This books' title is misleading. Rosenberg is not principally advancing a defense of atheism, he is defending what he himself describes as "scientism." By scientism, Rosenberg means the view that the "physical facts" -- essentially meaningless collections of sub atomic particles ("fermions and bosons") -- "fix" all other facts. In this view, physics not only offers an extremely powerful insight into the nature of reality -- the whole of reality is exhausted by what physics tells us. If physics does not include meaning or purpose in its account of reality, meaning or purpose must be illusions. While many self-described naturalist philosophers -- otherwise beholden to natural science as the only reliable means of understanding reality -- have attempted to reconcile a commitment to physicalism with our "common sense" or "folk" notions, Rosenberg will have none of it. Taking the scientistic view to its logical conclusion, Rosenberg maintains that not even our thoughts are "about" anything. We don't really think "about" anything; instead, our minds are simply physical input/output processors shaped by natural selection that give the appearance of what modern philosophers describe as intentionality.
If there is anything to commend about this argument, it is Rosenberg's stubborn insistence on accepting the implications of his scientistic commitments, however absurd. Most people, for example, would argue that, if physicalism implies that we can't have any thoughts about anything, then physicalism is false. Indeed, demonstrating that physicalism cannot account for intentionality is widely viewed as a reductio argument against the cogency of physicalism. But, rather than denying this implication (as most naturalist philosophers do), Rosenburg bites the bullet. Since the neurons in one's brain cannot -- on physicalism -- be "about" anything, and since our thoughts are nothing more than neuronal processes, ergo, our sense that we think "about" concepts, ideas, beliefs, etc. is an "illusion."
Of course, as Rosenberg seems to appreciate, this argument implies that the hundreds of pages of text in Rosenberg's book aren't about anything either. Rosenberg's very arguments for scientism must be dismissed as meaningless scribbles, the excitation of neurons firing in Rosenberg's brain. Which is to say that Rosenberg's core argument -- like scientism itself -- is self-refuting. Indeed, it is not even coherent.
Rosenberg, for example, insists that "science" not only shows that the world is devoid of intentionality, "science" also maintains that there is no such thing as a self or person. But, if there is no self, who is the subject of the "illusion" that our thoughts are about something? Throughout his book, Rosenberg argues that human beings are beset by numerous "illusions" that science has now dispelled. Nowhere does he explain how it is possible that a non-existence self could entertain illusions in the first place. Who, exactly, is experiencing these illusions?
This is frankly only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the problems with Rosenberg' argument. Take the matter of defining one's terms -- an essential part of any philosophical argument. Rosenberg can't be bothered. Most notably, while pronouncing himself a believer in "scientism," Rosenberg cannot even be bothered to define what he means by "science." Does it include mathematics (presumably)? Philosophy (presumably not)? What does it mean for something to be "physical"? The closest Rosenberg comes is to say that science is "more a matter of blueprints, recipes, formulas, wiring diagrams, systems of equations, and geometrical proofs." Well, that narrows it down.
Other unaddressed questions abound. If purpose does not really exist in the universe, what the source of our concept of a "purpose"? How can Rosenberg demonstrate, within the methodological limitations of modern physics, that physics exhausts all there is no know about reality? Is there a theory of physics from which one can draw that conclusion? Can one account for the explanatory success of scientific theories while also maintaining, with Rosenberg, that there are no persons who are capable of thinking about anything? If so, how?
In lieu addressing these fundamental, threshold questions, Rosenberg offers what, for a professional philosopher, can only be described as blatantly fallacious arguments. He identifies (alleged) errors in introspection in certain discrete experimental settings and then draws the sweeping conclusion that introspection cannot be trusted at all to tell us anything about the mind. But Rosenberg ignores the modern neuroscience would be impossible if introspection were entirely unreliable. Even in the blindsight experiments that Rosenberg touts, the results depend on the reliability of the subject's report of his personal awareness (or lack thereof) of objects in his or her visual field (how does one know whether the subject does or does not see the object without introspection). Similarly, neuroscientific accounts of the correlation between brain activity and conscious states assumes that subjects have some reliable knowledge of the content of their conscious states.
Then there is Rosenberg attempt to explain away those features of reality that are inconvenient for scientism. For example, many philosophers -- including non-theists such as Thomas Nagel -- argue that the subject experience of consciousness, or "qualia," are impossible to explain with the tools of physical science. Rosenberg's response to this argument is, in essence, to complain that it is not "fair" for opponents of scientism/physicalism to highlight features of reality that physicalism cannot explain. That is, "science" -- really, Rosenberg's confused philosophical position masquerading as science -- has its tools for explaining reality; if reality isn't amenable to those tools, so much the worse for reality!
At points reading this book, it occurred to me that Rosenberg might be a closet religious fundamentalist who was trying to write a parody of atheism. I certainly found myself laughing out loud at time at the disparity between Rosenberg's intellectual self-confidence and the strength of his arguments. But, as remarkable as it may seem, there is no reason to doubt that Rosenberg quite sincerely believes in his scientism. Which, if scientism is true, makes no sense, as "beliefs" are non-physical and thus yet another examples of the many illusions with which "we" -- another illusion! -- are confronted.
Rosenberg's reductio thus is complete. If Rosenberg is right, he is wrong. Or, to be more precisely, if it is even possible in principle for Rosenberg to advance an argument through reasoning, and if it is further possible to assess the truth of that argument, then Rosenberg's scientism is thereby falsified. This, ultimately, is Rosenberg's only accomplishment.
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A curiously good book that falls apart into a train crash in the last half.
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