Christopher Catherwood rightly reminds his audience that the course of history results from the decisions and whims of outstanding individuals as well as impersonal forces and inevitable economic factors (pg. 13). In March 1921, Winston Churchill, the newly appointed...
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Christopher Catherwood rightly reminds his audience that the course of history results from the decisions and whims of outstanding individuals as well as impersonal forces and inevitable economic factors (pg. 13). In March 1921, Winston Churchill, the newly appointed Secretary of State for the colonies and his advisers re-mapped the Middle East at the Cairo conference to primarily advance British interests in the region from the ruins of the disintegrated Ottoman Empire (pg. 125).
The imperial, pan-Arabic ambitions of the Hashemite family, bone fide senior descendants of Prophet Mohammed, also played a key role in modeling the region (pg. 47, 50-51, 102, 123, 129, 143, 156). The ill-fated Sykes-Pico Agreement made in 1916 between France and Britain to contain Tsarist Russia in the region became meaningless after the fall of the Russian imperial government in 1917 (pg. 56, 64). However, this agreement was not far from the minds of conference participants. The Sykes-Pico Agreement has been perceived in some quarters as both a self-inflicted curse on the British and a betrayal to the Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule (pg. 42-43, 53, 61-62, 78-79, 122).
In addition, events outside the direct control of conference participants were shaping the outcome of this conference. The war-weary and very battered British Empire faced severe budgetary constraints following the ruinous Great War. Furthermore, the war between Greece and Turkey waged after the end of WWI represented an additional constraint placed on conference participants, and especially on Churchill whose position in the cabinet depended solely on the goodwill of Lloyd George, his political boss (pg. 107-108, 161). Churchill strongly opposed the disastrous pan-Hellenism of Prime Minister Lloyd George that ultimately resulted in the fall of the government by the end of 1922 (pg. 38-39, 60-61, 80, 198). Churchill sensibly believed in the appeasement of Turkey to avoid a widespread Muslim rebellion in some British colonies, one of the many ironies of his long political life (pg. 70, 82, 98).
One of the legacies of the Cairo conference was the creation of Iraq, the result of the amalgamation of the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. This creation had disastrous consequences for the Kurds until the instauration of the no-fly zones in 1991 and for the Shia Muslims until the toppling of former President Saddam Hussein in 2003 (pg. 26, 92, 106-107, 125, 135-136, 150, 221-224). At the insistence of Feisal, a Sunni Arab and the first King of Iraq, the British integrated the predominantly Sunny Kurds into Iraq to better balance the Shia Muslim majority in Southern Iraq with the Sunni Arabs in the center (pg. 26). The British wrongly assumed that nationalism was stronger than religion (pg. 229-230).
As Catherwood correctly points out, the real problem was ultimately how to square imperial designs of France and Britain in the region with President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and especially with the policy of self-determination described in the fifth point (pg. 66, 112, 172-173).
Britain had to do as if the Iraqi people had acclaimed overwhelmingly Feisal, while pulling the strings behind the scene to get the desired result (pg. 96, 124, 131, 151-152, 163, 170, 188). However, the British wrongly underestimated Feisal's determination to become his own man in the eyes of his new subjects (pg. 153, 171, 176, 185-190, 197). Unlike the French, the British did not, however, use force to get rid of Feisal but left him on his throne as the best deal available to them to preserve their interests in the region (pg. 142-144, 174-175).
To the British, having an Arab King in Iraq and having some form of indirect British rule there were not incompatible objectives. The British Empire was largely built on indirect rule that turned out to be a cheap way to run an empire (pg. 58, 142, 212). Surprisingly from the vintage of 21st century observers, oil was the missing factor in British political establishment's decision to become embroiled in Iraq (pg. 66-68, 113). In contrast, the British generals and Americans were not oblivious to the future potential of Middle Eastern oil (pg. 75, 178). However, the British ultimately stayed to obtain the oil of Iraq (pg. 205).
British overreach around the world after WWI and the disastrous British policy in the war between Greece and Turkey pushed Churchill to sensibly privilege budgetary considerations above anything else (pg. 69, 95-96, 116-118, 169, 182). Empire building on the cheap by propping up a friendly regime with the help of the sole Royal Air Force met the fierce resistance of the military establishment and their paymasters who were not enthusiastic about deep cuts in the Army's budget (pg. 72, 77, 101, 137, 165-169). At the same time, Churchill knew that he was weakening the Empire's capacity to crush any eventual rebellion against British interference in the new country as subsequent events proved him right (pg. 74, 81-83, 94). These contradictory considerations about how best to manage an occupied territory for the time needed to foster a friendly regime (read a capitalist democracy) are of course not foreign to the ultimate success of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (pg. 87, 133, 154).
The map of today's Middle East and the problems still associated with this map owe their nature to the decisions made by Churchill and his advisers at the conference of Cairo (pg. 109, 227). A successful transition to a Shia-dominated federal Iraq that preserves the rights and freedoms of Iraqi minorities could be one of the key factors to help isolate the most hawkish Iranian powerbrokers and ultimately facilitate the beginning of a serious dialogue involving Israel, the U.S. and Iran (pg. 227). Furthermore, this successful transition in the core territory of Shia Islam could further foster tolerance between the two ancient branches of Islam in the countries of the region to the benefit of everybody (pg. 227-230).
