- Hardcover 232 pages
- Publisher: Harvard University Press (June 15, 2010)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0674048962
- ISBN-13: 978-0674048966
- Product Dimensions: 6.2 x 0.5 x 9.5 inches
- Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
- Average Customer Review: 1 customer review
- Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #3,143,695 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
To get the free app, enter your mobile phone number.
Allies of the State: China's Private Entrepreneurs and Democratic Change
Use the Amazon App to scan ISBNs and compare prices.
The Amazon Book Review
Author interviews, book reviews, editors picks, and more. Read it now
Customers who viewed this item also viewed
Allies of the State is a finely-tuned laser of a book. With a rigorous yet elegant research design deployed with great dexterity, the argument unfolds in tantalizing layers, as Chen and Dickson get us closer than ever to understanding the political attitudes and behavior of China's private entrepreneurs. (Scott Kennedy, author of The Business of Lobbying in China)
About the Author
Jie Chen is William Borah Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Dean of the College of Graduate Studies at the University of Idaho.
Top customer reviews
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
On the other hand, "Allies of the State" is well written, and contains a clear overview of some of the economic policy changes made as China moved from Mao to 'Socialism with Chinese characteristics' and became the economic wonder of the 21st Century. From the early 1990s, the number of private enterprises in China increased by 35%/year, and now total over 5 million. By 2007 the private sector contributed 66% of GDP and 71% of tax revenues. Between 2002-06, the private sector created 44 million new jobs, while employment among SOEs fell 11 million. Private property is now protected by law, and the CCP began recruiting entrepreneurs in 2001. After the 1989 Tienanmen Square tragedy, planners and ideologues blamed economic reforms for creating instability. Deng's 1992 southern China tour was required to restart the reforms.
In the original reform phase, 1978-89, the size of private firms was limited to 7 persons, excluding the owner and his family. It was thought this would prevent their competing with SOEs. The limit came from Marx' comment that having over 8 workers was exploitative. (Later this limit was limited in China.) The private sector was also seen as a way to provide jobs for those whose family backgrounds and political problems prevented their employment in the state sector. Evading the limit became wide-spread via claiming to be a TVE. In some communities, over 90% of TVEs were such 'red-hat' enterprises. Fears that SEZs risked China's autonomy and the survival of communism surfaced in the 1989 protests over corruption, inflation, and the failure to implement promised governing reforms, and the fact that these protests (most notably Tienanmen) were supported by capitalists such as Wan Runnan, founder of a successful electronic firm. (Their efforts included motorcycle-provided assistance.)
The years 1989-92 then brought retrenchment and repression. Skeptics advocated rolling back many reforms. Deng traveled to South China in the spring of 1992 and lauded their achievements and encouraged local leaders to be even bolder. At first, only local media provided coverage. Eventually national media reports of Deng's comments shifted the balance of power in favor of reform.
In 1992-2001 came rapid expansion of China's private sector - 90,000 in 1989, 400,000 in 1994, and 1.5 million in 1999, while capital/firm multiplied 7X. About 70% of SOEs were partially or totally privatized by 2001. In 1997, the CCP accepted the private sector as important, and by 2000 declared it would be officially supported. In 2002, policy turned to the present-day focus on building neglected areas (central and western China) and groups (rural residents). Private property rights were established. About 30% of SOEs were converted to private sector ownership, mostly through sales to insiders - often 'red hats' and/or CCP members. State employees were encouraged to participate. Only 22% of those sold were through public bidding - this encouraged corruption and kickbacks to local officials. (Major Soviet-style fraud was precluded by the state retaining ownership of SOEs in key industries - eg. autos, power, communications, transportation, steel, etc.
The authors state that 38% of entrepreneurs became CCP members, vs. only 6% of the general population - however, this seems doubtful unless they were restricting their analysis to only the largest and most successful entrepreneurs. Their surveys found that most entrepreneurs prefer stability and status quo to avoid jeopardizing their own personal economic and social advancement. As Homer Simpson would say, "Duh!"