Okay, I have not finished Jonathan’s book as of yet but felt I must react. I have to say Jonathan’s provides insights especially surrounding the overall British political and military aspects that shaped the “Battle of the Atlantic” as well as the impact on the “British Home Front.” However, it seems Jonathan does not provide the same situational context to his blistering comments about US Admiral King as he does for others.
To provide context, one must consider the general situation Admiral King faced during the specific period January-May, 1942 and the extended campaign through August 1942. It is clear the attack on Pearl Harbor caught the nation and the US Armed Forces unprepared and, while there had been progress moving to a wartime footing, Admiral King faced multiple challenges.
AUTHORITY: Admiral King assumed the appointment as COMINCH, US Fleet on December 20, 1941 from Admiral Kimmel. While that provided operational control of the three US Navy Fleets and coastal vessels, Admiral Stark was the Chief of Naval Operations which included responsibilities under Article 392 and Article 433, US Navy Regulations (“The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, Act of 3 Mar. 1915). ” Admiral King was not appointed to the dual role of Chief of Naval Operations until the issuance of the General Order No. 170, dated March 23, 1942.
AVAILABILITY of VESSELS (based on a variety of sources ): An analysis of the disposition of US Naval vessels in December, 1941 highlights a total of about 300 “patrol capable vessels” (DD, PG, PC, Coast Guard Cutters, PY and PYc types) including those in overhauls, major repairs and fitting out). The inventory included 171 destroyers of which over 40% were WWI era types, about 52 “Patrol Types” (PG, PY, PYc) including Spanish American War trophies and a collection of about 76 Coast Guard Cutters (not including the 10 of the 21 larger 250+’ cutters given to the British).
The US Atlantic Fleet contained 100% of the newer Sims, Benson and Gleaves destroyer classes. Of the 91 destroyers deployed in US Atlantic Fleet (leaving only 66 in the US Pacific and 13 in the US Asiatic Fleets), 52 US Atlantic Fleet destroyers were deployed either on Atlantic Convoy duty (including a squadron escorting British Troop transports to Cape Town), in Iceland or Newfoundland; only 24 were either in US Atlantic ports (including those be fit out, repairs) or serving as capital ship escorts; four were stationed in Bermuda; and the remaining 8 were stationed at the Canal Zone working convoys or in port. The US Atlantic Fleet accounted for 37 Patrol type (leaving a handful for the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets) vessels with 7 assigned to the Caribbean and the 54 of the Coast Guard Cutters with 26 assigned to Greenland/Newfoundland/Iceland Patrols were stationed with the Atlantic Fleet.
If one looks at the building programs for FY39 and FY40, the US Navy had 194 destroyers (some ordered in June and July 1940), 140 Patrol Craft (PC’s of the 110’ and 173’ classes), 78 Sub Chasers (SC’s) and 129 YMS’s (which could be utilized for anti-sub role if necessary). Of the Destroyers laid down in 1940-1 that were not commissioned on December 7, twenty-eight were commissioned between January and June of 1942 with 16 assigned to the US Atlantic Fleet or the ETO and 12 assigned to the US Pacific Fleet (and of the 12, 1/3 conducted anti-submarine/convoy duty in the Atlantic/Caribbean prior to reporting to the Pacific Fleet) and, of the remaining fifty-two of the classes of 1940-1, 35 were commissioned and assigned to the US Atlantic Fleet and/or the ETO.
As for coastal class escorts, the US Navy commissioned 126 vessels in the period January to June 1942 with 83 being assigned to the US Atlantic Fleet. The bulk of the vessels were of the new 173’ PC and 110’ SC classes. During the same period, the Coast Guard commissioned 11 vessels with 10 being assigned to the Greenland/Newfoundland Patrols. For the period July-December 1943, the Navy commissioned an additional 52 Patrol Craft and, while the data on the 110’ SC’s is a little lacking, the pattern seems to remain with the bulk of the vessels being assigned to the US Atlantic Fleet while the US Coast Guard commissioned 21 vessels with 19 going to the Greenland/Newfoundland Patrols. In addition, a number of other vessels types were being launched configured for escorts like the seven Cactus Class Lighthouse Tenders in 1942 (as well as the follow-on Cactus and Mesquite Classes); the Admirable class minesweepers; and the YMS class minesweepers. The US Coast Guard drafted almost every vessel type including sea going tugs, weather ships, icebreakers, and converted freighters into the Greenland Patrol.
