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Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity 1st Edition
In a devastating critique Raymond Tallis exposes the exaggerated claims made for the ability of neuroscience and evolutionary theory to explain human consciousness, behaviour, culture and society.
While readily acknowledging the astounding progress neuroscience has made in helping us understand how the brain works, Tallis directs his guns at neuroscience’s dark companion – "Neuromania" as he describes it – the belief that brain activity is not merely a necessary but a sufficient condition for human consciousness and that consequently our everyday behaviour can be entirely understood in neural terms.
With the formidable acuity and precision of both clinician and philosopher, Tallis dismantles the idea that "we are our brains", which has given rise to a plethora of neuro-prefixed pseudo-disciplines laying claim to explain everything from art and literature to criminality and religious belief, and shows it to be confused and fallacious, and an abuse of the prestige of science, one that sidesteps a whole range of mind–body problems.
The belief that human beings can be understood essentially in biological terms is a serious obstacle, argues Tallis, to clear thinking about what human beings are and what they might become. To explain everyday behaviour in Darwinian terms and to identify human consciousness with the activity of the evolved brain denies human uniqueness, and by minimising the differences between us and our nearest animal kin, misrepresents what we are, offering a grotesquely simplified and degrading account of humanity. We are, shows Tallis, infinitely more interesting and complex than we appear in the mirror of biologism.
Combative, fearless and always thought-provoking, Aping Mankind is an important book, one that scientists, cultural commentators and policy-makers cannot ignore.
- ISBN-101844652726
- ISBN-13978-1844652723
- Edition1st
- PublisherAcumen
- Publication dateJanuary 1, 2011
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions6.5 x 1.5 x 9.5 inches
- Print length400 pages
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Despite its mischievous title, Aping Mankind is a very serious book, and represents the author's current location in his decades-long stream of multifaceted thinking. Tallis has been called a polymath ― he is a physician, philosopher, public speaker, and a prolific writer … Much of his speaking and writing over the past several decades has been deliberately controversial and engagingly argumentative, and Aping Mankind is no exception … The breadth of Tallis's familiarity and facility with the positions of others both in his own field and in others (such as the arts) is impressive throughout the book … The reader will find it richly rewarding, packed with thoughts worth sharing and ideas worth considering, and quite a lot of fun. For what more could we reasonably ask?" – Metapsychology Online
"This is an immensely valuable book because it makes us think hard about what we are and 'if any ideas are important, then ideas about the kind of creatures we are must be of supreme importance'. My bottom line is buy it and read it and then read it again and again and again … A landmark book." – Network Review
"A triumph of rational thought over the Darwinian afflictions that the author argues against in such an eloquent fashion" – The Quarterly Review of Biology
"A terrific book, though readers must be prepared to read it at least twice, not because it is in any sense obscure, but fully to appreciate the richness and subtlety of Tallis’s novel insights, with all their implications for our understanding of humanity’s precious attributes of freedom, intentionality and moral responsibility." – James Le Fanu, The Tablet
"A trenchant, lucid and witty attack on the reductive materialism of many scientific accounts of consciousness – not from a religious point of view, but that of an atheist humanist with a distinguished record in medicine and neuroscience." – David Lodge, The Guardian’s Books of the Year 2011
"Neuroscience, we are implausibly informed by white-coated Simon Baron-Cohen, will help dispense with evil. Who better to debunk its pretensions while instructing us in its uses than wise, literate Raymond Tallis, a neuroscientist himself, in his entertaining Aping Mankind." – George Walden, Evening Standard’s Best Books of the Year
"With erudition, wit and rigour, Tallis reveals that much of our current wisdom is as silly as bumps-on-the-head phrenology." – Jane O’Grady, The Observer
"Impassioned and intensely erudite." – Dominic Lawson, Sunday Times
"Brilliantly written . . . renowned polymath Raymond Tallis puts the picture back into much clearer perspective in his scathing exposé of neuroscientific narcissism." – Human Givens
"A pleasure to read. . . Tallis is fighting for a good cause." – Willem B. Drees, Times Higher
"This kind of personhood – the capacity, in fact the compulsion, to bring things together into some kind of coherent narrative, without which experience is not just senseless, but almost impossible, is what Tallis believes science cannot now explain. Anyone tempted to suppose that science has explained it even in principle – and that means almost all of us – should read him, and realise we’re wrong." – Andrew Brown, The Guardian
