Today a catastrophe owing to a Blunder of blunders in starting a civilization-ending nuclear war remains an historically unprecedented threat 24/7. There is a crack in the dam; yet many seem to be hoping that the dam will hold indefinitely.
The present book by William J. Perry, the 19th Secretary of Defense, and Tom Z. Collina, Director of Policy at Ploughshares Fund, reveals that no President, no National Leader, should possess the full authority to end humanity by facing a decision to start a nuclear war which must be made in mere minutes during the ultimate Fog of War. As to that Fog: are we seeing evidence or "evidence" of an attack by another nuclear power?
Is there any decision case in all of History in which the consequence of an honest but wrong decision would come even close to the finality of the scenarios dramatized in THE BUTTON?
We are most likely talking here of the end of Homo sapiens and almost certainly at least the ushering in of a regressive state of barbarism worldwide among the presumptive unlucky survivors facing extended nuclear effects ("Global Warming" etc).
Yet as Perry and Collina superbly explain, and brilliantly define remedies for, we Americans and Russians (and other nuclear powers) have allowed over changing times the creation of scenarios in which opposing nuclear forces might well be launched by national leaders solely responsible for sending those weapons in an attack BUT BASED ON THE MOST AWFUL SPECULATION. After all, incoming missiles would be mere minutes from US targets. Were the warning systems of integrity? It the evidence real? You must imagine that such a determination could take longer than the mere minutes needed for a strike to occur.
The ultimate "hedging" decision!
Indeed, an inhuman one!
It is an astonishing risk.
In short, what about a false alarm? Could Mutual Assured Destruction slip from its much-cited preventive function and, now diametrically opposed to deterrence theory, actually occur on the basis of an erroneous though "empirically" convincing threat detection? Imagine a case in which the President knows only that there may have been a launch against the US--he has a few minutes to decide whether the threat is real enough to respond with a nuclear counterattack--and concludes in that hellishly brief few minutes that in prudence he must make the most awful decision in History.
Well, as Perry and Collina inform us, the gravest of such "near misses" have already occurred both in the US and in Russia; and we have come extremely close to blundering into nuclear war in each case. Extremely close. Somebody leaves a highly credible nuclear missile-attack training tape in the NORAD detection system or just as likely the Russian monitoring systems and in an awful irony its false realism carries the day. And certainly we can imagine more than one highly believable form of false detection in warning systems that an all-out attack, minutes away, has been launched.
The corrective nuclear policy changes Perry and Collina recommend are authoritative and crucial.
Perry and Collina recount the history of nuclear policy and the causes of the decision predicament we are now in. They convincingly cite the chilling cases of near catastrophe and soberingly convey that we must find our way to changing nuclear policy to eliminate those supreme risks and make the world safer.
The good news: Most importantly, the authors draw on their great experience here to recommend a few rather simple but profound changes in nuclear policy to allow us greater margin in decision-making. They make that case in THE BUTTON better than anyone else.
Indeed, this book is riveting and will make you expert. It is that good. And what a pivotal point in human history! You owe it to yourself to get informed. Please read THE BUTTON.
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I have credibility issues after reading The Button. A gaff right off the bat: At page 4 the book discusses "discovery of the nuclear bomb." No, nuclear fission was discovered, nuclear fusion was discovered, but nuclear bombs were invented.Next, at page 5, the "first use" term is introduced, as in "no first use" of nuclear weapons by the U.S. But what is really meant is no first use in anger, because nuclear weapons have been used well over 2,000 times in tests (if you want to see an eye opener, watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLCF7vPanrY, which is a video showing the location of every nuke test since 1945, by month/year and country; the count ends at a mind boggling 2,053 tests by the U.S., Russia, England, France, China, Pakistan, and India). But in reality there can now be no first or second use of nuclear weapons in anger, there can only be "no third use in anger," since Hiroshima and Nagasaki already have the first and second use in anger slots. Indeed, the correct "third use" (in anger) term is used only once in the entire book, at page 22.The book does take every opportunity to bash President Trump, claiming at page 4 that "short of mutiny, no one can stop him" and again at page 8, "no checks-- no checks-- on the President's authority" from ordering use nuclear weapons in a temper tantrum or on the mistaken belief by President Trump (but not his senior advisors) that the U.S. was under an out-of-the-blue massive attack by Russia (i.e., the hair-trigger, launch-on-warning problem). But this ignores the 25th Amendment regarding Presidential succession, which includes "incapacitation." Thus, a senior U.S. military commander who truly believes that the President had lost it, could probably stall a launch order for a short time by questioning whether the order was "legal;" that is, outright mutiny, as discussed at page 4, is not the only option. And as repeatedly discussed in the book, a short delay of a flawed Presidential