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The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order Paperback – August 2, 2011
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Since its initial publication, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order has become a classic work of international relations and one of the most influential books ever written about foreign affairs. An insightful and powerful analysis of the forces driving global politics, it is as indispensable to our understanding of American foreign policy today as the day it was published. As former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski says in his new foreword to the book, it “has earned a place on the shelf of only about a dozen or so truly enduring works that provide the quintessential insights necessary for a broad understanding of world affairs in our time.”
Samuel Huntington explains how clashes between civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace but also how an international order based on civilizations is the best safeguard against war. Events since the publication of the book have proved the wisdom of that analysis. The 9/11 attacks and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the threat of civilizations but have also shown how vital international cross-civilization cooperation is to restoring peace. As ideological distinctions among nations have been replaced by cultural differences, world politics has been reconfigured. Across the globe, new conflicts—and new cooperation—have replaced the old order of the Cold War era.
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order explains how the population explosion in Muslim countries and the economic rise of East Asia are changing global politics. These developments challenge Western dominance, promote opposition to supposedly “universal” Western ideals, and intensify intercivilization conflict over such issues as nuclear proliferation, immigration, human rights, and democracy. The Muslim population surge has led to many small wars throughout Eurasia, and the rise of China could lead to a global war of civilizations. Huntington offers a strategy for the West to preserve its unique culture and emphasizes the need for people everywhere to learn to coexist in a complex, multipolar, muliticivilizational world.
- Print length368 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- Publication dateAugust 2, 2011
- Dimensions6.13 x 0.9 x 9.25 inches
- ISBN-101451628978
- ISBN-13978-1451628975
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—Patrick Healy, The Boston Globe
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
The New Era in World Politics
INTRODUCTION: FLAGS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY
On January 3, 1992, a meeting of Russian and American scholars took place in the auditorium of a government building in Moscow. Two weeks earlier the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and the Russian Federation had become an independent country. As a result, the statue of Lenin which previously graced the stage of the auditorium had disappeared and instead the flag of the Russian Federation was now displayed on the front wall. The only problem, one American observed, was that the flag had been hung upside down. After this was pointed out to the Russian hosts, they quickly and quietly corrected the error during the first intermission.
The years after the Cold War witnessed the beginnings of dramatic changes in peoples’ identities and the symbols of those identities. Global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines. Upside-down flags were a sign of the transition, but more and more the flags are flying high and true, and Russians and other peoples are mobilizing and marching behind these and other symbols of their new cultural identities.
On April 18, 1994, two thousand people rallied in Sarajevo waving the flags of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. By flying those banners, instead of U.N., NATO, or American flags, these Sarajevans identified themselves with their fellow Muslims and told the world who were their real and not-so-real friends.
On October 16, 1994, in Los Angeles 70,000 people marched beneath “a sea of Mexican flags” protesting Proposition 187, a referendum measure which would deny many state benefits to illegal immigrants and their children. Why are they “walking down the street with a Mexican flag and demanding that this country give them a free education?” observers asked. “They should be waving the American flag.” Two weeks later more protestors did march down the street carrying an American flag—upside down. These flag displays ensured victory for Proposition 187, which was approved by 59 percent of California voters.
In the post-Cold War world flags count and so do other symbols of cultural identity, including crosses, crescents, and even head coverings, because culture counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most people. People are discovering new but often old identities and marching under new but often old flags which lead to wars with new but often old enemies.
One grim Weltanschauung for this new era was well expressed by the Venetian nationalist demagogue in Michael Dibdin’s novel, Dead Lagoon: “There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. These are the old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a century and more of sentimental cant. Those who deny them deny their family, their heritage, their culture, their birthright, their very selves! They will not lightly be forgiven.” The unfortunate truth in these old truths cannot be ignored by statesmen and scholars. For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential, and the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the world’s major civilizations.
The central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world. The five parts of this book elaborate corollaries to this main proposition.
Part I: For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies.
Part II: The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence; Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors; and non-Western civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.
Part III: A civilization-based world order is emerging: societies sharing cultural affinities cooperate with each other; efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful; and countries group themselves around the lead or core states of their civilization.
Part IV: The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China; at the local level fault line wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate “kin-country rallying,” the threat of broader escalation, and hence efforts by core states to halt these wars.
Part V: The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.
A MULTIPOLAR, MULTICIVILIZATIONAL WORLD
In the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational. During most of human existence, contacts between civilizations were intermittent or nonexistent. Then, with the beginning of the modern era, about A.D. 1500, global politics assumed two dimensions. For over four hundred years, the nation states of the West — Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany, the United States, and others — constituted a multipolar international system within Western civilization and interacted, competed, and fought wars with each other. At the same time, Western nations also expanded, conquered, colonized, or decisively influenced every other civilization (Map 1.1). During the Cold War global politics became bipolar and the world was divided into three parts. A group of mostly wealthy and democratic societies, led by the United States, was engaged in a pervasive ideological, political, economic, and, at times, military competition with a group of somewhat poorer communist societies associated with and led by the Soviet Union. Much of this conflict occurred in the Third World outside these two camps, composed of countries which often were poor, lacked political stability, were recently independent, and claimed to be nonaligned (Map 1.2).
