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The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded American is Tearing Us Apart Paperback – Illustrated, May 11, 2009
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Armed with startling demographic data, Bill Bishop demonstrates how Americans have spent decades sorting themselves into alarmingly homogeneous communities—not by region or by state, but by city and neighborhood. With ever-increasing specificity, we choose the communities and media that are compatible with our lifestyles and beliefs. The result is a country that has become so ideologically inbred that people don't know and can't understand those who live just a few miles away.
In The Big Sort, Bishop explores how this phenomenon came to be, and its dire implications for our country. He begins with stories about how we live today and then draws on history, economics, and our changing political landscape to create one of the most compelling big-picture accounts of America in recent memory.
- Print length384 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- Publication dateMay 11, 2009
- Dimensions5.31 x 0.93 x 8 inches
- ISBN-100547237723
- ISBN-13978-0547237725
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Essential reading for activists, poli-sci types, journalists and trend-watchers." Kirkus Reviews
"A timely, highly readable discussion of American neighborhoods and the implications of who lives in them." Library Journal
"A book posing hard questions across the political spectrum." Booklist, ALA, Boxed Review
"Bishop's argument is meticulously researched—surveys and polls proliferate—and his reach is broad." Publishers Weekly
"a gripping new book" - The Economist
"Jam-packed with fascinating data, "The Big Sort" presents a provocative portrait of the splintering of America." Boston Globe
"[a] rich and challenging book about the ways in which the citizens of this country have, in the past generation, rearranged themselves into discrete enclaves that have little to say to one another and little incentive to bother trying." The Wall Street Journal —
About the Author
BILL BISHOP was a reporter for the Austin American-Statesman when he began research on city growth and political polarization with the sociologist and statistician Robert Cushing. Bishop has worked as a columnist for the Lexington Herald-Leader, and, with his wife, owned and operated the Bastrop County Times, a weekly newspaper in Smithville, Texas. He lives in Austin.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
You don’t know me, but you don’t like me. Homer Joy, Streets of Bakersfield”
How can the polls be neck and neck when I don’t know one Bush supporter?
Arthur Miller
In the spring before the 2004 election, I heard from LaHonda Jo Morgan. Jo Morgan lived in Wauconda, Washington, a one-building town (combination grocery, café, and post office) about 150 miles northwest of Spokane. She was convinced that Wauconda remained on the map simply because mapmakers don’t like to leave a lot of empty space on their products.” Jo Morgan was writing about segregation political segregation. She had seen an article I had written about the tendency of places to become politically like- minded, either increasingly Republican or Democratic. She noticed that the article came from Austin, her hometown. So she recounted that through fifty years of marriage, she had lived in a number of places across the United States and elsewhere in the world. And then she described a change she had noticed taking place in Wauconda:
This is a predominantly conservative area with most residents tied to ranching, mining and apple orchards. A few years back I began to feel somewhat disconnected in my church community, but I chalked that up to the struggle between pre and postVatican II concerns. Since the strife of the 2000 election, I became increasingly uncomfortable in conversations in a variety of situations. Perhaps I had more flexible views because of having been exposed to different cultures. In fact, I felt like a second-class citizen, not entitled to have opinions. I even wondered if I [was] becoming paranoid since being widowed.
Of course, now I understand. Increasing divisiveness arising from political partisanship is giving rise to the same sort of treatment I observed growing up in racially segregated Texas, only now it is directed at people who think differently from the majority population of an area. Sort of scary, isn’t it?
Jo Morgan was right about Wauconda changing. In 1976, Okanogan County in Washington had split fifty-fifty in the nearly fifty-fifty race between Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford. That made sense. Americans in 1976 were more likely to live close to somebody who voted differently from themselves than at any time since the end of World War II. And then, like the rest of the country, Jo Morgan’s community changed. Okanogan County went for Clinton in 1992 and then veered Republican, strongly so, in the next three elections. In 2000, 68 percent of Okanogan County voted for George W. Bush. No wonder Jo Morgan felt lonely.
