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Air Power's Lost Cause: The American Air Wars of Vietnam (War and Society) Hardcover – May 14, 2021
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The first comprehensive treatment of the air wars in Vietnam.
Filling a substantial void in our understanding of the history of airpower in Vietnam, this book provides the first comprehensive treatment of the air wars in Vietnam. Brian Laslie traces the complete history of these air wars from the beginning of American involvement until final withdrawal. Detailing the competing roles and actions of the air elements of the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force, the author considers the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. He also looks at the air war from the perspective of the North Vietnamese Air Force. Most important for understanding the US defeat, Laslie illustrates the perils of a nation building a one-dimensional fighting force capable of supporting only one type of war.
,- Print length272 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherRowman & Littlefield Publishers
- Publication dateMay 14, 2021
- Dimensions6.39 x 0.84 x 9.4 inches
- ISBN-101442274344
- ISBN-13978-1442274341
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Editorial Reviews
Review
The various aspects of aerial warfare in Vietnam have been well studied, but historian Brian Laslie is the first to attempt an overall description and assessment of what he rightly calls the air "wars" of Vietnam. In the process, he thoroughly debunks a key aspect of the Lost Cause mythology that grew out of the American failure in Vietnam: the claim that air power, if properly employed, could have won the war. The book constitutes an excellent starting point for anyone seriously interested in the air wars of Vietnam.
― Michigan War Studies ReviewAir Power's Lost Cause is a key text for those interested in air power studies, or indeed the Vietnam War. Laslie’s work also opens up a number of vistas that should be of interest to anyone studying the influence of politics on military campaigns, the deployment of cutting-edge technology or the battle of the narrative. Air Power's Lost Cause has a lot to offer and is highly recommended.
― Wavell Room: Contemporary British Military ThoughtIn Air Power's Lost Cause, Brian Laslie offers an important and provocative argument that invites readers to reexamine the role of air power in the Vietnam War. Laslie places the entire air war in an intriguing new frame, making this book a must-read addition to the literature on air power and the Vietnam War.
-- Michael W. Hankins, Smithsonian National Air and Space MuseumA long-overdue, sweeping chronicle of US air operations over Southeast Asia during the American war in Vietnam. Laslie excels in demonstrating the promise—and ultimate failures—of airpower solving political problems overseas. A penetrating account demolishing the myth that air advocates could have ‘won’ the war in Vietnam if only given the chance.
-- Gregory A. Daddis, San Diego State University, author of Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in VietnamA concise, incisive account of the chaotic air wars that the United States military waged over Vietnam in the 1960s. Laslie deftly explains how ambiguity in mission, doctrine, and command left the United States without a coherent air strategy, leading different services to fight at cross-purposes over the course of the conflict. His book is an excellent starting point for all those interested in the conflict, as well as for scholars looking for an integrated approach to the air wars.
-- Robert Farley, University of KentuckyBrian Laslie climbs into the rarified air of authors who provide a truly new perspective on the aerial conflict over Southeast Asia. Packed with insightful analysis, reliant on valuable sources, and penned with cogent prose, Air Power’s Lost Cause is a fresh look at how air power came of age during the Vietnam War, yet still never made it quite to full maturity either. Simply one of the best books on the subject.
-- John Terino, USAF Air Command and Staff CollegeBrian Laslie presents history in a formidable style that challenges the reader to evaluate facts and question the conclusions he derives from them. His latest book, Air Power’s Lost Cause, divides and analyzes the U.S. Air Force’s combat in the Vietnam War into six parts. The book is part of the War and Society Series, which investigates the history of the conduct of war, along with its social consequences.
― The VVA VeteranBook Description
The first comprehensive treatment of the air wars in Vietnam.
About the Author
Brian D. Laslie is the Command Historian at the United States Air Force Academy. He is the author of The Air Force Way of War: U.S. Tactics and Training after Vietnam.
