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The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine Paperback – February 1, 2011
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The #1 New York Times bestseller: "It is the work of our greatest financial journalist, at the top of his game. And it's essential reading."―Graydon Carter, Vanity Fair
The real story of the crash began in bizarre feeder markets where the sun doesn't shine and the SEC doesn't dare, or bother, to tread: the bond and real estate derivative markets where geeks invent impenetrable securities to profit from the misery of lower- and middle-class Americans who can't pay their debts. The smart people who understood what was or might be happening were paralyzed by hope and fear; in any case, they weren't talking.
Michael Lewis creates a fresh, character-driven narrative brimming with indignation and dark humor, a fitting sequel to his #1 bestseller Liar's Poker. Out of a handful of unlikely-really unlikely-heroes, Lewis fashions a story as compelling and unusual as any of his earlier bestsellers, proving yet again that he is the finest and funniest chronicler of our time.
- Print length291 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherW. W. Norton & Company
- Publication dateFebruary 1, 2011
- Dimensions5.5 x 0.9 x 8.3 inches
- ISBN-100393338827
- ISBN-13978-0393338829
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― Michiko Kakutani, The New York Times
"Superb: Michael Lewis doing what he does best, illuminating the idiocy, madness and greed of modern finance. . . . Lewis achieves what I previously imagined impossible: He makes subprime sexy all over again."
― Andrew Leonard, Salon.com
"One of the best business books of the past two decades."
― Malcolm Gladwell, New York Times Book Review
"I read Lewis for the same reasons I watch Tiger Woods. I’ll never play like that. But it’s good to be reminded every now and again what genius looks like."
― Malcolm Gladwell, New York Times Book Review
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- Publisher : W. W. Norton & Company; Reprint edition (February 1, 2011)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 291 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0393338827
- ISBN-13 : 978-0393338829
- Item Weight : 9 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.5 x 0.9 x 8.3 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #14,364 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #14 in Journalism Writing Reference (Books)
- #27 in Economic Conditions (Books)
- #28 in Economic History (Books)
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Michael Lewis, the best-selling author of The Undoing Project, Liar's Poker, Flash Boys, Moneyball, The Blind Side, Home Game and The Big Short, among other works, lives in Berkeley, California, with his wife, Tabitha Soren, and their three children.
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Lewis opens his tale with the perfect quote from Tolstoy:
"The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man if he has not formed any idea of them already; but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt, what is laid before him." Like many situations in Wall Street, the "experts" know so much and are so deeply involved in what they are doing that they cannot see the forest for the trees. During the subprime debacle, it must have been nearly impossible for a bond trader to concede to himself that there was something wrong with giving $750,000 loans to migrant Mexican berry pickers making $15,000 per year. In a culture where most consider the size of their bonus proportional to their own brains, the hubris of these overpaid scoundrels was stratospheric. When the whole thing goes down in flames, Lewis writes "For more than twenty years, the bond market's complexity had helped the Wall Street bond trader to deceive the Wall Street customer. It was now leading the bond trader to deceive himself."
The result is the big investment banks, led by incompetent CEOs, allowed their high and mid-level employees in the bond departments to lose billions of dollars and escape financially unscathed while taxpayers picked up the tab. Low income borrowers were complicit primarily in their lack of sophistication. By getting the criminally incompetent ratings agencies to call all of these poor quality loans AAA, the investment banks created huge bonuses for themselves. When the music stopped playing, every major investment bank had billions of losses because they had started to believe their own bulls---. Meanwhile, the US government assessed the costs to the taxpayers by handing the banks a gift of billions of dollars, without reforming the system in any way.
Michael Lewis' tale centers on a handful of smart investors who saw what was happening and had the foresight to bet against these fools. Even the winners dealt with horrible unintended consequences.
The "heroes" of this story are the brilliant investors, mainly a rag-tag band of Wall Street outsiders, who made common sense statements like "A Home without Equity is Just a rental with debt." They were naturally skeptical in their dealings with Wall Street, asking their salesmen "I appreciate this trade, but I just want to know one thing: How are you going to f--- me?"
