Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Follow the author
OK
The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War Hardcover – Large Print, January 1, 2007
- Print length1240 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherThorndike Pr
- Publication dateJanuary 1, 2007
- Dimensions6.5 x 2.25 x 9.25 inches
- ISBN-100786298324
- ISBN-13978-0786298327
Books with Buzz
Discover the latest buzz-worthy books, from mysteries and romance to humor and nonfiction. Explore more
Similar items that may ship from close to you
Product details
- Publisher : Thorndike Pr (January 1, 2007)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 1240 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0786298324
- ISBN-13 : 978-0786298327
- Item Weight : 1.1 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 2.25 x 9.25 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #5,987,785 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #726 in South Korean History
- #43,064 in American Military History
- #44,745 in World War II History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
Important information
To report an issue with this product or seller, click here.
About the author

David Halberstam, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, has chronicled the social, political, and athletic life of America in such bestselling books as The Fifties, The Best and the Brightest, and The Amateurs. He lives in New York.
Photo by William H. Mortimer (ebay.com, front of photo, back of photo) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons.
Customer reviews
Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Learn more how customers reviews work on AmazonReviews with images
-
Top reviews
Top reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
The Korean War is a very bitter memory for Americans. Even though a non-communist South Korea was preserved it was a very unpopular war in America, shortened Truman’s presidential aspirations, ended McArthur’s career, and set America on the endless task of eternal military protection for that nation.
I had always thought that Korea marked McArthur’s career peak with the Inchon landing and that the Chinese invasion had been a complete surprise. In other words, McArthur did not see that China was prepared to invade until it happened and his demand to use nuclear weapons was what got him fired. Now I know that I was half right and the half I got wrong was the most important part. McArthur knew. He ignorantly, arrogantly, underestimated the resolve of the PRC. He wasted American lives because of this dereliction. Their blood is on his hands. And he was responsible for much more than American forces. His egregious performance also endangered international UN forces. A truly despicable performance.
David Halberstam has produced a very revealing account of how that happened. He begins with a description of the world as it existed at the end of World War II and clearly describes the events that culminated with the North Korean invasion on 25 June, 1950. His writing, as always, is first rate and he tells a very engaging and informative tale. I could not stop reading.
The Communist victory in China was the pivotal event affecting the First Indochina War, already underway by 1950; the Korean War; and the subsequent Second Indochina War. I had always wondered why the US didn’t take away any lessons from her involvement in the Korean War. It was not a happy outcome even though a non-communist government was preserved. The war was very unpopular at home and ended with an armistice, not a peace agreement. America’s involvement was plagued by mismanagement and dereliction. The whole affair was overshowed by partisan political concerns.
President Johnson, on a White House tape of a phone conversation, said on 27 May, 1964, “…the more I think of it [Vietnam], I don’t know what in the hell…it looks like to me we are getting into another Korea. I don’t see what we can ever hope to get out of there with. I don’t think it is worth fighting for and I don’t think we can get out!”
Another Korea! That is why I got this book. I needed to know more about that conflict. I had no idea anyone in the Johnson administration was even thinking about Korea before the decision to put boots on the ground in Vietnam. US involvement in Korea established a permanent burden for the US military and Johnson was right: Vietnam would either become another Korea, with permanent US military involvement, or we could limit US involvement to advice and support.
Growing up during the 60s I had always thought of Korea as a victory, or at worst a draw. As I delved into the history of the Vietnam War it became obvious that there were similarities and differences but this book makes it clear that Korea should have provided an overarching cautionary tale for Kennedy and Johnson, especially Johnson, with respect to Vietnam.
David Halberstam tells the complete story. From Chang’s loss of the Chinese Civil War, and how Truman was successfully blamed for that outcome, to how the United States then became the guarantor of the Republic of China’s security on Taiwan. How the China Firsters, who convinced the American public that Truman and the Democratic Party really lost China to the Communists, looked on a war in Korea as a catalyst to reignite the war between Communist and Nationalist Chinese. This is a long story of denigrating and underestimating the resolve and ability of North Korea and the PRC while overestimating the abilities of the Nationalist on Taiwan who had just lost a long war.
I guess Korea had to be fought but the progression of the war after Inchon did not need to follow the course it took. A better, more engaged, less egomaniacal commander was necessary but partisan political concerns prevented that. The difficulty of fighting a war on the Asian mainland and the obvious necessity to maintain a constant US military force to preserve the peace should have been paramount concerns for any subsequent presidents considering the same action.
David Halberstam's book is a valuable source to understand what happened in Korea and how America eventually lost her way in Vietnam.
Halberstam skillfully combines first-hand interviews and existing second-hand sources to weave an interesting, thoughtful narrative that not only tells the story of the war (mainly its first year), but also provides some thoughtful, higher themes. He's written one of the better general histories about a war that I've read.
