- File Size: 48115 KB
- Print Length: 817 pages
- Publisher: Harvard University Press; Reprint edition (August 14, 2017)
- Publication Date: August 14, 2017
- Sold by: Amazon.com Services LLC
- Language: English
- ASIN: B074DVRW88
- Text-to-Speech: Enabled
- Word Wise: Enabled
- Lending: Not Enabled
- Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #26,981 Paid in Kindle Store (See Top 100 Paid in Kindle Store)
|Digital List Price:||$20.50|
|Print List Price:||$20.50|
Save $11.28 (55%)
Capital in the Twenty-First Century Kindle Edition
|New from||Used from|
Explore your book, then jump right back to where you left off with Page Flip.
View high quality images that let you zoom in to take a closer look.
Enjoy features only possible in digital – start reading right away, carry your library with you, adjust the font, create shareable notes and highlights, and more.
Discover additional details about the events, people, and places in your book, with Wikipedia integration.
Ask Alexa to read your book with Audible integration or text-to-speech.
Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
To get the free app, enter your mobile phone number.
More items to explore
About the Author
Thomas Piketty is Director of Studies at L’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and Professor at the Paris School of Economics. He is the author of Capital in the Twenty-First Century.--This text refers to the paperback edition.
“A sweeping account of rising inequality… Eventually, Piketty says, we could see the reemergence of a world familiar to nineteenth-century Europeans; he cites the novels of Austen and Balzac. In this ‘patrimonial society,’ a small group of wealthy rentiers lives lavishly on the fruits of its inherited wealth, and the rest struggle to keep up… The proper role of public intellectuals is to question accepted dogmas, conceive of new methods of analysis, and expand the terms of public debate. Capital in the Twenty-first Century does all these things… Piketty has written a book that nobody interested in a defining issue of our era can afford to ignore.”―John Cassidy, New Yorker
“An extraordinary sweep of history backed by remarkably detailed data and analysis… Piketty’s economic analysis and historical proofs are breathtaking.”―Robert B. Reich, The Guardian
“Piketty’s treatment of inequality is perfectly matched to its moment. Like [Paul] Kennedy a generation ago, Piketty has emerged as a rock star of the policy-intellectual world… But make no mistake, his work richly deserves all the attention it is receiving… Piketty, in collaboration with others, has spent more than a decade mining huge quantities of data spanning centuries and many countries to document, absolutely conclusively, that the share of income and wealth going to those at the very top―the top 1 percent, .1 percent, and .01 percent of the population―has risen sharply over the last generation, marking a return to a pattern that prevailed before World War I… Even if none of Piketty’s theories stands up, the establishment of this fact has transformed political discourse and is a Nobel Prize–worthy contribution. Piketty provides an elegant framework for making sense of a complex reality. His theorizing is bold and simple and hugely important if correct. In every area of thought, progress comes from simple abstract paradigms that guide later thinking, such as Darwin’s idea of evolution, Ricardo’s notion of comparative advantage, or Keynes’s conception of aggregate demand. Whether or not his idea ultimately proves out, Piketty makes a major contribution by putting forth a theory of natural economic evolution under capitalism… Piketty writes in the epic philosophical mode of Keynes, Marx, or Adam Smith… By focusing attention on what has happened to a fortunate few among us, and by opening up for debate issues around the long-run functioning of our market system, Capital in the Twenty-First Century has made a profoundly important contribution.”―Lawrence H. Summers, Democracy
“It is easy to overlook the achievement of Thomas Piketty’s new bestseller, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, as a work of economic history. Debates about the book have largely focused on inequality. But on any given page, there is data about the total level of private capital and the percentage of income paid out to labor in England from the 1700s onward, something that would have been impossible for early researchers… Capital reflects decades of work in collecting national income data across centuries, countries, and class, done in partnership with academics across the globe. But beyond its remarkably rich and instructive history, the book’s deep and novel understanding of inequality in the economy has drawn well-deserved attention… [Piketty’s] engagement with the rest of the social sciences also distinguishes him from most economists… The book is filled with brilliant moments… The book is an attempt to ground the debate over inequality in strong empirical data, put the question of distribution back into economics, and open the debate not just to the entirety of the social sciences but to people themselves.”―Mike Konczal, Boston Review
“What makes Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century such a triumph is that it seems to have been written specifically to demolish the great economic shibboleths of our time… Piketty’s magnum opus.”―Thomas Frank, Salon
