, rifle making, artillery and machine guns, while demobilizing or transforming cavalry units) and professionalization (with always increasing quality levels of the reserve units) are the keys of German capability shown against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870). One thing I really liked of this book is the extraordinary quantity and quality of the research sources (actually, thanks to this book I've been able to get some other texts on the subject), many of which are not in English. An extraordinary work.

12 people found this helpful

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Christian Potholm

Strange Interlude

Reviewed in the United States on December 29, 2013

Antulio Echevarria, After Clausewitz; German Military Thinkers Before the Great War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). A wide ranging but densely packed analysis of German military thinkers in the 19th century. The author believes it wasn’t that they underestimated the technological changes as much as the German military thinkers underestimated the ability of other European nations to copy them from the earlier Prussian successes against the Austrians and the French. They also failed to see how difficult it was to command large numbers of troops with all their added firepower over time. Echevarria argues that it was junior officers during early World War I who vaunted “the spirit of the offensive” not their senior counterparts who paid more attention to the realities captured by Clausewitz.

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