Prior and during WWII, the US Navy instituted the procurement and modification of civilian/commercial vessels as it has in times of conflict since the Revolution. The effort began in earnest with the efforts to enforce the Neutrality Patrols (1940) and continued past December 1941. In fact, of the “Patrol” types available prior to December 1941 the majority of them were acquired, converted craft (PG, PY, PYc). The Navy extended the acquisitions especially of fishing vessels to fill minesweeping and harbor patrol duties (AM, AMc types). As one sailor (Ed Hickey, SK1) on the Sapphire (PYc-2) commented, "We knew we were a sitting duck for any U-Boat that we found since a converted yacht is no match even though we had some depth charges and a few other armaments." The US Coast Guard (under the command of the US Navy) continued to acquire commercial and fishing vessel types as Patrol Cutters (WPG, WYP, WYPc, WAK) into early stages of the war with 95% being utilized to the east coast but the majority assigned to the Greenland Patrol.
As to Escort Carriers, two “Escort Carriers” (AVG/CVE Types) following the general design of the USS Long Island (acquired March 1941) were built prior to December 1941 with one being siphoned-off by the UK. During the first half of 1942, four CVE’s were commissioned with two going to the UK with the other two being assigned to the US Navy with one each to the Pacific and Atlantic. In the last half of 1942, fifteen CVE’s were commissioned with six going to the UK, and all but one of the US Navy units initially assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. The US manned CVE’s carried a more robust air wing the previous UK-built/manned vessels and, obviously, the UK units were not assigned to the daunting tasks facing the US Navy.
AVAILABILITY of NAVAL PATROL AIRCRAFT (based on a variety of sources ): As to Naval aviation, a review of the “Dictionary American Naval Aviation Squadrons” and the declassified “Location of U.S. Naval Aircraft” show on February 2, 1942 the US Navy had 102 “primary” patrol aircraft (PBY-5, PV-1, PB4Y-1 (B-24), and PBM-3) deployed in nine squadrons in the US Atlantic Fleet (Gulf, Caribbean and the Atlantic) including about 33% of the squadrons deployed to Newfoundland or Iceland (and net of VP-72 and VP-71). The Navy had 110 aircraft (post the losses to the Japanese and with the US Asiatic Fleet and with the inclusion of the two transferred squadrons from the Atlantic) in fourteen squadrons in the greater Pacific. Of course, one can point to the transfer after Pearl Harbor of VP-72 and VP-71 from the Atlantic as bias, but one must consider the losses inflicted by the Japanese. In addition, 51 shorter range in-shore patrol aircraft were assigned to the US Atlantic Fleet while 42 were posted in the Pacific.
By June 25, 1942, the US Navy had 168 “primary” patrol aircraft in the “Battle for the Atlantic” zones in 15 squadrons while 176 aircraft (including the remainder of the US Asiatic Squadrons) in the greater Pacific. The US Navy assigned 148 in-shore patrol aircraft in the Atlantic Fleet while 86 were assigned in the Greater Pacific. By December 8, 1942, the US Navy increased the “primary” patrol aircraft to 174 in the Atlantic with a net of 164 in the Pacific (net of headquarters and training commands and squadrons being trained). Actually, the US Atlantic Fleet training commands which conducted anti-submarine and convoy escort missions had more aircraft than the Pacific units.
INTER-SERVICE CHALLENGES: As put forward in the Army Antisubmarine Command History, there were “conflicts” between the Navy and the Army addressing defense from seaborne treats along the coasts. Under the Joint Action of the Army and Navy (FTP-155, 1935), the Navy had responsibility for seaborne coastal patrols and there was no debate over the Navy operating seaplanes and carrier-class aircraft. General Arnold was opposed to the Navy operating land-based bombers and to Admiral King’s request of 200 B-24’s and 400 B-25’s for long range patrol. On the Army Air Forces side, little was done to provide the necessary air assets when the US Navy requested the US Army Air Force (AAF) assign I Bomber Command. The Command was thrown into the gap stripped of most of its long-range aircraft. If fact by January 1943, the two AAF commands tasked to support the US Navy’s effort could put together only 139 operational aircraft (given strains of the build-up in the ETO).
STAFFING: The US Navy had about 160,000 personnel in 1940 building to 640,570 plus 56,716 USCG in 1942 to over 3.3 million by the end of the war. Thus in 1941 into early 1942, the meager availability of trained officers and NCOs had to be metered out to crews for new capital ships, supply operations, medical operations, repair and maintenance operations, air wings, etc. Patrol craft and Destroyers assignments were some of the most challenging non-flight assignments given the reliance on junior officers.
BLACK-OUTS/DIM-OUTS: There is some support for Admiral King’s reliance on FDR to order blackouts/dim-outs along the coasts. The order could have very quickly come from FDR (as an Executive Order); FDR could have expedited a request Congress to enact emergency legislation; or quickly contacted the Governors of the relevant states to address the situation.