These investors knew that investing could not be reduced to a formula. One of them was a one-eyed man with Asperger's, Dr. Michael Burry. He said "the more he studied Buffett, the less he thought Buffett could be copied; indeed, the lesson of Buffett was to succeed in a spectacular fashion you had to be spectacularly unusual. I love this quote from Burry: "If you are going to be a great investor, you have to fit the style to who you are." Investing is something you have to learn how to do on your own, in your own peculiar way.
The irony of his success is that the troubled genius Burry earned his clients a fortune, beating the S&P by a massive margin, for ungrateful clients. Instead, he was hassled because his subprime short took almost 2 years to play out - which was exactly what he said would happen. He was able to beat the market indices by impossibly wide margins, all from a small office in California, far from Wall Street, mainly by reading detailed company filings from a 10-K service that cost only $100 per year. His style wasn't an easy ride, as his typical trade "goes up by ten times but first it goes down by half."
There is much to learn from this remarkable man, including his thought process on communicating his investment ideas. He said: "I hated discussing ideas with investors because I then become a Defender of the Idea, and that influences your thought process." In his first five years running money, the S&P was down 6.84% and in the same period, he was up 242%. He assumed investors trusted him enough to let him invest the way he wanted - but that was wrong.
After the subprime mess did indeed explode, he had more than doubled his clients' money that final year of his fund. At the end of the whole ride, his founding investor Gotham Capital pulled their money out of his fund. He sent them an unsolicited email that said only "you're welcome." By June 30, 2008, any investor who had stuck with Berry from his beginning on Nov 1, 2000, had gained 489% after fees, while the S&P 500 returned only 2% during the same time. In 2007 alone, Burry had made his investors $750 million, yet due to redemptions, he ended up managing only $600 million.
Lewis writes: "What had happened was that he had been right, the world had been wrong, and the world hated him for it."
Michael Lewis accurate descriptions of the sleazy bond salesmen on Wall Street appear to be hyperbole but are instead spot-on. Anyone that has met these creatures will instantly recall real-world examples that look and sound exactly as he describes them.
Lewis writes of the perils for investors of buying this mortgage-backed paper: "An investor who went from the stock market to the bond market was like a small, furry creature raised on an island without predators removed to a pit of pythons." "The bond market customer lived in perpetual fear of what he didn't know." (I worked at a hedge fund for a few years that was routinely sodomized by a sleazebag bond salesman. Finally, at one point, I could no longer be in the same room with him when he pitched his ideas to the fund's principals, because I couldn't stand to watch the rape in progress - it was like watching a snuff film).
The physical description of one of the bond traders that copied Burry's idea of shorting this paper was perfect: "He wore his hair slicked back, in the manner of Gordon Gekko, and the sideburns long, in the fashion of an 1820s Romantic composer or a 1970s porn star. He wore loud ties, and said outrageous things without the slightest apparent awareness of how they might sound if repeated unsympathetically. He peppered his conversation with cryptic references to how much money he made..." "He was a walking embodiment of the bond market, which is to say he was put on earth to screw the customer."
One of my favorite passages in the book is how Lewis describes a meeting in Vegas between the loser/patsy/criminally stupid Wing Chau, who is buying the CDOs (bad loans) in size and Eisman, one of the hedge fund guys who has taken the other side of the bet. The boob Wing Chau earns millions by "managing" CDOs, which is another way of saying buying any and all that Wall Street creates. He says with condescension: "I love guys like you who short my market. Without you, I don't have anything to buy. The more excited that you get that you're right, the more trades you'll do, and the more trades you do, the more product for me." Eisman later grabs the bond salesman that put the meeting together and says, "Whatever that guy is buying, I want to short it." Of course, Wing Chau's is proven to be completely wrong, but like everyone in the right place in this debacle, he emerges unscathed with millions in bonus money.
Some of the most delicious quotes by Lewis in this book have been well reported already, but bear repeating:
On the subject of John Paulson, a hedge fund manager that ended up making billions of dollars shorting the subprime garbage created by Wall Street. A quote by a Goldman Sachs client: "I called Goldman Sachs to ask them about Paulson, they told me he was a third-rate hedge fund guy who didn't know what he was talking about."
