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Allied Master Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II Hardcover – November 15, 2012
| David Rigby (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
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Careful attention is paid in the book to the three organizations that contributed the principal membership of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; i.e., the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, and (in the case of Sir John Dill) the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. After providing a biographical background of the principal member so the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Rigby provides information on wartime Washington, D.C. as the home base for the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization.
Detailed information is given regarding the Casablanca Conference, but the author is careful to distinguish between the formal nature of the big Allied wartime summit meetings and the much less formal day-to-day give and take which characterized British-American strategic debates between the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, it is a major contention of the book that it is critical to remember that more than half of the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff took place in Washington, D.C. in a regularly scheduled weekly pattern and not at the big Allied conferences such as Yalta.
The role of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in directing the war in the Pacific and in planning the OVERLORD cross-channel invasion of western Europe, respectively, is covered in detail. These were the two most contentious issues with which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had to deal. Rigby attempts to answer the question of why two combative, fearless, warriors like Churchill and Brooke would be so unwilling to go back across the Channel, and to explain the tug-of-war the British Chiefs of Staff had to conduct with Churchill before a British battle fleet could join the American Central Pacific Drive late in the war.
The book also provides a wealth of information on the role played by members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the spheres of economic mobilization and wartime diplomacy. Most of all, what Allied Master Strategists does is to give the Combined Chiefs of Staff what they have long deserved--a book of their own; a book that is not weighted towards the U.S. Joint Chiefs on the one hand or the British Chiefs of Staff on the other; a book that is not strictly a "naval" book, an "army" book, or an "air" book, but a book that like the western alliance during World War II, is truly "combined" in an international as well as an interservice manner.
- Print length224 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherNaval Institute Press
- Publication dateNovember 15, 2012
- Dimensions6.1 x 1 x 9 inches
- ISBN-101612510817
- ISBN-13978-1612510811
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Because multinational partnerships will mark future operations more and more, the observations and insights provided by Rigby can only gain in significance. Accessible, well researched, and including extensive notes and a detailed bibliography, the book is highly recommended to students of World War II, coalition warfare, strategy and policymaking, and civil-military relations."-- H-War, H-Net Reviews
"This is an important study that provides insights into leadership, logistics, and administration of war at the highest level."--Warships International Fleet Review
"…offer[s] the generalist reader a sound treatment of the conclusions reached by the biographers of the major personages covered and shows some of the strengths and limitations each brought to the committee. Thus, this work will be of more value to the casual reader of history, than to those more fully attuned to the subject, but all will appreciate afterwards that the war at the top made the war at the front more effective still."-- Naval Historical Foundation
"This is an excellent book and highly recommended for those interested in World War II, combined planning, the logistics and economics of large scale warfare, and inter-allied operations."--DCMilitary.com
"The author does an excellent job providing an introductory look at a complex subject. The book is easy to digest, logically organized, and supported by extensive research balancing primary and secondary sources. It is a great first reference and foundational work for military officers, students of history, and those interested in furthering their knowledge of the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the Anglo-American Alliance during World War II."--Military Review
"David Rigby has written a path-breaking book that helps us understand how World War II was won. He sheds new light on the reasons for success of the Anglo-American alliance. Rigby shows how, in an unprecedented pooling of resources and strategic policy making, the Combined Chiefs of Staff managed to resolve disputes and to frame a cohesive and effective war-making machine. Rigby's meticulous research, shrewd judgment, and literary skill shine forth on every page. This book is not only a major contribution to scholarship on World War II, but also a pleasure to read."
--Bernard Wasserstein, Ulrich and Harriet Meyer Professor of History, University of Chicago
"Allied Master Strategists is an important new study of the central organization of the Western Allied effort in the Second World War. Not only is this very well researched and clearly written book an excellent and lucid starting point for serious newcomers approaching the history of the war, its new material and interesting and original perspectives, even if one may not agree with all of them, will stimulate even the best informed."
--Dr. Eric Grove, professor of naval history, University of Salford
"Anyone wishing to know how and why the British and American allies cooperated so much more effectively during the Second World War than their Axis enemies, and how in spite of profound differences of personality and principle they forged such a complex yet purposeful coalition, should turn to this deeply researched and sorely needed work of historical scholarship. It is a fascinating read."
--Paul Jankowski, Ray Ginger Professor of History at Brandeis University
"Allied Master Strategists is the first authoritative account of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, the key agency of U.S.-British military collaboration in World War II. Especially noteworthy are the personalities of the admirals and generals--reserved or flamboyant, cooperative or obstinate--who wrangled to shape the Allied path to victory."