launch order would be sufficient to differentiate between a mistaken warning versus an actual attack. As repeatedly noted in the book, the U.S. would still have its submarines and at least a few bombers as a deterrent, even if most, or all, of its now vulnerable land-based ICBMs were destroyed. And with today's nukes, even a few surviving bombers with a couple of thermonuclear bombs each is a powerful deterrent, to say nothing of the still fully intact SLBMs.Then there is the stunning discussion, at page 122, questioning the need for a continued hair trigger "launch on warning" policy, in order to avoid the risk of a decapitating first strike by Russia. In that unlikely event, the book suggests that not to worry, sailors aboard a U.S. nuclear submarine "would still be able to fire their missiles by opening (with a blowtorch or drill) the onboard safe and retrieving the launch key." Really?Then there is the push, at page 171, for the U.S. to eliminate all of its nukes. But no discussion of the most obvious reason for not doing so: Namely, that modern day nukes are relatively small, and therefore easy to conceal. There would be the temptation for Russia to salt away a few nukes, while claiming that all of its nuclear weapons had been destroyed. And I am not sure I would believe such a claim by the U.S., either. So while greatly reducing the number of nukes is a prudent goal, and removing U.S. nukes from their current "hair trigger" status is an even more prudent goal, going to zero nuclear weapons is rubbish, and dangerous rubbish at that.However, the "atomic Titanic" analogy at Chapter 10 is outstanding, as are every one of Mr. Perry's and Mr. Collina's "top ten recommendations," with the caveat that recommendation #3 should be "prohibit third use," not "prohibit first use." That is, Russia, or some other foe, would have to be shown guilty of third use of nuclear weapons in anger; only then should the U.S. implement a fourth use of nuclear weapons in anger.Nevertheless, The Button now has an honored place on my bookshelf, along with four books by Richard Rhodes: The Making of the Atomic Bomb; Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb; Arsenals of Folly; and The Twilight of the Bombs; along with John Newhouse's War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, and Jeffrey Lewis' hair raising speculative novel The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States.
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Reviewed in the United States on August 29, 2020
Next, at page 5, the "first use" term is introduced, as in "no first use" of nuclear weapons by the U.S. But what is really meant is no first use in anger, because nuclear weapons have been used well over 2,000 times in tests (if you want to see an eye opener, watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLCF7vPanrY, which is a video showing the location of every nuke test since 1945, by month/year and country; the count ends at a mind boggling 2,053 tests by the U.S., Russia, England, France, China, Pakistan, and India). But in reality there can now be no first or second use of nuclear weapons in anger, there can only be "no third use in anger," since Hiroshima and Nagasaki already have the first and second use in anger slots. Indeed, the correct "third use" (in anger) term is used only once in the entire book, at page 22.
The book does take every opportunity to bash President Trump, claiming at page 4 that "short of mutiny, no one can stop him" and again at page 8, "no checks-- no checks-- on the President's authority" from ordering use nuclear weapons in a temper tantrum or on the mistaken belief by President Trump (but not his senior advisors) that the U.S. was under an out-of-the-blue massive attack by Russia (i.e., the hair-trigger, launch-on-warning problem). But this ignores the 25th Amendment regarding Presidential succession, which includes "incapacitation." Thus, a senior U.S. military commander who truly believes that the President had lost it, could probably stall a launch order for a short time by questioning whether the order was "legal;" that is, outright mutiny, as discussed at page 4, is not the only option. And as repeatedly discussed in the book, a short delay of a flawed Presidential launch order would be sufficient to differentiate between a mistaken warning versus an actual attack. As repeatedly noted in the book, the U.S. would still have its submarines and at least a few bombers as a deterrent, even if most, or all, of its now vulnerable land-based ICBMs were destroyed. And with today's nukes, even a few surviving bombers with a couple of thermonuclear bombs each is a powerful deterrent, to say nothing of the still fully intact SLBMs.
Then there is the stunning discussion, at page 122, questioning the need for a continued hair trigger "launch on warning" policy, in order to avoid the risk of a decapitating first strike by Russia. In that unlikely event, the book suggests that not to worry, sailors aboard a U.S. nuclear submarine "would still be able to fire their missiles by opening (with a blowtorch or drill) the onboard safe and retrieving the launch key." Really?
Then there is the push, at page 171, for the U.S. to eliminate all of its nukes. But no discussion of the most obvious reason for not doing so: Namely, that modern day nukes are relatively small, and therefore easy to conceal. There would be the temptation for Russia to salt away a few nukes, while claiming that all of its nuclear weapons had been destroyed. And I am not sure I would believe such a claim by the U.S., either. So while greatly reducing the number of nukes is a prudent goal, and removing U.S. nukes from their current "hair trigger" status is an even more prudent goal, going to zero nuclear weapons is rubbish, and dangerous rubbish at that.