One of the hedge fund managers said this to the CEO of Moody's, who claimed his company's ratings were correct: "With all due respect, sir, you're delusional."
After a meeting with Ken Lewis, CEO of Bank of America: "I was sitting there listening to him. I had an epiphany. I said to myself, Oh my God, he's dumb! A light bulb went off. The guy running one of the biggest banks in the world is dumb!"
Then, about Merrill Lynch: "We just shorted Merrill Lynch." "Why?" "We have a simple thesis. There is going to be a calamity, and whenever there is a calamity, Merrill is there." (This turned out to be true, and ironically, Merrill sold themselves to said "dummy" Ken Lewis of Bank of America)
When fighting about values of CDOs broke out and Deustche Bank demanded collateral from another bank: "Dude, f--- your model. I'll make you a market. They are 70 to 77. You have three choices. You can sell them back to me at 70. You can buy some more at 77. Or you can give me my f------ $1.2 billion."
Maybe the best quote of the entire book, is Morgan Stanley CEO John Mack responding to a question on an earnings call. He was asked how just one little desk on the bond floor could have lost $8 billion. He said: "One, this trade was recognized and entered into our accounts. Two, it was entered into our risk management system. It's very simple. When these got, it's simple, it's very painful, so I'm not being glib. When these guys stress loss the scenario on putting on this position, they did not envision... that we could have this degree of default, right. It is fair to say that our risk management division did not stress those losses as well. It's just simple as that. Those are big fat tail risks that caught us hard, right. That's what happened." This type of verbal diarrhea is commonplace on earnings calls.
Michael Lewis writes some statements that I love:
"The Big Wall Street firms, seemingly so shrewd and self-interested, had somehow become the dumb money. The people who ran them did not understand their own business, and their regulators obviously knew even less."
"What are the odds that people will make smart decisions about money if they don't need to make smart decisions - if they can get rich making dumb decisions? The incentives on Wall Street were all wrong: they're still all wrong."
"No investment bank owned by its employees would have leveraged itself 35:1, or bought and held $50 billion in mezzanine CDOs."
"The people in a position to resolve the financial crisis were of course, the very same people who had failed to foresee it: Henry Paulson, Tim Geithner, Ben Bernanke, Lloyd Blankfein, John Mack, and Vikram Pandit...."
"All shared a distinction: they had proven far less capable of grasping basic truths in the heart of the U.S. financial system than a one-eyed money manager with Asperger's syndrome."
"The $306 billion (TARP) guarantee, nearly 2% of US GDP - was presented undisguised, as a gift. By early 2009 the risks and losses associated with more than a trillion dollars' worth of bad investments were transferred from big Wall Street firms to the U.S. taxpayer."
"The problem wasn't that Lehman Brothers had been allowed to fail. The problem was that Lehman Brothers had been allowed to succeed (in the first place)"
"This new regime - free money for capitalists, free markets for everyone else - plus the more or less instant rewriting of financial history vexed all sorts of people..."
He ties the whole story up so elegantly, with a quote from Gutfreund, the original bond trader, the first villain of "Liar's Poker" who says:
"It's laissez-faire until you get in deep sh--."
So what did I really think of the book? Well, Lewis should be commended for writing a book on the 2008 financial crisis from the most unique perspective thus far. Rather than focus on the major characters that a plethora of other books have focused on (Paulson, Bernanke, Geithner, etc.), Lewis tells his story using some extremely obscure characters as his lead actors: A handful of hedge fund managers who made massive bets against the subprime industry (and by hedge fund managers, I am not referring to high profile, well-known hedgies; I am talking about very, very minor players). Readers will feel connected to the characters when they are done with the book, and a less gifted writer could have never pulled this off. It was a difficult task for Lewis as well, but he skillfully made the points he wanted to make and simultaneously told a story, all through a narrative of four or five unconnected characters of whom the public has never heard.