"an all-out assault on the exaggerated claims made on behalf of the biological sciences . . . an important work. Tallis is right to point out that a fundamental shift in our self-perception is under way and frequently going too far." – Stephen Cave, Financial Times
". . . a relentless assertion of common sense against a delusive but entrenched academic orthodoxy. Few books evince their authors’ complete mastery of his subject like Aping Mankind." – The New English Review
"A provocative, fascinating, and deeply paradoxical book. . . Tallis displays a wit and a turn of phrase which often made me howl with laughter." – Allan Chapman, Church Times
"A major and erudite statement of a position that is intellectually, morally and spiritually of the first importance to us living now." – Roger Scruton
"A splendid book. Tallis is right to say that current attempts to explain major elements of human life by brain-talk are fearfully misguided. He is exceptional in having both the philosophical grasp to understand what is wrong here and the scientific knowledge to expose it fully. He documents the gravity of this menace with real fire, venom and humour." – Mary Midgley
"A wonderful book and an important book, one that all neuroscientists should read. Tallis’s fearless criticism of the work of some distinguished contemporary academics and scientists and the rather ludicrous experimental paradigms of fMRI work needs to be made." – Simon Shorvon, UCL Institute of Neurology
"I strongly recommend this work to existential therapists and indeed to anyone who has ever asked the question of what it is to be human...Tallis writes eloquently and argues brilliantly" – Existential Analysis
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- Publisher : Acumen; 1st edition (January 1, 2011)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 400 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1844652726
- ISBN-13 : 978-1844652723
- Item Weight : 1.7 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 1.5 x 9.5 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,038,728 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #601 in Humanist Philosophy
- #951 in Neuroscience (Books)
- #2,659 in Cognitive Psychology (Books)
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Against popular modern philosophical thinking, the author strongly affirms the obvious realities of consciousness, qualia and intentionality. It is most impressive and intellectually delicious how, with razor-sharp reasoning, Tallis lays waste to Dan Dennett's ideas who seeks to explain these issues "away" (at some point he rightfully argues why Dennett's book "Consciousness Explained" should rather be called "Consciousness Evaded"). He also superbly demolishes Dawkins' meme theory and, while he does not mention his name that frequently, Steven Pinker's ideas as well. Tallis convincingly demonstrates why evolutionary psychology and its spin-offs neuroaesthetics, neuroethics, neurolaw and neurotheology, among others, are thoroughly misguided (and in part dangerous) pseudo-science -- even if some of the studies have been published in the most reputable top scientific journals like Nature and Science. He also refutes the popular but unfounded idea that the human mind is (like) a computer, and shows how hollow the assertion is that one day computers may acquire consciousness once they are "complex enough". Tallis affirms that the mind is not identical with the brain, but that it is far more than just the brain. His arguments to that effect, which do not invoke an immaterial soul, are original, and while I do not by any means think they tell the entire story, they certainly appear to have considerable merit.
Tallis also affirms the profound and common-sense reality of human freedom, against all the facile and pseudo-scientific dismissals, born from nothing more than plain naturalistic dogma, that it is just an illusion of our brains. He tries to argue for freedom from the perspective of intentionality which, he appears to think, simply allows us to somehow step back from the laws of nature and make choices by "aligning ourselves for our means" with one law or another. Yet Tallis treats intentionality as a brute given, and it seems hard to envision how intentionality, even from his particular view of how the mind is more than just the brain, somehow might escape the web of determinism without the assumption of an immaterial soul. This section appears rather contrived, and to me clearly shows some of the limitations of an atheistic world view. Tallis shines the right light on the common-sense reality of human freedom and he does it so well; the more stunning it seems how his solution appears so flawed. Yet this is an exception in a book that is otherwise soundly reasoned (a few remarks here and there also reveal a crude lack of understanding of theistic philosophy; yet these remarks are not directly relevant to the ideas discussed in the book).
