It’s an interesting book in presenting the inside, high – level story of British political and military decisions from around 1900 through 1945. The chapters describing the almost self – imposed disarmament during the 1920s and 1930s were especially revealing. The timidity of the British government in the 1930s during Hitler’s rise to power and the increasing Japanese militarism was also thoroughly described. The problem with the book is that I’m not sure the author intended it to be taken that way.
Throughout the book, the author attempts to offer what he evidently perceives to be reasonable explanations for British (and especially Churchill’s) actions. The book is really 350 pages of excuses for those actions and for British (and especially Churchill’s) political and military ineptitude.
The perfect example of this is presented in Chapter 6 in which the British thinking and actions regarding the Norwegian campaign of April – June 1940 are described. This all occurred while Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty and a member of the War Cabinet. For months, the British government contemplated seizing the Swedish iron ore mines at Gallivare by invading Narvik in northern Norway and crossing overland into Sweden. One would logically think that if this were the case, then detailed planning and analyses of the likely problems, and the required military effort, would have been thoroughly investigated.
Then when the Germans invaded Norway on April 9, 1940 chaos ensued in the British response. The description of what happened is summarized on page 186. First, a force of 350 men was dispatched to Haarstad at the entrance of the fjord leading to Narvik. It was to be followed two days later by four additional battalions. Then additional forces would leisurely follow. Churchill informed his colleagues in the War Cabinet that the seizure of Narvik from the German force that was already there would take about two weeks. Further study of the terrain around Trondheim was then considered, since it constituted a serious obstacle to the undertaking of seizing that port as well. The author concludes by saying “Thus, despite having lost the initiative to the Germans, the initial British response to the invasion demonstrated a sound appreciation of what could realistically be accomplished and which objectives were most important.” This is simply astounding! The British government had been contemplating invading Norway for months – and none of these issues had been considered until after the Germans actually got there?
Even more astonishing is that throughout the previous chapters, there were numerous pronouncements in the government (even in the Cabinet) that the Royal Navy was materially so superior to the German Navy that the Germans could never seriously consider invading Norway in the first place. Yet it happened anyway. There have been numerous books published on the 1940 Norwegian campaign, from both German and Allied points of view. Whatever the viewpoint, history has not been kind to British decision making and actions regarding the Norway campaign. This book can hardly be considered a first-rate account of what happened and why.
Chapter 7 then discusses the war against Germany and Italy 1940 – 1941. Page 203 rightly describes the successful British triumph over the Italian army and the seizure of Cyrenaica by the end of January 1941. This is then followed by a more or less distorted account of what happened next. To quote the author, “But before the Italian presence in Libya could be eliminated, Churchill and his advisers … diverted a large portion of their forces to assist in the defense of Greece.” This is a gross rewriting of history. The Germans did not invade Greece until April of 1941. The decision to transfer British troops from North Africa to Greece was entirely Churchill’s and was done in the illusion that 50,000 British troops would somehow prevent a German attack upon Greece as a possible consequence of the Greek army’s victory over the Italian invasion from Albania. This entire issue opens up an interesting historical “what if” scenario. What if the British troops had NOT been diverted to Greece, but had continued into Libya and occupied the entire Italian colony before the Germans could respond? Maybe then no one would ever have heard of Erwin Rommel. In fact, the diversion of troops from Egypt and Libya to Greece and the associated fiascoes of the withdrawals from Greece and Crete resulted in the war in North Africa dragging on for another 2 ½ years until May of 1943.
Chapter 8 discusses the British decisions regarding the Far East. The reality is that Churchill, the War Cabinet, the Admiralty, and Chiefs of Staff based their collective decisions on a combination of fantasy, wishful thinking, and ungrounded assumptions regarding the Japanese military leadership’s intentions and abilities to attack Singapore, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. The author spends several pages going through literary contortions trying to explain that the British sent the Prince of Wales and Repulse to Singapore, and two battalions of infantry to Hong Kong, to show the Japanese that they would be Allies with the US if japan attacked and that they never thought two capital ships would deter the Japanese from attacking. Ridiculous! The evidence is overwhelming that the British grossly underestimated Japanese military capability and persuaded themselves that the Prince of Wales and Repulse would in deed act as a deterrent. The author also tries to argue that it was really Admiral Phillips fault that he lost the two ships on December 8, 1941 and that Churchill had never really intended for him to use the ships to stop the Japanese landings at Seletar and Khota Baru!