However, the "atomic Titanic" analogy at Chapter 10 is outstanding, as are every one of Mr. Perry's and Mr. Collina's "top ten recommendations," with the caveat that recommendation #3 should be "prohibit third use," not "prohibit first use." That is, Russia, or some other foe, would have to be shown guilty of third use of nuclear weapons in anger; only then should the U.S. implement a fourth use of nuclear weapons in anger.
Nevertheless, The Button now has an honored place on my bookshelf, along with four books by Richard Rhodes: The Making of the Atomic Bomb; Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb; Arsenals of Folly; and The Twilight of the Bombs; along with John Newhouse's War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, and Jeffrey Lewis' hair raising speculative novel The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States.
Verified Purchase
Some parts are simply not credible
Reviewed in the United States on August 29, 2020
I have credibility issues after reading The Button. A gaff right off the bat: At page 4 the book discusses "discovery of the nuclear bomb." No, nuclear fission was discovered, nuclear fusion was discovered, but nuclear bombs were invented.Reviewed in the United States on August 29, 2020
Next, at page 5, the "first use" term is introduced, as in "no first use" of nuclear weapons by the U.S. But what is really meant is no first use in anger, because nuclear weapons have been used well over 2,000 times in tests (if you want to see an eye opener, watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLCF7vPanrY, which is a video showing the location of every nuke test since 1945, by month/year and country; the count ends at a mind boggling 2,053 tests by the U.S., Russia, England, France, China, Pakistan, and India). But in reality there can now be no first or second use of nuclear weapons in anger, there can only be "no third use in anger," since Hiroshima and Nagasaki already have the first and second use in anger slots. Indeed, the correct "third use" (in anger) term is used only once in the entire book, at page 22.
The book does take every opportunity to bash President Trump, claiming at page 4 that "short of mutiny, no one can stop him" and again at page 8, "no checks-- no checks-- on the President's authority" from ordering use nuclear weapons in a temper tantrum or on the mistaken belief by President Trump (but not his senior advisors) that the U.S. was under an out-of-the-blue massive attack by Russia (i.e., the hair-trigger, launch-on-warning problem). But this ignores the 25th Amendment regarding Presidential succession, which includes "incapacitation." Thus, a senior U.S. military commander who truly believes that the President had lost it, could probably stall a launch order for a short time by questioning whether the order was "legal;" that is, outright mutiny, as discussed at page 4, is not the only option. And as repeatedly discussed in the book, a short delay of a flawed Presidential launch order would be sufficient to differentiate between a mistaken warning versus an actual attack. As repeatedly noted in the book, the U.S. would still have its submarines and at least a few bombers as a deterrent, even if most, or all, of its now vulnerable land-based ICBMs were destroyed. And with today's nukes, even a few surviving bombers with a couple of thermonuclear bombs each is a powerful deterrent, to say nothing of the still fully intact SLBMs.
Then there is the stunning discussion, at page 122, questioning the need for a continued hair trigger "launch on warning" policy, in order to avoid the risk of a decapitating first strike by Russia. In that unlikely event, the book suggests that not to worry, sailors aboard a U.S. nuclear submarine "would still be able to fire their missiles by opening (with a blowtorch or drill) the onboard safe and retrieving the launch key." Really?
Then there is the push, at page 171, for the U.S. to eliminate all of its nukes. But no discussion of the most obvious reason for not doing so: Namely, that modern day nukes are relatively small, and therefore easy to conceal. There would be the temptation for Russia to salt away a few nukes, while claiming that all of its nuclear weapons had been destroyed. And I am not sure I would believe such a claim by the U.S., either. So while greatly reducing the number of nukes is a prudent goal, and removing U.S. nukes from their current "hair trigger" status is an even more prudent goal, going to zero nuclear weapons is rubbish, and dangerous rubbish at that.
However, the "atomic Titanic" analogy at Chapter 10 is outstanding, as are every one of Mr. Perry's and Mr. Collina's "top ten recommendations," with the caveat that recommendation #3 should be "prohibit third use," not "prohibit first use." That is, Russia, or some other foe, would have to be shown guilty of third use of nuclear weapons in anger; only then should the U.S. implement a fourth use of nuclear weapons in anger.
Nevertheless, The Button now has an honored place on my bookshelf, along with four books by Richard Rhodes: The Making of the Atomic Bomb; Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb; Arsenals of Folly; and The Twilight of the Bombs; along with John Newhouse's War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, and Jeffrey Lewis' hair raising speculative novel The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States.
Images in this review