Bonfire of the Yard Signs But scary”? I kept a file of the more outrageous examples of political anger in 2004. They ranged from the psychotic to the merely sad. There was the Sarasota, Florida, man who swerved his Cadillac toward Representative Katherine Harris as she campaigned on a street corner. (Harris had been the Republican secretary of state in Florida during the presidential vote recount in 2000.) I was exercising my political expression,” Barry Seltzer told police. The South Florida Sun-Sentinel reported just a week before the election that when an 18-year-old couldn’t convince his girlfriend that George W. Bush was the right choice for president, he became enraged, put a screwdriver to her throat and threatened to kill her.” The man told her that if she didn’t change her vote, she wouldn’t live to see the next election.” Two old friends arguing about the war in Iraq at an Eastern Kentucky flea market both pulled their guns when they got tired of talking. Douglas Moore, age sixty-five, killed Harold Wayne Smith because, a witness said, Doug was just quicker.” The destruction of campaign yard signs and the vandalism of campaign headquarters was epidemic in 2004. The Lafayette, Louisiana, Democratic Party headquarters was struck twice; in the second assault, miscreants wrote 4 + GWB” on the building’s front windows in a mixture of motor oil and ashes collected from burned John Kerry signs. The most pathetic display of partisan havoc started at the Owens Crossroads United Methodist Church near Huntsville, Alabama. The youth minister at the church sent children on a scavenger hunt” shortly before the election. On the list of items to be retrieved were John Kerry campaign signs. Once the kids toted the placards back to the church, the minister piled them in the parking lot and set the signs on fire. The scavengers did the best they could, but in Republican Huntsville they found only eight signs, barely enough for kindling. Had the same hunt taken place in, say, Seattle, the kids could have rounded up enough fuel to signal the space shuttle.
Living as a political minnority is often uncomfortable and at times frightening. In 2000, more than eight out of ten voters in the Texas Hill Country’s Gillespie County cassssst ballots for Bush. Two years later, Democrats prepared a float for the Fourth of July parade in the county seat of Fredericksburg. We got it all decorated,” county party chairman George Keller recalled, but nobody wanted to ride.” Nobody wanted to risk the stigma of being identified as a Democrat in an overwhelmingly Republican area. Thank goodness we got rained out,” Keller said of the orphaned float.
Gerald Daugherty used to live in the hip and shady section of Austin known as Clarksville. When he became active in a campaign against a proposal to build a light rail system in town, Daugherty put no light rail bumper stickers on his car and on his wife’s Mercedes. That apparently didn’t go over too well in Democratic and pro-rail Clarksville. Somebody keyed” the Mercedes at the local grocery and for good measure punched out the car’s turn signal lights. Was Daugherty sure the damage had been politically motivated? Not really. But then one morning he found his car coated with eggs. There must have been two dozen eggs all over my car,” he remembered. Splattered. And then deliberately rubbed on the No Rail’ bumper stickers. You knew where that was coming from.” So Daugherty sold his house in a precinct that gave George W. Bush only 20 percent of the vote against Al Gore. He bought a place in a precinct where two out of three people voted Republican in the same election. Two years later, Daugherty became the only Republican elected to the county governing body. His move out of Clarksville, he admits, was a political exodus. He left a place where he stuck out like a sore thumb” and moved to a neighborhood that was more ideologically congenial. He reasoned, You really do recognize when you aren’t in step with the community you live in.” People don’t check voting records before deciding where to live. Why would anyone bother? In a time of political segregation, it’s simple enough to tell a place’s politics just by looking. Before the 2006 midterm elections, marketing firms held focus groups and fielded polls, scouring the countryside to find the giveaway to a person’s political inclination. Using the most sophisticated techniques of market profiling, these firms compiled a rather unsurprising list of attributes.