Tallis rightfully rejects scientism, the silly and dogmatic idea that science is the only valid source of human knowledge and understanding (just like him, I reject the idea also as a scientist, knowing the limitations of science). He restores proper authority to philosophy which, while it should be informed by science, is not subservient to it. Interestingly, while as an atheist the author repeatedly dismisses dualism and what he calls "supernaturalism" as unnecessary alternative, he ultimately has to admit that he has no good explanation for the mysteries of the human mind himself -- which puts into question if dualism is really as unnecessary an alternative as he wants it to be. It makes the impression that Tallis does protest a bit too much. It is refreshing, however, that he exhibits the intellectual honesty, the profound philosophical thought and the common sense to admit to these mysteries, rather than being content with modern materialistic pseudo-explanations.
This book should be considered mandatory reading for atheists who are interested in genuine reasoning about the reality of the uniqueness of the human mind, rather than in superficial pseudo-scientific reasoning that is rooted in Neuromania and in a simplistic biologism that seeks to minimize what distinguishes us from the remainder of the animal world, including apes. It should also be considered mandatory reading for theists who want to inform themselves how a convincing case can be made that evolutionary psychology, Neuromania and Darwinitiis are terribly mistaken, simply by reasoning "from within", without having to invoke an immaterial soul (I do believe that correct philosophy about human rationality and freedom is ultimately impossible without the concept of a soul, but that is another issue). Be prepared though to invest some mental energy into following the arguments, which can be demanding at times. But it is worth it.
I recommend this well-reasoned and exciting book in the highest terms.
Contrary to what evolutionary psychologists have argued, our behavior is not just determined by our biology. "The reduction of human life to a chain of programmed responses of modules to stimuli overlooks the complexity of everyday experience and the singularity of the situations we find ourselves in, to say nothing of the role of conscious deliberation." The human brain alone does not account for all our actions, our most private thoughts and our beliefs.
Religious belief is not the result of certain parts of the brain, so-called "God-spots". We are not just "hard-wired" for religious belief.
Darwinism cannot give a satisfactory answer to the questions: how did consciousness emerge, and what is consciousness for, anyway? When Darwinists teach that natural selection is random, and that we have evolved without any intelligent design or purpose, they still have to account for the emergence of humans who have consciousness, and seek for meaning and purpose in their lives. The logic of human development presupposes purpose. Atheists cannot explain the fact that we are purpose-seeking beings. We have the need to ask "Why?" We seek reasons. We are rational beings. Random natural selection does not explain this feature of life.
Tallis protests too much when he opines, "As an atheist humanist I reject the idea that evolution has a goal. More particularly, I do not for a moment think it had us in mind as its destination and crowning glory....it is a mindless, pointless process...Darwin had argued that there was an alternative to a conscious, super-intelligent designer: the operation of unconscious, although non-random, natural selection over hundreds of millions of years." He is going against his fellow atheists, like Dawkins, who see no purpose in the blind forces of physics. He claims that Darwinism leaves something unaccounted for.
"Isn't there a problem in explaining how the blind forces of physics brought about (cognitively) sighted humans who are able to see, and identify, and comment on, the `blind' forces of physics, even to notice that they are blind, and deliberately utilize them to engage with nature as if from the outside, and on much more favorable terms than those that govern the lives of other animals? On the Origin of the Species leaves us with the task of explaining the origin of the one species that is indeed a designer. How did humans get to be so different?...Something rather important about us is left unexplained by evolutionary theory. We are not mindless and yet seem to do things according to purposes that we entertain in a universe that brought us into being by mindless processes that are entirely without purpose. To deny this is not to subscribe to Darwinism but to embrace Darwinitis."
