"The Breaking Of Nations - Order And Chaos In The Twenty-First Century", by Robert Cooper is another of the currently popular books that tries to explain the historical sociological basis behind our international dilemma; the breakdown of the authority of the state and perhaps of authority in general.
Starting with the generally accepted view of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Weber, that civilization and order rests on the legitimate control of violence by the state, Cooper examines the problems the world is facing with many non-state actors who use or threaten force and the states that are unable to exercise control over their own territory and are no longer responsible for the behavior of their citizens. These are the states he calls pre-modern. He further defines the pre-modern state as a post-imperial or colonial chaotic association where there is no real sovereign authority. In some cases these are the result of the decline of imperialism. Today, the general opinion being, that the rewards of imperialism are small and the burdens large, especially with a population hostile to being `colonials'. The result is all too often chaos, which may give rise to a `defensive' imperialism where nations may seek to control other states to maintain their own safety. Defensive imperialism is the latest interpretation of what used to be called a `buffer state' or `cordon sanitaire', a protective border zone to protect `us' from `them' or to keep potentially hostile neighbors apart. Nations have traditionally been secular and organized along ethnic or group identities. Their legitimacy has been derived from below rather than imposed from above. This is different than an empire, where the government is usually imposed from above and there is a non-homogenaeity of population. Frequently empires have strong religious elements (Ottoman, Mogul, Russian Orthodox, Soviet-Scientific Socialism) but no common relevant identity. When empires break up, however, identity becomes relevant for the first time as the chaos of tribal or ethnic division emerges. All of these situations lead to the Wilsonian idea of a nation-state that is sovereign, more or less homogeneous, and defined by fixed and defended or at least defendable borders. This is the type of state organization that Cooper calls modern. In this modern world order, force is still the ultimate guarantor of peace. Cooper calls these states modern because they are linked to the idea of the nation-state created by the Treaty of Westphalia, which he considers the engine that created the modern world. Both the `realist' theories based on the calculation of national interests and the so-called balance of power, and the `idealist' theories based on collective security and world government are considered `modern' because of their reliance on force to maintain order. By this measure, both the U.N. and the U.S. would be considered `modern' since the former has the use of force as a means of enforcement written into its charter and the latter has used force as part of policy since its inception. `Modern' states, according to Cooper, can, if successful, become expansionist and create a new imperialism. Its success would depend on its demonstrated superiority to the existing liberal capitalist democracies of the West. If, on the other hand, `modern' states fail, devolution into a `pre-modern' failed-state chaos is likely. The solution, at least in European eyes, to all of the world's problems is the "post-modern" state. The post-modern state system doesn't rely on balance, sovereignty, or the separation of foreign and domestic affairs for its stability. The post-modern ideal emerged from the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the Treaty On Conventional Forces In Europe (CFE) and was the inspiration for the Organization For Security And Cooperation In Europe (OSCE). Its rules stress openness and transparency that are contrary to normal state behavior. For example, it is normal behavior to conceal ones strengths and weaknesses from potential adversaries; under the CFE Treaty force details are declared and challenge inspections are mandated. In the `post-modern' state rules are self-enforced and there is no need for a mechanism to compel the payment of fines. All of this sounds like Utopia, and in many ways it is. Although under `post-modernism' the object of foreign policy is peace and prosperity, rather than power and prestige, unfortunately most democratic institutions remain stubbornly national. The EU is trans-national rather than supra-national. Although some still dream of a European State, outside of the elites this is a very small minority. If the state is the problem, a super-state cannot be the solution. Cooper obviously favors the concept of postmodernism as he has defined it, but is skeptical to the point of contempt to those who think that the post-modern state has arrived as embodied in the EU. He says that the presence of US forces in Europe rather than those of NATO or the EU is responsible for the half-century of peace Europe has enjoyed. Those forces enabled Germany to maintain much lower force levels at lower cost than would have been possible otherwise. The German `Wirtschaftswunder' was subsidized by the American taxpayer. He says that the US is the only nation in the world with an independent strategy. According to Cooper the rest of the world reacts to, fears, lives under the protection of, envies, resents, plots against, and depends on America. As the most powerful country, the US has less reason to accept the idea of security based on mutual vulnerability that is the basis of the post-modern state (see Robert Kagan "Of Paradise And Power"). In his view, every country would choose to be invulnerable if it were possible, but only the US is. He says the US is not imperial (Niall Ferguson "Colossus" disagrees and says the US should accept its imperial role), but is hegemonic. The US wants to rule, but only in order to promote democracy in a neo-conservative Wilsonian convergence that drives a foreign policy to make the world safe for America (see Walter Russell Mead "Terror, Power, War, and Peace). All of this said, he, like Mead and Ferguson, seems to favor a benevolent American hegemony, rather than the `association of the weak' offered by the EU at the present. He says that a balance of power produces instability rather than stability and hegemony produces resentment, but it would be irresponsible to allow even one more nation to acquire WMDs. This, he thinks, is an issue of such importance for the whole civilized world that the imperative of security must defeat rational argument and negotiated solutions. Longer-term he hopes voluntary reform (as in Turkey) and the extension of the system of cooperative empire (the EU) will result. He posits that real change in foreign policy only comes from change in domestic policy and that is related to national identity and national purpose which is in conflict with post-modernism. Cooper identifies this modern/post-modern EU versus US conflict as derivative from the differing attitudes towards nationalism in Europe and America. While European nationalism is tied to ethnicity and has been weakening (he doesn't mention the anti-nationalist sentiment resulting from the nationalist excesses of WWI and II), American nationalism is tied to the concept of national identity engendered by the US Constitution. There is no corresponding European identity, at least not yet, in his opinion. He calls for the creation of a European military force that trains together and has interoperable equipment, a force that would give some responsibility to Europe. He agrees with Kagan, that the inability to respond with force, leaves only one choice, the choice of weakness, which is inaction. He ends the book, with a quote from George W. Bush at the American Enterprise Institute: " We meet here during a crucial period in the history...of the civilized world. Part of that history was written by others, the rest will be written by us." Cooper comments that if that `us' is to include Europe, they will need more power, both military power and multilateral legitimacy. This book adds another serious voice to those of Ferguson ("Colossus"), Fukuyama ("State-Building"), Huntington ("The Clash Of Civilizations And The New World Order" and "Who Are We?), Kagan ("Of Paradise And Power"), Walter Russell Mead ("Terror, Power, War, and Peace"), and Nye ("Soft Power") in the discussion of the emerging world order. I recommend it.
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Top reviews from other countries
Erik Cleves Kristensen
Insightful, intelligent and well-written
Reviewed in the United Kingdom 🇬🇧 on February 24, 2009Stathis
A brief textbook about foreign policy and international affairs.
Reviewed in the United Kingdom 🇬🇧 on March 18, 2014Faruk Mustafa
The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century
Reviewed in Germany 🇩🇪 on March 17, 2013
