Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier: 22, July 1942-1 May, 1944 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 6) Hardcover – May, 2001

Following the battles on Guadalcanal, the tenor of World War 2 in the Pacific changed. The U.S. was no longer on the defensive, while the Japanese were forced to shift to a defensive posture. This sixth volume in the series covers the next two years which were spent in solving the problem posed by the Japanese "fortress" of Rabaul. Since this is a history of the U.S. Navy, it's not surprising that the author focuses on the naval engagements, but he does make the point - repeatedly! - that without the support of the Navy, there could have been no attacks in that area. He also makes the same point by stating - repeatedly! - that the Japanese had lost control of the waters and therefore could not support their own troops as well as they should have. Please be aware, that when he speaks of Naval engagements, he does count the Naval aviation assets as part of the Navy and does not credit the air forces by themselves. Of course, at that time, there was no U. S. Air Force so from that point of view, it makes some sense.

The biggest problem facing the U.S. Admirals was that Rabaul was developed intensely and had two or three years in which to fortify and prepare itself. Having four different airfields in it, as well as about one hundred thousand troops, it could dispatch hundreds of airplanes which would harass U.S. shipping and warships and bomb troops on land incessantly. Between Rabaul and Guadalcanal is the chain of the Bismarcks which forms the barrier that this volume is dedicated to describing - especially how the U.S. Navy, Marines, and Army managed to slowly claw their way around Rabaul and neutralize it.

If you've read Morison's other volumes, you know what to expect as far as his writing style, and since I commented on it extensively in my other reviews of his works, I will not repeat that here. His style has not changed and is still as pleasurable to read as always. The unique things about this volume that stood out to me were three:
1. While the overall U.S. strategy was to defeat Germany first, I did not realize that it translated into the allocation of resources to favor the European theater as much as Morison describes. Early in the volume he mentions that it was a great victory when the General Staff and the President agreed to increase the percentage or resources allocated to the Pacific theater from 15% to 30%. I am still amazed by that. Only 30% of the U.S.'s total resources were enough to stop the Japanese juggernaut in World War 2 and put the U.S. on the offensive. An offensive that crippled the Japanese islands by the time the war ended. Wow.
2. It is not clear whether Morison knew that the U.S. had deciphered the Japanese code system and was actively collecting, and using, information to plan its offensive actions. In this book, Morison occasionally mentions that a commander "guessed" that an attack was brewing, or that the Japanese would be sending planes or ships to particular spots. Of course, reading this now, it seems kind of obvious that these were not simply lucky "guesses"!
3. On the negative side, the long drawn-out series of battles described here were pretty much the same. The only difference being which island was being attacked - in other words, the names of the places changed, but the action did not. With over 440 pages of text, it is difficult to write in an engaging manner about the various invasions of islands that nobody today cares about. A shame since hundreds of Americans and thousands of Japanese perished on these islands.

This is clearly the weakest volume in the series, but given the desire for the series to be comprehensive, something like this was needed. The good news is that Morison's style is in full force and if you enjoy it, this book will be much less of a drudgery to read than it could otherwise have been.

Having been a part and witness of this World War II campaign:
I experienced emotions resulting from my presence in this war time arena; while I traversed my 17 through 19 years of existance.
I now have a better and greater picture of the various activities that occurred in that theatre of operations while I was there.
I couldn't help but note that no mention was made of the loss of an ammunition ship in the harbor of the Admiralties, which I witnessed; resulting in the annihilation of the ship and the 500 or so sailors who manned that vessel. To this day, I am 84 years of age, at times I remember, and am still bothered by this event.
The author of this book did a very comprehensive job of presenting this era of the war for posterity.

I was very happy to receive this book and in such good condition. It still has a good quality jacket on it.
I've read this book from the library back about twelve years ago and I want to collect all of the books in this set.
I'd be surprised if it was read more than a couple of times, if at all.

A bit dry, a little bit too blunt for modern tastes. The book is refreshingly not politically correct and reflects exactly the mood toward all things "war-time Japanese" of the day. Yet, it gives a fair and often (I thought) admiring account of the Japanese efforts against the American might in the Pacific war. I am impressed, as, no doubt, most S. E. Morison readers are. I offer this bit of advice; do not expect over-much entertainment unless you really want to know as much about the subject matter as possible. This book is a container of masses of information. I am not saying it would make a better reference book than a chronologic history. But, nearly, that is so. Fortunately, I am the kind of reader who revels in this kind of book. I will treasure my copy, placing it right on my favorite books shelf.

Great book!

I loved it approx. 45-50 years ago when I read all the books in the History of Naval Ops series. For now I'm slowly collecting all of them and will certainly read them again (hopefully before I die).

Well written. Engrossing. Incredibly detailed history down to who sunk what uboat. He faults the Navy for our total lack of preparedness for the submarine war on our shipping. He faults Navy & Army for personal power struggles that prevented coordination of our war effort. A sobering history.