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The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times Hardcover – April 26, 2011
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For the first time, the Nobel Prize laureate and "man in the middle" of the planet's most explosive confrontations speaks out--on his dealings with America, negotiations with Iran, reform and democracy in the Middle East, and the prospects for a future free of nuclear weapons.
For the past two decades, Mohamed ElBaradei has played a key role in the most high-stakes conflicts of our time. Unique in maintaining credibility in the Arab world and the West alike, ElBaradei has emerged as a singularly independent, uncompromised voice. As the director of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency, he has contended with the Bush administration's assault on Iraq, the nuclear aspirations of North Korea, and the West's standoff with Iran. For their efforts to control nuclear proliferation, ElBaradei and his agency received the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize.
Now, in a vivid and thoughtful account, ElBaradei takes us inside the international fray. Inspector, adviser, and mediator, ElBaradei moves from Baghdad, where Iraqi officials bleakly predict the coming war, to behind-the-scenes exchanges with Condoleezza Rice, to the streets of Pyongyang and the trail of Pakistani nuclear smugglers. He dissects the possibility of rapprochement with Iran while rejecting hard-line ideologies of every kind, decrying an us-versus-them approach and insisting on the necessity of relentless diplomacy. Above all, he illustrates that the security of nations is tied to the security of individuals, dependent not only on disarmament but on a universal commitment to human dignity, democratic values, and the freedom from want.
Probing and eloquent, The Age of Deception is an unparalleled account of society's struggle to come to grips with the uncertainties of our age.
- Print length352 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherMetropolitan Books
- Publication dateApril 26, 2011
- Dimensions6.5 x 1.23 x 9.42 inches
- ISBN-100805093508
- ISBN-13978-0805093506
Editorial Reviews
Review
In this spirited memoir ElBaradei recounts ferreting out the nuclear secrets of the world's most paranoid regimes, nerve-wracking adventures full of intrigue, car chases, and Pyongyang's grim hotel accommodations. ElBaradei's accounts of diplomacy are fascinating and rife with acerbic portraits of George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and other world leaders... The result is a lively, acerbic take on recent geo-political confrontations that makes an impassioned case for using persuasion rather than punishment to resolve the direst threats. (Publishers Weekly)
About the Author
Mohamed ElBaradei served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1997 to 2009. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, together with the IAEA, and has also been honored with the Indira Gandhi Prize for Peace, Disarmament and Development; the Nile Collar; and the Roosevelt Institute's Four Freedoms Award. Founder of the Egyptian opposition movement The National Association for Change, ElBaradei lives in Cairo.
Product details
- Publisher : Metropolitan Books (April 26, 2011)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 352 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0805093508
- ISBN-13 : 978-0805093506
- Item Weight : 1.3 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 1.23 x 9.42 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #3,971,128 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #851 in Arms Control (Books)
- #2,937 in International Diplomacy (Books)
- #3,666 in African Politics
- Customer Reviews:
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By treaty, every country is entitled to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Assuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy is the IAEA’s specific job. In clear language, ElBaradei simplifies two complex topics: the nuclear fuel cycle itself and the problem of distinguishing between the nuclear energy for peaceful versus non-peaceful purposes. While the processes of conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication are common to both uses, only tedious work by skilled neutral inspectors can differentiate the two.
His title “Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times” signals one of his over-arching themes: There is little to distinguish the ethical behavior of the Nuclear Haves from the Nuclear Wanna-Haves. Neither group can claim the moral high ground. Despite being signatories to the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Wanna-Haves (such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran) have procured illicit materials and engaged in technological development far outside the boundaries of the treaty they have willingly signed. Only when blatantly caught in the act have they admitted their transgressions and promised to mend their ways by allowing IAEA inspection. Sometimes, like North Korea, they just bow out of the NPT entirely, or, like Israel, they never sign it in the first place.
For their part, the Haves (such as the US, UK and Russia) have covertly uncovered these transgressions and intentionally failed to notify the IAEA of their findings. This, too, is far outside the boundaries of the treaty in which they voluntarily participate. Moreover, the Haves often overlook the transgressions of some countries and go berserk over the transgressions of others. And the Haves seem to conveniently forget that the treaty requires their own disarmament.
ElBaradei uses these facts to underscore a second theme: Nuclear weapons grant such enormous military and strategic advantage. It is entirely expected for some small nations, submerged in insecurity and fearing the power of the Haves, to attempt to level the playing field. Even if Wanna-Haves don’t actually procure nuclear capability, their threats to do so can be converted to tangible benefits. The very presence of Haves and Wanna-Haves creates an imbalance, an unholy game of cat and mouse resulting in temporary advantage to one group or the other. Both groups then use self-righteous proclamations and self-serving actions to bolster their internal political landscape.
A third theme that ElBaradei sounds is this: A successful planetary future depends on addressing the root causes of insecurity, giving the IAEA the necessary tools to inspect and report, and holding all players to their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since the book was published, the threat of nuclear rouge actors has increased considerably. ElBaradei’s recommendations take on even more urgency.
Readers who dislike multinational endeavors will have little use for ElBaradei’s opinions. Those who see the interconnected nature of our nuclear future and the extraordinarily lethality of nuclear weapons run amok will find much in this book to thoughtfully consider.
