On one hand, this is a good book. I'll recommend it to anyone interested in the attack. Zimm's goal here is to analyze the Japanese planning, preparation, and execution of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and I think he does it pretty well. He explicitly doesn't try to tell the story, leaving that to other authors.
One of the reasons I like Zimm is that he understands wargaming; when he describes the pre-Midway Japanese gaming and the resurrection of Kaga and Akagi (IIRC), he doesn't engage in the usual tut-tutting. Instead, he points out that stopping the game at that point would be a waste of resources and that the best response is to write down that they lost at that point and why, to deal with it after the game, and make the minimal changes to allow the game to proceed, in order to explore the rest of the plan. Further, he takes the objective look of a modern analyst to the attack.
There are some spectacular high points in the book:
One [250kg] bomb [delivered by a dive bomber] did wonders for some American sailors' morale. It blasted open a mobile Gedunk Wagon on 1010 Dock. Men from Helena and everywhere within shouting distance raced to gather pies, ice cream, and candy bars, their fast reaction ensuring the Japanese could not claim credit for the destruction of vital supplies.
(p.211)
But there are some low points, too. The typos. Oh, the typos. It's bad. There is no copyeditor in evidence. (Par for the course of an academic book, but still....) Typos, reduplication; this book needs to be taken out, hung on a clothes line, and whacked with a rug-beater. Zimm can't decide whether Hawai'i should be spelled "Hawai'i", "Hawaii", or "Hawa'ii" (ah, the beautiful glaciers of the frozen land of Hawa-eee-eee). But there are a few situations that might be copyediting problems, but may not. Zimm writes,
Eventually, as the planning process brought the attack into focus, it is evident that the attack became an end unto itself. If weather prevented underway refueling, the force would proceed with only Kaga, Shokaku, and Zuikaku, and would attack the Pacific fleet battleships with twelve torpedoes and fifteen AP bombs....
(p.367)
The torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs were carried by B5N Kates, of which the Kaga, Shokaku, and Zuikaku each carried 27, for a total of 81. What happens in this scenario to the other 54 B5Ns? (p.84)
Well, the plan has two waves; in the first, the plan has 40 B5Ns carrying torpedoes and 50 carrying AP bombs against the fleet. The second wave has 54 B5Ns carrying general-purpose bombs against airfield hangers and facilities. (p.96) So Zimm's analysis of the no-refueling scenario has all of the missing aircraft taken from the first-wave attack on the fleet and leaves the second wave unchanged.
Now, one of Zimm's points in that the Japanese planners were heavily resistant to changes and contingencies. But holy poop, that's ridiculous. I'm going to need more footnotery to believe that than "Willmott, et al. 2001, 63-64".
Anyway, overall, it's a good book and will sit cheerfully next to Shattered Sword.
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The Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions Kindle Edition
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LanguageEnglish
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PublisherCasemate
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Publication dateMay 6, 2011
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Editorial Reviews
Review
“…proves an engrossing study, particularly for those considering themselves well-read on the topic…. it is even more interesting for those with ample knowledge of events in World War II's Pacific Theater of Operations leading up to, on, and following December 7, 1941. For a variety of reasons, including the provocative nature of many of Zimm's fact-built arguments, this reviewer does not hesitate to recommend..."
Globe at War
“…very thorough …as an analysis of the raid from the Japanese point of reference it is very intriguing and goes far to display the old axiom “every plan changes (or falls apart) once the enemy is encountered”.
IPMS/USA
“…examines every aspect of the attack and uses operations research techniques to critique the planning and performance of the Japanese forces and compare the results with expectations.”
Seapower
“Zimm's conclusions will remain definitive for the foreseeable future… So, by all means, reread Gordon Prange's At Dawn We Slept, but definitely read Alan Zimm's Attack on Pearl Harbor for a fuller and more up-to-date understanding of an event that changed history and continues to fascinate.”
Michigan War Studies Review
“It is not often that one can say that an outstanding book transforms our knowledge of a well –known event but this can be said of Alan Zimm’s Attack on Pearl Harbor….groundbreaking…sets straight the record of a key historical event…essential reading…”
Dr. Eric Grove, Navy News
“…uses modern methods of operational analysis to determine exactly how the Japanese planned and executed the great raid…a worthy, useful analysis…”
Naval History Magazine
“Dr. Zimm provides a solid analysis, and at the same time knows how to maintain a healthy critical distance vis-à-vis the literature (historical records, autobiographical accounts, official reports) which he puts to good use.”
Politique Etrangere
“An interesting analysis of the strategy and tactics involved. Instead of “the most daring and brilliant naval operations of all time”, Zimm demonstrates that the Japanese carrier strike force did not plan the attack very well, nor did they train effectively for it… an interesting new “look” at this opening gambit in the Pacific Theater of World War II.
The Past in Review
“For seven decades, conventional wisdom has extolled the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as brilliant in its planning and execution… masterful analysis topples that pillar of Pacific War history... with its amazing depth of meticulous research and analysis, this forceful book is essential reading for anyone with a serious interest in Pearl Harbor.”
World War II
“…nothing previously published has offered such a close examination of Japanese strategy…an in depth study of the Japanese planning, preparation and execution of the attack with particular focus on factors not thoroughly considered by other historians, if at all…full of revelations that counter common perceptions…detailed analyses that lead to a much better understanding of what the Japanese did, why they did it and especially how the attack was very nearly an abject failure instead of a stunning success.”
