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The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution Kindle Edition
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To give a few examples, Vego relates that 35 inches of rain fell in the 40 days of the main actions, saturating the soil so as to seriously hinder American airfield and road construction and movement of supplies and heavy equipment, and that Japanese possession of weather stations out to the west enabled them to accurately predict movement of fronts in the area and bring reinforcements and supplies in under cloud cover. He also describes in detail the situation existing in the American radio message handling networks, providing vital context as to why communications among the commanders were so poor.
The description and analysis of the controversial decisions by Halsey, Kinkaid and Kurita in the naval battle, in particular, surpass in depth and detail those in any of the many other books I've read over the years.
Note, however, that the depth and detail are in regard to the thoughts, actions and informational and cognitive context of those directing the planning, preparation and execution, and of the resulting outcomes from the viewpoints of those providing that direction.
There are no stirring, blow-by-blow narratives of the actual combat.
The most famous part of the battle was Halsey's decision to take virtually all of his carrier force north to fight the Japanese northern decoy force. This, of course, left the naval forces around Leyte very weak. This event again shows the careful research that characterizes the book.
Years later Halsey still defended his actions saying, 'given the same circumstances and the same information ..., I would make it again.' The author's conclusion, 'no decision can be considered sound if the commander does exactly what the enemy wants him to do.'
Writing many years after the battle Mr. Vego has the ability to draw a whole series of conclusions about the battle (too many to go into here) and his final chapters are a masterpiece of conclusions and lessons learned.