Tallis addresses the issue of God rigging the outcome of evolution, but concedes that that notion would not be compatible with evolutionary theory. He thinks that evolution is a shockingly cruel and inefficient process that has nothing to do with love, mercy or even common decency. It is no place for a God of love. He has a problem with the relationship between God and nature, and opts for eliminating God from the equation. He thinks that belief in a Creator is a man-made notion to explain why the world makes sense. However he is disgusted with those who would reject religion on the basis of a devastating reductionism. "In defending the humanities, the arts, the law, ethics, economics, politics and even religious belief against neuro-evolutionary reductionism, atheist humanists and theist have a common cause, and, in reductive naturalism, a common adversary: scientism."
This book will keep the new atheists like Dawkins, Dennett, Harris, Hitchens and Wilson up late at night. If ever Tallis has a religious experience he will be hard put to maintain his atheism since he has rejected scientific reductionism.
Perhaps the most effective part of his critique is that which deals with "neuromania" and its dependence upon fMRI brain scans. Tallis defends the view that the mind is not the brain, and that brain scans reveal nothing of interest about mental activity beyond a vague correlation - yes, our neurons do fire when we think, but no, this is not what thinking actually is.
There is also a valuable and enlightening discussion of what makes humans different from the other animals. Tallis relies upon commonsense here, but also highlights the idea that humans are explicit animals. The striking idea that a human tool is a "sign of itself" - in other words, it looks like a designed artifact rather than something sculpted by nature - was worth much more space than he gives it. This may provide a key to understanding the whole network of signs and symbols, the objects and practices that transcend animal awareness and provide the basis for human existence.
Raymond Tallis is a fascinating philosopher whose latest work is stylish, provocative, and intellectually rewarding. Four stars.
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A peculiar quality of this book, however, is that some aspects can both impress and frustrate, almost at the same time. For example, the bibliography runs to over fifteen pages, and represents an impressive range of primary publications and secondary reading. Tallis not only knows what he's talking about, he seems to know what everyone else is talking about. So, why can I, with a much smaller library of references, identify at least three or four books that are unaccountably absent? Now, I usually don't like critics who complain about what's missing, but occasionally I think such complaints can be justified.
For example, one of the major themes of the book explores, to put it crudely, the gap between matter and consciousness. Tallis is keen "to resist the claim that it is the structure and complexity of the brain that creates consciousness". Those who suppose that the contents of consciousness boil down to "patterns of material objects or events" in the brain forget that these have to be picked out by something else: "a conscious observer". How Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain is actually the title of Antonio Damasio's latest book, mysteriously uncited by Tallis despite being highly relevant. Damasio explores how "the brain manages to introduce a knower in the mind" (p11 of his book). In contrast, time and again Tallis pours scorn on "the Hippocratic notion that the brain and the mind are identical" (p39 of his book) and so, it would seem, Tallis must conclude that Damasio is making a fundamental mistake. And yet when Damasio writes that there "is indeed a self, but it is a process, not a thing", surely Tallis would agree?
"The notion that our consciousness, the self to which the successive moments of consciousness are attributed, our personality, our character, personhood itself, are identical with activity in our brains is so widely received that it seems downright eccentric to profess otherwise." That Tallis is aware of his own eccentricity is endearing up to a point, until it becomes, and in one sense literally, self-defeating. In his vehement rejection of the brain he does not see that he's also throwing overboard the very thing he wants to preserve, the self.
For all its complexity and diversity, the self has one very simple, and logically crucial, property: boundedness. Tallis seems to forget this when he insists that our "consciousness, and the engines that shape it, cannot be found solely in the stand-alone brain; or even just in a brain in a body; or even in a brain interacting with other brains in bodies". Our consciousness, he continues, "participates in, and is part of, a community of minds built up by conscious human beings over hundreds of thousands of years". Surely, he is confusing consciousness with culture?
In Soul Searching: Human Nature and Supernatural Belief (another uncited book), Nicholas Humphrey identifies one necessary condition for natural selection as being that living organisms should be highly discrete in the way they go about things. Having boundaries is essential, not just biologically, but for precisely those aspects of human nature that Tallis fears are under threat from a biological description: personality, character, personhood, self.