Proceedings
‘Anyone with a serious interest in understanding the Pearl Harbor attack in its many aspects, both for what actually happened and for what might have happened under alternative circumstances, should read this new book for the invaluable analytical rigor and intellectual exploration that it brings to the subject. “
Warship International Vol 49, No 1
“…the first militarily professional description of the Pearl Harbor attack, and for those who are serious about military history and operations, it is a joy to read… a superb military analysis of the attack…not only rendered all other histories of Pearl Harbor obsolete, it has set the bar high got other histories of the Pacific War.”
War in History
“Alan D. Zimm applies his considerable professional experience in operations research and combat simulations design to a novel assessment of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. It is an ambitious undertaking to fins something new to say about one of the most analyzed military engagements in history, but Zimm has managed to do so…must reading for any serious student of the Pacific War.”
International Journal of Maritime History
“…takes a very interesting approach…an arguably better and clearer analysis of what the Japanese did, could have done, and should have done. An amazing amount of detailed research on the part of a very fastidious individual has gone into this very valuable work.”
Work Boat World
“…takes a very interesting approach…analyses the known facts and data using modern research techniques. The result is an arguably better and clearer analysis of what the Japanese did, could have done, and should have done. An amazing amount of detailed research on the part of a very fastidious individual has gone into this very valuable work.”
Ausmarine
“ What Alan Zimm has done is to use Japanese information and not the uncorroborated thoughts of Mitsuo Fuchida, , who is now well known for being “careless with the truth”. With this information, Zimm has carried out a bottom up analysis of the attack in the first eight chapters covering the strategic and operational setting , the targets (and it is clear that these were the Pacific Fleet’s battleships and not the aircraft carriers), the weapons and weapon- target pairings, the war games, planning, training, rehearsals, briefings etc followed by the execution of the attack. He goes on to assess the attack, the attle damage and the folklore…..clearly this is not a primer for someone wishing to learn about the Pearl Harbor Attack . Rather, it is a thorough analysis of many aspects of the attack, completely overturning conventional wisdom.
The Northern Mariner
"... essential reading for anyone interested in the operation or the opening phases of the Pacific War…"
StrategyPage
"Readers will be left with a great deal to think about and consider new aspects of the attack that are illuminated in Zimm’s book. This excellent analysis is a definitive critique of the Japanese planning and execution of the attack. For any serious student of the Pacific War, the volume makes for fascinating, “must” reading and should be included among the very best books on the Pearl Harbor attack."
Naval Historical Foundation
"This is a very impressive contribution to the literature on Pearl Harbor. Zimm makes a very convincing argument for his view that the Japanese plan was flawed in many ways, but was saved by a combination of luck and the skill of the crews of the few torpedo bombers that actually hit important targets."
History of War --This text refers to the paperback edition.
Globe at War
“…very thorough …as an analysis of the raid from the Japanese point of reference it is very intriguing and goes far to display the old axiom “every plan changes (or falls apart) once the enemy is encountered”.
IPMS/USA
“…examines every aspect of the attack and uses operations research techniques to critique the planning and performance of the Japanese forces and compare the results with expectations.”
Seapower
“Zimm's conclusions will remain definitive for the foreseeable future… So, by all means, reread Gordon Prange's At Dawn We Slept, but definitely read Alan Zimm's Attack on Pearl Harbor for a fuller and more up-to-date understanding of an event that changed history and continues to fascinate.”
Michigan War Studies Review
“It is not often that one can say that an outstanding book transforms our knowledge of a well –known event but this can be said of Alan Zimm’s Attack on Pearl Harbor….groundbreaking…sets straight the record of a key historical event…essential reading…”
Dr. Eric Grove, Navy News
“…uses modern methods of operational analysis to determine exactly how the Japanese planned and executed the great raid…a worthy, useful analysis…”
Naval History Magazine
“Dr. Zimm provides a solid analysis, and at the same time knows how to maintain a healthy critical distance vis-à-vis the literature (historical records, autobiographical accounts, official reports) which he puts to good use.”
Politique Etrangere
“An interesting analysis of the strategy and tactics involved. Instead of “the most daring and brilliant naval operations of all time”, Zimm demonstrates that the Japanese carrier strike force did not plan the attack very well, nor did they train effectively for it… an interesting new “look” at this opening gambit in the Pacific Theater of World War II.
The Past in Review
“For seven decades, conventional wisdom has extolled the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as brilliant in its planning and execution… masterful analysis topples that pillar of Pacific War history... with its amazing depth of meticulous research and analysis, this forceful book is essential reading for anyone with a serious interest in Pearl Harbor.”
World War II
“…nothing previously published has offered such a close examination of Japanese strategy…an in depth study of the Japanese planning, preparation and execution of the attack with particular focus on factors not thoroughly considered by other historians, if at all…full of revelations that counter common perceptions…detailed analyses that lead to a much better understanding of what the Japanese did, why they did it and especially how the attack was very nearly an abject failure instead of a stunning success.”
