British Commandos 1940–46 (Battle Orders) Paperback – March 28, 2006

I have to argue against the conventional wisdom that "The volunteers stripped from regular units to man the Commandos undoubtedly lowered the effeiciency of regular units, denying the rest of the British Army an opportunity to develop the offensive spirit." (Page 84) There are four things the Commandos did to the British Army that cannot be forgiven:

1) They said that they had a better way to fight the war, one that just wasn't cricket--never mind that war isn't a game of cricket!

2) The Commando units then proved that they had a better way to fight.

3) The publicity took fame and glory away from the regulars.

4) Worst and most unforgivable of all, the rest of the British Army was forced to adopt the more-successful Commando techniques!

As for "developing the offensive spirit," the volunteers left the regular units because there was no offensive spirit and little chance to develop one. Keep doing things the old, defeated way, only with more enthusiasm? Or try something new? Page 9 quotes Prime Minister Winston Churchill on this exact motivation. Of course, the Thompson sub machine gun was a gangster weapon and not proper armament for soldiers at all. Worse, common lower-ranks were using the officer's badge of rank, the handgun, for close-quarter fighting! Brightly-polished boots were replaced by footwear totally unsuited for stomping about the barracks square--soldiers do not wear rubber-soled gym shoes for combat operations! See the chapter on Commando uniforms, equipment and weapons starting on page 45 for details.

it is often said that Commando personnel would have made fine junior leaders in conventional units. The historical record is clear on this--Commando corporals and sergeants who rejoined conventional units were often given the choice between becoming privates again or leaving active service entirely. Were these "superior soldiers" ruined? Or was it just that there was no place for their superior skills, proven leadership talents, and offensive spirit? No, the complaint that Commando units depleted the "real" British Army by creaming off its best men is disproven by how these Commandos were treated upon return to their original units. As I said, the real crime of the Commando was imposing changes on the regular Army.

Tim Moreman documents the British Army and Marine Commandos from formation immediately after Dunkirk to the disbanding of the Army Commandos after World War Two. Note that Army Commandos have recently been reintroduced into the British Army. The Royal Marines eventually became an all-Commando service after World War Two. Moreman wrote that Marine Commandos in World War Two were not considered to be the equal of Army Commandos--today, the British Army Commandos are still not considered mission-capable by the Royal Marine Commandos.

Do not confuse either with the Special Air Service, another British Army special force covered in another Osprey book.

Special units do not spring up overnight, born perfectly suited to war. The Commandos had their share of trial and error--critics say more errors than successes. War is risky and Commando units frequently "failed" because they were willing to try the untested. In 96 pages, Tim Moreman managed to convey this attitude and details the unsuccessful Middle Eastern theater commando units along side the more successful ones. Was Dieppe a defeat or a resounding success? Victory in war is often a matter of perception.

Besides, a raid is a military operation that ends with a planned withdrawal. This withdrawal permits the defending troops to crow about driving the invaders back into the sea. Who's the winner?

Maps and line-and-block organizational charts and photos make it easy to see what the Commandos did and how they did it. Bear in mind that deception and surprise are major Commando weapons. Chaos and confusion are a part of war and Commandos exploit this--though, like everybody else, Commandos suffer from chaos and confusion. These twin factors of chaos and confusion were responsible for the success of the German Blitzkrieg and for the British being trapped at Dunkirk.

Would the British Army have reformed after Dunkirk without the Commandos? I don't see how it could have failed to change--but it is obvious to me that one instrument of change was the formation of Commando Units and Independant Companies--forced down the Army's throat by a former Navy minister! There were commando units for every purpose, and some that had no purpose. Moreman lists the major ones.

Commando units are colorful and controversial. If nothing else, this history book has a lot of entertainment value.

Perhaps I'm missing something, but among the well-written prose and background material, this book seems to have forgotten to include the order of battle of two of the four Special Service Brigades, in particular, the only two Commando brigades that fought in North-West Europe. I don't know if the editor thought it was a duplication because perhaps that information is available in one of Osprey's other books - if so, there is no indication of where I might find that info. But if one combs through this book carefully, they will find that while the book is for the most part logically and cleanly laid out with a chronology of the growth of the Special Service organization, there is almost no history provided on S.S. units in Northwest Europe. There is a chapter on Walcheren Island. However, the 1st Commando Brigade's part in the Rhine Crossing, the last days of the war, and the 1st and 4th S.S. Brigade on D-Day are completely ignored. In fact, the 1st Brigade is only mentioned once, in a photo caption. It seems like a bizarre exclusion, given the amount of attention paid to detail in other areas of the book. And a shame, given that so few books on the subject seem to give precise details of organization, history, etc.

It is not clear if the book contains a complete listing of raids - one presumes not, and it appears that a selection of 'typical' commando operations has been chosen by the author to expand the chronology and chapters on training, tactics and organization. In all the volume has interesting and useful information, but seems unevenly organized, and incomplete, as if there was simply too much to include and the editor was unsure of how to gracefully select areas of concentration. Perhaps a better way to have done this would have been two volumes, with the Mediterranean and Far East being split out from Northwest Europe. Anyone trying to research the latter in the 1944-45 period will be disappointed in this one.