Democrats want to live by their own rules. They hang out with friends at parks or other public places. They think that religion and politics shouldn’t mix. Democrats watch Sunday morning news shows and late-night television. They listen to morning radio, read weekly newsmagazines, watch network television, read music and lifestyle publications, and are inclined to belong to a DVD rental service. Democrats are more likely than Republicans to own cats.
Republicans go to church. They spend more time with family, get their news from Fox News or the radio, and own guns. Republicans read sports and home magazines, attend Bible study, frequently visit relatives, and talk about politics with people at church. They believe that people should take more responsibility for their lives, and they think that overwhelming force is the best way to defeat terrorists. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to own dogs.
None of this is particularly shocking. We’ve all learned by now that Republicans watch Fox News and Democrats are less likely to attend church. Okay, the DVD rental clue is a surprise, and Democrats in my part of town own plenty of dogs, but basically we all know these differences. What is new is that some of us appear to be acting on this knowledge. An Episcopal priest told me he had moved from the reliably Republican Louisville, Kentucky, suburbs to an older city neighborhood so that he could be within walking distance of produce stands, restaurants, and coffee shops and to be among other Democrats. A journalism professor at the University of North Carolina told me that when he retired, he moved to a more urban part of Chapel Hill to escape Republican neighbors. A new resident of a Dallas exurb told a New York Times reporter that she stayed away from liberal Austin when considering a move from Wisconsin, choosing the Dallas suburb of Frisco instead. Politically, I feel a lot more at home here,” she explained. People don’t need to check voting records to know the political flavor of a community. They can smell it.
Picking a Party, Choosing a Life To explain how people choose which political party to join, Donald Green, a Yale political scientist, described two social events. Imagine that you are walking down a hall, Green said. Through one door is a cocktail party filled with Democrats. Through another is a party of Republicans. You look in at both, and then you ask yourself some questions: Which one is filled with people that you most closely identify with? Not necessarily the people who would agree were you to talk policy with them. Which group most closely reflects your own sense of group self-conception? Which ones would you like to have your sons and daughters marry?” You don’t compare party platforms. You size up the groups, and you get a vibe. And then you pick a door and join a party. Party attachments are uniquely strong in the United States. People rarely change their affiliation once they decide they are Democrats or Republicans. No wonder. Parties represent ways of life. How do you know which party to join? Well, Green says, it feels right. The party is filled with your kind of people.(Sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld, working in the 1940s, saw the same kind of policy-free connection between parties and people. In his book Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), Lazarsfeld wrote: The preference for one party rather than another must be highly similar to the preference for one kind of literature or music rather than another, and the choice of the same political party every four years may be parallel to the choice of the same old standards of conduct in new social situations. In short, it appears that a sense of fitness is a more striking feature of political preference than reason and calculation” (p. 311).) How do you know which neighborhood to live in? The same way: because it feels right. It looks like the kind of place with boys and girls you’d like your children to marry. You just know when a place is filled with your kind. That’s where you mentally draw a little smiley face of approval, just as my wife did as we moved from Kentucky to Austin in 1999.
Texas voted in 2005 on whether to make marriage between people of the same sex unconstitutional. Statewide, the antigay marriage amendment passed with ease. More than seven out of ten Texans voted for it. In my section of South Austin, however, the precincts voted more than nine to one against the measure. The difference between my neighborhood and Texas as a whole amounted to more than 60 percentage points. It’s not coincidence that in our narrow slice of Austin, a metropolitan area of more than 1.4 million people filling five counties, the liberal writer Molly Ivins lived just five blocks from the liberal writer Jim Hightower and at one time we lived five blocks from both of them.
During the same years that Americans were slowly sorting themselves into more ideologically homogeneous communities, elected officials polarized nationally. To measure partisan polarization among members of Congress, political scientists Howard Rosenthal, Nolan McCarty, and Keith Poole track votes of individual members, who are then placed on an ideological scale from liberal to conservative. In the 1970s, the scatter plot of the 435 members of the House of Representatives was decidedly mixed. Democrats tended toward the left and Republicans drifted right, but there was a lot of mingling. Members from the two parties overlapped on many issues. When the scholars fast-forward through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, however, the votes of the 435 representatives begin to split left and right and then coalesce. The scatter plot forms two swarms on either side of the graph’s moderate middle. By 2002, Democratic members of Congress were buzzing together on the left, quite apart from a tight hive of Republicans on the right. In the mid-1970s, moderates filled 37 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives. By 2005, only 8 percent of the House could be found in the moderate middle.