Humphrey also notes that scientific materialism "is regarded by many, even by some of its own prophets, as deeply unsatisfying" (p7 of his book). Along with the "resistless melancholy" Elizabeth Barrett feared would fall upon her if she had such thoughts, this captures the overwhelming feeling of this book. I certainly got the impression that Tallis would agree wholeheartedly with Elizabeth Barrett that scientific materialism is "a miserable creed" but I just don't share his pain. That could well be because I am too stupid to understand the issues, and I freely admit I may be closer to the pig satisfied than Socrates unsatisfied.
However, Tallis is not quite the socratic sage himself. In a revealing sentence he says: "if the arguments sketched above were sound... then we would require no data to support them". Now, he is enough of a philosopher to realize that arguments are either sound or unsound, not true or false, but he seems to forget that validity is only one criterion for soundness: the premises must also be true, and this requires data.
This is not the only infelicity in reasoning. In attacking the bogeyman of determinism he mistakenly conflates ultimate and personal responsibility, as if losing one jeopardizes the other. In her magnificent Human Nature After Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction (Philosophy and the Human Situation) (another uncited book), the professional philosopher Janet Radcliffe Richards addresses many of the issues that concern Tallis. Indeed, her title is one of the major themes of his book, which makes this omission all the more curious. In contrast with Tallis, she writes that "many philosophers argue that determinism is essential for free will and responsibility" (p139 of her book). You wouldn't get that impression reading Aping Mankind.
Tallis snorts in derision at uberneuromaniac Daniel Dennett's idea that free will is an illusion. What's so funny about that? Gravity, too, is an illusion (a "fictitious" force, according to Victor Stenger in Fallacy of Fine-Tuning ), but I don't go jumping out of fifth-floor windows expecting to fly. This polemical tone can be entertaining so long as you share his judgement about who is a deserving target, although it also inevitably corrodes his intellectual project. For example, he quite rightly recoils from prefix promiscuity, where neuro- is tagged on to everything. And yet Tallis is guilty of this himself. I've always read Dennett as a philosopher who has a broad and deep interest in science. I've heard him lecture several times, and I've never heard him described or introduced as a "neurophilosopher" and yet this is how Tallis chooses to characterize him. It is one of the many ironies in this book that Tallis narrows Dennett with this demeaning term, while elsewhere lambasting those who limit our view of the mind to brain.
Is it also a cheap rhetorical trick to invent ridiculous sounding terms like Neuromania and Darwinitis and then go on at length as though they were real? I wouldn't go that far. These ugly diseases of the mind are more than "shaping fantasies" apprehended by the seething brain of Raymond Tallis. That they are not entirely within his own head gives this book some legitimacy, although, ironically, their unreality would vindicate some of his arguments about the mind's wonderful ability to transcend material reality. He has given local habitation and names to more than "airy nothing" but I fear he "sees more devils than vast hell can hold".
I think that Tallis as a humanist is desperate to distance humanity from biological determinism (which also undermines the whole concept of the existence of rationality and science therefore) and the bleak philosophies that flow from that. He wants Art for Art's sake and not as an adaptive survival mechanism! He wants to retain a sense of humanity's (and his own - there is a sense that he protests very loudly) wonderful difference from the animal realm, yet as an atheist who cannot bring himself to deny his neo-Darwinian faith, he rejects the classic dualism of religious thought. Yet his own (admittedly very truncated presentation thereof in this book) theory still has matter pulling itself up by its own boot straps to create consciousness. It has to do with hand/eye coordination mixed with social interaction leading to a sense of self in relation to others and the ensuing nexus of shared memory/ideas/values so that finally true consciousness escapes the bonds of the brain to exist in the social space. That probably faulty and simplistic explanation will not have done his magisterial theory any justice l'm sure! It seems to be disguised by the classic sleight of hand of 'with many small steps we climbed Mount Improbable' which is an illusory path because the many steps lack any direction towards anything as they rely upon purely random events, such as mutation, for anything to change. Major things about consciousness are that it is analytic, purposeful and directive. The very antithesis of chance acting under natural law. It rules over matter and its laws; it isn't subject to them but utterly disassociated from them. How did that magic materialise - the immaterial from the material? It is so very different from cause and effect matter. It also either is or isn't present as a whole. It is irreducibly complex to coin a phrase!