“[A] 700-page punch in the plutocracy’s pampered gut… It’s been half a century since a book of economic history broke out of its academic silo with such fireworks.”―Giles Whittell, The Times
“Thomas Piketty of the Paris School of Economics has done the definitive comparative historical research on income inequality in his Capital in the Twenty-First Century.”―Paul Starr, New York Review of Books
“Bracing… Piketty provides a fresh and sweeping analysis of the world’s economic history that puts into question many of our core beliefs about the organization of market economies. His most startling news is that the belief that inequality will eventually stabilize and subside on its own, a long-held tenet of free market capitalism, is wrong. Rather, the economic forces concentrating more and more wealth into the hands of the fortunate few are almost sure to prevail for a very long time.”―Eduardo Porter, New York Times
“Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century is a monumental book that will influence economic analysis (and perhaps policymaking) in the years to come. In the way it is written and the importance of the questions it asks, it is a book the classic authors of economics could have written if they lived today and had access to the vast empirical material Piketty and his colleagues collected… In a short review, it is impossible to do even partial justice to the wealth of information, data, analysis, and discussion contained in this book of almost 700 pages. Piketty has returned economics to the classical roots where it seeks to understand the ‘laws of motion’ of capitalism. He has re-emphasized the distinction between ‘unearned’ and ‘earned’ income that had been tucked away for so long under misleading terminologies of ‘human capital,’ ‘economic agents,’ and ‘factors of production.’ Labor and capital―those who have to work for a living and those who live from property―people in flesh―are squarely back in economics via this great book.”―Branko Milanovic, American Prospect --This text refers to the paperback edition.
Would you like to tell us about a lower price?
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
One, everyone should read it. This is not a book just for economists. This is a book for everyone no matter your profession or stage in life because it illuminates the arch of wealth and where we are now. We are at a pivotal point in history and what we do could lead to WWIII or huge leap forward for mankind.
Two, to truly understand you need a basic understanding of macro economics (and some micro). If you already have that, great. Otherwise, just google the terms and study as you go along.
Not an easy read but surprisingly not a difficult one either. Compared to other economic books this one is very accessible.
Anyone who has bothered to read this book must admit that the writer is rigorous in his analyses and my impression was the writer eschews prejudgment. Piketty provides exhaustive data throughout in a fascinating historical analysis of capital and the inevitable pitfalls of indecent inequality of wealth ("...the `first globalization of finance and trade (1870-1914) is in many ways similar to the `second globalization' which has been underway since the 1970's." and, "...capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based.") There were reasons for the financial shocks and the world wars of the 20th century, and if we're not paying attention...
Piketty notes that, "Economists are all too often preoccupied with petty mathematical problems of interest only to themselves." Nevertheless, the essential economic equations and trend analyses are sufficiently addressed and easily understandable by all. He notes that economics should be considered a branch of social science, i.e., "...politics is ubiquitous and...economic and political changes are inextricably intertwined and must be studies together."
If nothing else, the reader is warned, "...all citizens should take a serious interest in money, its measurement, the facts surrounding it, and its history. Those who have a lot of it [money] never fail to defend their interests. Refusing to deal with numbers rarely serves the interests of the least well-off."
So why are reactionaries freaking out over this book? Piketty concludes that national debt can only be reduced by: repudiation (bad), inflation (horrible), austerity (really horrible), or a progressive tax on capital (reasonable). Further, he recommends that the only reasonable way to address indecent wealth inequality is a progressive global tax on wealth, which in turn requires global transparency of accounts and an end to foreign tax havens; he goes on to say none of these measures will be easy, but does offer practical suggestions. Clearly, the plutocrats would panic over popularization of such a suggestion, and it only takes a word or two from them to spin up their PACs and puppet organizations (I won't name names) into blindly trashing these rational suggestions. Thus the one-star reviews from those who haven't read the book.
Other specifics of note:
* His rational explanation of what central banks do and why they are necessary is excellent and should be understood by all.
* His discussion of past and recent European economic issues, the creation the Euro, and administration by the ECB and European Committee should be of great interest to most Americans.