What are these points Lewis wanted to make? I suppose the major tension of the book is the teeter-tottering between the greed/evil genius of the major Wall Street firms (on one hand), and then the utter stupidity and incompetence of Wall Street (on the other). It is a difficult balance to strike, and one reason it is difficult is because, well, one can not have it both ways. Lewis can not claim, as he astonishingly and explicitly does, that Goldman Sachs made AIG write credit default swaps on the subprime mortgage industry, guaranteeing AIG's demise and Goldman Sachs flourishing, but then on the other hand claim that the firms had no idea what they were doing, and were completely shell-shocked by what happened to their CDO's (the collateralized debt obligation instruments which served as the toxic assets you hear so much about). This inconsistency permeates the book, and tonight on 60 Minutes I heard Lewis repeat what his major thesis is: Wall Street did not know what they were doing. This is the correct thesis. But it is wholly imcompatible with the obscene Goldman Sachs conspiracy movement that has taken over the Oliver Stone mainframe of our society. Even a Michael Lewis fan like myself was taken aback by the audacity of this oft-repeated contradiction.
Perhaps the most disappointing message of the Lewis book is the conclusion he saved for the final chapter - the one I have heard him preaching for some time now on the media circuit. Lewis has been preaching since the days of Liar's Poker that the great sin of Wall Street was when all of the major firms went public (i.e. rather than function as closely-held partnerships, they sold shares to the public in the IPO market and now have no reason to ever check their evil inhibitions at the door). It is a rhetorically effective charge, but one that is not up for the most routine of examinations. The individuals most responsible for the massive money-losing operations of 2005-2007 were the largest shareholders in the firms. Jimmy Cayne of Bear Stearns saw his stock holdings decline from $1 billion of value to $50 million of value, directly under his watch. Richard Fuld was thrown to the lions as Lehman Brothers burned to the ground, but it burned up his $550 million of Lehman stock as well. The gentlemen running these firms were wealthy, and they were driven by a desire to get even wealthier, but it is absurd to postulate that the performance of these companies in the public stock markets were not important to them. It was all that was important to them. Are we really to believe that Wall Street would not have found more creative ways to raise capital in the capital markets if they were partnerships? Whether the firms were partnerships or public corporations, they lived off of balance sheet capital that they mostly raised in the debt markets. It was the bondholders who were on the verge of utter collapse in September of 2008. Why would that be different if they were partnerships? The most obvious refutation of Lewis's thesis is the question many are probably dying to point out to him after reading it: If being a public corporation corrupts the intentions of financial firms, why couldn't the same broad brush be used for all public corporations of all industries? If the removal of the partner capital from the company capital is a self-corrupting event, why should any corporation ever be allowed to go public? What exactly is the difference? Do not huge retail businesses, manufacturing firms, and technology outfits also use shareholder money to grow and operate? Does Lewis really want to advocate the abolition of public equity markets in America? It is absurd to even carry that argument through to its logical conclusion.
I do not want readers to be confused. There are some stellar observations in Lewis's newest book. He gets inside some of the most confused and ridiculous financial transactions ever conducted in the history of civilization, and he does it with the precision of a surgeon. But Lewis does not use his 264-page book to even apply one word - not one single utterance - against the malignant government policies behind much of this malaise. He could easily counter that his book was not meant to be a comprehensive introspection of the financial crisis, and that would be a fair response. But readers hoping for a biog-picture analysis of this crisis will not get it here. They will see the worst of a very small number of Wall Street traders, and they will see a system that was clueless to keep this process from ballooning out of control (his section on the high seven-figure bond traders being regulated by the high five-figure ratings agency analysts is choice). The risk management processes of Wall Street broke down. The hubris of a select number of people grew to a point of perversity. Contrary to Lewis's assertion, the bulk of these CEO's and executives did lose their jobs (Citi, Merrill Lynch, UBS, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, etc.) all fired their Presidents and CEO's as their houses burned to the ground. But overall, the book has a ton of good to say about the crisis. Most notably, he demonstrates how "in an old-fashioned panic, perception creates its own reality" (a concept that I want to explore much further in the future). He summarizes in a single sentence the most important thing that can be said about Lehman Brothers ("the problem wasn't that Lehman had been allowed to fail; the problem was that Lehman had been allowed to succeed").
