The Concept of Sin 1st Edition

This is an slim book by the great German Thomistic philosopher Josef Pieper as translated by Father Edward Oakes. Oakes' explanation of how he manages to go from noun heavy but littered with "digestif" connectives German to English is very interesting. Oakes also acknowledges that he has added a quote from Milton's Paradise Lost, which probably exceeds his brief as translator, but doesn't intrude all that much into Pieper's text.

Pieper offers a Thomistic meditation on sin. He starts with the observation that the concept of sin has become a thing to joke about, rather than a serious matter of existence. And, yet, sin is correlated with guilt ("man simultaneously infringes against the divinely established norm by, in Hartmann's words, becoming guilty "before the forum of his own conscience and of his values. According to the unclouded testimony of human tradition, this is precisely what constitutes the essence of "sin.")(p. 15.)

Sin is a human act that "misses the mark," but the "mark" is not established by man. Every sin is a willed and intentional missing of the mark. (p. 41.) Every sin is contrary to reason and nature. (p. 35.) "Nature" does not mean - as so many people think - "what animals do," but human nature. Pieper observes:

>>>In other word's man's nature can virtually be identified with his creaturely status: his being a creature - his coming into the world without his consent - defines his innermost essence. Everything, therefore, that man can do as a self-aware, consciously deciding essence is based on, and necessarily already presupposed by, what he is by nature. And here "nature" means not just the earliest and first endowment (nature in the sense of "by birth") but also the permanent norm.<<< (p. 36.)

Strangely, sin contradicts what we want but is also founded on what we want. (p. 41.) An answer to this apparent contradiction is that sin is contrary to reason - it is wanting something that might be good, and therefore desirable, in a disordered way. Sin acts against conscience, where conscience is "nothing other than the power we have by virtue of our own innate reason to render and formulate judgment on what we should do here and now." (p. 45.)

Pieper places a high value on conscience:

>>>And even if this judgment of conscience, objectively considered, is in fact not the best, even then it still obligates us for so long as there is no other higher authority [Instanz] to speak against it. Even if I am determined to direct all my decisions expressly according to the will of God, it is still my knowledge and the judgment of my conscience in which alone the will of God comes into view for me. And "if reason erroneously (errans) says something is God's command, then the demand of reason can no more be disregarded than can God's command." "Every act of the will is simply and always wrong insofar as it does not agree with reason - whether this be in error or not."<<< (p. 45.)

Sin, moreover, involves an act against God. "Every sin consists in the longing for a passing good." (p. 57.) Yet, everything that exists is good. (p. 58.) This insight applies not only to things which exist - and were created by God and have goodness insofar as they exist, (p. 58), but "it also applies no less to ourselves, and that means to our activity as well. But that means that we must ascribe essential good to every act of will in the innermost cell of our freedom. In other words, this statement must also hold true for the sinful deed. Oh, the immensity of the thought.<<< (p. 58.)

Pieper also notes:

>>>Consequently, not only is there nothing ontologically evil in objective reality to which man could ever direct his intention, but the power of willing is itself of such a kind that, formally speaking, it cannot possibly will evil in the form of positive turning-toward. "Evil is never striven for in the manner of turning toward something, but only by turning away from something. Thus one says something is "good" by virtue of its participation in the good but something is "evil" only by virtue of its distance from the good" - notice how Thomas does not say for example: "by virtue of its participation in evil"!<<< (p. 59.)

Pieper concludes:

>>>The clear implication of the above reflections is that no act of turning the will toward any of the goods of the world can in fact, strictly considered, be sin unless at the same time this turning-toward is preceded by a turning-away, that is, by deliberately turning away from God.<<<< (p. 61.)

Interestingly, this insight leads to the observation that the motivation of pride is the most likely to lead to sin. People can miss the mark through pride or cupidatas (desire). The less the deed contains the element of pride and the more it contains of cupidatas, the less the guiltiness of the action. (p. 62.) This seems to lead to the conclusion that those of a higher intellectual status - philosophers and angels - are more likely to sin more greatly. (Id.) Pride also leads to self-deception, where the prideful are inclined to excuse themselves with the thought that "Well, it wasn't really half so bad as all that." (p. 63.)

