Several books have been written that attempt to describe the CIA's Hughes Glomar Explorer (HGE) mission to recover a sunken Soviet submarine from the bottom of the Pacific Ocean in 1974. David H. Sharp's newly published book, The CIA's Greatest Covert Operation, is by far the most detailed and authoritative of the lot. Dr. Sharp (PhD, EE, UVA) was assigned to the AZORIAN Program (the CIA's name for the effort) from the concept development phase through the actual recovery effort. He sailed as the CIA mission director on the second "survey" mission (which was really intended to support the cover story described below) and as the director of recovery operations on the subsequent recovery mission.
There are several interwoven stories (or mission phases) in this narrative, some played out sequentially, others in parallel. I'll try to briefly outline these mission phases in the following paragraphs.
Intelligence Opportunity
In 1968, the Soviet guided missile submarine designated K-129 sank in the Pacific Ocean northwest of Hawaii. The cause of the disaster was probably an onboard explosion of unknown origin. The event was probably detected by various acoustic sensors operated by the US Navy to monitor Soviet submarine activity and by the US Air Force to monitor the impacts of Soviet missile tests in the Pacific. Subsequent search and rescue activity indicated that the Soviets did not know where the sub sank. These circumstances created the possibility that the US could obtain valuable intelligence on Soviet missile technology, nuclear warheads, crypto logical codes and equipment, and submarine design IF the US could obtain access to the sub without being detected by the Soviets.
Target Location
The detection of the event by multiple acoustic sensors probably provided a rough initial estimate of the sub's location. Dr. Sharp does not provide more detail on how the sub was precisely located (see Blind Man's Bluff by Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew for more on this topic.) By whatever means, the sub was precisely located resting on the bottom at a depth of 16,000 - 17,000 feet.
Development of Possible Mission Concepts
As the service most directly concerned with Soviet submarines, the US Navy developed the first mission concept for recovering useful intelligence on the K-129. However, the concept, based on deploying a manned mini-sub to cut or blow a hole in the K-129 and then remove items of interest, failed to convince Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations. Moorer sought alternative mission concepts from other elements of the Intelligence Community, and the CIA responded by forming a team of engineers with extensive experience on aircraft and satellite systems. This team developed several preliminary concepts for raising the entire sub by using devices such as inflatable pontoons attached to the sub or a pentane filled barge that would be lowered to the target, jettison its ballast after capturing the target and then rise to the surface.
Mission Definition
Eventually, the CIA team recognized their lack of experience in designing deep sea and heavy lift systems (the K-129 weighed a few million pounds!). They contacted Global Marine, a designer and operator of large off-shore drilling ships. The Global Marine engineers politely listened to the CIA concepts and politely suggested that the ideas wouldn't work. Their alternative suggestion was a "grunt-lift" concept based on their off-shore drilling systems.
Selection of Contractor Team
Global Marine was selected to procure a custom-designed ship for the recovery mission.
The next problem was how to attach a lifting mechanism to the target. Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) was selected to design a "Capture Vehicle" (CV), essentially a large multi-toothed claw that would be lowered to the target and then close around it to provide support along the target's length.
Estimating and maintaining the positions of the ship and the CV relative to the target 17,000 feet below the surface was essential to the mission. Honeywell was selected to develop required positioning system.
Cover Story
It was inconceivable that the Soviets, if they realized what was happening, would permit the US to raise and examine their submarine. It was also inconceivable that the CIA would go into deep ocean exploration for any purpose other than intelligence collection which would lead quickly to the K-129 as the probable target. Consequently, a cover story for the Glomar Explorer mission needed to hide the CIA and US Government as sponsors. Even the standard response to inquiries "I can't tell you; that's classified" wouldn't work since it led directly to a classified government sponsor. The cover story had to be that the operation was private and for purely commercial purposes.
A public US corporation, answerable to its stockholders would be subject to inquiries that could not be honestly answered. A small privately held company would not be a credible sponsor for so large and expensive a project (on the order if $500 million). Fortunately, there was a large, privately held company controlled by an eccentric and reclusive owner: Howard Hughes' Hughes Tool Company (later Summa Corporation) which was involved in the drilling business. The cover evolved from off shore drilling to ocean mining to better fit the observable aspects of the ship and its equipment. Hughes Tool/Summa Corp issued contracts in its own name to the contractor team and was covertly reimbursed by the CIA.
System Development and Integrated System Test
Dr. Sharp goes into much detail on the design, development and testing of the HGE and its various systems. I found that description fascinating but will leave it as an exercise for the interested reader.
Mission Execution
The HGE arrived on station in July 1974 and was shadowed / harassed by Soviet naval vessels. Hoping that the cover story would hold, the crew proceeded with the deployment of the capture vehicle. After several days and numerous technical problems (again left as an exercise) the CV reached the target, enclosed it, and lifted it off the bottom. At just this point, a problem arose in the Heave Compensator (part of the control system that kept the ship, CV, and target moving smoothly together). To repair problem, it was necessary to lower the CV and target back to the ocean floor. Unfortunately, the tines on the CV were designed to support the immense weight of the target resting on them but were not designed to be pressed into the ocean floor by the weight of the target. (The tines could withstand downward force much better than upward force.) Some of the tines were probably over stressed by this unanticipated but necessary return to the bottom. After correcting the Heave Compensator problem, lifting resumed, but part way up, some of the stressed tines apparently broke and about two thirds of the target sank back to the bottom. The remaining portion of the target was safely enclosed in the HGE. At just about this point, the Soviet ship That had been harassing the mission apparently thought it had seen enough and steamed away.
It was impossible to attempt to recover the lost portion of the target with the damaged CV but it was hoped that a second recovery mission could be mounted in 1975.
Security
Somehow, the press got wind of the mission prior to its execution. CIA Director William Colby personally contacted NY Times reporter Seymour Hersh and gave him a full briefing on the project on the condition that Hersh would hold his story until the mission was complete. Hersh honored the agreement.
In June 1974, just before the recovery of the target, a Hughes office in Los Angeles was burglarized. Cash, various valuables, and a hand written memo describing the mission were stolen. The CIA cooperated with the LAPD and briefed some of their officers on the mission. The burglars were never identified nor was the memo recovered. In 1975, after the recovery mission was complete, The LA Times got word of the HGE mission, probably as a result of the burglary investigation and published a story about the US raising a sunken Soviet submarine.
In his memoirs, Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin describes a late 1974 event (soon after the recovery mission) in which an anonymous note was delivered to the Soviet embassy stating that the US was attempting to recover a sunken Soviet submarine.
These leaks rendered a second recovery mission impossible.
Product Exploitation
Little has been said by Dr. Sharp or other authors on the intelligence derived from the HGE mission. Dr. Sharp offers the plausible explanation that one of the valuable byproducts of the mission was the uncertainty that it created in the minds of Soviet leaders. They didn't know how much information the US had derived from the recovery and, consequently, had to consider the possibility that the US did obtain details of their nuclear weapons, submarine design, and crypto codes.
Reviewer's Comments
This book was fascinating, in large part due to the author's style. Dr. Sharp presents this detailed and often technical narrative in an informal, conversational style, interspersed with entertaining and often self-deprecating anecdotes. I recommend it, along with Blind Man's Bluff cited above, to readers interested in the intelligence aspects of the Cold War. While I had nothing to do with the HGE mission, after reading Dr. Sharp's book, I feel like I was there.
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Addendum 6/8/13: I recently discovered the author's related website: http://www.todaretheimpossible.com
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