In the late 1980s the communist world collapsed, and the Cold War international system became history. In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.
Nation states remain the principal actors in world affairs. Their behavior is shaped as in the past by the pursuit of power and wealth, but it is also shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences. The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocs of the Cold War but rather the world’s seven or eight major civilizations (Map 1.3). Non-Western societies, particularly in East Asia, are developing their economic wealth and creating the basis for enhanced military power and political influence. As their power and self-confidence increase, non-Western societies increasingly assert their own cultural values and reject those “imposed” on them by the West. The “international system of the twenty-first century,” Henry Kissinger has noted, “… will contain at least six major powers — the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India — as well as a multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries.”1 Kissinger’s six major powers belong to five very different civilizations, and in addition there are important Islamic states whose strategic locations, large populations, and/or oil resources make them influential in world affairs. In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.
Product details
- Publisher : Simon & Schuster (August 2, 2011)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 368 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1451628978
- ISBN-13 : 978-1451628975
- Item Weight : 14.4 ounces
- Dimensions : 6.13 x 0.9 x 9.25 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #23,708 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Samuel P. Huntington (1927-2008) was the Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard and former chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. He authored and edited more than dozen books.
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Customers find the book thought-provoking, interesting, and timely. They also say the predictions regarding population and demographic change are interesting and applicable to the current challenges. Opinions differ on the writing style, with some finding it well-written and easy to read, while others find it not as engaging or dry.
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Customers find the book thought provoking, incisive, and important. They also say it's a good book for thoughtful readers, and a prescient book that stays focused on the subject. Readers also appreciate the lucidity of argument and great intellect.
"...forward with precise definitions, reasoned exposition and pertinent historical examples buttressed by statistical data and a full scholarly apparatus..." Read more
"...It is not. Actually, the book provides an incredibly thoughtful and provocative examination of the world we live in today...." Read more
"...It is written well, has a good flow and stays focused on the subject. The analysis is well founded. I recommend highly." Read more
"...All one can do is hope that it inspires you to read this very prescient book...." Read more
Customers find the book very timely, as the results of the Clash of Champions are still fresh in their minds.
"This book was written more than 20 years ago. However, it is very timely because the results of the Clash of Civilizations and the things Huntington..." Read more
"Quick delivery to the knowledge and information we need in today's fast changing world!!" Read more
"...Huntington's work has stood the test of time and also remains particularly prescient today...." Read more
"Delivered quickly, very good condition." Read more
Customers are mixed about the writing style. Some find it well written, easy to get through, and relevant. They appreciate the great clarity and no unnecessary verbiage. However, some find the book not as engaging to read as they had hoped, and find the type difficult to read and dry.
"...It is written well, has a good flow and stays focused on the subject. The analysis is well founded. I recommend highly." Read more
"...INTENSE. Profound. NOT a mindless easy read...." Read more
"...The book, like the previous article, is clearly written and is for a far wider audience than just those who read the political science literature...." Read more
"...This book is well written and backed up by recent events. A very timely book...." Read more
Customers find the book dated and obsolescent.
"As with many book of this sort it is a bit dated, and I think Huntington would have different views if he wrote the book after 9/11/01...." Read more
"...It's all pre-911 and quite outdated I thought...." Read more
"...It shows however some obsolescence, due to its having been fisrt published in 1966, and infourteen years the world has furhter evolved." Read more
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On the basis of such examples, Huntington draws the painful conclusion that we (as Westerners) cannot universalize rights and principles that we hold dear and apply them to other peoples, governments and states that do not observe them. To do so, he warns, is false, immoral and dangerous. He asserts toward the close of his book: "Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict in a multicivilizational world." He advances an "abstention rule": that core states of one civilization abstain from intervening in the conflicts of other civilizations. He proposes that a constant seeking for common values, practices and institutions among different peoples, states and civilizations is the key to peace and world order in the realignment of nations taking place after the end of the Cold War.
THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS was a bestselling book that was widely discussed and debated throughout America--in the popular media, in the halls of academe and in the chambers of government. Henry Kissinger endorsed it. Zbigniew Brzezinski called it revolutionary. Presumably every reader of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, where Huntington's initial statement was published, studied the book. This means all the world analysts in the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Cabinet. It is hard to imagine another publication that had a greater chance of influencing US foreign policy. And yet, as the US prepared to go to war for a second time against Iraq, then went to war and got stuck, every single argument, proof and piece of advice packed into its nearly 400 pages was forgotten or ignored. All that was left was a catch-phrase, "clash of civilizations," which was denied and almost always misused.
Contrary to one of the reviews on this page, there is nothing simplistic about this book. The concepts of "civilization," "core state" and "fault-line war" are put forward with precise definitions, reasoned exposition and pertinent historical examples buttressed by statistical data and a full scholarly apparatus. Balkan politics are discussed in exacting detail, Chinese and Central Asian politics as well. Islamic militancy is examined with unflinching objectivity. Distinctions are drawn between domestic multiculturalism and foreign universalism which are hairsplitting, but crucial. The writing abounds in classifications and qualifications; often tedious, but often capped with a memorable maxim: "The great beneficiaries of the war of civilizations are those civilizations who abstained from it."
