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Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy Hardcover – November 1, 2008
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- Print length296 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherNaval Institute Press
- Publication dateNovember 1, 2008
- Dimensions6.25 x 1 x 9 inches
- ISBN-109781591144489
- ISBN-13978-1591144489
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Product details
- ASIN : 1591144485
- Publisher : Naval Institute Press; 1st edition (November 1, 2008)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 296 pages
- ISBN-10 : 9781591144489
- ISBN-13 : 978-1591144489
- Item Weight : 1.2 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.25 x 1 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #2,107,225 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #4,707 in Naval Military History
- #17,658 in American Military History
- #19,225 in World War II History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

John T. Kuehn is a former naval aviator (EP-3/ES-3) who has completed cruises aboard four different aircraft carriers. He flew reconnaissance missions during the last decade of the Cold War, the First Gulf War (Desert Storm) and the Balkans (Deliberate Force over Bosnia). He currently serves as a Professor of Military History at the Army Command and Staff School. He previously served as FADM E. J. King Visiting Professor at the US Naval War College 2020-2021. Kuehn served on the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College since July 2000, retiring from the naval service in 2004. He earned a Ph.D. in History from Kansas State University in 2007. He is the author of the Agents of Innovation and Eyewitness Pacific Theater with Dennis Giangreco, A Military History of Japan (Praeger, 2014), Napoleonic Warfare (Praeger, 2015), America's First General Staff: A Short History of the Rise and Fall of the General Board of the Navy, 1900-1950 (Naval Institute, 2017), and most recently The 100 Worst Disasters in Military History, with David Holden (ABC-CLIO, 2020). He is a past Major General William Stofft Chair of Historical Research and Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He won the Moncado Award from the Society of Military History in 2010 for his essay "The U.S. Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitation: 1922-1937." He was also honored as "Best Faculty Member" by Norwich University in the Military History Masters program in 2011.
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Customers find the book insightful and informative about naval strategy and tactics. They describe it as a good read for students of naval strategy, World War II, and the interwar U.S. Navy. The Board is described as a deliberative organization with traits of a think tank.
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Customers appreciate the book's thinking. They find it insightful and informative for students of naval strategy, World War II, and the interwar U.S. Navy. The board is described as a deliberative organization with traits of a think tank. The treatment of the topic is first-rate and covers how the doctrine and development of the fleet was formed. Readers mention that the book entertains many crazy ideas incorporating naval aviation.
"...a think-tank, a general staff, an advisory committee, a collection of subject-matter-experts and an investigative body populated by some of the U.S...." Read more
"...Overall, this is a good book that informs the student of US naval history or the Second World War in the Pacific." Read more
"...It discusses the overall strategic and tactical thinking that went into the design of the U.S. Navy ships, primarily of the 1930s...." Read more
"...It covers how the doctrine and development of the fleet was formed, going back to WWI, and in the interceding years. A real eye opener." Read more
Customers enjoy reading the book. They find it informative and wish it covered more topics.
"...Overall, this is a good book that informs the student of US naval history or the Second World War in the Pacific." Read more
"Overall a good book that I enjoyed reading...." Read more
"A must read...." Read more
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- Reviewed in the United States on July 12, 2015John T. Kuehn’s “Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated the Japanese Navy” is an important work that demolishes the image of the U.S. Navy’s General Board as musty place for elderly admirals to get in a “twilight tour” before mandatory retirement age. Instead, the General Board is revealed as a far-thinking deliberative organization with traits of a think-tank, a general staff, an advisory committee, a collection of subject-matter-experts and an investigative body populated by some of the U.S. Navy’s luminaries.
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Kuehn’s work is well-organized. He introduces the reader to the institution of the General Board, coherently discusses the impact of the Washington Treaty’s provisions on the General Board’s work; and the innovative solutions the General Board found or attempted to deal the strategic problems facing the U.S. Navy.
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The author also discusses the General Board’s efforts on three particularly important issues: keeping the aging battleships up-to-date until new ones could be built; finding ways to bring air power into the fleet despite the shackles of the Washington Treaty’s limitations on the numbers and size of aircraft carriers; and creating a mobile base structure to overcome the lack of fortified bases in the western Pacific Ocean. By the time the U.S. entered the Second World War, nine of the Navy’s ten oldest battleships had received comprehensive upgrades to fire controls, armor and armament which kept them relevant; aviation was so comprehensively established throughout the fleet that when the battle line was crippled at Pearl Harbor the transition to carrier task forces was immediate, seamless and without hesitation; and a plan was already in place to build up the mobile base structure and underway replenishment organization that allowed the U.S. Navy to stride across the central Pacific in seven-league boots. Viewed in conjunction with the Navy’s other two great interwar institutions, the Naval War College and the annual Fleet Problem exercise, it becomes readily apparent that the U.S. Navy’s success in World War II was anything but an accident, an underdog victory, or a come-from-behind affair.