Members from the two parties used to mingle, trade votes, and swap confidences and allegiances. (In 1965, half the Republicans in the Senate voted for President Lyndon Johnson’s Medicare bill.) That kind of congressional compromise and cross-pollination is now rare. More common is discord. The Washington Post’s Dana Milbank and David Broder reported in early 2004 that partisans on both sides say the tone of political discourse is as bad as ever if not worse.” Former Oklahoma congressman Mickey Edwards said that on a visit to Washington, D.C., he stopped at the barbershop in the Rayburn House Office Building. And the barber told me, he said, It’s so different, it’s so different. People don’t like each other; they don’t talk to each other,’” Edwards recalled. Now, when the barber in the Rayburn Building sees this, it’s very, very real.”
The Myth of Polarization Some very smart people have questioned whether the American public is polarized to begin with, whether there really are vast and defining differences among Americans. Some argued that, viewed over the centuries, the increase in geographic segregation since the mid-1970s has been minor, a subtle fluctuation and compared to the Civil War period, that is certainly the case. At the same time, Stanford University political scientist Morris Fiorina proposed in the mid-2000s that Americans were not particularly polarized in their politics: Americans are closely divided, but we are not deeply divided, and we are closely divided because many of us are ambivalent and uncertain, and consequently reluctant to make firm commitments to parties, politicians, or policies. We divide evenly in elections or sit them out entirely because we instinctively seek the center while the parties and candidates hang out on the extremes.” Fiorina argued that the fractious politics Americans were experiencing were wholly a result of polarized political leadership and extreme issue activists. Elected officials might be polarized, the professor wrote, but people were not. Journalists miss what’s really happening in the country, he contended, because few of the journalists who cover national politics spend much of their time hanging out at big box stores, supermarket chains, or auto parts stores talking to normal people . . . When they do leave the politicized salons of Washington, New York and Los Angeles, they do so mainly to cover important political events which are largely attended by members of the political class . . . The political class that journalists talk to and observe is polarized, but the people who comprise it are not typical.” Fiorina announced that his book was needed to debunk what he described as the new consensus” that Americans were deeply divided. In the meantime, however, Fiorina’s view became the new truism. Jonathan Rauch wrote in the Atlantic that when scholars went to look for the red and blue division, they couldn’t find it.” Joe Klein in Time blamed the Anger-Industrial Complex” for ginning up a division that didn’t exist in real life. Columnist Robert Kuttner scolded a lazy press corps” for overplaying the red and blue division when the reality is quite different.” Fiorina’s argument was even picked up in 2005 by the yellow pages of conventional wisdom, Reader’s Digest.
The abortion question was a favorite of those who contended that the middle was wide and the fringe narrow. Both Klein and Kuttner used abortion as such an example. Likewise, E. J. Dionne wrote in the Atlantic that 60 to 70 percent of us fall at some middle point” on most issues. Dionne wrote that only 37 percent of the people interviewed in a 2004 Election Day exit poll said that abortion should be always” legal or always” illegal. Indeed, if we accepted the notion that a person who believed that abortion should be legal for victims of rape but illegal for victims of incest qualified as a moderate, then we would find nearly two-thirds of the population in the middle” on this issue. (Dionne saw a much larger division in June 2007 after reviewing a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center. The Pew poll revealed that Republicans and Democrats had entirely different concerns and opinions about foreign and domestic policy. The Washington Post columnist wrote: Our two political parties and their candidates are living in parallel universes. It’s as if the candidates were running for president in two separate countries” (June 1, 2007, p. A15).) But a late 2005 poll from Cook/RT Strategies posed the abortion question in a slightly different way. Instead of asking if abortions should always” be illegal or legal, Cook asked if people were strongly pro-life” or strongly pro-choice.” In response to that question, the middle” those who were only somewhat” committed to a position shriveled to 25 percent. Those who felt strongly” about this issue totaled 70 percent of the population, split just about evenly between the two poles.