For me, the discussions of post-Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe are most instructive: "People could no longer identify as Communists, Soviet citizens or Yugoslavs, and desperately needed to find new identities. They found them in the old standbys of ethnicity and religion. The repressive but peaceful order of states committed to the proposition that there is no god was replaced by the violence of people committed to different gods." The presentation of civilizational alignments in the Afghan war of 1979-1989, the Tadzhikistan war of 1992 and the Chechen wars beginning in 1994 provides the background for ongoing conflicts today. The analysis of Sino-Russian politics and prospects brings us right up to the moment.
The failure of this book to prevent the very thing it warned against is very troubling and raises questions about the real impact of public discourse today. No doubt it is too much to ask power-mongers to re-read it, but for us mere mortals it is essential. We may not be able to change the world, but we at least want to understand it.
Huntington's thesis is based on his belief that "the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural" (21). Thus, the most important and dangerous conflicts will be between people from different cultures (28). Huntington sees the world "divided between a Western one and non-Western many" (36). He states that "[c]ulture is the common theme in virtually every civilization," and that the most important element which defines culture is religion (42). At this point, one might assume that Huntington is setting the reader up for justification as to why the U.S. must go to war with ________ (insert Muslim country here). He is not.
Some concepts that Huntington elaborates upon are that of 'fault lines' and 'core states,' as well as 'indigenization,' which would be defined as the reassertion of indigenous cultures and beliefs. Indigenization serves to explain why many countries in the world are not on the same page as that of the U.S. And his idea of core states is especially significant. To simplify, basically each civilization has a core state. For example, in the West it is (and must remain) the U.S. In East Asia, it is China. But in the Muslim civilization, there is no core state, and this, according to Huntington, helps explain why there is so much conflict and unrest in this part of the world. Incredibly, this book very much holds up after 9/11, and I'd say that recent history could serve to validate much of Huntington's thesis thus far. This is not to say that I agree with everything he espouses. For example, I think he unfairly paints the Muslim world with a broad stroke, and I would argue that many people in the Muslim civilization are actually motivated by reasons that are political and economic (not religious), yet his argument merits serious contemplation. Huntington also focuses significantly on China/Sinic civilization, Russian/Orthodox civilization, as well as examines the Bosnian War as a case study in fault line wars.
Huntington makes two points that especially stood out to me. One is addressing the issue of weapons proliferation. Huntington writes, "The hold-down efforts of the West may slow the weapons build up of other societies, but they will not stop it" (190). He explains this in further detail, but I can't help think of the U.S.'s position on Iran and those who advocate another pre-emptive attack. Secondly, in his conclusion, Huntington encourages that civilizations focus on what they have in common in order to get along peacefully. This makes perfect sense to me, and I wish we would hear this more often. He writes: "[T]he world's major religions - Western Christianity, Orthodoxy, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Confucianism, Taoism, Judaism - also share key values in common. If humans are ever to develop a universal civilization, it will emerge gradually through the exploration and expansion of these commonalities" (320).
Reading this book is well worth your time. I recommend it.
Top reviews from other countries
Das bedeutet praktisch, dass eine Kritik an den Verhältnissen in einer anderen Kultur wie zum Beispiel China oder auch Russland überheblich ist. Sie entstammt einem westlichen Verständnis, das ganz naiv davon ausgeht, dass alle Welt nach unserem Verständnis glücklich werden sollen und müssen. Im schlimmsten Fall verbunden mit Drohungen und Sanktionen.
Was interessiert das praktisch? Eine Analyse für Soziologen und andere, aber politisch praktisch wertlos?
Im Gegenteil. Wenn man als ein sehr simples Beispiel die deutsche Politik vertreten durch die Innenministerin bei der Fussball WM in Katar nimmt, dann erkennt man sofort, wie absurd das Verhalten der Ministerin in einem arabischen Land, wo sie Gast war, gewesen ist. Relativ offenherzig - diplomatisch formuliert - und mit einer Armbinde, die die Gastgeber erziehen wollte, ihr Verhältnis zur Homosexualität zu verändern, in aller Öffentlichkeit, das war eine kulturelle Anmassung ohne gleichen und ohne jeden Sinn. Der Westen kann eben nicht davon ausgehen, dass eine islamische Gesellschaft unsere liberalen Vorstellungen übernimmt, er kann noch nicht einmal davon ausgehen, dass diese Gesellschaft das überhaupt toleriert. Wir müssen daher lernen, mit diesen Unterschieden umzugehen. Wir müssen die Welt nicht erziehen. Und wir würden damit auch inzwischen scheitern, da sich die Machtverhältnisse zu Lasten von Europa und den USA deutlich verschieben.
It is interesting how to analyze Japans strategic role and ability in Big Politics of the world from the West.