Pieper has a chapter discussing mortal and venial sins. He also discusses the paradox of sin - how it is a "freely chosen compulsion." "Sin is a kind of vampire," according to George Bernanos. (p. 74.) The question of sin raises problems, not the least of which is "why?" Aquinas offers the explanation that origin of evil comes "not by virtue of its origin from God but from its origin from nothing." (p. 81.) Man is created by God from nothing, so man has a dual origin - God and nothing. It is, according to Pieper and Aquinas, a bent toward nothingness that accounts for man's propensity or ability to sin. Beyond that insight, evil remains a mystery.

Pieper concludes with a discussion of the "stain of sin." Sin effects an ontological transformation. (p. 86.) "Sin doesn't just mean: I have done something. Sin also means: I henceforth am something that I was not previously: I am, because of my deed, guilty. The status of being guilty is what "springs out of" the act of sinning as its inner fruit, its effectus." (p. 87.)<<

Guilt and sin by definition call for expiation and punishment. (p. 88.) Pieper seems to think that this is an obvious fact, but I question how obvious it is to moderns, who seem to think that punishment is unfair and wouldn't understand expiation if they were handed the definition.

Pieper deals with the "Hell issue." He points out that eternal punishment applies only to "deadly sin in the strict sense; that is, only when the sinner consistently turning away from God's will....To sin "mortally" means: deliberately to apply the most intense valuation and love of which one is capable not to God but to oneself." (p. 89.) Pieper also explains that the doors of Hell are locked from the inside:

>>>When discussing "eternal punishment" one must clearly distinguish the images that are meant to make the essence of the matter visible to the imagination from the essence of the matter itself. but if the essence of damnation is rightly characterized as separation from the infinite Good, which God himself is, then the punishment only consists in not possessing what one has already expressly renounced. "Hell" should not be thought of as a dungeon inside which one has been forcibly locked up against one's will. The bolt on the door that seals off the way into the open air is not located outside, but inside, the person. It is the stiff necked will of the damned person himself, a will that turns away from God, which has closed the gates of hell in on itself. (p. 90.)<<<

Pieper's book is slim, approximately 90 pages, but it is filled with insights fruitful for meditation.

It is unclear whether it is the German or the English translation that is at fault here, but if you are interested in reading Pieper, you may want to start somewhere else. Pieper is someone I enjoy immensely. He is very readable, is good at making concepts easy to digest, and tends to be very accessible for some who wants to get their feet wet in Thomistic philosophy. This volume was the opposite in every respect.

The translator's introduction would lead the reader to believe that he a number of liberties in translating. It is unclear whether the translator committed sabotage, but the English is cumbersome and many of the sentences go on for several lines. It takes the skill of an investigative journalist and logistician to decifer some of the passages.

I have enjoyed other works by Pieper translated by Richard and Clara Winston, Sister Mary Francis McCarty, and Lothar Krauth. Two personal favorites are LIESURE THE BASIS OF CULTURE and HAPPINESS AND CONTEMPLATION.

As usual Pieper delivers some keen and penetrating insights into the nature of sin. However, I was disappointed upon finishing it because it raised questions for me that weren't answered or it didn't directly address the questions that originally motivated to read the book in the first place. Reading Pieper is always a learning experience for me - I just wish this book were twice as long as it is.

That the reality of sin and its effects is not solely a Christian idea is one of Pieper's key points in this book. He draws heavily from the ancient Greeks, as well as from the East, and from modern authors, who all illustrate how the concept of sin, and even the distinction between mortal and venial sin, is something which is found throughout human experience. He develops these concepts, and furthermore touches on specifically Christian elements to the understanding of sin and redemption. However, this book provides many insightful approaches to pondering the reality of sin.

A bit overly abstruse, and seems to take pages to say something that could be said in a few paragraphs.