This kind of ideological allegiance has grown over time, as successful politicians know. Bill Bellamy has been an Oregon state representative and was a Jefferson County commissioner in the small town of Madras when we talked in 2005. Madras is on the dusty side of Mount Hood, where the Cascades flatten into fields that circle around irrigation rigs. In Bellamy’s real estate office parking lot, a cowboy pulled in with a blue heeler barking and twirling on the toolbox just behind the back window of his pickup. In Portland, trailer hitches are bright chrome and virginal. Here a trailer hitch ball has seen some action. In 1976, when I first ran and they would ask me my position on abortion, out of one hundred people, it was really important to only ten of them,” Bellamy said. By 1988, when I ran for the [state] senate, out of that one hundred people, for probably sixty of them it was very important.” Emory University political scientist Alan Abramowitz argued that Morris Fiorina systematically understates the significance” of divisions over abortion, gay marriage, and other cultural markers. Abramowitz collected national polling data to show that differences among Americans were deep and growing deeper, increasing between 1972 and 2004, just the period when the country was segregating geographically. People who identified themselves as Democrats thought differently about issues than those who considered themselves Republicans. And those differences on issues such as abortion, living standards, and health insurance were growing larger. People’s evaluation of George W. Bush in 2004 were more divided along party lines than at any time since the National Election Studies started asking questions about presidential approval in 1972.
The sharp divisions among Americans appeared again in the results of the 2006 midterm elections. Voters split most dramatically on the war in Iraq: 85 percent of Democratic House voters said the invasion had been a mistake, compared to only 18 percent of Republican voters. But those divisions extended to most other issues. Sixty-nine percent of Democrats were strongly pro-choice, compared to 21 percent of Republicans. Only 16 percent of Democrats supported a constitutional ban on gay marriage, a position favored by 80 percent of Republicans. Nine out of ten Democrats, but less than three out of ten Republicans, felt in November 2006 that government should take some action to reduce global warming. Plotted on a graph of how they felt about the issues of the day in November 2006, American voters didn’t form a nice, high-peaked bell, with most people clustered toward the happy ideological center. Instead, there was a deep, sharp V, with voters pushed hard left and right. How many voters wavered between the two parties as true independents in 2006? About 10 percent.
Product details
- Publisher : Mariner Books; First Edition (May 11, 2009)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 384 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0547237723
- ISBN-13 : 978-0547237725
- Item Weight : 11 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.31 x 0.93 x 8 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #233,383 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #52 in Demography Studies
- #239 in Elections
- #787 in History & Theory of Politics
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"The Big Sort" refers to the fact that lifestyle choices are leading like-minded folks to live together in communities where they feel comfortable and perhaps unchallenged. That has significant ramifications for our country's political and social development. To quote the book, "The lesson for politics and culture is pretty clear. It doesn't matter if you're a frat boy, a French high school student, a petty criminal, or a federal appeals court judge. Mixed company moderates; like-minded company polarizes. Heterogeneous communities restrain group excesses; homogeneous communities march toward extremes."
The fact that Republican strategists understood this well before the Democrats is detailed in a discussion with Matthew Dowd, George Bush's pollster in the 2000 election and chief strategist for the Bush campaign in 2004. According to Bishop's account, Dowd understood that "American communities were 'becoming very homogeneous'. He believed that to a large degree, this clustering was defensive, the general reaction to a society, a country, and a world that were largely beyond an individual's control or understanding. For generations, people had used their clubs, their trust in a national government, and long-established religious denominations to make sense of the world. But those old institutions no longer provided a safe harbor. 'What I think has happened,' Dowd told me early in 2005, 'is the general anxiety the country feels is building. We're no longer anchored'." Bishop decodes this further, saying "Unsurpassed prosperity had enriched Americans---and it had loosened long established social moorings. Americans were scrambling to find a secure place, to make a secure place...Most Americans have done that by seeking out(or perhaps gravitating toward)those who share their lifeworlds---made up of old, fundamental differences such as race, class, gender, and age, but also, now more than ever, personal tastes, beliefs, styles, opinions, and values."
