Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket, the Campaign That Should Have... Paperback – May, 1995

Martin Blumenson is one of the top three (Pogue, Blumenson, D'Este) U.S. military historians, ever. In The Battle of the Generals, Mr. Blumenson is at his best. He served with the U.S. Army in WW II as the official historian for both Third and Seventh U.S. Armies. Before his death in 2005, he wrote, "Breakout and Pursuit," "The Patton Papers," "Mark Clark," and "The Duel for France." Chapter 17 of "Breakout" is a much quoted article on "General Bradley's Decision at Argentan (13 August 1944)," it deals exclusively with the Battle of the Falaise Gap. If anyone understands what happened in Europe during the war, it should be Martin Blumenson. He was there.

Unfortunately 'being there' also required adherence to a code of conduct determined by those a lot further up the chain-of-command than a meager clerk-typist, historian for George Patton's Third Army. On the morning of August 13th, 1944, at some time between 10:30 and 11:30 that morning, Generals Bradley and Eisenhower met at Eisenhower's headquarters and decided to tell a lie. British General Bernard L. Montgomery had twice ordered Patton's XV Corps to halt on the inter-Army Group boundary line, just south of Argentan along the Orne River. If the Americans did not quickly drive through Argentan to Falaise, the Germans were likely to make good their escape through the so-called Falaise gap.

The 'halt decision' was highly controversial the moment it was made. Eisenhower saw Montgomery's 'halt order' as a threat to the survival of the Anglo-American Alliance. He was determined that the alliance succeed. One way to take the sting out of Montgomery's wrong-headed 'halt order' was to direct General Bradley to issue the 'halt order' in his name. Eisenhower probably offered his support for any reasons Bradley would later give for issuing the 'halt order.' Bradley claimed to have based his 'halt decision' on having too few troops available to close the gap; he wrote, "I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken nech at Falaise." (Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 377.)

Leaving Bradley with too few divisions at Argentan on August 13th required playing a shell game with the four (4) divisions in U.S. XII and XX Corps (now you see them - now you don't) and a slight manipulation of the date on which General Collins VII Corps closed on Haislip's left flank at Ranes. Gilbert Cook's XII Corps was forming near Le Mans on August 13th and would have been available later that day or on the 14th. Walton Walker's XX Corps had been sitting at Le Mans for a couple days. They were barely 55 miles away and could have been available within a few hours had Bradley needed them at Argentan.

Blumenson also tries to hide 'Lightning Joe' Collins' VII Corps. He suggests they did not start to the move from Mortain to close off Haislip's left flank until August 13th, in spite of receiving an order from Bradley to do so on the afternoon of August 12th. Blumenson also says they did not cover Haislip's flank until August 14th. (p. 212) Why did it take Collins' VII Corps 18 hours to move 40 miles from the Mortain sector to Ranes. The short answer is, it didn't. As Major William Sylvan's diary makes perfectly clear, 3rd Armored Division had closed on Ranes by 1000 hours on August 13th. They had met so few Germans that Collins requested permission for VII Corps to contiunue the drive to Falaise, bragging that they could,"...do the job before the British even started to move." (Sylvan diary August 13, p. 58)

First Army Commander Courtney Hodges endorsed Collins' request and phoned Bradley's headquarters to ask for permission for Collins to move north to Falaise. He, like George Patton, was turned down. There were actually thirteen (13) U.S. divisions available for Bradley to close the gap on August 13th. With attached reconnaissance, artillery and armor battalions there were over 200,000 U.S. soldiers sitting on the southern German flank. Bradley did not have too few men, he had too many men. There was no way he could have committed all thirteen (13) divisions between Ranes and Gace, they would have been falling all over each other.