Proceedings
‘Anyone with a serious interest in understanding the Pearl Harbor attack in its many aspects, both for what actually happened and for what might have happened under alternative circumstances, should read this new book for the invaluable analytical rigor and intellectual exploration that it brings to the subject. “
Warship International Vol 49, No 1
“…the first militarily professional description of the Pearl Harbor attack, and for those who are serious about military history and operations, it is a joy to read… a superb military analysis of the attack…not only rendered all other histories of Pearl Harbor obsolete, it has set the bar high got other histories of the Pacific War.”
War in History
“Alan D. Zimm applies his considerable professional experience in operations research and combat simulations design to a novel assessment of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. It is an ambitious undertaking to fins something new to say about one of the most analyzed military engagements in history, but Zimm has managed to do so…must reading for any serious student of the Pacific War.”
International Journal of Maritime History
“…takes a very interesting approach…an arguably better and clearer analysis of what the Japanese did, could have done, and should have done. An amazing amount of detailed research on the part of a very fastidious individual has gone into this very valuable work.”
Work Boat World
“…takes a very interesting approach…analyses the known facts and data using modern research techniques. The result is an arguably better and clearer analysis of what the Japanese did, could have done, and should have done. An amazing amount of detailed research on the part of a very fastidious individual has gone into this very valuable work.”
Ausmarine
“ What Alan Zimm has done is to use Japanese information and not the uncorroborated thoughts of Mitsuo Fuchida, , who is now well known for being “careless with the truth”. With this information, Zimm has carried out a bottom up analysis of the attack in the first eight chapters covering the strategic and operational setting , the targets (and it is clear that these were the Pacific Fleet’s battleships and not the aircraft carriers), the weapons and weapon- target pairings, the war games, planning, training, rehearsals, briefings etc followed by the execution of the attack. He goes on to assess the attack, the attle damage and the folklore…..clearly this is not a primer for someone wishing to learn about the Pearl Harbor Attack . Rather, it is a thorough analysis of many aspects of the attack, completely overturning conventional wisdom.
The Northern Mariner
"... essential reading for anyone interested in the operation or the opening phases of the Pacific War…"
StrategyPage
"Readers will be left with a great deal to think about and consider new aspects of the attack that are illuminated in Zimm’s book. This excellent analysis is a definitive critique of the Japanese planning and execution of the attack. For any serious student of the Pacific War, the volume makes for fascinating, “must” reading and should be included among the very best books on the Pearl Harbor attack."
Naval Historical Foundation
"This is a very impressive contribution to the literature on Pearl Harbor. Zimm makes a very convincing argument for his view that the Japanese plan was flawed in many ways, but was saved by a combination of luck and the skill of the crews of the few torpedo bombers that actually hit important targets."
History of War --This text refers to the paperback edition.
About the Author
Dr. Alan D. Zimm is a member of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, where he heads a section in the Aviation Systems and Advanced Concepts Group. He is a former officer in the US Navy, completing his service as a Commander, and holds degrees in Physics, Operations Research, and Public Administration with a concentration on Policy Analysis and Strategic Planning.
--This text refers to the paperback edition.
Product details
- ASIN : B004VRW1Z0
- Publisher : Casemate (May 6, 2011)
- Publication date : May 6, 2011
- Language : English
- File size : 4656 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Print length : 465 pages
- Lending : Enabled
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Best Sellers Rank:
#397,124 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #232 in History of Japan
- #360 in Military Strategy History (Kindle Store)
- #372 in Military Naval History
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Reviewed in the United States on November 1, 2019
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5.0 out of 5 stars
Careful, well researched and objective - a serious addition to the historical record.
Reviewed in the United States on November 5, 2015Verified Purchase
One of the most surprising books I've read on WWII history - and I'm pretty well read as both an avocation as well as studies in university. Although Zimm is a naval officer, this reads more like a carefully researched historian's work. There has been a considerable amount of mythology and repeated statements in the record of Pearl Harbor, and this work consider them in detail. Unlike many other historical treatments, this is ALSO a review of the engagement, in terms of how and why it happened the way it did. He does this from not only a historical perspective, but from the vantage of a military planner. For example, most armchair historians know that the USS West Virginia and USS Oklahoma were torpedoed and sunk. Why were they singled out? Zimm points out that the approach paths for attacking the other battleships were technically very difficult, requiring a low approach over alternating water and land from the south (exerting alternating uplift and downdraft on the torpedo bomber), and then with only a very limited time to drop the weapon into the harbor. The West Virginia and Okhlahoma, on the other hand, had clear over-water runs up one of the channels, making it a far easier attack from a technical perspective. The author is also quite objective, noting for example that the pilot who put a torpedo into the USS California had an extremely difficult task, flying a curved approach to a short drop - which he did to near perfection. These are NOT the type of things you read in other discussions of Pearl Harbor.
We're taught by both the historian's literature and the popular works that the attack was planned exhaustively and executed to perfection. Zimm points out that neither of these were the case. The planning was flawed in many ways, for example leaving a whole attack group allocated to aircraft carriers, even though intelligence unambiguously indicated that no carriers were in port. This wasted or at least mis-applied a fairly significant proportion of the first attack wave. The cherished notion that ships could be sunk in the channel to prevent the port from being used is exposed as completely impossible, since the channels were so wide that it would take TWO large ships, sunk end-to-end at exact right angles at the critical point. (The channel was about 1400 feet wide, and battleships were about 650 feet long by 100 feet wide.) In other words, without the active cooperation of at least one American captain, the planners had no hope of blocking the channel, so orders to attempt to block the channel should not have been issued, and the expenditure of a considerable proportion of the second wave's dive bombers should not have been expended on attempting to sink the USS Nevada in the channel.
