Other Sellers on Amazon
+ $5.32 shipping
90% positive over last 12 months
& FREE Shipping
90% positive over last 12 months
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Learn more
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle Cloud Reader.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Follow the Author
OK
The Battle of Kursk Paperback – October 29, 1999
| David M. Glantz (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
| Price | New from | Used from |
Enhance your purchase
Drawing on both German and Soviet sources, Glantz and House separate myth from fact to show what really happened at Kursk and how it affected the outcome of the war. Their access to newly released Soviet archival material adds unprecedented detail to what is known about this legendary conflict, enabling them to reconstruct events from both perspectives and describe combat down to the tactical level.
The Battle of Kursk takes readers behind Soviet lines for the first time to discover what the Red Army knew about the plans for Hitler's offensive (Operation Citadel), relive tank warfare and hand-to-hand combat, and learn how the tide of battle turned. Its vivid portrayals of fighting in all critical sectors place the famous tank battle in its proper context. Prokhorovka here is not a well-organized set piece but a confused series of engagements and hasty attacks, with each side committing its forces piecemeal.
Glantz and House's fresh interpretations demolish many of the myths that suggest Hitler might have triumphed if Operation Citadel had been conducted differently. Their account is the first to provide accurate figures of combat strengths and losses, and it includes 32 maps that clarify troop and tank movements.
Shrouded in obscurity and speculation for more than half a century, the Battle of Kursk finally gets its due in this dramatic retelling of the confrontation that marked the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front and brought Hitler's blitzkrieg to a crashing halt.
- Print length485 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherUniv Pr of Kansas
- Publication dateOctober 29, 1999
- Dimensions5.75 x 1.25 x 8.75 inches
- ISBN-100700613358
- ISBN-13978-0700613359
Inspire a love of reading with Amazon Book Box for Kids
Discover delightful children's books with Amazon Book Box, a subscription that delivers new books every 1, 2, or 3 months — new Amazon Book Box Prime customers receive 15% off your first box. Learn more.
Frequently bought together
Customers who viewed this item also viewed
Editorial Reviews
Review
"A good read. Looks at the traditional approach to Kursk and provides another well-founded interpretation of the battle."--Parameters
"The definitive analysis of Kursk. Ranks among the decade's most distinguished works of military history."--Dennis Showalter in the History Book Club Review
"The most detailed, authoritative, and thorough analysis of the massive battle that led to the final victory of the Red Army over the Germans. This outstanding book deserves the highest praise."--Malcolm Mackintosh, author of Juggernaut: A History of Soviet Armed Forces
"The Battle of Kursk combines the authors' encyclopedic knowledge of their subject with a panoramic narrative of military operations to challenge the 'myths of Kursk.ⅅ Drawing heavily upon hitherto classified Soviet material, as well as German sources, the work is both original and revisionist, making it a major contribution to our understanding of one of the most important operations of the Second World War."--John Erickson, author of The Road to Stalingrad
"At last we have an account of the battle of Kursk from the Soviet perspective. And what an account! It is meticulously researched, persuasively argued, full of new and important findings, and written with verve and pathos. This is operational history at its best."--Joel S. A. Hayward, author of Stopped at Stalingrad
From the Back Cover
"The Battle of Kursk combines the authors' encyclopedic knowledge of their subject with a panoramic narrative of military operations to challenge the 'myths of Kursk.' Drawing heavily upon hitherto classified Soviet material, as well as German sources, the work is both original and revisionist, making it a major contribution to our understanding of one of the most important operations of the Second World War."--John Erickson, author of The Road to Stalingrad
"At last we have an account of the battle of Kursk from the Soviet perspective. And what an account! It is meticulously researched, persuasively argued, full of new and important findings, and written with verve and pathos. This is operational history at its best."--Joel S. A. Hayward, author of Stopped at Stalingrad
About the Author
Jonathan M. House is professor of history at Gordon College and the author of Towards Combined Arms Warfare and Military Intelligence, 18701991. Glantz and House also coauthored When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.
I'd like to read this book on Kindle
Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.
Product details
- Publisher : Univ Pr of Kansas; Sixth Printing edition (October 29, 1999)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 485 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0700613358
- ISBN-13 : 978-0700613359
- Item Weight : 1.73 pounds
- Dimensions : 5.75 x 1.25 x 8.75 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #159,401 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #14 in Armored Vehicles Weapons & Warfare History
- #529 in German History (Books)
- #635 in Russian History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

David M Glantz is a former US Army intelligence specialist with a unique knowledge of the Russian army and Russian military history. His WHEN TITANS CLASHED is the standard single volume account of the war in Russia.