Martin Blumenson knows this. He has forgotten more history than this poor amateur will ever learn, but Mr. Blumenson is also part of a select club. He was one of the original writers. These were men who, according to Max Hastings, created the "...comfortable chauvinistic legends..." that three generations of military historians have been repeating since the end of the war. Martin Blumenson is no different than most historians. He developed an emotional attachment to his own works. He felt the need to protect his own reputation by protecting the historical staus quo. Once that happened, Blumenson's reputation became part of the story, he was defending the legacy he had helped to create.

One senses that Martin Blumenson was an honest man. He may well have tried to tell the truth early on but was instructed by senior officers in the army to repeat only the Eisenhower - Bradley version of the events at the Falaise Gap. Forrest C. Pogue, Stephen E. Ambrose and Carlo D'Este have all tasted the same bitter drink and have chosen, for whatever reasons, not to tell the truth about the Battle of the Falaise Gap. Like Martin Blumenson, these men all know the truth. This stuff is not rocket science.

Understanding what happened at the Falaise Gap is important not simply because 40,000 or 100,000 Germans escaped to fight another day, although that was bad enough in itself. The real dilemma Eisenhower faced at the Falaise Gap was his failure to deal directly with British battlefield politics. As the senior Allied officer he was responsible for creating a unified command. The senior British general in France was simply not going to play ball. Montgomery had agreed with Eisenhower and Bradley on August 8th to conduct the short envelopment between Argentan and Falaise. On August 12th he changed his mind but did not tell anyone else about it until the next day. Eisenhower was mentally limp from arguing with Churchill over the Allied landings in southern France (August 5th and 9th). When Montgomery decided to deny the Americans permission to move north of Argentan, Eisenhower meekly went along with it.

Blumenson quotes Montgomery's letter of August 14th to Bradley directing him to go northeast and send anything else he can move around to Le Mans to the northeast. p. 218. Two pages later, Blumenson is critical of Bradley's decision to go northeast with part of Patton's Third Army, "... without consulting Montgomery - he shouild have done so out of respect..." p. 220. Exactly why Bradley should consult Montgomery while following his exact hand written instructions is not very clear.

Blumenson also badly misjudges Montgomery's position within the alliance. According to Blumenson, "Montgomery's authority in fact was fading ... Eisenhower would take over from Montgomery as overall ground commander in barely two weeks." p. 212. Roosevelt was facing elections in November with the U.S. press complaining about the British domination of the Allied command in Europe. The British had secured all three operational commands of Allied Air Forces, Allied Ground Forces and the Allied Navies. The only visible American commnand was Eisenhower's, and his command situation was rather vague. With the Brits commanding all air forces, ground forces and navies - what the hell was Eisenhower commanding? Army Chief of Staff George Marshall told Eisenhower to take command of something as soon as possible. Eisenhower did take nominal command of Allied ground forces on September 1st, but it was more for a show in U.S. politics and Roosevelt's election chances than for any new authority Eisenhower would exercise in the field.

Eisenhower would have the Allied ground foces command on paper, Montgomery would exercise a dominant influence on Allied strategy through his Rhine River crossing at Wesel in March 1945. Montgomery ordered Patton to halt at Argentan on August 13th. Montgomery sent Patton's forces northeast on August 14th. Montgomery decided to go for the Rhine crossing at Arnhem in September instead of opening the port of Antwerp, which the Americans badly needed. Eisenhower remained silent while Allied armies anguished for want of supplies in the fall of 1944. When the decision was finally taken to give Montgomery a direct order to give Antwerp his first priority, Eisenhower delegated the task to his COS Bedell Smith, who then delegated to it British General Sir Frederick Morgan. If Eisenhower ever exercised his commnand authority, that would have been most welcome news to Generals Bradley and Patton who fought a losing battle for SHAEF's strategic priority with Montgomery through March 1945. British politics emanating from 21st Army Group Headquarters and London determined the ebb and flow of Allied strategy through the fall and winter of 1944/1945. Martin Blumenson, Forrest C. Pogue, Stephen E. Ambrose and Carlo D'Este would do their best to cover it up, but the historical record is pretty clear.

