The Battle For Okinawa 1st Edition

I have read a couple of books by American soldiers about the bloody battle for Okinawa in WWII that many suggest was the catalyst for dropping atomic bombs on Japan to prevent a contracted war of attrition in Japan after invasion. So it was an interesting to get the perspective of a high ranking Japanese officer who was leading the Japanese forces in the battle of Okinawa in The Battle For Okinawa (1995 originally written in Japanese in 1972) by Colonel Hiromichi Yahara with an introduction and commentary by Frank B. Gibney (a former WWII POW interrogator). In many ways the memoir is self-serving, Yahara has an agenda to set two things straight: 1) that he was not a coward for not killing himself and allowing himself to be captured and 2) that he was one of the few commanding officers who rejected the banzai attack offensives and wait for air power approach to save the day strategy. Furthermore, he was correct in thinking that Okinawa would probably be the next target rather than Taiwan as many of his peers thought. The defeat in that the the strategic defensive (attrition warfare) and all-out offensive (direct confrontation) plans constantly collided leaving them without a consistent war plan. Some other trends appear throughout the memoir, the utter disregard for the lives of Okinawans: "For want of antitank weapons, we had to use Okinawan conscripts armed with bamboo spears. They were destroyed in one day." Yahara didn't seem to lose much sleep over civilian causalities or deaths of comfort women and nurses that he witnessed. In fact he mentions that he had studied in America for two years and found the propaganda spread among the Okinawans about the brutal nature of their enemy would result in widespread rape, torture, and death. A policy that hey sometimes enforced with force. He knew it was absurd but did nothing to stop the spread of such nonsense. Here's a sample of the mentality of the high command, when the commanding General Cho wrote his last orders he added this postscript: "Do not suffer shame of being taken prisoner. You will live for eternity." Yahara saw the folly of such an order and muses about this concept and ask serious questions such as: must one hundred soldiers die because of this tradition of avoiding shame? He suggests that their leaders only seemed to care about preservation of their own status, prestige, and honor. All in all a fascinating account of one of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific theater in WWII.

Yahara was the most senior officer to survive the Battle of Okinawa. While the definitive account of the Battle is still to be written, Yahara carries a large part of our understanding on the Japanese strategy and tactics for the battle. Yahara as senior Staff Officer for the 32nd Army was responsible for all planning for the battle. He wrote this work long after the war to explain his role and the tactics of the Japanese Army.

Yahara's account is not an overall view, even from the Japanese side. With Frank Gibney, former US Army Intelligence officer during the battle, giving commentary in both the beggining, the middle and end, the book runs about 200 pages (including American interogation documents). Yahara misses whole sections of the battle that are not relevant to his explanation of his strategy of attrition. There is no explanation of the initial landing (though there is a good account of the Japanese commanders looking down at the initial landing and sharing a good joke, cigarettes, and banter on the ultimate surprise in store for the Americans). There is no account of the battles on Ie Shima or other smaller islands. No account of the battle for the northern island on Motobu Peninsula.

Yahara's account comprises two themes: the strategy for the defence of Okinawa and his role, and his personal experiences during and shortly after the battle.

He sets out the tactical and strategic considerations and his understanding for the necessity in fighting a war or attrition. No Banzai attacks. The goal is to bleed the Americans, convince them that a similar ground campaign on the main islands would be prohibitively expensive in blood and treasure, and to, maybe hold out on the Southern part of the Island until a possible peace treaty is brokered (though it must be said, he did not place much hope in the latter possibility).

Yahara survives in the initial command post underneath Shuri Castle for about two months as the main line is slowly but inevitably cracked by the US Marines and Infantry and unbelievable US firepower that makes staying about ground very hard indeed. In fact Yahara does not leave his dugout for weeks on end. Eventually with the fall of Shuri he needs to move the HQ to Mabuni for a final defence in the bottom Kisen Penninsula (an area about 8x5 miles). His final underground command is a cramped and awkward arrangement. But Staff Officers still have private caves and there is enough sake for everyone and food never was a problem for most of the troops. This troglodyte existence comes to an end after the complete collapse of any organised Japanese defence on June 21st. Ushijima issues him with an order to get to the Mainland, however he can, and report on what has happenned. After witnessing the death of General Ushihima (seppuku) and Cho (shoots himself in the head), Yahara wanders around in the night and eventually tries to pass himself off as a Japanese civilian. Caught by native Japanese working for the Americans he confesses to all and eventually is repatriated after a rather comfortable stay in a POW compound for officers.

Anyone looking for pangs of conscience from Yahara on the treatment of Okinawa civilians will be dissapointed. Though surrounded by many civilians young and old, he hardly mentions them and spends a total of 2 pages on their plight. He had it in his power to ask them before and during the battle to head for the American Lines. He had been in the US as an exchange officer and notes that he knew Japanese propoganda about the Americans being Ogres was largely fiction. But true to his own warrior code he is silent.

It is hard to feel sorry for Yahara. He ground up many units. He never inspected frontal units and he never tried to obtain or set up a good intelligence network (all general faults of the Japanese Military as well as Yahara's).

One thing to note, his nemesis was General Cho who wanted to launch frontal infantry attacks against the Americans. Although Yahara's relationship with this man was strained, he is (as is the Japanese characteristic) reluctant to directly criticise his superiors. Ushijima seems almost completely sidelined and out of the battle in the last stages. Just waiting for the end, issuing orders to units that no longer exist, and all the time being rip-roaring drunk on sake. Having said that, Japan had the last large infantry-centred army. Their willingness to fight and die was unrivalled and deserves the grudging respect of all. Yahara is a worthy expression of this tradition.

Anyone who wants to truly understand this battle needs to read this account.

Colonel Yahara was obviously a clever chap and had unorthodox views on how to conduct a the defense of Okinawa, on which he seemed to have prevailed. So a war of attrition was fought and the US did exactly what he was after, namely to conduct a brainless frontal assault campaing, hill by hill, bunker by bunker, until the final and entirely senseless bloodbath 3 months after the invasion. Some 240.000 people died and the colonel is fairly unrepentened, neither for the Japanese soldiers who died, nor for the civilians, for whom he did not seem to care either until he was about to surrender.
Still this is a good book if only it shows the Japanese side to a horrific battle with war crimes committed plentiful by both sides, dominated so far almost exclusively by US accounts - since there were so few Japanese survivors.