"The Big Sort" identifies 1965 as the beginning of the major shift in American political and social demographics. The result today, in a political sense, is underscored by the findings of Bishop and his sociologist/demographer contributor Robert Cushing. Statistics showed that in the 1976 presidential election only 20% or Americans lived in counties that voted for one candidate or the other by more than a 20% margin. By 2004, 48% of America's counties were this type of landslide county with 20% plus margins for one of the candidates. Big change.
Bishop's book manages to deal with this subject comprehensively while being fluidly written, informative, insightful, and even entertaining. Somehow he pulls off the trick of letting us know of his participation in the "clustering" by living in a liberal Austin neighborhood where he fits in, without upsetting the balanced analytical perspective of the book. At least that's my take on it. It's an important book that seems to be gaining deserved recognition as we move toward November 4.
Prior to reading this book I believed for some time that our country is heading for more than just ideological, political and economic division. I believed that our country is heading for geographic division, as in dividing into more than one physical country. I still believe this. But at least I understand why I was feeling this way for so long. I just hope I'm wrong.
The basic point seems to be this:
1). Americans are segregating themselves into communities of people who live and think alike.
2). In such homogeneous communities, people become increasingly more intensely committed to the values they hold and increasingly intolerant of anyone who does not share those same values.
3). This phenomenon could seriously jeopardize the ability of our society to constructively address the issues it faces.
As to the first point, the strongest critique I think could be thrown at it would be to claim it is self-evident. Surprisingly, I don't see a lot of reviews here that make that assertion.
It is a point I think I have been vaguely aware of already, but the book really put it into focus.
The second point is a disturbing one and to me a very convincing one. Aside from everything that is covered in the book, from my own experience, I get a strong feeling in political discourse in recent years that most people have become rigid adherents to the entire agenda of either the Republican or Democratic party. As someone who agrees with the R's on some issues and with the D's on others, when I am contemplating expressing my opinion about a particular issue, I have the strong feeling that nearly everyone who hears my opinion will immediately assume that I support the entire agenda of whichever party that stance on that particular issue is associated with.
Something not really mentioned in the book that I think is also indicative of this, there are a lot of people who are so politically polarized that if you don't agree with them on a particular issue, it is not just an honest difference opinion, your position on the issue makes you a sociopath, unlike they who are on the side of moral virtue.
It stands to reason when someone is absolutist in supporting a particular political agenda, that it is not grounded in reason but rather in a quasi-religious moral certitude, hence for me to not share any of that agenda makes me a sociopath.
The author does at at least one point do a good job in pointing out that the intellectual inbreeding associated with self-segregation tends to stifle any genuine critical thinking about issues.
If there is anything in the book I can take issue with I would say that the degree to which the views of Americans have become solidified into a binary pair of opposite ideological agendas is probably somewhat overstated. There are some factions of the political right that have some very fundamental disagreements. The most obvious would probably be the foreign policy views of Neocons versus Libertarians. And there is still a substantial faction among Republicans who do not agree with the prevailing stance of the party on the conservative side of social issues, i.e. abortion and gay rights. However, the author does make a good case that those who are liberal or agnostic on social issues are facing a lot more conflict from the conservative establishment.
As to the Democratic Party, I would say there is a similar situation regarding diversity of views. There is a dominant "progressive" wing that is very monolithic in its ideological agenda, and is increasingly intolerant of accepting anyone as a "Democrat" who holds contrary views such as fiscal conservatism or a pro-life stance on abortion.