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Kuehn concludes his work by doing something too few historians attempt: he properly contrasts the U.S. Navy’s experience with that of the British Royal Navy, Imperial Japanese Navy, and Nazi German Kriegsmarine. None enjoyed a deliberative body anything like the General Board, and although each developed certain innovations, they were often taken in isolation and not part of any coherent, comprehensive strategy.
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The volume includes five appendices. The first included the complete text of the Washington Treaty (“Five-Power Treaty”) of 1922, and the second the U.S. Naval Policy of 1922. The third appendix discusses proposals for battleship modifications, the fourth concerns “flying-deck cruiser” designs, and the fifth details Mobile Base Project.
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I highly recommend this book. It jettisons the fallacious view of the General Board as a stagnant backwater for fading, change-resistant admirals and replaces it with a look into an organization that was everything the title and subtitle claim. This book should be read with Felker’s “Testing American Sea Power,” O’Hara’s “On Seas Contested,” and “Battle Line” by Hone & Hone.
- Reviewed in the United States on March 31, 2017This is a specialist naval history of the US Navy’s General Board. The Board was established after the Spanish-American War when the widely disparate performance of US warships in the war came under analysis. The Board was intended to tie together the various bureaus of the navy to get better lateral communication. The board typically had the heads of the different bureaus: Ordnance, Shipbuilding, Docks & Yards, the Marines, and, after WW1, Air, plus the Navy Secretary, the CNO (after that post was created), and three mid-rank “up and comers”. The War College and CNO had plans so the General Board ended up studying force structure: how best to develop the ships that would conform to the current treaties and carry out the Navy’s plans in time of war. In Mahan’s formulation, the naval power of a nation was based on upon its fleet, the bases available to the fleet, and its merchant marine. After the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference resulted in treaties that forbade the US to develop bases west of Pearl Harbor, the rule of thumb that a naval force lost 10% of its combat power for every 1000 miles that it operated away from its bases meant that despite the 5:3 force superiority assured by the Treaty relative to Japan, the USN could not operate in the western Pacific at anything other than parity since the USN would be far from Pearl and Manila would be presumed to be captured or unusable while the Japanese would have convenient bases in the Home Islands or Formosa. Consequently, the interwar navy spent a lot of time developing cruisers and destroyers with long range and efficient propulsion plants, underway replenishment, and mobile drydocks to permit the most extensive possible repairs to capital ships far from pre-war base facilities. Although an eventual decisive battle ship duel was anticipated in the western Pacific, the Navy recognized that the opening phases of a Pacific conflict would be dominated by cruisers and carriers, since neither side could afford to lose battleships to ambush ahead of the final duel. Therefore, the overall shape of the campaign of was anticipated as an initial campaign of maneuver and attrition of non-battle-line units, much like the historical campaigns in WW2 that saw the Japanese keeping their battleline close to home while the USA repaired its battle line that had been wrecked at Pearl Harbor. Not every notion pushed by the Board prospered. Rigid airships were mothballed as fleet scouts after a head of the Air Bureau, Admiral Moffett, perished in the loss of the USS Macon in the eastern Pacific. The flying deck cruiser was never funded for construction. This was a 10,000 ton cruiser hull with a flight deck on the back half of the ship and an aircraft capacity of 12 -24 planes and a conventional cruiser battery of 9 x 6” rifles forward. The Independence class light carriers and the WW2 escort carrier can both claim descent from this notion of “spreading around” the fleet’s air arm so it would not be tied to a small number of big fleet carriers. The treatment of the topic is first rate. Kuehn is a bit dry with the prose and almost returns to much of the treaty clause forbidding base development in the western Pacific. But the challenge posed by the treaty created a generation of naval officers who had spent years thinking about the specific problems that would face the USN in the Pacific War and results demonstrated that they had successfully anticipated the outlines of the challenges with successful solutions. Overall, this is a good book that informs the student of US naval history or the Second World War in the Pacific.