Also considered are a variety of misconceptions (and a few outright lies) that have grown up around the event. For example, it is certainly true that the Fleet was at anchor in peacetime drill on the 7th of December. However, few realize that the attack had actually been planned for two weeks earlier (November 26th) - and that moreover, the whole base had been at high alert for the entire month before the actual attack. Had the attack actually been launched on Nov 26th as originally planned, the outcome would very likely have been quite different. Still a serious result for the US Pacific Fleet, but probably nothing like the completely one-sided catastrophe that actually occurred.
Other authors have castigated the Japanese planning methods for being entirely biased and in fact actually "rigged." Evidence of the latter is given by others as the war gaming referees "resurrecting" lost or damaged ships in the exercise. Zimm explains the wargaming methodology and in the process one realizes that such a "resurrection" might well be an entirely valid action. For example, if a force runs over a minefield and ships are sunk, the planners may make note of the fact and order in minesweepers in the event. The loss of the ships would then be irrelevant, so putting them back on the board to continue war gaming the remaining part of the plan is an entirely valid and unbiased method. He also notes that in some cases such changes were in fact reflected in the plans, and that in others, the suitable changes were NOT in fact ordered. This is a much more even-handed treatment than the common narrative.
Even if one does not completely agree with the very surprising different narrative, the author defends his analysis very well. Such analysis, at minimum, should cause everyone to consider why they agree or disagree with any given narrative - and that's the function of a work of historical analysis.
To me, this is probably the single most thoughtful and informative analysis of any WWI or WWII action that I've read.
Highly recommended.
We're taught by both the historian's literature and the popular works that the attack was planned exhaustively and executed to perfection. Zimm points out that neither of these were the case. The planning was flawed in many ways, for example leaving a whole attack group allocated to aircraft carriers, even though intelligence unambiguously indicated that no carriers were in port. This wasted or at least mis-applied a fairly significant proportion of the first attack wave. The cherished notion that ships could be sunk in the channel to prevent the port from being used is exposed as completely impossible, since the channels were so wide that it would take TWO large ships, sunk end-to-end at exact right angles at the critical point. (The channel was about 1400 feet wide, and battleships were about 650 feet long by 100 feet wide.) In other words, without the active cooperation of at least one American captain, the planners had no hope of blocking the channel, so orders to attempt to block the channel should not have been issued, and the expenditure of a considerable proportion of the second wave's dive bombers should not have been expended on attempting to sink the USS Nevada in the channel.
Also considered are a variety of misconceptions (and a few outright lies) that have grown up around the event. For example, it is certainly true that the Fleet was at anchor in peacetime drill on the 7th of December. However, few realize that the attack had actually been planned for two weeks earlier (November 26th) - and that moreover, the whole base had been at high alert for the entire month before the actual attack. Had the attack actually been launched on Nov 26th as originally planned, the outcome would very likely have been quite different. Still a serious result for the US Pacific Fleet, but probably nothing like the completely one-sided catastrophe that actually occurred.
Other authors have castigated the Japanese planning methods for being entirely biased and in fact actually "rigged." Evidence of the latter is given by others as the war gaming referees "resurrecting" lost or damaged ships in the exercise. Zimm explains the wargaming methodology and in the process one realizes that such a "resurrection" might well be an entirely valid action. For example, if a force runs over a minefield and ships are sunk, the planners may make note of the fact and order in minesweepers in the event. The loss of the ships would then be irrelevant, so putting them back on the board to continue war gaming the remaining part of the plan is an entirely valid and unbiased method. He also notes that in some cases such changes were in fact reflected in the plans, and that in others, the suitable changes were NOT in fact ordered. This is a much more even-handed treatment than the common narrative.
Even if one does not completely agree with the very surprising different narrative, the author defends his analysis very well. Such analysis, at minimum, should cause everyone to consider why they agree or disagree with any given narrative - and that's the function of a work of historical analysis.
To me, this is probably the single most thoughtful and informative analysis of any WWI or WWII action that I've read.
Highly recommended.
14 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on November 14, 2016
Verified Purchase
Awesome book with really good insights . Confirms what I thought or suspected about the culpability at the top . If Kimmel and Short had
had the guys even halfway ready as they were a couple of weeks prior , the outcome could have been much different . It also lays to rest several
popular myths about the attack , including a third wave and the possibility of effectively keeping the US out of the war longer . Must Read for any naval buff .
had the guys even halfway ready as they were a couple of weeks prior , the outcome could have been much different . It also lays to rest several
popular myths about the attack , including a third wave and the possibility of effectively keeping the US out of the war longer . Must Read for any naval buff .
8 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on January 9, 2016
Verified Purchase
Very good book that clarifies much of the story behind Pearl Harbor. Zimm makes a convincing case that the attack was neither 'brilliantly planned,' 'well-executed' nor strategically sound, despite its success.
The Japanese ran enormous risks with this operation, and the fact that they got lucky -- and were helped by American blunders (Gen. Short, especially) -- doesn't turn a poor plan into a good one.