* The fact that income taxes were not invented by Woodrow Wilson and had been used successfully in Europe for many decades before that is probably news to most Americans.
* The real reasons why the gold standard had to be abandoned and is no longer feasible should be better understood by many.
* His explanation of what "rentiers" are (i.e. those with sufficient wealth to live off dividends, rents, and other financial instruments) is something that should be better understood by all. At some point, wealth takes on a life of it's own whenever r>g and this and what amounts to regressive taxation at the top of the pyramid, are the driving force behind income inequality.
* His explanation of the recent phenomenon of "super managers" who demand salaries in the tens of millions (the ones that piss everyone off), and how it was a result of the conservative revolution of the 1980s' is something that should be understood by all.
Though it's a tough slog for me, but I highly recommend this book be read be all. I recommend someone write a "Reader's Digest" version that could reference the original, since the average reader may struggle with it.
In the introduction, he briefly reviews the contributions but also the errors of earlier debate without data. These included Malthus’s concern with overpopulation and the need to end all welfare, Ricardo’s principle of scarcity with population and production growing as land becomes increasingly scarce, and Marx’s principle of infinite accumulation with the industrial revolution leading to no limit on the accumulation of capital (which did not consider coming social democracy, technological progress, and how to organize society without private capital). The Kuznets Curve of 1955 introduced data from US tax returns and Kuznets’s own estimates of national income to conclude that inequality increased in the early phase but declined in the later phases of industrialization. Unfortunately, this curve greatly understated the roles of the World Wars and violent economic and political shocks that led to the reduction in inequality between 1914 and 1945 and failed to explain the rising inequality after 1970.
Piketty seeks to contribute “to the debate about the best way to organize society…to achieve a just social order….achieved effectively under rule of law…subject to democratic debate.” He states he has “no interest in denouncing inequality or capitalism per se…as long as they are justified.” He worked briefly in the US and found the work of US economists unconvincing. “There had been no significant effort to collect historical data on the dynamics of inequality since Kuznets, yet the profession continued to churn out purely theoretical results without even knowing (the) facts.” He found that “the discipline of economics has yet to get over its childish passion for mathematics and the purely theoretical and often highly ideological speculation.” Subsequently, he returned to France and set out to collect the missing data.
He gathered data in two main categories: 1) inequality in distribution of income and 2) inequality in the distribution of wealth and the relation of wealth to income. For income, he built the World Top Incomes Database (WTID), which is based on the joint work of some thirty researchers around the world. This data series begins in each country when an income tax was established (usually 1910-1920 but as early as the 1880s in Japan and Germany). For wealth his sources included estate tax returns (usually dating back to the 1920s, but in a few cases as far back as the French Revolution), the relative contributions of inherited wealth and savings, and measures of the total stock of national wealth. In collecting as complete and consistent a set of historical sources as possible, he had two advantages over previous authors—a longer historical perspective (now including data from the 2000s) and advances in computer technology.
Piketty reports two major conclusions from his study. “The first is that one should be wary of any economic determinism in regard to inequalities of wealth and income (that they emerge according to immutable natural laws). The history of the distribution of wealth has always been deeply political and it cannot be reduced to purely economic mechanisms. In particular, the reduction of inequality…between 1910 and 1950 was above all a consequence of war and of policies adopted to cope with the shocks of war.” “The resurgence of inequality after 1980 is due largely to political shifts…especially in regard to taxation and finance. The history of inequality is shaped by the way…actors view what is just…as well as the relative power of those actors.”
The second conclusion is “that the dynamics of wealth distribution reveal powerful mechanisms pushing alternately toward convergence (equality) and divergence (inequality)….There is no natural, spontaneous process to prevent destabilizing ineqalitarian forces from prevailing permanently.” “Over a long period of time, the main force in favor of greater equality (convergence) has been the diffusion of knowledge and skills.” Other proposed forces for greater equality, such as advanced technology creating a need for greater skills or class warfare giving way to less divisive generational warfare as the population ages, appear to be largely illusory.