I am truly glad that I read this book, and I do recommend it. However, as the pivotal work of evaluating the big picture of the crisis continues, the conclusion that Wall Street's transition to a shareholder-owned entity was at the heart of the matter is quite lacking. Unfortunately, both evil and incompetence exist in all kinds of business structures.
Top reviews from other countries
We all know, some years after the event, that a great many people saw the 2007 crash coming. Michael Lewis’s book, however, focuses on the handful of people who really saw it coming and left proof that they’d done so by staking large amounts of money betting that it would.
Take Michael Burry. This is a man we get to know better and better through 'The Big Short', which is appropriate because the events it describes include his own awakening self-awareness (one of the charms of this book). He was perhaps the first to see that the US mortgage industry was lending increasing amounts of money to people who had not the slightest chance of being able to keep up the repayments.
Those mortgages were being sold on to other financial institutions, and then being collected together into bonds which could be sold as packages to yet others. A market quickly developed in those bonds, which developed their own prices quite independent of any value the initial mortgages themselves might have.
In fact, the process went still further, with collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) which contained bits of many bonds and could themselves be sold on.
The explanation I’ve just given is almost certainly inadequate, but I don’t pretend to understand how individual mortgages got packaged into bonds and bonds into CDOs. But that’s the book’s essential point: very few people did understand. These were opaque instruments, not understood by the people who traded in them or by the executives of the Wall Street firms which employed the traders.
They didn’t understand, but they knew that it was in their interest that they keep being created, that their price keep increasing and that the market stay buoyant. So they did all it took to maintain the flow of the instruments – which meant making more and more loans to people less and less able to afford them – and to keep the price high.
In one of his most damning revelations, Lewis explains how Wall Street maintained pressure on the ratings agencies, whose staff were simply not of a calibre to withstand it. So the agencies continued to award to rate these essentially rubbish bonds triple-A. That allowed their prices to be kept floating ever more ludicrously higher.
What the few people like Burry (Steve Eisman, Greg Lippmann and the founders of Cornwall Capital also play major roles in the book) had understood was that this whole structure was ultimately built on lousy loans. It couldn’t be sustained in the long term – the whole tower eventually had to crash. So the trick was to find a way to bet against it. That’s the process known as “selling short.”
Normally, it involves borrowing. You might borrow pounds today to buy dollars, in the belief that the pound will fall, so when you come to buy pounds to pay the loan back, it will take fewer dollars than you’ve realised today; or you might borrow shares to sell today, believing that when you come to buy them again to reimburse the lender, they will cost you less. Large amounts of money can be made that way, but the risk is colossal: if the shares rise instead of falling, or the pound increases in value against the dollar instead of devaluing, your losses can be immense. In fact, they are unlimited.
As it happens there was no mechanism to borrow mortgage-backed bonds in the years leading up to 2007. What there was, however, was a way of insuring against them defaulting. The so-called credit default swap (CDS) meant paying a quarterly premium, against the insurer paying out the full value of any default on the bond – if the bond became worthless, the insurer paid out the face value at which it had been sold.
One can imagine that this was initially a legitimate form of insurance (though it wasn’t regulated as ordinary insurance is). If you’ve lent $100m to someone whose credit you believe is good, you might nonetheless want to take out some insurance against his being unable to pay you back; if someone is prepared to insure the full value for, say, two or three hundred thousand a year then the chances are that you will only be out of pocket by a small percentage of the interest you make on the loan, and usually the insurer will not have to pay out anything (just as in insurance generally: most houses don’t burn down, so the insurers turn the premiums into pure profit). You’ll have made a small reduction in your profit for peace of mind.
Until nearly the end, the Wall Street firms were so convinced of the solidity of the sub-prime mortgage market, that they were more than happy to issue large quantities of CDSs. They were happy to insure the bonds. Interestingly, the men who bet against them didn’t even have to own the bonds they were insuring: they could take out CDSs against the bonds without buying them – in other words, they were making pure bets.
This was the Big Short. They were taking out fire insurance on houses belonging to other people, which they were convinced were already burning. And they made a packet.