As Zimm points out, Yamamoto's strike ensured that Japan would fight the long, attritional war that he knew they could not win. On the other hand, the USN had already decided that was going to be the kind of war it would fight anyway, due to logistic constraints and the size of the Pacific. So it may not have made much difference either way. Still, This book does a great forensic job dissecting the planning and conduct of this horrific American defeat and is heartily recommended.
The Japanese ran enormous risks with this operation, and the fact that they got lucky -- and were helped by American blunders (Gen. Short, especially) -- doesn't turn a poor plan into a good one.
As Zimm points out, Yamamoto's strike ensured that Japan would fight the long, attritional war that he knew they could not win. On the other hand, the USN had already decided that was going to be the kind of war it would fight anyway, due to logistic constraints and the size of the Pacific. So it may not have made much difference either way. Still, This book does a great forensic job dissecting the planning and conduct of this horrific American defeat and is heartily recommended.
8 people found this helpful
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Top reviews from other countries
C Castleton
3.0 out of 5 stars
This one is a problem for a dedicated reader of WWII history.
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on February 27, 2013Verified Purchase
This is the absolutely definitive nuts and bolts history of the planning and the attack on Pearl Harbour by a modern American naval officer, and it shows, sometimes to its strength but sadly too often to its weakness.
The endless study of BDA, bomb damage assessment, should have had a samurai sword taken to it by its editor so that more of the context, military, political and diplomatic, could have been treated.
Having said that, it is a quality product physically and has an intellectual rigour which has afforded me insight into the planning of this attack or indeed any WWII attack I would never have got anywhere else. But for such a dramatic event, it can be a real hill climb unless you are a hard-core WWII historical enthuisiast - which I am !
The endless study of BDA, bomb damage assessment, should have had a samurai sword taken to it by its editor so that more of the context, military, political and diplomatic, could have been treated.
Having said that, it is a quality product physically and has an intellectual rigour which has afforded me insight into the planning of this attack or indeed any WWII attack I would never have got anywhere else. But for such a dramatic event, it can be a real hill climb unless you are a hard-core WWII historical enthuisiast - which I am !
3 people found this helpful
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oldhexmap
5.0 out of 5 stars
The time is.....
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on June 2, 2020Verified Purchase
Proves it is the only book on Pearl Harbor worth reading. Makes all previous volumes obsolete. Revisionism at its true best
One person found this helpful
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J. Rupp
5.0 out of 5 stars
Das Ende eines Mythos
Reviewed in Germany on December 29, 2013Verified Purchase
Mit dem japanischen Angriff auf die amerikanische Marinebasis von Pearl Harbor, der am 7.12.1941 überraschend erfolgte, verbinden sich bis heute eine ganze Reihe von falschen Vorstellungen und Behauptungen, die sowohl im akademischen Schrifttum als auch in der Populärkultur eine weite Verbreitung gefunden haben. Ein angeblich brillanter Plan sei hervorragend ausgeführt worden und habe die US-Pazifikflotte für ein halbes Jahr paralysiert.
Dass hiervon keine Rede sein kann, belegt der ehemalige Marineoffizier Alan D. Zimm in diesem exzellenten Buch. Mit Hilfe der modernen Operationsanalyse zeigt er im Detail auf, warum die Strategie, die Planung, die Vorbereitung und die Ausführung der Attacke alles andere als vorbildlich waren.
Wie der Autor in seiner Einleitung klar hervorhebt, ist seine Studie keine revisionistische Geschichtsschreibung, sondern eine militärwissenschaftliche Untersuchung, die im Sinne einer Manöver- bzw. Einsatzkritik versucht, die Leistungen und Versäumnisse der beteiligten Akteure herauszuarbeiten. Seine Argumente haben aber sehr wohl erhebliche Konsequenzen für die historische Forschung, die sich in nicht wenigen Bereichen von bislang vertretenen Ansichten verabschieden muss.
Zimm beginnt seine Darlegungen mit einem Paukenschlag, indem er sich sehr kritisch mit dem strategischen Verständnis bzw. Unverständnis von Admiral Yamamoto auseinandersetzt. Dieser sei keineswegs der visionäre Vordenker der modernen Marinefliegerei gewesen, für den er bis heute vielfach gehalten wird. Sein Fokus war vielmehr auf das Versenken von Schlachtschiffen ausgerichtet, die er als die wahren Symbole der maritimen Macht betrachtete. Yamamotos Hauptziel bestand deshalb in der Ausschaltung der amerikanischen Schlachtschiffe und eben nicht in der Vernichtung von deren Flugzeugträgern.
Aus diesem Grund spielte die An- oder Abwesenheit der US-Träger in Pearl Harbor für ihn keine entscheidende Rolle. Wichtig war aus seiner Sicht nur, dass einige der Schlachtschiffe versenkt oder schwer beschädigt würden. Yamamoto erhoffte sich hiervon zum einen, dass die amerikanische Bevölkerung derart geschockt wäre, dass ihre Politiker keinen Willen mehr aufbringen könnten, um einen langen und kostspieligen Krieg gegen das "Reich der aufgehenden Sonne“ zu führen. Zum anderen versprach er sich einen Zeitgewinn von einem halben Jahr. Dies sollte den japanischen Streitkräften die Möglichkeit eröffnen, ihre Eroberungen im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum ungestört zu konsolidieren.