“No matter how potent a force the diffusion of knowledge and skills may be, it can nevertheless be thwarted and overwhelmed by powerful forces pushing…toward greater inequality (divergence).” With respect to income, the spectacular increase in inequality from labor income, particularly in the US and UK, largely reflects the recent marked separation of the top managers of large firms from the rest of the population, not because of increased productivity, but because they can set their own remuneration. This separation is amplified by marginal tax rates that actually decrease for the highest incomes. Capital income from large fortunes also contributes to income inequality but may be understated due to hidden off-shore accounts and by producing only the relatively small portion of income needed for expenses while the rest remains within the fortune. (Fig. I.1 shows income inequality in the US from 1910 to 2010.)
With respect to wealth, inequality (divergence) is increased when the rate of return on capital significantly exceeds the growth rate of the economy (r > g) as it did until the nineteenth century and is likely to in the twenty-first century. “Under such conditions it is inevitable that inherited wealth will dominate wealth amassed from a lifetime’s labor by a wide margin” and lead to extreme inequality. This increasing inequality of wealth is greatly amplified by structural factors leading to higher rates of increase for the largest fortunes that are no longer related to whatever entrepreneurial activities were at the onset of their origin. (Fig. I.2 shows wealth inequality in Europe from 1870 to 2010.) This analysis also shows a major shift in the main components of wealth from land, slaves (in the US), and colonies (in Europe) to domestic capital and housing.
Historically, the rate of return on capital was 4.5-5% from antiquity to 1913, fell to 1.5% by 1950, and is rising again to 4% or more by 2012 and beyond. During the same period, the global rate of growth was close to zero before the industrial revolution, rose to 1.5% by 1913 and to 3.5% in the mid to late twentieth century (due to catch-up after World War II and in the developing world), and is now falling and projected to be 1-1.5% in the twenty-first century. Thus the unusual fall of the return on capital (r) below growth (g) in the mid twentieth century was associated with a temporary reduction in the rate of increasing inequality. (Fig 10.10 shows a comparison of the return on capital [r] to growth [g] from antiquity to 2100.)
This review barely scratches the surface of the core contribution of this book, which is the enormous volume of data and analysis it provides. The numerical information is presented in a very well developed series of 97 illustrations and 18 tables. This information is used as support for extensive analysis and discussion of the many aspects of historical, present, and likely future inequality that often contradict positions related to ideology and simplistic models. An excellent 22 page overview of “A Social State for the Twenty-First Century” is provided at the beginning of the fourth and final part of the book. This is followed by “Rethinking the Progressive Income Tax,” “The Question of the Public Debt,” the author’s preference for “A Global Tax on Capital,” and finally, the conclusion.
The conclusion reiterates that the principal destabilizing force leading to ever-increasing inequality is a return on capital (r) significantly higher than the rate of growth of income and output (g) for long periods of time. Hence wealth accumulated in the past grows more rapidly than output and wages, and the entrepreneur inevitably tends to become a rentier no longer of use in promoting growth. A progressive annual tax on capital would be the right solution to this problem, although it would require a high level of international cooperation. Piketty objects to the expression “economic science” which implies little to do with the logic of politics or culture in conclusions about inequality. He prefers the expression “political economy” which considers economics as a sub discipline of the social sciences, alongside history, sociology, anthropology, and political science. He insists that economic and political changes are inextricably entwined and must be studied together.
This review is supplemented by a relatively random selection of multiple comments and assertions from the book:
“The nature of capital has changed: it once was mainly land but has become primarily housing plus industrial and financial assets.”
“Capital…is always risk-oriented and entrepreneurial, at least at its inception; yet it always tends to transform itself into rents as it accumulates….”
With respect to global inequality, the industrial revolution led to growth of Europe and America’s share of global output to two to three times their share of population. This share is now rapidly decreasing due to higher growth in developing economies in the “catch-up” phase than in mature economies.
Europe and America’s share of global production of goods and services rose from about 30-35% in 1700 to 70-80% from 1900 to 1980, fell to 50% by 2010, and may go as low as 20-30% later in the twenty-first century.
European and American national inequality rose to record heights in 1910, decreased markedly by the 1940s due to the world wars and Great Depression, then began a rapid return to high levels after the 1970s, particularly in the US.
The share of national income for the top 10% in Europe was over 45% in 1910, under 25% in 1970, and about 30% in 2010. In the US it was over 40% in 1910, under 30% in 1970, and nearly 50% in 2010.
“Numerous studies mention a significant increase in the share of national income in the rich countries going to profits and capital after 1970, along with the concomitant decrease in the share going to wages and labor.”