--Edward S. Miller, author War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945
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Product details
- Publisher : Naval Institute Press; Illustrated edition (November 15, 2012)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 224 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1612510817
- ISBN-13 : 978-1612510811
- Item Weight : 1.31 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.1 x 1 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #2,192,842 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #4,942 in Military Strategy History (Books)
- #16,897 in Great Britain History (Books)
- #21,839 in World War II History (Books)
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for my Mother, a historian. She liked it too.
I recommend it.
I am not quite sure why the author went off topic in discussing the three volume work of Lee's Lieutenants. I realize that Marshall and King read the volumes but it seemed out of place to discuss the work in detail. In his criticism of Vice Admiral Ghormley he notes that hewas operating his HQ afloat. The author makes it appear that it was Ghormley's choice alone. I find that hard to believe. From what I have read the French were extremely difficult to work with and very prickly about their sovereignty. I am guessing there was diplomacy above Ghormley's level involved. Also there was the age old tradition of admirals commanding from ships that would have made him think that being on a ship even if at anchor or pierside was where he belonged. It takes courage and thinking outside the box to break old traditions. I would love for someone to research why and how the command was eventually moved from ship to shore. I am sure it is far more complex than how it has been portrayed by authors. In regards to the buildup of improperly loaded ships at Noumea, the author suggests that Ghormley should have sent the ships to Guadalcanal to be unloaded. The author seems to forget that the ships unloading at Guadalcanal were under attack and extra time unloading put them at greater risk. Later on he describes the proper solution taken by Halsey of unloading them at Noumea and then reloading them in a manner called a combat load. A combat load is loaded in manner where the offloading is sped up and the sequence is most logical for troops in combat. I am willing to bet the problems in shifting HQ ashore were also involved in authority to unload the ships at Noumea.
A great person to have offered insight would have been Ghormley but to my knowledge he never wrote his account of Guadalcanal. My guess he understood that the winners write the history so that if he wrote an account that ended up challenging the account of Halsey it would have been discounted. It is a loss to history. Ghormley is also criticized for not visiting Guadalcanal. I also think the importance of visiting the front is overrated. What information could he have gained form going to the front that he not get by message? How much time would it take to go the front and for what period would he difficult to reach for command decisions? Isoroku Yamamoto was killed trying to show his face to his troops. Was Douglas MacArthur less effective for hunkering down on Corregidor? Was his effectiveness diminished by bugging out on his troops in the Philippines?
I also liked his debunking of the myth that Churchill was a great strategist. His value was as a symbol. It was maybe a little outside the scope of this book but I would love to see research done on why the German source of iron from Sweden was not the prime target by the Allies. Germany got something like 80% of its iron-ore from Sweden. That would seem to me would be the place to have defeated Germany the quickest and with least cost. It also offered a direct invasion route to Germany. Overall very good book.
'After Churchill and Roosevelt, the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs were the most important shapers of Allied victory in the Second World War, yet they have been a curiously neglected body. Although several members of this unique body have left memoirs and all have been the subject of biographies, which often discuss their role in the Combined Chiefs, Dr. Rigby’s book is the first to examine how these men of different backgrounds and temperaments as a group wielded the might of the “Grand Alliance” against the Axis. Allied Master Strategists opens with brief profiles of the principals and some other important leaders, and then examines the formation of the Combined Chiefs at the Washington conference of December 1941 and the development of their organizational and administration structure. It then looks at how they shaped the war, with chapters on the Pacific Theatre, the development of a fully mobilized and integrated war effort, the conception and planning of Overlord, coping with the often amateur strategies of their political leaders, and their oversight of operations in the field, closing with a look at political, diplomatic, and managerial aspects of their work. Anyone interested in how the war was won, coalition warfare, or grand strategy will find Allied Master Strategists important reading.'
For the full review, see StrategyPage.Com
The author describes in detail the workings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff - the joint US-British organization responsible for planning the war. He goes into the personal relationships, feuds and friendships that bound the CCS group together while they set strategic goals for defeating Germany and Japan.
The Brits thought Germany should be beaten first, but the Americans, shell-shocked by Pearl Harbor, wanted to bring the fight to Japan at the same time as Germany.
Some scholars have suggested that US Admiral Ernest King's thrust through the Japanese-held island chains in the Central Pacific wasn't necessary; that General MacArthur's slower but less casualty-costly offensive out of the Southwest Pacific was sufficient to win.
"Allied Master Strategists" has a convincing answer to the critics. The author points out that Adm. King chose his island strategy becuse he believed that it would move faster, that the two offensives could support each other's flanks, and that the US Navy already had well-developed plans for that kind of warfare.
It's worth reading the book for this kind of insight, but it also offers many other alalyses of the high-level thinking that led to victory.