Martin Blumenson's Battle of the Generals is the first book that tells the whole story of the missed opportunities offered by the success of Operation Cobra. Some books cover the pros and cons of the deep envelopment (the Seine) verses the close envelopment (Falaise), and some books just cover the close envelopment and lay the blame for the failure to close the gap on the Canadians under Montgomery. This book covers all that plus goes over all the attempts to close the Gap, first at Falaise, then Trun, and Finally Chambois. Martin Blummenson's assessment of the Commanders involved, Ike, Monty, Bradley, and Patton is extremely interesting and objective. He does not blame the failure to effectively close the Gap on the Canadians alone but demonstrates how Ike and Bradley equally share the responsibility with Montgomery. If you are looking for a book that thoroughly explains what happened at the Falaise Gap this is the one I recommend you buy.

The German defeat at Falaise could have been on the scale approaching Operation Bagration in the east or greater than Tunisia or Stalingrad but the ineptness of Montgomery, Bradley and Eisenhower allowed much of the two German Armies to escape the Falaise pocket. To make things worse, the Allies allowed the retreating Germans to cross the Seine River almost unmolested as well. It was estimated that upwards of 300,000 Germans were allowed to escape across the Seine River. A major win here could have eliminated the need for Operation Market-Garden and possibly the Battle of the Bulge! (Some books quote lower figures.)

The author covers a wide area, including the manuvering of Churchill with FDR, and the relationships of the key commanders of Normandy prior to the landings in North Africa, Sicily and Italy and during the planning process of Overlord. He builds profiles of Montgomery, Bradley, Patton and Eisenhower and will show how throughout the book how the personalities of these key people had more more often than not a negative impact on the battlefield.
The main theme of the book will take place on the southern and northern approaches to the Falaise pocket but the author begins at the landings and quickly moves through the key engagements. Operations Epsom, Charnwood, Goodwood, Cobra and Mortain are mention and with each successive engagement as you near Falaise the engagements become more detailed.

Mr Blumensen is not a basher; if you've read any of his other books you know that he is too leinent at times. In this book, he is more critical of people but the criticism is not overdone and is a fair appraisal of each of the key people. All the major armies are also included in the book - US, British, Canadians, French and Poles and they all receive comments on their performance but as the title indicates the overwhelming attention to this narrative falls on Montgomery, Patton, Bradley and Eisenhower.

To provide the many examples of poor leadership that 3 of the 4 leaders demonstrated is beyond the limits of this review but Patton is the only general that comes out of this experience as knowing what had to be done and having the guts to implement those plans if allowed to do it. Much of the attention is given to Montgomery and he is shown right from the landings as ineffective at Caen and completely confused and unconcerned about Falaise until it was too late. He knew the weaknesses of the green Canadian Army driving toward Falaise but didn't reinforce it and at first he also wouldn't allow Patton to cross into the Canadian sector to close the gap. Bradley was once again unsure of himself and timid and would not take any risks at Argentan. Then Bradley, always thinking of gaining ground and not destroying the enemy, had a change of attitude and allowed Patton to move part of this army toward the Seine, leaving the southern jaw at Falaise too weak and even though the Allies claimed the gap was closed; it was never closed tightly and the Germans continued to escape.
While Bradley couldn't really fathom the importance of this potential, being too wrapped up in reaching Germany, General Eisenhower had a better understanding and yet did nothing to force or motivate Montgomery to greater action. The author shows Eisenhower as too passive through the whole Overlord campaign.
In the last chapter, "Reflections", the author gives a noteworthy summation of the generals and Operation Overlord in general. There are a few maps and they are very good; I just wish there were more of them. There are a few photos, a decent Bibliography and an Index.

I've read two other accounts of this campaign and Mr Blumensen's is the best. I admit three books is not a majority but its definitely a good read and if you're just starting out it would be an excellent choice. If you have already read about Normandy, as I have, you still might learn some interesting things for the author knows his characters and gives good insight into why this campaign was not nearly as successful as it should have been.