In the past several decades, the share of national income for the top 0.1% increased from 2 to 10% in the US, from 1.5 to 2.5% in France and Japan, and from 1 to 2% in Sweden.
“It is important to note the considerable transfer of US national income—on the order of 15 points—from the poorest 90% to the richest 10% since 1980”— 5 to 7 times greater than the 2 to 3 points in Europe and Japan.
“The vast majority (60 to 70%)…of the top 0.1% of the income hierarchy in 2000-2010 consists of top managers. By comparison, athletes, actors, and artists of all kinds make up less than 5% of this group.”
“At the very highest levels salaries are set by the executives themselves or by corporate compensation committees whose members usually earn comparable salaries….”
“It is when sales and profits increase for external reasons that executive pay rises most rapidly. This is particularly clear in the case of US corporations…pay for luck.”
Global inequality of wealth in the early 2010s is comparable to that of Europe in 1900-1919. The top 0.1% own nearly 20%, the top 1% about 50%, the top 10% between 80 and 90%, and the bottom half less than 5%.
The share of national wealth ownership in Europe for the top 10% and top 1% was 90% and over 50% in 1910, 60% and 20% in 1970, and about 63% and 24% in 2010. During this time, the share for the 50th to the 90th percentile increased from 5% to 40%, creating a middle class, but the share for the bottom 50% remained at 5%.
In the US, shares for the top 10% and top 1% were about 80% and 45% in 1910, 64% and 30% in 1970, and about 70% and 34% in 2010—with a much more rapid increase after 1970 than in Europe, reaching 70% and 34% versus 63% and 24% by 2010 (while the bottom half claim just 2%).
Inherited wealth is estimated to account for 60-70% of the largest fortunes worldwide. This figure is lower than the 80-90% reached during the belle Epoque, but trending strongly toward a return to that level.
Forbes magazine divides billionaires into three groups—pure heirs, heirs who subsequently grow their wealth, and pure entrepreneurs, with each of these groups representing about a third of the total.
Due to increased life expectancy, the average age of heirs at the age of inheritance has increased from thirty in the nineteenth century to fifty in the twenty-first century, although with larger inheritances.
Today, transmission of capital by gift is nearly as important as transmission by inheritance. This change counters increased life expectancy and accounts for almost half of the present inheritance flows.
“No matter how justified inequalities of wealth may be initially, fortunes can grow and perpetuate themselves beyond all reasonable limits and beyond any possible rational justification in terms of social utility.”
Large fortunes experience increasing rates of growth related to size alone independent of their origins—
10% from $15-30 billion, about 9% from $1-15 billion, about 8% from$500 million to $1 billion, about 7% from $100-500 million, and about 6% below $100 million for university endowments.
From 1990 to 2010, the fortune of Bill Gates, the Microsoft genius, grew from $4 billion to $50 billion, while that of Liliane Bettencourt, a cosmetics heiress who never worked a day in her life, grew at a similar rate from $2 billion to $25 billion.
In 2013, sovereign wealth funds were worth $5.3 trillion ($3.2 trillion from petroleum exporting states and 2.1 trillion from nonpetroleum states like China, Hong Kong, and Singapore), similar to the total of $5.4 trillion for Forbes billionaires. Together, these sources account for 3% of global wealth.
Large amounts of unreported financial assets are held in tax havens—approximately 10% according to the negative global balance of payments (more money leaves countries than enters them).
In the US, parents’ income has become an almost perfect predictor of university access—average income of parents of Harvard students is currently about $450,000.
“Broadly speaking, the US and British policies of economic liberalization (after 1980)…neither increased growth nor decreased it.”
The US economy was much more innovative in 1950-1970 than in 1990-2010….Productivity growth was nearly twice as high in the former period as in the latter.
In most countries taxes have (or will soon) become regressive at the top of the income hierarchy.”
The optimal tax rate in the developed countries is probably above 80%.
One of the most important reforms (is) to establish a unified retirement scheme based on individual accounts with equal rights for everyone, no matter how complex one’s career path.
Debt often becomes a backhanded form of redistribution of wealth from the poor to the rich (who as a general rule ought to be paying taxes rather than lending).