In beiden Punkten irrte er sich gewaltig. Die amerikanische Reaktion auf den unerwarteten Angriff bestand in einem einhelligen Ruf nach Vergeltung und Abrechnung mit dem als besonders hinterhältig empfundenen Aggressor. Der vermeintliche Zeitgewinn war gleichfalls eine Chimäre, weil die US-Pazifikflotte wegen ihrer logistischen Beschränkungen ohnehin nicht in der Lage gewesen wäre, die erste Phase des japanischen Eroberungsfeldzuges zu verhindern.
Die Attacke auf Pearl Harbor war also operativ unnötig und strategisch völlig kontraproduktiv.
Wie ihr Oberkommandierender bekommen auch die für die Angriffsplanung und Umsetzung hauptverantwortlichen Offiziere, Genda und Fuchida, ein schlechtes Zeugnis ausgestellt. Den beiden Marinefliegern unterliefen bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung der gewagten Operation derart viele Fehler, dass es schon der groben amerikanischen Fahrlässigkeit bedurfte, um noch einen taktischen Erfolg zu erzielen.
So gab es kein koordiniertes Vorgehen der eingesetzten Kräfte. Die Jagdflugzeuge, Torpedo-, Horizontal- und Sturzkampfbomber operierten unabhängig voneinander, ohne sich gegenseitig zu unterstützen. Vor allem die langsamen Torpedobomber, die für die Attacke auf die Schlachtschiffe unentbehrlich waren, hätten die Jäger als Geleitschutz gut gebrauchen können. So aber waren sie gezwungen, ihren gefährlichen Auftrag alleine auszuführen.
Die technisch begrenzten Kommando- und Kommunikationsmittel wurden ebenfalls schlecht genutzt oder gleich ganz ignoriert. Die Piloten waren hierdurch weitgehend auf sich selbst gestellt. Zudem verlief die Zielauswahl und Zielerfassung suboptimal. Die Flugbesatzungen mussten unter Gefechtsbedingungen und eingeschränkten Sichtverhältnissen ihre Ziele richtig erkennen und zuordnen, womit nicht wenige überfordert waren. Außerdem überlagerten sich die Flugruten der angreifenden Maschinen und deren zeitliche Abstimmung ließ mehr als zu wünschen übrig.
Das Hauptproblem bestand jedoch darin, dass die Japaner generell zu unflexibel waren. Anstatt ihre Planungen und Vorbereitungen an sich verändernde Umstände anzupassen, behielten sie diese unverändert bei. Beispielsweise spielte es für sie kaum eine Rolle, ob der Überraschungseffekt noch gegeben war oder nicht. Auch Genda und Fuchida, die der Vernichtung der amerikanischen Träger einen größeren Stellenwert einräumten als Yamamoto, reagierten nicht auf die kurz vor dem Angriffsbeginn erhaltene Nachricht, dass die Träger nicht im Hafen waren. Sie hielten stattdessen an der unrealistischen Annahme fest, dass diese vielleicht doch noch während der Attacke vor Ort sein würden.
Dass der Angriff überraschend erfolgen konnte, lag auch weniger am Geschick der Japaner, als vielmehr am Unvermögen der Amerikaner. Diese hatten am Tag der Attacke weder eine adäquate Luftaufklärung betrieben, noch die Luftverteidigungskapazitäten von Armee und Marine in erhöhte Alarmbereitschaft versetzt. Obwohl Warnungen über eine Kriegsgefahr vorlagen, veranlassten weder Admiral Kimmel noch Generalleutnant Short an jenem schicksalhaften Sonntag eine der Lage entsprechende Wachsamkeit und Kampfbereitschaft ihrer Einheiten.
Selbst die Aufklärungsflugzeuge und Mini-U-Boote, welche die Japaner in unverantwortlicher Weise vor ihrem Angriffsbeginn losgeschickt hatten, blieben unentdeckt oder wurden von höherer Stelle nicht als eine unmittelbar drohende Gefahr wahrgenommen. Dies wäre in den Wochen vor dem siebten Dezember wohl nicht der Fall gewesen, weil die US-Streitkräfte auf Hawaii in diesem Zeitraum besser vorbereitet waren. Über ein mangelndes Kriegsglück brauchte sich die japanische Seite daher nicht zu beklagen.
Zimm geht zudem noch auf die Bewertung des angerichteten Schadens durch die Japaner näher ein. Er vergleicht deren Einschätzungen mit dem real angerichteten Schaden. Seine Überlegungen zu häufig anzutreffenden Alternativ-Szenarien sind gleichfalls hochinteressant. So weist er etwa die Vorstellung von einer dritten Angriffswelle zurück, die sich angeblich gegen die Infrastruktur der Flotte hätte richten sollen. Eine solche Angriffswelle war nicht vorgesehen und selbst wenn sie erfolgreich durchgeführt worden wäre, hätte sich der angerichtete Schaden in Grenzen gehalten.
Auch die Versenkung eines Schiffes im Kanal wäre weitgehend unproblematisch verlaufen und hätte die Mobilität der Flotte kaum beeinträchtigt. Die Annahme, dass die US-Kriegsschiffe noch Glück im Unglück hatten, da sie im Hafen attackiert wurden und sich nicht im offenen Gewässer befanden, wird vom Autor ebenfalls zurückgewiesen. Für ihn wären die Schiffe auf hoher See weitaus weniger verwundbar gewesen als in der Enge des Hafens.
