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The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan) Volume 3 ed. Edition
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The Calculus of Consent was co-authored by Buchanan with Gordon Tullock, with whom Buchanan collaborated on many books and academic enterprises throughout their careers. As Robert D. Tollison states in the foreword, “[this book] is a radical departure from the way democracies conduct their business. The Calculus is already a book for the ages.”
This classic work analyzes the political organization of a free society through the lens of the economic organization of society. The authors acknowledge their unease as economists in analyzing the political organization, but they take the risk of forging into unfamiliar territory because they believe the benefits of their perspective will bear much fruit.
As the authors state, their objective in this book is “to analyze the calculus of the rational individual when he is faced with questions of constitutional choice. . . . We examine the [choice] process extensively only with reference to the problem of decision-making rules.”
The authors describe their approach as “economic individualism.” They believe that economists have explored individual choice extensively in the market sector while social scientists have largely ignored the dynamics of individual decision-making in the dynamics of forming group action in the public sector.
Written in the early 1960s, The Calculus of Consent has become a bulwark of the public choice movement for which James M. Buchanan is so justly famous.
James M. Buchanan (1919–2013) was an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and was considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
- ISBN-100865972184
- ISBN-13978-0865972186
- EditionVolume 3 ed.
- PublisherLiberty Fund
- Publication dateAugust 1, 1999
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions6 x 1.1 x 9 inches
- Print length376 pages
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- Publisher : Liberty Fund; Volume 3 ed. edition (August 1, 1999)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 376 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0865972184
- ISBN-13 : 978-0865972186
- Reading age : 18 years and up
- Item Weight : 1.44 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 1.1 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #817,888 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #758 in Calculus (Books)
- #952 in Democracy (Books)
- #4,469 in Political Science (Books)
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Some of the ideas in "The Calculus of Consent" are quite provocative and Buchanan and Tullock deserve credit for raising them. They are also mostly wrong, which is why I limited my review of the book to three stars. Chapter 7 is about the rule of unanimity, which the authors argue becomes more necessary as the varied interests in society become more diverse. We already had the rule of unanimity in the United States Congress once. It was called the Articles of Confederation and didn't work out so well.
The beginning and middle of the book are dedicated to the evaluation of the Pareto efficiency of various actions by a polity. When they let slip Pareto's first name, Vilfredo, I was able to look him up on Wikipedia. It turns out he taught Mussolini and was one of the intellectual godfathers of Italian fascism. He felt strongly that democracy was a fraud because it falsely promised to improve the conditions of the masses, which would always eventually force it into a left-wing stance. I don't disagree with the second part, but that doesn't make it a fraud.
Basically I would suggest that people coming to this book read the last section of the last chapter, "The Politics of the Good Society," first and if they agree with what's in there, then read the rest of the book. Among the presumptions (which would have been less controversial in 1962 than now) is that Judeo-Christian morality is necessary to a good society. Had Buchanan and Tullock been able to see what Japan and South Korea have evolved into, they might re-evaluate this stance. I am not familiar with any of their later writing but I sadly doubt that the second Gilded Age which followed the Cold War convinced them that the untrammeled market which they praise is actually a threat to Judeo-Christian morality. Three stars.
That is to say, given a choice to fund road improvements or not, some voters will have very strong feelings for, some strong feelings against, but many voters may not have strong feelings either way. In a market transaction, the voters strongly desiring the road could purchase the acceptance of the opposition and uninterested voters with concessions, resulting in an efficient allocation of resources (everyone is happy). The analog to this in the political realm is that politicians buy the votes of other politicians by promising to vote for their issues. Thus, in the Buchanan/Tullock view, such log-rolling is to be expected, while in the traditional political science view, it is anomalous. Their model explains things that the standard view of politics previously could not.
They also make distinctions between constitutional rules and voting made in the context of existing constitutional rules. As part of the constitution making process, they point out that the traditional political science approach views simple majority voting as the standard, and question why unanimity is not. There is a tradeoff to be considered: a unanimity-based system results in no external costs, but considerable decision-making costs, whereas a simple majority-based system imposes some of both. They conclude that many more decisions should be made on at least a super-majority system, especially those decisions that potentially impose significant external costs.
The biggest problem I had with this book is that the prose is somewhat dense, though not as bad as Ricardo. They tend to write almost exclusively in the passive tense. One description I have seen of this work is that it essentially applies the science of economics to the ideas described in Federalist X. It would be nice to see an update of the contents in a more user-friendly style; their ideas would find a much broader audience and a better understanding of Madison's thesis on majority rule and the "violence of faction".
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Le livre référence des débuts du public choice. c'est là que tout est né, que tout est en germe... Intellectuellement stimulant. Le niveau d'anglais requis n'est pas très important mais certaines subtilités restent difficile d'accès.
Bref, Buchanan est un dieu...