Product details
- Publisher : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (May 14, 2021)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 272 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1442274344
- ISBN-13 : 978-1442274341
- Item Weight : 1.22 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.39 x 0.84 x 9.4 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,551,460 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1,232 in Southeast Asia History
- #3,009 in Vietnam War History (Books)
- #3,196 in Military Aviation History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Brian Laslie is an Air Force Historian and currently the Command Historian at the United States Air Force Academy. A 2001 graduate of The Citadel and a historian of air and space power studies, Dr. Laslie received his Masters' from Auburn University Montgomery in 2006 and his Doctorate from Kansas State University in 2013. He lives in Colorado Springs.
He can be reached at http://brianlaslie.com/ or at goodreads.com
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Top reviews from the United States
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His vague assertion that the U.S. incorrectly applied airpower is not even supported by suggestions of how airpower could have been more successfully applied. For example, he claims that General Momyer contributed to the failure because did not recognize that Vietnam was not a conventional air war. But if you read Momyer’s book you will find he thought the mistake in Vietnam was in seeing and prosecuting it as nonconventional war. He thought airpower would have been more successful if applied in a more conventional manner. The author and Momyer obviously disagree, but you can’t say that Momyer was asleep at the switch and simply did not recognize and adapt to the nature of the war. The author doesn’t specify what he thinks Momyer should have actually done differently, he only says that he was inflexible and unable to adapt. It's as if Momyer is at fault for not having a magic wand.
The author’s claim that airpower was not even decisive in the south is a ridiculous conclusion given that he himself details how airpower was decisive when applied to enemy troop concentration in the field. He apparently thinks air support should have magically won the war by doing more than just helping defeat enemy formations in actual battle. You can’t blame USAF for the failure of the ARVN to win the ground war against the invasion by North Vietnam. He doesn’t even credit Linebacker II with bringing North Vietnam back to the negotiating table.
Overall, the author doesn't suggest how the war should have been prosecuted, yet he blames defeat on insufficient military adaptability rather than insufficient national commitment. He does not make his case at all with this book.
Top reviews from other countries
The author makes plain the disparity between what was imagined possible and what was actually possible determining, for example, that while close air support to the forces operating on the ground in southern Vietnam proved achievable the interdiction of supply between north and south along the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" was to remain a goal unfulfilled. Government direction is examined but not found to be the outright cause of failure as is so often stated by critics of policy both within and without the air forces. The command of the air forces believed in the capabilities of strategy applied and equipment possessed but, in fact, success was not attainable and Laslie provides proof in detail that, even if given free reign victory by means of airpower in Vietnam would not be achieved.
Laslie determines the conclusion held by many that, if only the air forces had not been restrained by a political leadership that lacked will, victory in Vietnam was possible was not grounded in reality. The tremendous efforts undertaken by the three principal services, USAF, USMC, USN, to develop efficient equipment as well as effective strategies and tactics while the conflict raged and following the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam can be seen as evidence that, at the least, some of those in positions of authority knew changes had to be made. The improvement to the services that evolved can be seen as a success that developed from failure.
A complete history the aerial struggle in Vietnam is presented by Laslie. Respectful references are made regarding the Vietnamese foes who, the author relates, generally maintained a clear understanding of what was feasible though the use of American air power during "The Easter Offensive" was an exception as air strikes against Vietnamese forces were, if not decisive, successful in limiting the success of the attack. Weapons systems employed and tactics developed by the Vietnamese are examined with the pilots who flew in defense of the homeland give particular mention.
Laslie makes it clear that the American pilots and aircrew who flew to the attack, let it be said, a special breed. Tremendous exertions had to be made even before "strapping on" the aircraft. Maintaining the daily grind against a dedicated foe required both skill and courage and Laslie explains that, while those in command who theorized and predicted could be, those who took to the air could not be found lacking.
Air Power's Lost Cause is written in fine style, once picked up one does not want to put the book down, and supported with photographs, interesting and useful appendicies, detailed notes and a useful bibliography; an excellent work!