Bei der abschließenden Beurteilung der Hauptpersonen kommt lediglich Vizeadmiral Nagumo halbwegs gut weg. Zimm lobt den Kommandeur der Trägerflotte "Kidô Butai“ für seine vorsichtige und überlegte Vorgehensweise. Alle anderen werden von ihm scharf kritisiert.
Die Folgen von Pearl Harbor waren durchaus beachtlich, allerdings nicht in einem materiellen Sinne, sondern in psychologischer Hinsicht. Die Amerikaner setzten ihre Schlachtschiffe nur noch sehr verhalten ein und benötigten eine ganze Zeit, bevor sie sich trauten, diese wieder offensiver zu nutzen. Die Japaner ihrerseits klammerten sich an ihren fragwürdigen Sieg und hofften bis zuletzt, dass es ihnen vielleicht noch einmal vergönnt sein würde, etwas Ähnliches zu erreichen.
Insgesamt gesehen ist es Alan Zimm hervorragend gelungen, einen unbefangenen Blick auf die japanische Attacke zu werfen. Er lässt dabei keinen Stein auf dem anderen und geht jedem Flugzeug, jeder Bombe und jedem Torpedo gewissenhaft nach. Das Ergebnis besteht in einer erfrischenden Neubewertung des Angriffs. Man muss nicht jede Schlussfolgerung von ihm teilen, um sagen zu können, dass sein Buch absolut empfehlenswert ist.
Jürgen Rupp
Dass hiervon keine Rede sein kann, belegt der ehemalige Marineoffizier Alan D. Zimm in diesem exzellenten Buch. Mit Hilfe der modernen Operationsanalyse zeigt er im Detail auf, warum die Strategie, die Planung, die Vorbereitung und die Ausführung der Attacke alles andere als vorbildlich waren.
Wie der Autor in seiner Einleitung klar hervorhebt, ist seine Studie keine revisionistische Geschichtsschreibung, sondern eine militärwissenschaftliche Untersuchung, die im Sinne einer Manöver- bzw. Einsatzkritik versucht, die Leistungen und Versäumnisse der beteiligten Akteure herauszuarbeiten. Seine Argumente haben aber sehr wohl erhebliche Konsequenzen für die historische Forschung, die sich in nicht wenigen Bereichen von bislang vertretenen Ansichten verabschieden muss.
Zimm beginnt seine Darlegungen mit einem Paukenschlag, indem er sich sehr kritisch mit dem strategischen Verständnis bzw. Unverständnis von Admiral Yamamoto auseinandersetzt. Dieser sei keineswegs der visionäre Vordenker der modernen Marinefliegerei gewesen, für den er bis heute vielfach gehalten wird. Sein Fokus war vielmehr auf das Versenken von Schlachtschiffen ausgerichtet, die er als die wahren Symbole der maritimen Macht betrachtete. Yamamotos Hauptziel bestand deshalb in der Ausschaltung der amerikanischen Schlachtschiffe und eben nicht in der Vernichtung von deren Flugzeugträgern.
Aus diesem Grund spielte die An- oder Abwesenheit der US-Träger in Pearl Harbor für ihn keine entscheidende Rolle. Wichtig war aus seiner Sicht nur, dass einige der Schlachtschiffe versenkt oder schwer beschädigt würden. Yamamoto erhoffte sich hiervon zum einen, dass die amerikanische Bevölkerung derart geschockt wäre, dass ihre Politiker keinen Willen mehr aufbringen könnten, um einen langen und kostspieligen Krieg gegen das "Reich der aufgehenden Sonne“ zu führen. Zum anderen versprach er sich einen Zeitgewinn von einem halben Jahr. Dies sollte den japanischen Streitkräften die Möglichkeit eröffnen, ihre Eroberungen im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum ungestört zu konsolidieren.
In beiden Punkten irrte er sich gewaltig. Die amerikanische Reaktion auf den unerwarteten Angriff bestand in einem einhelligen Ruf nach Vergeltung und Abrechnung mit dem als besonders hinterhältig empfundenen Aggressor. Der vermeintliche Zeitgewinn war gleichfalls eine Chimäre, weil die US-Pazifikflotte wegen ihrer logistischen Beschränkungen ohnehin nicht in der Lage gewesen wäre, die erste Phase des japanischen Eroberungsfeldzuges zu verhindern.
Die Attacke auf Pearl Harbor war also operativ unnötig und strategisch völlig kontraproduktiv.
Wie ihr Oberkommandierender bekommen auch die für die Angriffsplanung und Umsetzung hauptverantwortlichen Offiziere, Genda und Fuchida, ein schlechtes Zeugnis ausgestellt. Den beiden Marinefliegern unterliefen bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung der gewagten Operation derart viele Fehler, dass es schon der groben amerikanischen Fahrlässigkeit bedurfte, um noch einen taktischen Erfolg zu erzielen.
So gab es kein koordiniertes Vorgehen der eingesetzten Kräfte. Die Jagdflugzeuge, Torpedo-, Horizontal- und Sturzkampfbomber operierten unabhängig voneinander, ohne sich gegenseitig zu unterstützen. Vor allem die langsamen Torpedobomber, die für die Attacke auf die Schlachtschiffe unentbehrlich waren, hätten die Jäger als Geleitschutz gut gebrauchen können. So aber waren sie gezwungen, ihren gefährlichen Auftrag alleine auszuführen.