My respect to IAEA, and to Dr. El Baradei, has grown orders of magnitude larger after reading the book. Sometimes too elaborate on details, but nevertheless a must read.
of the ins and outs of his difficult job as the top man of IAEA for so many years
is an account of courage - of standing up to powers who wanted him to do and
say otherwise - I got many missing holes filled in - Anyone who has anything
to do with or an ''opinion'' about nuclear proliferation should read this book.
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Mohamed ElBadarei I hope will be able to give to his own country what he
gave to the IAEA.
The world is a better world for men like Mohamed ElBadarei.
Bente Petersen
Top reviews from other countries
4.0 out of 5 stars Four Stars
5.0 out of 5 stars Compelling like a James Bond thriller
4.0 out of 5 stars Steadfast ElBaradei
Before and after having been awarded the Nobel Prize, ElBaradei had been a highly controversial figure to either side; certain rogue states, and the West. As a Muslim he had been put under general suspicion of being biased toward the numerous nuclear capability efforts in the Middle East; and hostile to Israel, the only state of the region with a huge arsenal of (undeclared) nuclear weapons. Well, after having read his book that might be true to some extent. One can easily imagine, though, what has to be expected of the new Director General of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, who seems to be rather biased toward American demands.
As regards Iran, ElBaradei’s narrative reads like a crime thriller. That the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate by America’s 16 intelligence agencies stopped, literally in the last minute, the Bush/Cheney administration of striking the country seems to be more fact than fiction. The estimate (i.e., Iran has halted, with high confidence, its military nuclear program in late 2003) seems to confirm the IAEA’s own findings which were, however, pretty uncertain due to Iran’s lack of full cooperation. What is quite disturbing is that the IAEA was not provided with respective intelligence by the Americans either. ElBaradei reports that he frequently is confronted with a question like this: “What do you really think – is Iran trying to build a nuclear weapons program?” Reading his answer to that is worthwhile (p. 211f).
“My assessment is a gut feeling informed by historical context. First, elements of Iran’s nuclear procurement and research programs began in the mid-1980s, in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War. Iran was at the time under dire threat from Iraq; more than one hundred thousand Iranians, including civilians, reportedly fell victim to Iraq’s chemical weapons. Faced with this extreme sense of vulnerability, the Iranians might have originally intended to develop nuclear weapons. But at some point – perhaps after the war ended or in the mid-1990s, when records show abrupt adjustments to some of Iran’s nuclear programs, or perhaps after the Agency began its investigations – Iran may well have decided to limit its program to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle, legitimately remaining a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT (nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty).
In any case, my belief is that Iran has not revealed the whole truth about the beginning of its nuclear program. There might have been some military involvement in nuclear procurement and nuclear experiments. However, these skeletons in the closet are, in all probability, fairly insignificant; the body of evidence would otherwise be greater and harder to conceal.
My impression is that Iran might have intended finally to come clean about any past weapons ambitions during their negotiations with the Europeans, as part of a comprehensive package and a pre-agreed scenario and at a time when the world’s focus was on Iran’s future and not its past. But when the negotiations fell apart and the environment turned confrontational, the Iranians were left with a dilemma: any revelation of past involvement in a military nuclear program, however minor or distant, coming during a moment of confrontation, would be seen as vindication of the view that Iran was not to be trusted. But if they refrained from giving a full account, they were perpetuating the original sin of concealment.”
In a footnote, ElBaradei writes that, “According to rumor, certain Iranian officials had admitted that Iran had appointed a special group in 1987 to look into planning a nuclear weapon option. The group allegedly had been disbanded in the early 1990s. Reportedly, Iran was divided internally about how to confess this matter to the IAEA. The Agency had heard similar intimations through intelligence channels. But we were never able to verify the truth behind these rumors.”
“A second question frequently posed to me is why Iran has remained so intent on pursuing uranium enrichment in the face of sanctions and Western condemnation. My best reading is that the Iranian nuclear program, including enrichment, has been for Iran the means to an end. Tehran is determined to be recognized as a regional power. That recognition, in their view, is intimately linked to the achievement of a grand bargain with the West.
Even if the intent is not to develop nuclear weapons, the successful acquisition of the full nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment, sends a signal of power to Iran’s neighbors and to the world, providing a sort of insurance against attack. Each of the factions in Iran understands that the nuclear program is in itself a deterrent. There is a clear consensus domestically that Iran needs to maintain that deterrence. Overall, though, Iran’s goal is not to become another North Korea – a nuclear weapon possessor but a pariah in the international community – but rather Brazil or Japan, a technological powerhouse with the capacity to develop nuclear weapons if the political winds were to shift, while remaining a non-nuclear-weapon state under the NPT.
The furor over Iran’s nuclear program cannot be understood without reference to the volatile security situation in the Middle East and the region’s fiercely competing ideologies. The elephant in the room is Israel’s nuclear arsenal. Israel of course is not in violation of the NPT, having never joined, but that distinction does nothing to temper the anger of its neighbors at the perceived asymmetry in treatment and the imbalance in regional security.”