But where or how exactly does the metamorphosis into real consciousness happen from the instinctual and rudimentary self-recognition of apes? We are very, very different from all animals. Even in such basic similar functions as defaecation as Tallis enjoys telling (Dr's humour no doubt!) not just in the Arts and Philosophy. How did Consciousness escape the dull sleep of lumpitiousness? Existential agonising from sodium ion fluctuation? Unlikely. The multiplication of computational power thro a bigger or more intricately wired brain for him is just more of the same. A bigger lump. The biological binary of fluctuating neuronal action potentials just don't cut it. AI is dead in the water for similar reasons. The Turing test inadequate.
At last I think he admits that it is still a Mystery. His beliefs lead him to scornfully reject the religious explanation that we are different because we are made that way. He certainly doesn't align with any belief in Divine agency and is embarrassed his book may be used by Creationists. Silly people when he has disproved the existence of God as illogical. Gosh, that's it then, no more debate needed!
There seems to be evidence tho' that consciousness is something extra-material; Tallis says so though he locates it predominantly in the social space, even though intimately connected to the brain - well, he has to doesn't he? Why should it not be derived from a greater original Consciousness? Why shouldn't that Consciousness be more fundamental than matter? What is unreasonable about that? Why shouldn't that ultimate Consciousness have shaped a place for other consciousnesses to exist? Why not souls therefore? Surely the reasonable evidence is between our own ears (or wherever!) present in the existence of our thoughts? There is much evidence presented here that a purely material explanation is inadequate. Seems more reasonable that matter derived from Mind than the other way round.
Tallis has done us the favour of displaying the vacuousness of the neuromaniac and hyper-Darwinitic view of mankind with great learning and attention to detailed rebuttal. Important when all we hear is the litany of 'we're not special; we're just animals'. Well, we are (special) it seems though that is blindingly obvious.
I found the book a real education though no doubt some may say I need more education yet.
The title and subtitle of this book marks Tallis as a satirist and not the kindest. This is what he has to say about Dennett's book:
"a book title that should have landed him in court, charged with breach of the Trade Descriptions Act, for what this, his most famous, book offers is not Consciousness Explained, but Consciousness Evaded."
I liken Tallis to Don Quixote attacking windmills or medieval Scholastics railing against the Renaissance and Enlightenment philosophers who introduced the nonsensical (to them) notion that objects might move through the heavens without needing to be pushed or pulled by some person or animal, albeit sometimes endowed with magical attributes. The medievals found it easier to conceive of human or semi-human agency than of abstractions like gravitation whose secrets could only be revealed to the practioners of the rituals of 'Symbol Manipulation'.
Tallis has a chapter, "Bewiched by language" in which he states "Computers are no more information handlers in their own right than a clock is something that tells the time." Neither John Harrison nor John von Neumann would dispute the proposition, whether or not the phrase "in their own right" is removed. However, that phrase is a nugget of tendentiousness of the sort that Tallis skillfully finds and lays bare in the writings of his antagonists.
Tallis freely admits his failure to understand. In one instance, after quoting a passage of about four or five lines from 'Consciousness Explained', he comments: "You don't need to be able to understand this (I don't) but you can see where he [Dennett] is coming from." The implication being that there was probably nothing of sufficient import in the passage to justify the time and effort it might take the reader - or Tallis himself - to get to understand it. I requote it here so that you may make that judgement for yourself:
"[Dennet believes that minds can] best be understood as the operation of a "von Neumannesque" virtual machine implemented in the parallel architecture of a brain that was not designed for any such activities. The powers of this virtual machine vastly enhance the underlying powers of the organic hardware on which it runs."