Inflation is at best a very imperfect substitute for a progressive tax on capital. It is hard to control, and much of the desired effect disappears once it becomes embedded in expectations.
Defining the meaning of inequality and justifying the position of the winners is a matter of vital importance, and one can expect to see all sorts of misrepresentations of the facts in service of the cause.
No hypocrisy is too great when economic and financial elites are obliged to defend their interests—and that includes economists, who currently occupy an enviable place the US income hierarchy.
“Modern meritocratic society, especially in the United States, is much harder on the losers, because it seeks to justify domination on the grounds of justice, virtue, and merit, to say nothing of the insufficient productivity of those at the bottom.”
The history of the progressive tax over the course of the twentieth century suggests that the risk of a drift toward oligarchy is real and gives little reason for optimism about where the United States is headed.
Top international reviews
His long run ‘serial history’ data are remarkably clear, with useful 2 line summaries of the main inferences.
As many readers will know, Picketty’s view is that in normal circumstances (ie peace), inequality will increase because private capital grows faster than national income. (However, research on eight centuries of real interest rates, by P. Schmelzing and published by the Bank of England in 2020, showed a continuous trend line of declining real returns on capital, which implies that there are forces acting against the steady concentration of wealth and hence tending to reduce inequality.) The world war years of 1914-1945 and the subsequent two decades in the West were anomalies in that public spending and the public good trumped private capitalist accumulation. Now, says Picketty, we are back to ‘normal’ inequitable times.
Picketty proposes a progressive, annual tax on wealth to promote equality and the broader public good - but acknowledges that this requires a degree of international cooperation and solidarity which is highly unlikely.
Picketty also lambasts the sterile mathematical obsession of many economists, emphasising that economics is a ‘subdiscipline of the social sciences’ and cannot be separated from politics and history. It is about human behaviour, and how to run things so as to promote an ideal society. This begs all sorts of questions, but puts economics firmly in the moral, political and philosophical realm - not that of an objective ‘science’.
As a former macroeconomic forecaster, I applaud Picketty for his intelligent and wide realism.
As a concerned citizen, I wish fervently that our casino capitalist, over-consuming society was able to agree on reforming our market economy system before it collapses - and before we are turned irredeemably into zombie slaves of our shallowest desires.
However, the first 100, pages may be a bain to start. Keep at it and you will find the journey rewarding in the end.
Let me iterate this is not a casual reading book ... it is a serious study of the world's inequality and being quite voluminous requires significant ability to concentrate and maintain focus ...You also would need to have some understanding of basic economics to appreciate the work. Piketty, uses a lots of technical terms and rightly so perhaps, which refer to economics principles of demand and supply, r & g (rate of growth of capital vs growth of economy) at al, and lots of tables and charts. This is in that sense not a beginner's book. It's a book by an economist for economist. So don't be ashamed to skip sections of the book which are above you pay grade. There are a lot of interesting case studies, which buttress the central theme "Inequality and how money makes more money".
His proposal for Global Tax on Capital (as he himself puts it) is quite "utopian" in its construct. However it's a start, because the alternative of high tariffs and capital control is an unsatisfactory substitute.
My only advice is to not read the book from cover to cover and pick chapters which interest you. The second half of the book is really interesting. There are some good case studies, like the Havard University's $30 billion endowment and how they manage it, which are quite fascinating to read.
So don't miss those fascinating parts. To conclude I would say, Piketty has done a great job of harnessing data over several decades, curated, analysed and build a compelling case of " rising capital inequality", however, the proposed solution is quite ambitious and needs to be further fleshed out in context of global politics. Enjoy!
The arguments for a global capital tax are clearly highlighted.
The author does not make reference to how capital is changing in the information age i.e. Cryptocurrencies which I feel would greatly affect control, taxation as well as the redistribution of wealth.
For a global tax to occur there would have to be global agreement and collaboration this is highly unlikely to ever happen mainly due to how much influence and power people in possession of great wealth can have.
I do strongly agree with points by Karl Marx on how the capitalist system can collapse. My question would be if capitalism exploits the poor and we cannot achieve an agreed global tax on wealth then what other system can we use to address the issues that Capitalism causes?
This is quite a long book but a highly recommend read as the points in the book can be quite thought provoking.
Looking forward to sitting down with a nice cuppa and wading through this one