Barbarossa: The German Campaign in Russia - Planning and Operations (1940-1942) Paperback – July 6, 2006

This is a specialized work on the early stages of Operation Barbarossa. The inadequacies of materiale that could be produced and brought up to the front by the Reich are especially noteworthy with detailed descriptions of armanments, rolling stock, and petrol reserves. The hubris of the Wehrmacht in underestimating Russian production and ingenuity is evident. The miscalculations made by Hitler are clearly mapped out. Most interesting was the failure to secure the Baku region oil fields and the difficult dilemnas in the south. The division of fighting forces between the central sector and Ukraine resulted in the failure to take Moscow or secure the oil fields. The northern campaign appears to have been rather a wasted effort with the Finns joining in as rather reluctant allies. More effort in the north might have cut off American lend-lease supplies and more effort in the south could have secured the oil fields. Without the oil, the massive Russian armanment production in the Urals would have proved as useless as Speer's economic miracle in 1944 that sputtered to a halt without petrol for transport.

This book is about long term strategic planning by Hitler and his OKH staff. The author spends a lot of time discussing the preparation and objectives of the invasion under the Marcks Plan. This coverage is good but the Lossberg Plan is not specifically mention nor the involvement of Paulus detailed. Paulus had good arguments and reasons for Hitler to reconsider or least postponed the invasion but his contributions weren't included. The author also doesn't present the maneuvering and machinations of Halder in getting his way with the battle plan, particularly Moscow as the prime objective. The many secondary issues that were left out and the primary issues that were barely covered would have given greater impact to his book if included or expanded upon and its like that throughout the entire book. That's the reason for four stars. Though his facts and analysis is good, his presentation is so terse that while the reader receives the key facts doesn't receive the whole picture resulting in a book that could definitely be more rewarding than it is.

Some of the considerations for long term strategy that were studied before the invasion:
Locating and mapping Soviet armies, choosing key objectives and orgainizing the proper Army Groups
Avoiding impassable forests and swamps; finding the best routes to military targets
Overcoming the poor road system
Finding the best crossing sites for the many Russian rivers
Improve transportation capacity of Infantry and heavy guns
Maintain sufficient fuel as well as weapons, amnunition, food and other supplies
Improve Soviet rail system
Protect Rumanian oil fields
The coordination of infantry, panzer and air force
The capture and use of existing Russian industry and collective farms.
Improving production capacity
Maintaining the draft and training of new recruits
Maintaining relations with her Allies
Improve relations with Japan and convince her to attack Soviet Union
Maintain oversight of secret weapons
Maintaining vigilance over existing conquered countries
Handling Soviet POWs and the building of camps
Be aware of the extra hardship caused by the great distance to the Caucasus oil fields

The author doesn't get too involved with the actual engagements but only the results of those battles and how it affects future plans. Other milestones are used to trigger his analysis as well. Hitler's directives is a favorite.
After the initial planning of the war, the author does spend time on the preparations for Operation Typhoon. When in early December, Zhukov begins his counteroffensive the author delves into how Hitler handles the unexpected scale of the Soviet offensive, on how the original plans had to change.
Other key areas the author spends time on is Operation Blue and the Caucasus Offensive.

The author decided to analyze the German condition up to but excluding Operation Uranus when the Germans had conquered the most Russian soil. The analysis is good and did not see any glaring holes in his study. The author gave numerous reasons for Germany's loss but two were of special interest. The first was the fact that German intelligence gathering was not as good as it should have been, usually underestimating Russian strength which caused poor decisions in the field. The other was the failure by Germany to have a long range heavy bombing program. If such a program was in place, it could have slowed troops, tanks and supplies from moving west into the combat area. Bombing rail lines and supply columns east of Moscow in 1941 or east of Stalingrad in 1942 would have made a big difference.
There are 17 maps but they're modest. There is also a list of German personalities and their accomplishments and a chronology. The table of contents is very good and will help you find specific needs; there is no index.

I would suggest that anybody interested in the long term strategic planning and analysis of the war against Russia, especially if you have prior reading of the war, would enjoy this book.

I have a US Army Center of Military History reprint of this pamphlet, which was apparently first published as an internal study document for Army use in the early 1950s. It was authored by George Blau and based entirely on debriefings of Wehrmacht officers involved in the planning and fighting plus some archival material they managed to save. The study was commissioned at a time when the Army was interested in using German experience to plan a defensive war against the next apparent foe in the late 1940s-the Soviet Union. I agree with one reviewer that this edition seems to have zilch in-put from its alleged "author" professor Grant as, from the Google preview, it looks identical to my copy. At the price it is still worthwhile to obtain, although the extensive series of books by Col. David Glantz, with unprecedented access to Soviet archives and staff studies, has superseded this work. Nonetheless it's a handy review with the caveat that the German generals were interested in emphasizing Hitler's meddling as the chief cause of failure in the East. In general, the Russian forces are not given much credit for stopping the German drives--it was the mud, the early winter frost, Adolf's intrusion,etc. The US Army has a manuscript written by the late Charles von Luttichau on this phase of Barbarossa which would have likely been of greater interest, but for some reason they never published his work. They have published two sequel volumes on the campaign from Moscow to Stalingrad and from Stalingrad through the fall of Berlin. Anyhow, this book is worth adding to one's library if you are looking for how the US Army (or rather the German generals) viewed the opening operations as of the late 1940s.

Given that this book was authored by George Blau in 1955, how is it possible that Amazon identifies Prof. Grant as the author? At best he would be the editor, but it does not appear that any editing was done. In which case, all that was done is to re-publish an older, out of copyright work. If I republish Goethe's Faust with no changes/editing, would I be allowed to pronounce myself the author on Amazon?