Customer reviews
Top reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
In November of 1942, Winston Churchill said, "Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. but it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning. "Henceforth Hitler's Nazis will meet equally well armed, and perhaps better armed troops." No truer, or more prescient words have been spoken in regard to the changing tides in warfare. If not Stalingrad, then Operation Citadel, the German pincers attack on the Kursk salient during July of 1943, was the beginning of the end for the Third Reich. David Glantz and Jonathan House have written the definitive volume of this monumental battle.
With some hesitation, I give the book five stars as the Glantz and House work has comprehensively documented the battle, which though a tactical stalemate, ended German pretensions for strategic victory as the Germans were on their heels the remainder of the war in the East. The authors use extensive German and Soviet documentation for The Battle of Kursk. He provides background of the war, geography, opposing military leaders (especially Soviet), and dovetails divisional records and personal accounts as he weaves this story of the meat grinder on the Russian front.
I personally appreciated the "anglicizing" of Soviet accounts. All too often in the past, I have read accounts where translations were literally word for word and led to rather balky reading. Though maps are almost always an Achilles heel in this type of book, thirty two black and white maps are provided for the reader, some of which are topographical. Perhaps more a matter of my older eyes, but there was an awful lot of searching and flipping back and forth before I became comfortable with what was going on with who vs who on a daily basis. For basic geography, I'd recommend to new readers of this book spend some time with map 3 on page 24, and if your eyes dictate bifocals, a magnifying glass may prove helpful.
One hundred and sixty seven pages of notes and a bibliography follow the battle and its aftermath, as well as an extensive index. All the information is available for a reader/historian for the purpose of cross referencing.
Many superb reviews have preceded mine, and on the merits of the book, I don't think I can shed any more light than other reviewers have already done. Small caveats will exist in any book of this nature. Referring to the German tank buster Henschel 129 as the Henschel 109 is one of these. Big whoop. The authors conclusion, however, may be open to a bit more debate. If Kursk had not happened, as some German generals had put forth earlier in the book, why was any offensive on the Eastern front necessary, would it have made any differences in future conduct of the war? Political reasons, and "pinching off the Kursk salient would have shortened German defensive lines, thus freeing men and equipment for increasingly short supply of reserves. Or, if the offensive would have been carried out in April, as some German generals believe, the chances for success would have been greater. A curious anomaly occurs on pages 257 and 261. General Mellenthin, of the 48th Panzer Corps, who was in favor of an an early attack writes,"As part of the Fourth Panzer Army, the 48th Panzer Corps was to be the spearhead of the main drive from the south. I welcomed the idea, for our hardenedand experienced panzer divisionshad suffered little in the recent thrust on Kharkov, and were fit and ready for another battle as soon as the state of the ground would permit us to move." Yet, on page 261 the authors state that ,"The panzer divisions of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, for example, often counted fewer than twenty tanks each..." This is in regard to late March. I found this curious, that the authors use the Von Mellenthin quote in regard to the 48th Panzer Corps state of readiness, yet contradict him, without mentioning the earlier Von Mellenthin quote. Who was correct?
The concept of a German mobile defense is discussed. Would it have been enough to create stalemate on the Russian front? Glantz and House seem to think not, as the concept of mobile defense was new, and he perceives it to be more of an after-war reflection of German generals. But when one looks at casualty and equipment loss figures (those dealing with Operation Citadel and the ensuing Soviet counter attacks, soviet looses exceeded German losses by a 5:1 ratio), one wonders if the Germans had not bled themselves white throwing themselves against prepared Soviet positions, could they not have done the same to the soviets if the mobile reserves were present? Ahhh the stuff of discussion and debate. The bottom line, the Soviet army had the manpower and equipment advantage to sustain such losses, the Germans, even with the technical superiority of their weaponry did not.
This was a superb book that I would highly recommend to anybody interested in the clash between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. As an ultimate compliment to the authors based on my impression on the thoroughness of "The Battle of Kursk, I have every intention of reading the Glantz/House trilogy on the Battle of Stalingrad.
The front was a continuous line from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Envision a backwards "S" in that line, with the top half being a German salient extending eastward, centered on the town of Orel. And the bottom half being a Russian salient extending westward, centered on the town of Kursk. The Germans had lost another very decisive battle the previous winter, when the Sixth Army was decimated, surrounded and surrendered at Stalingrad. Nonetheless, the Germans intended to go on the offensive again, picking the obvious target of the Kursk salient, and via a pincer attack from the north and the south, surround and annihilate the Russian troops within. The problem for the German was that the Russians realized it was an obvious target, and therefore they were dug in and waiting.
