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A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam Paperback – April 10, 2007
| Lewis Sorley (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
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- Print length507 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherHarvest
- Publication dateApril 10, 2007
- Dimensions5.31 x 1.28 x 8 inches
- ISBN-100156013096
- ISBN-13978-0156013093
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Editorial Reviews
Amazon.com Review
Neglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 offer surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing from thousands of hours of previously unavailable (and still classified) tape-recorded meetings between the highest levels of the American military command in Vietnam, A Better War is an insightful, factual, and superbly documented history of these final years. Through his exclusive access to authoritative materials, award-winning historian Lewis Sorley highlights the dramatic differences in conception, conduct, and--at least for a time--results between the early and later years of the war. Among his most important findings is that while the war was being lost at the peace table and in the U.S. Congress, the soldiers were winning on the ground. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War sheds new light on the Vietnam War.
Amazon Exclusive Essay: "New Vietnam War History" by Lewis Sorley, Author of A Better War
For a long time most people thought the long years of American involvement in the Vietnam War were just more of the same--with a bad ending. Now we know that during the latter years, when General Creighton Abrams commanded U.S. forces, almost everything changed, and for the better.Abrams understood the nature of the war and devised a more availing approach to the conduct of it. Building up South Vietnam's own armed forces got high priority, whereas before they had been neglected and allowed to go into combat outgunned by the enemy. The covert infrastructure which through terror and coercion kept South Vietnam's rural population under domination was painstakingly rooted out, not ignored as earlier. And combat operations were greatly improved, concentrating on large numbers of patrols and ambushes designed to provide security for the people rather than cumbersome large-unit sweeps through the deep jungle.
Some commentators have called the description of these changes "revisionist" history, but actually it is new history. Virtually all the better-known earlier books about the war concentrated heavily on the early years, leaving the later period grossly neglected.
New insight came importantly from a collection of hundreds of tape recordings of briefings and staff meetings in General Abrams's headquarters during the four years he commanded in Vietnam. They are filled with human drama, professional debate, successes and frustrations, and ultimately a hard-won triumph, told in the voices of Abrams and his senior associates; such visiting officials as the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and a succession of often brilliant briefing officers.
Later, of course, what they had won was thrown away by the United States Congress, but the story of their better war is still a dramatic testament to courage, integrity, devotion, and professional competence.--Lewis Sorley
Review
"Sorley's book is as important a reexamination of the operational course of the war as Robert McNamara's In Retrospect is of the conflict's moral and political history."―Publishers Weekly (starred review)
"An extraordinary piece of work that is bound to become a valuable part of historical documentation about the war in Vietnam. The first to set the record straight concerning the outcome of that conflict."―H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General, U.S. Army, Retired —
From the Inside Flap
From the Back Cover
Lewis Sorley’s important and influential book A Better War sheds light on the often neglected final years in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 and revises our knowledge of the war and its conclusion. Drawing on his exclusive access to still classified tape-recorded meetings of the highest levels of military command in Vietnam, Sorley highlights the dramatic differences in the conception, the conduct, and--at least for a time--the results after General Creighton Abrams succeeded to the top military post in 1968. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War is an insightful history and a great human drama of purposeful and principled service in the face of an agonizing succession of lost opportunities--and it is never as important as it is now.
"A comprehensive and long-overdue examination of the immediate post-Tet offensive years." --The New York Times
"The book is the missing link in the history of the Vietnam War. It opens the old arguments up again and shows them in a new light." --Strategic Review
"[A Better War] is an outstanding piece of work, historically important with its use of new evidence, intellectually challenging with its suggestion of new interpretations of events, and highly readable." --Army
Lewis Sorley, a third-generation graduate of West Point, also holds a doctorate from Johns Hopkins University. He has served in the U.S. Army, on staff at the Pentagon, and later as a senior civilian official of the Central Intelligence Agency. He lives in Maryland.
About the Author
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Product details
- Publisher : Harvest; First edition (April 10, 2007)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 507 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0156013096
- ISBN-13 : 978-0156013093
- Item Weight : 1.09 pounds
- Dimensions : 5.31 x 1.28 x 8 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #240,042 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #217 in Southeast Asia History
- #464 in Vietnam War History (Books)
- #2,395 in World War II History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Lewis Sorley, a former soldier, is a graduate of West Point and holds a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins. His Army service included tank and armored cavalry units in Germany, Vietnam, and the U.S., Pentagon staff duty, and teaching at West Point and the Army War College.
His books include two biographies, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times and Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command. The Johnson biography received the Army Historical Foundation's Distinguished Book Award. An excerpt of the Abrams biography won the Peterson Prize as the year's best scholarly article on military history. He has also been awarded the General Andrew Goodpaster Prize for military scholarship by the American Veterans Center.
His book A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam was nominated for the Pulitzer Prize. His edited work Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968-1972 received the Army Historical Foundation's Trefry Prize for providing a unique perspective on the art of command. He has also written Honor Bright: History and Origins of the West Point Honor Code and System and edited a two-volume work entitled Press On! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry. He is currently researching a biography of General William C. Westmoreland.
