From Publishers Weekly
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"A chilling account of the political calculus that led five successive US presidents to turn a blind eye" to Pakistan's nuclear smuggling. — The Christian Science Monitor
"This chilling exposé chronicles American foreign policy in relation to nuclear weapons development worldwide, and particularly in Pakistan. Beginning with Truman's Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and ending with George W. Bush's hunt for nonexistent WMDs in Iraq, the history is as interesting as it is infuriating. Operating under Cold War paranoia in the 1960s and '70s, the U.S. saw Pakisatn as a conveniently located ally and so, in addition to providing hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid, helped jumpstart the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, which gave the country its nuclear capabilities. What followed was decades of mismanagement, culminating in the revelation that Pakistani national hero A.Q. Khan was deeply involved in the nuclear black market; the authors contend that the U.S. government knew all about Khan's negotiations with Libya, Iran and North Korea, but ignored it to keep Pakistan an ally, first against the Communists and now in the 'War on Terror.' This accessible history should raise awareness of the many devil's bargains that the U.S. has struck in the seemingly vain hope of keeping control over perhaps the greatest man-made threat to humanity." — Publishers Weekly
Learn more at www.islamicbomb.org
"Armstrong and Trento argue convincingly that Pakistan's leaking and selling of atomic secrets across the region have increased nuclear proliferation by 'small, weak states' and the likelihood of 'terrorists or unfriendly regimes getting their hands on an atomic device.' The United States 'aided and abettted' this exchange by remaining allied to Pakistan, which harbored one of the worst culprits, A.Q. Khan, leader of a nuclear smuggling ring, and by not taking a stronger stance against nuclear proliferation. . . . Written by experienced journalists . . . combines research with a journalistic flair. . . . and invites a wide readership from a lay audience." — Library Journal
“ . . . a ground-level look at the operational failures of U.S., British and other intelligence services in assessing the Khan network. . . . David Armstrong and Joseph Trento reveal multiple scuttled investigations and chronicle the infighting within several U.S. administrations, beginning under Reagan in the 1980s, over what to do about Khan and, more broadly, Pakistan, whose cooperation was deemed vital in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. Rivetingly, Armstrong and Trento also recount the deals that Khan made . . . to supply uranium centrifuges to several countries. And they tell the story of . . . a successful British effort to uproot the tentacles of Khan's illicit purchasing network from Malaysia to Spain and France.”
— Washington Post Book World