![]({"https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/51aiMXLn6wL._SX326_BO1,204,203,200_.jpg":[328,499],"https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/51aiMXLn6wL._SY344_BO1,204,203,200_.jpg":[228,346]})
In 2018, some of the ideas in this book will without a doubt be more controversial than ever, given that frank acknowledgements of problems caused by cultural differences has become taboo in some forums. The book is a greatly expanded and elaborated version of the author’s 1993 “Foreign Affairs” article of the same title (which can be accessed at the Foreign Affairs website via paywall.)
The central themes of the book are that culture and cultural identities (what he calls “civilization identities”) shape the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world; that clashes between these are the greatest threat to world peace; and that an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war. In the author’s own words: “In the emerging world of ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, Western belief in the universality of Western culture is false, immoral, and dangerous…The common Western assumption that cultural diversity is a historical curiosity being rapidly eroded by the growth of a common, Western oriented, Anglophone world culture, shaping our basic values...is simply not true.”
Professor Huntington’s model divides the world into nine “civilizations,” a model he acknowledges is not perfect, but better explains the world’s international difficulties than the most prevalent alternative models: 1) “One World—Euphoria and Harmony;” 2) “Two Worlds-Us and Them;” 3) “184 States, More or Less;” and 4) Sheer Chaos.” He suggests that the “civilizational” aspects of the world’s divisions were briefly thrown into the shade by the bipolar nature of the Cold War and the sometimes forced choosing of sides it required. This was written around 25 years ago, not too long after the end of the Cold War; it is interesting to see how accurately his world model explains the state of the world and the way in which certain choices (especially in the West) seem to be trending toward his predicted end states.
While I believe that Huntington largely avoids unfounded value judgements, some of his observations will certainly be considered controversial by many who seem to be in the ascendant these days (2018) in the Western political climate. One of these is his observation, supported by data, that “fault line” conflicts (those occurring across civilizational boundaries) are vastly more prevalent across the Muslim/non-Muslim divide than they are across any other world cultural boundary (remembering he considers that there are NINE cultures in the world). He offers some suggestive data supporting this observation, and offers some possible explanations for it. Despite some hostile reviews I read, it is important to note that Huntington himself does not push any particular conclusions—these are offered as POSSIBLE explanations.
A second observation is the undesirability and absurdity of the “multicultural state,” an assertion that seems to go directly against current Western trends being propelled by Western liberal elites. From p305:
- “Historically American national identity has been defined culturally by the heritage of Western civilization, and politically by the principles of the American Creed on which Americans overwhelmingly agree: liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property. In the late 20th century, both components…have come under concentrated and sustained onslaught from a small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists. In the name of multiculturalism they have attacked the identification of the US with Western civilization, denied the existence of a common American culture, and promoted racial, ethnic, and other sub-national cultural identities and groupings. They have denounced…the systematic bias toward European culture and its derivatives in education and the dominance of the European-American monocultural perspective. [These people are] very often ethnocentric separatists who see little in the Western heritage other than Western crimes. Their mood is one of divesting Americans of the sinful European inheritance and seeking redemptive infusions from non-Western cultures."
He quotes Theodore Roosevelt (p306): "The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing all possibility of its continuing as a nation at all, would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities." He then observes that in the 1990s, the leaders of the US have not only permitted this but assiduously promoted the diversity rather than the unity of the people they govern. Further (p307): "The clash between the multiculturalists and the defenders of Western civilization and the American Creed is the real clash within the American segment of Western civilization...the futures of the US and of the West depend upon Americans reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization. Domestically this means rejecting the divisive siren calls of multiculturalism. Internationally it means rejecting the elusive and illusory calls to identify the US with Asia."
Important to note is that Huntington does not reject the other world cultures he describes. His two simple assertions are that 1) Western values are not universal; and 2) There can be no such thing as a successful “multicultural civilization.” Any state that attempts this becomes what he describes as a “cleft state,” riven with internal conflict. Huntington does readily acknowledge the utility of immigration (p304): “Immigration is a potential source of invigoration for the West, provided that: 1) Priority is given to able, qualified, energetic people with the talents and expertise needed by the host country; 2) The new migrants and their children are assimilated into the host culture.” Unfortunately, neither of these is happening in the West, especially in Europe.
Huntington concludes with a recipe for peace in a multicivilizational world, containing three rules (p316):
1) Abstention rule: "In the coming era...the avoidance of major intercivilizational wars requires core states to refrain from intervening in conflicts in other civilizations."
2) Joint mediation rule: "Core states negotiate with each other to contain or to halt fault line wars between states or groups from their civilizations."
3) Commonalities rule: "Peoples in all civilizations should search for and attempt to expand the values, institutions, and practices they have in common with peoples of other civilizations." (This is NOT multiculturalism as “practiced” today!)
Some interesting observations and speculations:
1) (p53-54): The great political ideologies of the 20th century are all products of Western civilization. No non-Western civilization has generated a significant political ideology. The West, however, has never generated a major religion; these are all products of non-Western civilizations, and in most cases predate it…As the world moves out of its Western phase, religious and cultural means of identification and commitment are replacing ideologies. Separation of religion and politics will be increasingly replaced by intrusion of religion into international affairs.”
2) (p78) Modernization without Westernization is quite possible and has been done. (Japan was one of the best early examples.) The challenges of modernizing pale beside those of replacing an indigenous culture with a Western one. The world is becoming more modern and less Western.
3) (p90) The text states that military spending has drastically declined in the West and in Russia since the end of the Cold War. This is clearly no longer true in the US.
4) (p94): Adoption of Western style democracy by non-Western societies is a paradox, as it gives power to nativist and anti-Western political movements. Democratization is inherently a parochializing and not a cosmopolitanizing influence. "Politicians in non-Western societies do not win elections by demonstrating how Western they are."
5) (p112) The core elements in most revolutionary movements are students and intellectuals. He further demonstrates how peaks in certain civil disturbances worldwide correlate with peaks in the 15-24 year old age groups in those places.
6) Torn countries are those belonging to one civilization, but trying to join another. This process always seems to fail. Turkey is an excellent example, ultimately rejected by Europe. It is interesting that EU reluctance to embrace Turkey at the time was due to fears of opening its borders to unrestricted immigration from a Muslim nation of 60 million. EU (at least the governing elites’) policy on embracing immigration seems to have changed. The immigration aspect is discussed further starting on p200.
7) An interesting factoid (p203): “In 1994, the Clinton Administration, reversing its earlier stance, moved to toughen immigration controls, tighten rules governing political asylum, expand the INS, strengthen the Border Patrol, and construct physical barriers along the Mexican boundary.”
8) (p166) There is interesting discussion about the cleft nature of Ukraine, and its ethnic distribution, predictive of a split (25 years ago!).
As a final note, I have to wonder why, with so much text devoted to discussion of the Islamic / non-Islamic civilizational problem, the author is almost completely silent on Israel, and never even mentions which civilization he would assign it to. His “post-1990” map shading shows it as Islamic, despite his meticulous shading of other very small areas such as Hong Kong, the Philippines, and the Falkland Islands.
- Get 3 for the price of 2. Offered by Amazon.com. Shop items