Chapter 10 describes the war from 1943 – 1945. The author attempts to make it appear that Churchill strongly supported the Normandy invasion, but unfortunately it was the shortage of shipping and especially landing craft that delayed the invasion until June of 1944. This is totally erroneous. Churchill consistently tried to avoid landing in northern France until the Americans and particularly Roosevelt and General Marshal finally demanded that it be done. Churchill was constantly seeking ways to divert allied shipping and military strength to peripheral areas with proposals to invade northern Norway, southern Norway, the island of Rhodes in the eastern Mediterranean, coastal Burma, Sumatra, and Borneo. None of these actions could possibly result in the defeat of Germany or Japan. This is well discussed in the books “Winston Churchill – The Flawed Genius of World War II” by Catherwood (2009) and “Second Front Now” by Walter Dunn (1980).The latter book presents an exhaustive analysis of the shipping, landing craft and troops that could have been used for an invasion of France in perhaps August or September of 1943 – but they were diverted to the Mediterranean and the Pacific. The author thus uses circular reasoning to explain why the Normandy invasion couldn’t be undertaken until 1944: shipping and landing craft weren’t available, so Italy had to be invaded in 1943, which is why shipping and landing craft weren’t available for a Normandy invasion. As a point of fact: the Allies landed more troops on the first day of the invasion of Sicily than at Normandy, so troops clearly were available for an invasion of Normandy in late 1943.
All told the author manages to obfuscate just who was responsible for the debacles in France, Norway, North Africa, Dakar, Greece, Crete, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma. There have been many analyses now over the poor British army generalship during the entire war, but that can only be part of the problem. Churchill was directly responsible for many of the poor strategic decisions made early in the war. His constant interference in military operational issues is also legendary. I think the best that one can say is that while British political and military leadership during the early years of the war was perhaps mediocre, at least it was far superior to the incompetence of the German leadership (if one can call it that) of Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, and military (particularly Luftwaffe) commanders such as Udet and Jeschonnek. It wasn’t until late 1942 or early 1943 that British military leadership (particularly including Churchill as Minister of Defense and head of the War Cabinet) started making major military decisions based on hard assessments of reality and not on wishful thinking.
Mind you, I am not totally anti-Churchill. I think he justifiably deserves the credit for the moral courage he displayed early in the war when probably a majority of the British government leadership lacked the quality. He provided leadership when Britain desperately needed it and I doubt that anyone else could have provided it. That doesn’t excuse his many poor military decisions.
For a very different view of Churchill and his role in the war and the success (or lack thereof) of British generals, I suggest reading “Blood, Sweat, and Arrogance – and the Myths of Churchill’s War” by Gordon Corrigan (2006); “The Battle for Britain: Interservice Rivalry Between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, 1909-1940” by Anthony Cumming (2015); and “Decision in Normandy” by Carlo D’Este (1983). There are also many other more objective books on various individual subjects, such as the Norwegian campaign, North Africa, and the Normandy invasion that should be read.
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Sarah Selects is a book club hosted by Amazon Editorial Director Sarah Gelman. Whenever Sarah finds a book that sticks with her, she loves to recommend it to her friends and family. These books are the books she's sharing, so members can talk about them after they’re done reading. Join the club to view and reply to posts from Sarah and get email updates when the February book is chosen. Join the club.
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A history of political timidity and military policy decisions based on fantasy,wishful thinking, and ungrounded assumptions.
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Joshua Paris
Oustanding, Relevant and Gripping
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The Truth Is Out There
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Interesting Perspective.
Reviewed in the United Kingdom 🇬🇧 on December 11, 2013