He covers much territory, and gives gripping combat descriptions that show what the everyday soldiers (primarily Americans) went through. Halberstam's eye for detail, and his ability to pull these stories out of men who largely have been reluctant to tell their stories to nonveterans, is commendable. In keeping with "The Best and the Brightest," he seems particularly fascinated with the foibles of the higher ups, and in this regard he covers all 4 main combatants well, with a special emphasis on the Chinese and American leaders, primarily through the use of their memoirs and diaries.
It may have been the "coldest" or "bitterest" winter of the Coldest War. As Stalin shored up his eastern border in Europe, the process of decolonization was starting to appear in other areas of the world, and Korea (a former Japanese colony divided by the USSR and USA) was an early battleground. On balance, Halberstam's account paints the Chinese and the United States as using the Korean War to bolster political positions at home. Halberstam spends much time analyzing (maybe overanalyzing) the origins of American beliefs of the Cold War in terms of fears of Communist penetration into US government and other institutions.
In brief, the Democrats in the Truman administration felt compelled to act in Korea in order to deflect Republican charges of being soft on Communism, and to defend against the pro-Chiang, anti-Communist China lobby. Many in America believed that the USA had "lost China," and Halberstam spends some time explaining the lies and half-truths that accompanied what may be the first of American misadventures in Asia (China, then Korea, and then Vietnam). In any event, the Hank Luces of the time wanted to believe that China could be redeemed. MacArthur played to this anti-Democrat counterforce well, and he seemed to embrace a tougher stance on China himself, which is what ultimately got him dismissed. Mao, for his part, apparently saw Korea as a way to assert China's new independence, from the former colonialists in the West, the pro-Chiang remnants in mainland China, and from his rivals in the USSR.
Halberstam clearly sees a connection in Mao and MacArthur by way of their vanity and the monstrosity of their egos. MacArthur had the potential to take his country down a dark path by going to war with China in order to whitewash his huge error in concluding that the Chinese would never invade Korea. Truman removed him, removing that potential threat. Mao had no such check, despite Peng's attempt to get Mao to face reality. As a result, Mao indeed led China down a dark path, and maybe into an abyss, all of his own making. The perils of unchecked egos in government, and the benefits of democratic civilian authority, are made crystal clear by Halberstam's morality tale.
How all this Greek drama related to the average Joe in Korea isn't exactly made clear by Halberstam, except that the soldiers on both sides suffered, and too many lost their lives. This seems to be another theme: While the senior leaders argued with each other or indulged their private fantasies, the common people underwent misery. Halberstam tries to balance some decent combat descriptions with a lot of politics, but this is certainly not a complete telling of the war, and nor does it aim to be. While Halberstam does provide some good background and insights on Rhee and Kim, both of whom underscore Halberstam's main lesson of democracies vs dictatorships, little is said about everyday Koreans. However, the subtitle does make it clear that this is about "America and the Korean War," and sometimes Halberstam uses "we" to relate to his presumably American audience.
Also, in his search for unambiguous dichotomies, for good and bad characters, he may go a little soft on Truman. Truman had a number of moments when he could have relieved or reprimanded MacArthur earlier, in spite of MacArthur's heightened popularity immediately after Inchon. Isn't Truman at fault for not being stronger than he was, for letting MacArthur push him too far before making the politically dangerous choice? Perhaps this just highlights the powerful undertow of domestic politics on US foreign policy in the time, but one must wonder if Halberstam too easily gives Truman a pass to set him up as the hero of tale.
In a similar way, the fight between the Republicans and the Democrats is a central conflict, and it's questionable if Halberstam is seeing this war-within-a-war completely objectively at all points. Like Truman, perhaps the Democrats as a whole were too weak and on the defensive when they didn't need to be. Too, there are some soft conclusions that the American effort wasn't wasted because it resulted in a prosperous South Korea, a sort of mini-Japan; yet, North Korea still exists today and continues to bring misery to its own people and the region, and Halberstam doesn't adequately address this fact in light of the events of 1950-1953. Indeed, perhaps the Korean War was (as someone else has said) a war with a draw, a victory, and a defeat. Its ambiguities were the real lesson, and the USA didn't seem to adequately learn this until Vietnam, wisdom that came too late.
Despite the book's shortcomings, it is a good introduction to the war, its centrality to the developing Cold War, and its impact on later policy, namely in Vietnam. Halberstam writes with a well-practiced, accessible "plain English" style, and he seems to try very hard to rarely exceed two syllables. Typical punchy sentences: "It was a classic Stalin move" and (about a critical miscalculation by MacArthur) "He was wrong." Halberstam's varied, engaging style makes each paragraph a quick, lively, and usually enlightening read.
The maps are sufficient and numerous enough to follow the action throughout, although this is certainly not an operational "war" history by any means. Given Halberstam's love of story and his fondness for painting human portraits, the lack of photographs is particular striking (in the softcover version, at least). Such photographs could have underscored some points, giving a sense of the personality of the leaders, for example, or covered some gaps in the narrative (showing the war's devastation on the Korean people, for example). Even so, Halberstam's work is a readable and informative account of the war and the events surrounding it. Unfortunately, it was his last.
Top reviews from other countries
This book should be mandatory reading for all OCS entrants in the US military and beyond.