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I think what’s bad in this book cancels what’s good so the result is a bit of a mess but, I'm being generous here, overall it is OK. I did have trouble getting through the book because of what, I think, is bad in this book. The problem is Sorley has an ax to grind. For Sorley the most important aspect of the war was the pacification program. Basically he maintains that pacification was totally ignored by Westmoreland and that resulted in a complete lack of progress and wasted opportunity. Then, this is the important part, Abrams did emphasize pacification and that resulted in dramatic progress. According to Sorley: If only the US could have stayed committed to the defense of SVN, pacification would have resulted in a secure communist free nation. Actually, Sorley maintains that the war was won in 1970 but no one noticed…so the war continued. If that sounds ludicrous that is because it is!
For Sorley the most important period of the war came after Tet in 1968. In the prolog he bemoans the fact that many histories focus on the period prior to and including Tet 1968 and virtually ignore the period of Abrams’ command. After Westmoreland left and Abrams took command he focused on Vietnamization and pacification and, along with William Colby as director of CORDS and Ellsworth Bunker as US Ambassador to South Vietnam, “…came very close to achieving the elusive goal of a viable nation and a lasting peace.”
To demonstrate that near success Sorley examines the successes of the CORDS program and a few of the battles Americans fought to secure strategically important areas from Communist incursion. The author even titled one of the chapters Victory. That chapter opens with, “There came a time when the war was won. The fighting wasn’t over, but the war was won. This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970.” He then gives examples of how formerly enemy controlled areas around Saigon were now almost entirely free of Communist forces of any kind. He quotes Colby saying, “…by 1971 I could go down the canals in the Delta in the middle of the night.” But I am trying to understand how a win can be declared when the “fighting wasn’t over.” So people were still dying. So SV was not secure, just certain areas were secure. And the author, of course, focuses on these areas. While interesting and of historical importance, Sorley fails to convince me he has done nothing more than present cherry-picked events to support his conclusion of some kind of victory.
The numbers do not support a victory for US and SVN forces. Prior to Tet 1968 RVNAF deaths were less than 13,000 per year. After Tet 1968 RVNAF deaths exceeded 20,000 for every year until the fall of Saigon. So no significant improvement can be found for the years 1970 and 1971. I use Vietnamese military numbers because US forces were on their way home during those years.
But Sorley makes other claims to demonstrate that the war was being won. I think the most extravagant claim is that from 1969 until 1971 or 1972 the US had driven VC and PAVN forces from the A Shau Valley and it was held against the Communist forces until the US removed its ground forces in 1973.
Rising above the western side of the A Shau Valley is the hill that became known as Hamburger Hill. In May of 1969 a battle was fought there. Sorley says, “After driving out the 29th NVA, the 3rd Brigade [of the 101st Airborne Division] stayed in the A Shau for months, then passed the mission to other units.” Really, stayed for months? So name the combat base or fire base. If a brigade is staying in the bush they would set up a base. Sorley then quotes the 3rd Brigade commander: “We and our successors controlled the area until ordered out of Vietnam three years later.” So the 101st Airborne or its “successors” controlled the valley from 1969 to 1972? History shows that the 101st was out of Vietnam by March 1972. Sorley’s and the 3rd Brigade commander’s statements are so provocative I was impelled to check it further. But, I did already know that for about 23 days in 1970 the Battle of Fire Support Base Ripcord was fought in the mountains above the eastern side of the A Shau, again involving 101st Airborne’s 3rd Brigade. After 75 dead and 463 wounded it was determined the base was not defensible and US forces withdrew. I also knew that was the last major engagement between US and Communist ground forces. That was just one year after Hamburger Hill, not three. I have not found any other mention in the history of other “successor” units that controlled the A Shau Valley. The US never had control.
Although this book does have a lot to recommend it this is mostly an example of bad history. Sorley, of course, does not mention Fire Support Base Ripcord. This is not a history I would recommend to the uninitiated to the Vietnam War. But, in reality, Sorley is attempting to persuade and not inform. His bias is obvious in his long section on Westmoreland. Yes, Westmoreland did ignore pacification but Sorley’s critique is lacking and does not explore what Westmoreland did right. Yes, Abrams did a fine job with pacification but it had its limits and Sorley does not explore those limits. Sorley does not like that the US Congress was no longer in the mood to continue financial and military support after Tet 1968. The US was going to leave and not even provide that minimal support that existed prior to 1965. That was a Johnson / McNamara blunder and not a Westmoreland fault. Nixon could not gin up any kind of continued support for the war with congress or the public. So, Sorley wants to persuade the reader that Abrams could have done a better job than Westmoreland and it was Westmoreland who ultimately lost the war even though it was won, for a time, under Abrams. I know, the pieces don’t fit.
This complex war needs a wider lens than Sorley provides. It is too obviously focused on what happened in country and ignores the restrictions placed on Westmoreland by Johnson and McNamara. This book is an incomplete examination of the war after Tet 1968. It suffers from cherry-picking and confirmation bias. We do need a better examination of the war after 1968 but this book falls short.


