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Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Air Power, 1917-1945 (Studies in War, Society, and the Military) Paperback – Illustrated, December 1, 2013
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Clodfelter examines the progressive idealism that led to the creation of the U.S. Air Force and its doctrine that the finite destruction of precision bombing would end wars more quickly and with less suffering for each belligerent. What is more, his work shows how these progressive ideas emerged intact after World War II to become the foundation of modern U.S. Air Force doctrine. Drawing on a wealth of archival material, including critical documents unavailable to previous researchers, Clodfelter presents the most complete analysis ever of the doctrinal development underpinning current U.S. Air Force notions about strategic bombing.
- Print length390 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherUniversity of Nebraska Press
- Publication dateDecember 1, 2013
- Dimensions6 x 1.1 x 8.9 inches
- ISBN-100803271808
- ISBN-13978-0803271807
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"A solid and impressive study that will enlighten those interested in the formation of bombing theory (Douhet through Warden) and especially its practice in World War II."--Kenneth P./i>--Kenneth P. Werrell "Air Power History "
"A thoughtful and well written account of a central thread in the thinking of American airpower advocates and the way its implementation in two world wars took place at the time, was seen afterwards, and has come to be enormously influential in the decision process of our country's leaders into the twenty-first century."--Gerhard L. Weinberg, professor emeritus at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and winner of the Pritzker Military Library Literature Award--Gerhard L. Weinberg (01/08/2010)
"This is military, intellectual history at its best."--Colonel Gian P./i>--Colonel Gian P Gentile "Journal of American History "
About the Author
Product details
- Publisher : University of Nebraska Press; Illustrated edition (December 1, 2013)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 390 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0803271808
- ISBN-13 : 978-0803271807
- Item Weight : 1.15 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 1.1 x 8.9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #3,436,580 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #7,427 in Military Aviation History (Books)
- #30,719 in World War II History (Books)
- #77,304 in Engineering (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Mark Clodfelter is a Professor of Military Strategy at the National War College in Washington, DC. A former US Air Force officer, he served in radar assignments in South Carolina and Korea during a 23-year Air Force career devoted largely to teaching. He twice taught history at the US Air Force Academy, ultimately serving as the Academy's director of military history. From 1991-1994, he was part of the initial cadre of instructors at Air University's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). He next became Professor of Aerospace Studies and Commander of the Air Force ROTC detachment at the University of North Carolina--a true hardship tour for the native North Carolinian. He began teaching at National War College in 1997, first in uniform, and since 2000 as a civilian professor.
Mark has published extensively on air power topics. He has received several writing awards, and many of his publications are used in professional military education courses in the US and NATO countries. In 1996, US Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman placed "The Limits of Air Power" on his intermediate reading list; in 2007, the RAF Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, placed the paperback edition of "Limits" on his "top ten" reading list for that year.
Mark has recently completed "Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Air Power, 1917-1945," a book analyzing how progressive ideals influenced the American approach to strategic bombing before and during World War II, and why those progressive notions have endured to the present in the US Air Force.
He has a BS in European History from the Air Force Academy (1977), an MA in Military History from the University of Nebraska (1983), and a PhD in American History from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is a die-hard fan of North Carolina basketball, Air Force Academy football, and St. Louis Cardinals baseball.
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Mark Clodfelter has written a wonderful book with a unique theme, which he carries throughout the book, of the progressive idealism of the American Air Force's "founding fathers." He asserts that the guiding vision of the air power theorists and leaders, especially after World War I, centered upon using air power to decrease the horrors of war--thus linking them to the ideals of the American progressive movement of the early twentieth century. Clodfelter then demonstrates how the air power leaders in World War II in both theaters---but especially against Japan--modified their progressive concepts as the bombing campaigns resembled more a bludgeon than the scalpel they desired. The American airmen had little choice. The technology available at that time did not match the pre-war theorists hopes and designs and the leaders fought against the clock as they pressed to show air power's unique (and hopefully singular) contribution to end the war, which they hoped would lead to the ultimate goal of an independent air service.
Clodfelter's unique contribution is the guiding progressive ideal of "beneficial" air power as seen through those who brought American air power up from a few obsolete squadrons to the mightiest force on the planet within twenty years. He provides a superb summation of the bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan and he does not get lost in the details; instead he constantly highlights the progressive theme. Beneficial Bombing provides a different and needed perspective on the development of American air power during this formative period, and Clodfelter shows in a short conclusion how those ideals remain inculcated in U.S. Air Force doctrine and its leaders.
The book is extremely well written and documented. Clodfelter does not get caught-up in overly detailing the interwar fights for independence or doctrine or the intricacies of the world war. He remains focused on his theme while still providing enough specifics and examples to more than support his argument. The documentation is beyond reproach and uses outstanding primary sources augmented by the most respected secondary sources on the topic.
I believe it will take its place beside Michael Sherry's "The Rise of American Airpower" as the best ideological explanation for the development of American air power technologies and doctrine and their trials by the fires of total war.
The title, "Beneficial Bombing," is misleading and unfortunate. Clodfelter ties the concept of strategic bombing to the progressive movement of the early 20th century, which attempted to improve the human lot through technology. Strategic bombing was billed as a more humane way to wage war than the frontal attacks of trench warfare in World War I.
This is a very well-written book. Clodfelter is a former Air Force officer and a well-known historian of air power.
The main problem with this book is that the author fails to make a convincing connection between "progressive" idealism and American airpower, and, specifically, between "progressivism" and the air war against Germany and Japan. The "progressive" movement is briefly and unsatisfactorily described on pages 1 to 5, at which point the author contends that "progressive" airmen after WW1 thought that precision bombing of industrial targets would, in the future, make the clash of ground armies obsolete and make wars short and technologically intensive instead of protracted and manpower intensive. Are we to believe, then, that every advocate of precision bombing was a "progressive" - including such reactionaries as Curtis LeMay? Were British advocates of precision bombing progressives? Was Walter Wever, the Luftwaffe advocate of precision strategic bombing, a progressive? Later in the book the author contends that ending the war rapidly through airpower was the
"progressive" war aim. What is "progressive" about wanting to end the war quickly? Every responsible leader of every service in every country wanted to end the war quickly, so it is hard to see what is especially progressive about this goal. As for ending the war quickly through airpower, that is exactly what Bomber Harris wanted to do and thought he was doing, but with very different methods than the American "progressive" (?) precision bombing advocates. If Harris sought the same objective (rapid war termination without a ground invasion) using the same instrument (heavy bombers) as the Americans, was he a progressive, or not?
In sum, the author's failure to establish what is progressivism, who was a progressive, and how the theory and practice of American airpower was more "progressive" than other uses of airpower in WW2 is a basic failing of this book. Merely asserting that an idea or action was progressive, as the author does, is insufficient to support his thesis.