Regarding Tallis's comment, some readers may think they can see where Dennett comes from while others might think they can see where Tallis comes from, and yet others might say that they come from very nearly the same place; that it merely depends on the interpretation of Dennett's word, 'Vastly'.
Tallis makes no bones about where he comes from. To him its not a matter of quantification. Its just obvious to him that the human mind is qualitatively and categorically different from a machine.
About the excessive claims of much contemporary Evolutionary Biology and E. Psychology, Tallis has harsh words to say, and I agree with him. However, he has his own 'Just So' story about the evolution of human consciousness. This, I think, stops short of explaining how human consciousness got to be as different as he maintains it to be, from that of other creatures, higher apes in particular.
Tallis has no patience with scientism, the 'mistaken belief that the natural sciences can or will give a complete description and even explanation of everything, including human life'. He takes aim at the orthodox view of the brain, promoted aggressively by Daniel Dennett among others, that every mental phenomenon can be accounted for in terms of matter - the physical stuff of physics, chemistry, and physiology. Human behaviour and decision-making can't be reduced to what is going on in our brains, any more than it can be explained in terms of evolutionary adaptation, he thinks. Far from being chained to our evolutionary past, human consciousness has developed to the point that we have the ability to recognize and subvert the unconscious impulses that are supposed to drive us.
There are no punches pulled here. The idea underlying modern neuroscience, that nerve impulses can journey towards a place where they become consciousness, is plain 'barmy', Tallis thinks. He is scathing about Daniel Dennett's attempt to explain away intentionality by arguing that the inner life we ascribe to others is merely an 'interpretative device' and that nothing in reality corresponds to it. On the contrary, he argues, 'it is not out of mere interpretative convenience that we ascribe all sorts of intentional phenomena - perceptions, feelings, thoughts - to people; it is because the intentional phenomena are real, as we know from our own case.' These questions are easy to lose sight of, Tallis suggests, especially if one 'is a neuromaniac and has a vested interest in concealing it'.
Tallis is especially scornful about the way academics in the humanities - until recently sceptical of the claims of science - have rushed to embrace what he calls 'Neuromania', developing a whole new line in gobbledygook with which to impress and baffle their readers. He points out that fMRI scanning technology is actually quite a blunt instrument, that misses at least as much neuronal activity as it reveals - and doesn't justify the claims being based on it. The design of the studies used to reveal what's going on in the brain when, for instance, we feel romantic love or go on a shopping binge are 'laughably crude' and actually don't explain very much at all.
What gives the polemic force is the fact that Tallis knows his stuff, as a medical doctor who has also engaged in neuroscientific research. He gives a very detailed picture of what is known about the workings of the brain, and the assumptions that are currently being made about it, before going on to demonstrate what he considers to be gross flaws in the orthodox approaches.
Once I'd grasped how completely Tallis rejects current thinking I was all agog to know what he - a knowledgeable neuroscientist and 'proud atheist' - would propose in its place. He briefly sketches three alternatives: that consciousness is to be understood in terms of human relations as much as in biology (a view apparently now being promoted by the MIT, once the capital of mind-brain identity theory); that the solution will be found in quantum mechanics (which he forcefully dismisses); or that we should seriously moot the possibility of panpsychism, that consciousness is present throughout the entire universe (which, like David Chalmers and Galen Strawson, he considers has a certain logic). However since none of these really appeal, he is content to remain an 'ontological agnostic'.
Aping Mankind is erudite, passionate, witty and humane, although the humour will probably be lost on readers who find their assumptions being mocked. There will be at least some support for the attack on the media's uncritical fascination with neuroscience - this is a bubble just waiting to be pricked. But I can't see the arguments against consciousness being a product solely of brain functions gaining much traction with an establishment so wedded to materialist dogmas. That someone taking the minority view should express himself so forcefully will be considered poor taste.
However for those of us who consider the orthodox view of mind to be scientifically and philosophically incoherent - and richly in need of debunking - his book is a wonderfully stimulating read.