Die technisch begrenzten Kommando- und Kommunikationsmittel wurden ebenfalls schlecht genutzt oder gleich ganz ignoriert. Die Piloten waren hierdurch weitgehend auf sich selbst gestellt. Zudem verlief die Zielauswahl und Zielerfassung suboptimal. Die Flugbesatzungen mussten unter Gefechtsbedingungen und eingeschränkten Sichtverhältnissen ihre Ziele richtig erkennen und zuordnen, womit nicht wenige überfordert waren. Außerdem überlagerten sich die Flugruten der angreifenden Maschinen und deren zeitliche Abstimmung ließ mehr als zu wünschen übrig.
Das Hauptproblem bestand jedoch darin, dass die Japaner generell zu unflexibel waren. Anstatt ihre Planungen und Vorbereitungen an sich verändernde Umstände anzupassen, behielten sie diese unverändert bei. Beispielsweise spielte es für sie kaum eine Rolle, ob der Überraschungseffekt noch gegeben war oder nicht. Auch Genda und Fuchida, die der Vernichtung der amerikanischen Träger einen größeren Stellenwert einräumten als Yamamoto, reagierten nicht auf die kurz vor dem Angriffsbeginn erhaltene Nachricht, dass die Träger nicht im Hafen waren. Sie hielten stattdessen an der unrealistischen Annahme fest, dass diese vielleicht doch noch während der Attacke vor Ort sein würden.
Dass der Angriff überraschend erfolgen konnte, lag auch weniger am Geschick der Japaner, als vielmehr am Unvermögen der Amerikaner. Diese hatten am Tag der Attacke weder eine adäquate Luftaufklärung betrieben, noch die Luftverteidigungskapazitäten von Armee und Marine in erhöhte Alarmbereitschaft versetzt. Obwohl Warnungen über eine Kriegsgefahr vorlagen, veranlassten weder Admiral Kimmel noch Generalleutnant Short an jenem schicksalhaften Sonntag eine der Lage entsprechende Wachsamkeit und Kampfbereitschaft ihrer Einheiten.
Selbst die Aufklärungsflugzeuge und Mini-U-Boote, welche die Japaner in unverantwortlicher Weise vor ihrem Angriffsbeginn losgeschickt hatten, blieben unentdeckt oder wurden von höherer Stelle nicht als eine unmittelbar drohende Gefahr wahrgenommen. Dies wäre in den Wochen vor dem siebten Dezember wohl nicht der Fall gewesen, weil die US-Streitkräfte auf Hawaii in diesem Zeitraum besser vorbereitet waren. Über ein mangelndes Kriegsglück brauchte sich die japanische Seite daher nicht zu beklagen.
Zimm geht zudem noch auf die Bewertung des angerichteten Schadens durch die Japaner näher ein. Er vergleicht deren Einschätzungen mit dem real angerichteten Schaden. Seine Überlegungen zu häufig anzutreffenden Alternativ-Szenarien sind gleichfalls hochinteressant. So weist er etwa die Vorstellung von einer dritten Angriffswelle zurück, die sich angeblich gegen die Infrastruktur der Flotte hätte richten sollen. Eine solche Angriffswelle war nicht vorgesehen und selbst wenn sie erfolgreich durchgeführt worden wäre, hätte sich der angerichtete Schaden in Grenzen gehalten.
Auch die Versenkung eines Schiffes im Kanal wäre weitgehend unproblematisch verlaufen und hätte die Mobilität der Flotte kaum beeinträchtigt. Die Annahme, dass die US-Kriegsschiffe noch Glück im Unglück hatten, da sie im Hafen attackiert wurden und sich nicht im offenen Gewässer befanden, wird vom Autor ebenfalls zurückgewiesen. Für ihn wären die Schiffe auf hoher See weitaus weniger verwundbar gewesen als in der Enge des Hafens.
Bei der abschließenden Beurteilung der Hauptpersonen kommt lediglich Vizeadmiral Nagumo halbwegs gut weg. Zimm lobt den Kommandeur der Trägerflotte "Kidô Butai“ für seine vorsichtige und überlegte Vorgehensweise. Alle anderen werden von ihm scharf kritisiert.
Die Folgen von Pearl Harbor waren durchaus beachtlich, allerdings nicht in einem materiellen Sinne, sondern in psychologischer Hinsicht. Die Amerikaner setzten ihre Schlachtschiffe nur noch sehr verhalten ein und benötigten eine ganze Zeit, bevor sie sich trauten, diese wieder offensiver zu nutzen. Die Japaner ihrerseits klammerten sich an ihren fragwürdigen Sieg und hofften bis zuletzt, dass es ihnen vielleicht noch einmal vergönnt sein würde, etwas Ähnliches zu erreichen.
Insgesamt gesehen ist es Alan Zimm hervorragend gelungen, einen unbefangenen Blick auf die japanische Attacke zu werfen. Er lässt dabei keinen Stein auf dem anderen und geht jedem Flugzeug, jeder Bombe und jedem Torpedo gewissenhaft nach. Das Ergebnis besteht in einer erfrischenden Neubewertung des Angriffs. Man muss nicht jede Schlussfolgerung von ihm teilen, um sagen zu können, dass sein Buch absolut empfehlenswert ist.
Jürgen Rupp
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