THREATS IN THE PACIFIC: In the first six months to a year of 1942, the Japanese could have utilized their 65 (63 ocean-going submarines) submarines to conduct anti-shipping campaign either to cut-off Hawaii or Australia/New Zealand (remember, Japanese subs were present at Pearl Harbor and sited in the Philippines) especially from their newly won bases.
SUMMARY: By the time Admiral King was operational in his role in the Navy Department, pressure descended from the President to not only increase support for the Atlantic operations but to build forces to strike-back in the Pacific; prepare to support Allied land operations “somewhere in Europe;” and to deal with Operation Drumbeat.
There is no statistical evidence Admiral King stripped the Atlantic Fleet to fill the gaps in the Pacific nor is the evidence the US Navy had neglected the preparation for anti-submarine warfare or ignored the learnings from WWI, the Neutrality Patrols or the early Battle of the Atlantic. The attack on Pearl Harbor caught the US Navy in the early stages of operationalization. If the war for the US had started six months later, the Germans would have been facing a very different US Navy.
On could theorize the results of attempting to quickly organize convoys in the immediate aftermath of the declaration of war without adequate escort vessels and/or patrol aircraft. On the other hand, one can praise the US Navy for its ability to implement convoys so quickly with a bevy of essentially “green” crews, new vessels and new aircraft coming “on line.” If the war had started six months later the Germans would have been facing a very different US Navy.
A lesser leader could have pointed to the intense commitment to the Atlantic convoys system to the UK and Russia and/or the abandonment of Australia and New Zealand (as the British Navy had) and would have demanded relocation of experienced crews and vessels back to US waters (as well as fought to eliminate any further lead-lease deployment of naval escort-grade vessels). Admiral King stayed the course and the US Navy reasserted itself both in the “Battle of the Atlantic” and, with no help from the British, in a string of great victories in the Pacific. The bottom line is if FDR thought Admiral King was incompetent Admiral King would have been fired.
The Battle of the Atlantic: How the Allies Won the War
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American author "highly recommends" this book
Reviewed in the United States on March 26, 2016
Terrific book! …based on my own years of biographical research for “Good-Bye, Lord, I’m Going To New York” (Amazon.com & Amazon.uk.com) about WW-II from the American viewpoint – author Jonathan Dimbleby has written an extremely well researched work that flows – is vivid – and painstakingly well documented. I couldn’t put it down! – mostly because it is accurate! It should be noted that, simultaneously, in 1942 New York at the Anti-Submarine Command HQ at 90 Church Street, a Wall Street lawyer and then US Army-Air Force intelligence officer, William Harding Jackson, devised a plan for Americans to attack U-boats at their source. As described by Central Intelligence Agency historian, Ludwell Lee Montague, a former strategist in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) “…Captain Jackson had the temerity to produce an analysis of the effectiveness of anti-submarine warfare as it was then being conducted off the US East Coast. He showed that it was a dismal failure – and urged that the Army units involved be sent to reinforce the RAF Air Coastal Command for a concerted attack on the German submarines at their source – in the Bay of Biscay. Captain Jackson’s [intelligence estimate] paper infuriated the US Navy from Admiral King on down, but it delighted the Army-Air Force. Jackson was reassigned to be Assistant Military Air Attaché in London, in liaison with the Coastal Command. His recommendation was eventually carried out, although it took the personal intervention of the Secretary of War (Stimson) to overcome the bitter opposition of the Navy (King).” Jackson was elevated to the position of War Department chief of secret intelligence and later headed the 650-man super secret OSS ‘X-2’ in the US portion of the Ultra program on the war front for General Marshall and General Eisenhower. The detail and graphic life descriptions offered by Mr. Dimbleby are right up there with Rick Atkinson’s trilogy about the war and the observations (air and naval) of former RAF Air Marshal, Sir John Cotesworth Slessor in “The Central Blue” (Fredrick Praeger; 1957). Many Americans have not read about nor do we fully understand the British history on the matter. Dimbleby’s book is definitive. John Slessor and William Harding Jackson became close, lifetime friends because they shared the same view of adding more B-24 ‘Liberator’ bombers to the RAF Coastal Command – which resulted in the joint Allied Casa Blanca doctrine (14-24 January 1943), ultimately putting an end to the U-boat reign of terror in the Atlantic and English Channel. More than 600 U-boats and each of their forty man crews were dispatched to the bottom of the Bay – one of the heaviest losses of the Third Reich. Kudos to Mr. Dimbleby. This book is an excellent read – and if you are looking for outstanding documentation on the subject, you need look no further than “The Battle of the Atlantic” (2016) by Dimbleby. Excellent!
Reviewed in the United States on March 26, 2016
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S. Brunton
Good, highly readable mid-size history of the Atlantic campaign
Reviewed in Canada 🇨🇦 on June 20, 2022