Glantz and House have written what will almost certainly always be the definitive account of that battle. The first chapter summarizes the initial two years of war on the Eastern front. This is followed by a description and analysis of the respective strengths of the two sides, in terms of men and material, and there are reasonable sketches of the commanding generals. In particular, the models of the various tanks are described in detail. As a simplification, the Germans had the better tanks, but fewer of them; the Russians had out-produced the Germans, with a standardized, but somewhat inferior tank. Quantity over Quality. General Heinz Guderian, who had once famously stood on a knoll and could see the onion domes in Moscow, way too late in the fall of 1941, is considered to be the "father of the blitzkrieg." Before Kursk, this tactic had a 100% success rate. But the Russians had determined a way to beat it, placing all the troops in the salient in special training so they would not be terrorized by a tank attack. Dig in, stay camouflaged, wait for the tanks to pass, and then attack, at close range, from the side and rear, terrorizing the tankers.
The main battle extended for 9 days, July 5-14. There are 32 full page maps that are extremely useful in visualizing the ebb and flow of the battle lines. The battle is told in excruciating detail, I would argue TOO excruciating. There is a surfeit of names: unit commanders and their numerical designations. Far too many for the "general reader" and almost certainly, the "aficionado" as well. I can imagine the test on this book, at some war college, necessitating much proverbial midnight oil. And of the total of 450 pages, almost 200 are various appendixes. It is possible, however, to read for the essential action. Despite all the details, what is missing completely is the voice of the "common" soldier. No interviews. No diaries. No memoirs referenced. If you are interested in their voice, I'd highly recommend the DVD War of the Century - When Hitler Fought Stalin which contains interviews of the ordinary soldier of this war, now when they are in their 70's and 80's.
I was in a tank unit in Vietnam, the 1/69th Armor. 54 tanks, if we could keep them all running. And they were never all in the same place together. The thought of thousands of tanks together, in battle, tank against tank, on the steppes around Kursk, stirred the imagination so much that my family and I drove to Kursk, in July, 1990. There is a museum, dedicated to the battle, in the town, with enormous maps of the battle. For an hour, we were the only ones there. What a contrast to Normandy.
For the "war buff," or the "educated reader" who wants to know why things are the way they are, this is an important read, marred by excessive names and the lack of the common soldier. 4-stars.
Top reviews from other countries
It is a well known fact the numbers of men and material and the sheer effort operational staff work, logistical build up and fighting mark this as one of the titanic episodes of WWII on The Eastern Front.
Glantz does a thoroughly excellent job in relaying this to the reader with the wealth of details concerning the build-up, execution and aftermath of this campaign.
His account pays tribute to the amount Soviet intelligence and deception work which played their part in reducing the effectiveness of the initial assault; in lesser works this has all been put down to information supplied by the spy code named 'Lucy' (and that was that, as it were). Having said that he still conveys the toughness and adaptability of the German war machine, which still managed to make progress despite the formidable defences and tenacity of the Soviet soldier.
In lesser hands a book of this scope might well come across as dry. Not a bit of it! By using official reports from both sides he succeeds in painting a graphic account of the ferocity of the fighting.
The order of battle is also most comprehensive, the maps might require a bit of careful study to see who is exactly where, but that is not a problem, and the photos in their monochrome state add to the atmosphere of that time of carnage.
Highly recommended to those with an interest in this battle or the Eastern Front of WWII. If you are considering this as your first book on the battles around the Kursk Salient then it is a worthwhile book to have, but will require steady and persistence of reading; this is no light work (I am pleased to say)
The authors are Colonel David Glantz, the founder of the US Army's Foreign Military Studies Office and Jonathan House, A former political-military analist for the Joint Chiefs of Staff .
The outstanding job done by the authors, it is in the Glantz's perfect style, I mean that it represents the final job about this subject for the huge historical documentation present in the Appendix (the complete German Order of Battle, at the level of battalion and of single tank; the complete Soviet Order of Battle, at the level of battalionand of single tank/gun/multiple rocket launcher; comparative strength and losses; comparative armor strenghts; Key German Orders; Key Soviet documents).
The book begins examinating the German startegy of the first two years of war on the eastern front to explain why it had been necessary for them to start a new offensive on the third year of this war.
The second part of the book examines how the two armies prepared to the new clash.
The third part examines the various steps of the German offensive.
The Fourth part is dedicated to the exam of the Soviet counteroffensive andof the conclusions.
After reading a lot of his books, to me the name "David Glantz" it means a lot, more specifically it means that I read a book based on a historical research at the best possible level and this is the best that i can ask from such a book.
This book deserves the highest praise.
Very clearly written, with only one difficulty; the constant need to refer to the maps when following the narrative of unit movements. Perhaps future editions could have fold out maps provided in a pocket.