The main lesson for us? They did it because they were alone in understanding what the people paid huge salaries to manage the industry failed to grasp.
And the saddest lesson? No lessons have been learned. The finance sector was bailed out by the taxpayer. It goes on paying its senior players wildly excessive salaries. And it continues to pursue huge profits from financial instruments they don’t understand.
P.S. The film (same title) is not at all bad, either.
But it didn’t end there. Those that failed to get the desired rating were simply repackaged, so that all these dubious products were eventually classed as ‘risk free’. This was the second part of the conspiracy and a huge failure by the rating agencies (who were paid by the banks). They failed to examine in detail the structure of a given CDO, but simply accepted the bank’s assessment. The situation rapidly spiraled out of control. A CDO-A might contain some of the mortgages in CDO-B that in turn might contain some of the mortgages in CDO-C, and the latter might even contain some mortgages that were in CDO-A. This was an Alice in Wonderland world where it was impossible to give a true value of any CDO, and its worth was what the bank said it was worth. Even the senior staff at the banks that were selling the CDOs didn’t have a full understanding of what was happening.
This is where the outsiders entered. First they realized that the original loans were often being made to people without asking for proof of income (‘liars’ loans’) and that the home owner was offered a low interest rate (the ‘teaser’ rate) initially, typically for the first two or three years. They argued that after this period expired there would be a high probability that the owner would default and, crucially, that this would happen to the vast majority of loans within any given CDO, because they would all be unable to pay for the same social reasons. The banks, however, had risk models that only considered a worse case scenario of just a few percent failures. If they could take out insurance, via what were called ‘credit default swaps’ (CDSs), against a failure of a CDO, they argued that they would only have to wait a couple of years or so before the low-rate period expired and the insurance would have to pay out. Throughout they remained worried that they had missed something, because the logic seemed so obvious, they couldn’t understand why the banks themselves had not seen it. Eventually they did of course, and much later started to cynically (even corruptly?) bet that the very bonds that they had issued would fail.
Initially, the outsiders had hurdles to overcome. They had difficulty finding any bank that would sell CDSs to them because they were mere minnows with only small funds. However, these hurdles were overcome and to some amusement of the banks they started to accumulate substantial positions in ‘bets’ that the CDOs would fail, and at only a small cost in premiums. It was a nail-biting time because the price of CDOs continued to be stable, even sometimes rise, despite the increasing rate of defaults on the underlying loans. But the end, when it came, was very rapid, just as the outsiders had predicted. Indeed the losses were so great that they feared the big banks would themselves fail and so be unable to pay out on the CDSs. In great haste in the last stages of the collapse they scrambled to offload them and managed to get out before the final collapse.
The rest is history: several major bank collapsed; hundreds of billions of dollars were pumped into the system to keep others afloat; Congress stepped in and bought subprime mortgage assets for up to 2% of the US GDP; and senior bankers who had lost billions in the debacle were allowed to walk away with ‘bonuses’ of tens of millions of dollars. But the householders who had defaulted on their loans received nothing and were dispossessed.
What this sad story revealed was widespread cynicism in the financial industry, banks, rating agencies and regulatory bodies, bordering on corruption, and a remarkable lack of understanding of the fundamentals at the highest level in the banks. There have been many books about the causes of the financial crash of 2008, but few can match this one in the detailed knowledge of its author and the clarity of his presentation. There is some repetition in explaining technicalities, but this is acceptable. If the reader understands it first time these can easily be skipped over without loss of continuity. Overall it is an excellent book.
I had previously seen the film, however the book really captures incredibly well the hubris and madness of Wall Street. I have found this book very hard to put down. I’ve also had to stop swearing out loud in shock at some of the passages as Lewis exposes some of the utter stupidity and dishonesty of some of the key players in an act of collective madness and greed.
Strongly recommended to students of recent financial history.
Two criticisms of the book, although it's explained it's sometimes hard going to understand some of the detail (the gist is always clear), and it is sometimes repetitive. Still a five starer though, for the effort of producing something so revealing, and which clearly stung a few people, people who were incredibly fortunate to have only been stung rather than buried.