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I found the historical material in the book fascinating, some reviewers have found it superfluous and perhaps if I were more versed in sociology some of it would already be familiar to me, but since it was new to me, I thoroughly enjoyed it. I was not really familiar with the fact that the current split in the Christian religion in America of left wing and right wing denominations actually has a hundred years of history behind it. Other historical material that I found interesting was that on the textbook wars, the techniques the evangelical movement developed to grow their churches, the evolution of advertising philosophy (including political advertising). And some bizarre stories I found of particular interest were the Oxycontin problem in Kentucky and the big subdivision (in California?) that was divided into an enclave for right wingers and another for left wingers.
All in all I thoroughly enjoyed this book, and I feel like I learned something from it.
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He describes the "Big Sort" very convincingly, particularly the way that Republicans and Democrats drift towards their respective majority states, or at least the majority Republican or Democratic areas within each state, and the way that this seems to happen almost unconsciously by what "feels right and comfortable" about the surroundings.
One way or another Americans seem to gravitate towards two very different lifestyles; A) the city / anonymous / environmental / minority-rights / European / intellectual/ state-interventionist, or B) the country / community / traditional / religious / Constitutional / nationalist / self-reliant with Democratic and Republican loyalists dividing neatly along these lines.
He shows the result as a separation and hardening of positions generating the familiar American Gridlock politics of the new millennium, and as he says, "Democracy has become so balky that the normal processes of representative government are being replaced by systems of issue brokering that are only quasi-representative"......" public policy is often negotiated among interest groups". This would have been a great lead in to look at where the power went and who these interest groups are but he doesn't follow it.
Maybe they're not particularly Democratic or Republican and they just want the money and the influence, but the author doesn't really go into this interesting question.
The author seems to be more concerned with establishing the reality of the "Big Sort" rather than evaluating it in a historical context. He refers to the early 1970's research of Robert Inglehart at the University of Michigan, suggesting that a young generation growing up in abundance will esteem self expression more than economic growth as they seek "higher values", but he doesn't refer to the more recent and much richer version of this idea available in for example William Strauss and Neil Howes' The Fourth Turning: an American Prophecy .
The book doesn't consider that the opposing factors of the "Sort" seem to coexist quite happily in some countries. Japan can be very respectful of tradition and community while developing leading high technologies with the same going for Germany and northern Europe in general.
The author doesn't look at the fairly obvious divide between Original Americans (OAs) and Newcomers (N's). OA's were in American prior to 1900, they mostly originated from European countries and now regard themselves as Americans first and have strong links to the Constitution and American history and also provided most of the troops and leadership in the two world wars. N's arrived after 1900 and are now mostly non-European hyphenated Americans with weak links to American traditions and a preference for identity politics, non-integration and minority rights and they predictably find their natural home in the Democratic party.
Equally, Bishop doesn't consider the 1965+ rise to power of the Jews as a prime example of an American special interest insider group. He does talk about the rise of advocacy groups that aren't broad based or democratically controlled but he could have shown Jewish tribal self-selection producing for example the present (2013) strange situation where the eight leading candidates for the post of Federal Reserve chairman are all Jewish or married to Jews (apart from Geithner who was mentored by Rubin and Summers), or Jewish students being selected to occupy 30% of Ivy League university places. This is a major shift of power to a non-European, non-Christian newcomer minority group (3% of the population) which is also firmly on the Democratic left.
The author could also have usefully looked at the way in which the growing demands of the Democratic left generate a more extreme reaction from the traditionalist Republican right. For example he could have shown how the gay rights idea has progressed from 1965 onwards through illegality > ignoring > acceptance > protection > coming out > legal rights > marriage equality and adoption > to school teaching which is fine in a minority rights environment but is seen as provocative when legally applied to traditional Americans.
In general I think that the "Big Sort" was a missed opportunity but it certainly provides indisputable evidence for the post 1965 polarization of the Republican and Democratic parties.