Christopher Catherwood rightly reminds his audience that the course of history results from the decisions and whims of outstanding individuals as well as impersonal forces and inevitable economic factors (pg. 13). In March 1921, Winston Churchill, the newly appointed Secretary of State for the colonies and his advisers re-mapped the Middle East at the Cairo conference to primarily advance British interests in the region from the ruins of the disintegrated Ottoman Empire (pg. 125).
The imperial, pan-Arabic ambitions of the Hashemite family, bone fide senior descendants of Prophet Mohammed, also played a key role in modeling the region (pg. 47, 50-51, 102, 123, 129, 143, 156). The ill-fated Sykes-Pico Agreement made in 1916 between France and Britain to contain Tsarist Russia in the region became meaningless after the fall of the Russian imperial government in 1917 (pg. 56, 64). However, this agreement was not far from the minds of conference participants. The Sykes-Pico Agreement has been perceived in some quarters as both a self-inflicted curse on the British and a betrayal to the Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule (pg. 42-43, 53, 61-62, 78-79, 122).
In addition, events outside the direct control of conference participants were shaping the outcome of this conference. The war-weary and very battered British Empire faced severe budgetary constraints following the ruinous Great War. Furthermore, the war between Greece and Turkey waged after the end of WWI represented an additional constraint placed on conference participants, and especially on Churchill whose position in the cabinet depended solely on the goodwill of Lloyd George, his political boss (pg. 107-108, 161). Churchill strongly opposed the disastrous pan-Hellenism of Prime Minister Lloyd George that ultimately resulted in the fall of the government by the end of 1922 (pg. 38-39, 60-61, 80, 198). Churchill sensibly believed in the appeasement of Turkey to avoid a widespread Muslim rebellion in some British colonies, one of the many ironies of his long political life (pg. 70, 82, 98).
One of the legacies of the Cairo conference was the creation of Iraq, the result of the amalgamation of the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. This creation had disastrous consequences for the Kurds until the instauration of the no-fly zones in 1991 and for the Shia Muslims until the toppling of former President Saddam Hussein in 2003 (pg. 26, 92, 106-107, 125, 135-136, 150, 221-224). At the insistence of Feisal, a Sunni Arab and the first King of Iraq, the British integrated the predominantly Sunny Kurds into Iraq to better balance the Shia Muslim majority in Southern Iraq with the Sunni Arabs in the center (pg. 26). The British wrongly assumed that nationalism was stronger than religion (pg. 229-230).
As Catherwood correctly points out, the real problem was ultimately how to square imperial designs of France and Britain in the region with President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and especially with the policy of self-determination described in the fifth point (pg. 66, 112, 172-173).
Britain had to do as if the Iraqi people had acclaimed overwhelmingly Feisal, while pulling the strings behind the scene to get the desired result (pg. 96, 124, 131, 151-152, 163, 170, 188). However, the British wrongly underestimated Feisal's determination to become his own man in the eyes of his new subjects (pg. 153, 171, 176, 185-190, 197). Unlike the French, the British did not, however, use force to get rid of Feisal but left him on his throne as the best deal available to them to preserve their interests in the region (pg. 142-144, 174-175).
To the British, having an Arab King in Iraq and having some form of indirect British rule there were not incompatible objectives. The British Empire was largely built on indirect rule that turned out to be a cheap way to run an empire (pg. 58, 142, 212). Surprisingly from the vintage of 21st century observers, oil was the missing factor in British political establishment's decision to become embroiled in Iraq (pg. 66-68, 113). In contrast, the British generals and Americans were not oblivious to the future potential of Middle Eastern oil (pg. 75, 178). However, the British ultimately stayed to obtain the oil of Iraq (pg. 205).
British overreach around the world after WWI and the disastrous British policy in the war between Greece and Turkey pushed Churchill to sensibly privilege budgetary considerations above anything else (pg. 69, 95-96, 116-118, 169, 182). Empire building on the cheap by propping up a friendly regime with the help of the sole Royal Air Force met the fierce resistance of the military establishment and their paymasters who were not enthusiastic about deep cuts in the Army's budget (pg. 72, 77, 101, 137, 165-169). At the same time, Churchill knew that he was weakening the Empire's capacity to crush any eventual rebellion against British interference in the new country as subsequent events proved him right (pg. 74, 81-83, 94). These contradictory considerations about how best to manage an occupied territory for the time needed to foster a friendly regime (read a capitalist democracy) are of course not foreign to the ultimate success of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (pg. 87, 133, 154).
The map of today's Middle East and the problems still associated with this map owe their nature to the decisions made by Churchill and his advisers at the conference of Cairo (pg. 109, 227). A successful transition to a Shia-dominated federal Iraq that preserves the rights and freedoms of Iraqi minorities could be one of the key factors to help isolate the most hawkish Iranian powerbrokers and ultimately facilitate the beginning of a serious dialogue involving Israel, the U.S. and Iran (pg. 227). Furthermore, this successful transition in the core territory of Shia Islam could further foster tolerance between the two ancient branches of Islam in the countries of the region to the benefit of everybody (pg. 227-230).
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