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In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents Paperback – February 1, 2001
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- Print length688 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherUniversity of Washington Press
- Publication dateFebruary 1, 2001
- Dimensions9.23 x 6.11 x 1.37 inches
- ISBN-100295980818
- ISBN-13978-0295980812
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Product details
- Publisher : University of Washington Press (February 1, 2001)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 688 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0295980818
- ISBN-13 : 978-0295980812
- Item Weight : 2.15 pounds
- Dimensions : 9.23 x 6.11 x 1.37 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #404,078 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #506 in Communism & Socialism (Books)
- #535 in European Politics Books
- #874 in Russian History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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Top reviews from the United States
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Critical to resolving the Cuban missile crisis.
Chess player. Not exactly a fan of Karpov. Fascinated by a double rook sacrifice that prevented Toli from getting his name front page on the 60th Anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Pity....
When he died in 2010, I mourned on the day the news arrived.
As much as anyone, Dobrynin spared the world nuclear war (so far.) That's including the great Dieter Schwebs who impressed on Kennedy's The Best and The Brightest that the U.S. would be better off sharing the tech to control nuclear weapon explosions with the Russians. All of it.
You're not going to get a lot of detail on the major events such as Cuba or Vietnam, but you do get to learn how the talks worked - or didn't work - in the behind the scenes discussions between the two countries regarding said events.
I gave the book 4 stars because the book is somewhat linear in the sense it covers US-Soviet relations in a time of unstable global politics. I felt to truly understand the negotiations and stretegies, one needed to better understand the strategies each country had with other states (the book does do that to a small degree), but I suppose that is not the point of the book and would have deviated from Dobrynin's first hand accounts. Perhaps I am being too harsh and should have rated the book on what it is instead of what it is not.
I very much enjoyed this book and would recommend it to anyone who has an interest in that period.
That was extraordinary enough for someone who grew up in the Soviet Union. Further, he was able to obtain the respect of many influential Americans. He was invited to functions where he was the only non-American present.
This book tells that story very well. The politics with the 6 Presidents and Soviet Secretaries is really interesting. But I think Mr. Dobrynin is far more interesting himself.
Dobrynin's point of view was often interesting and gave a part of the story that is often missing.
The personal anecdotes were often very revealing.
My biggest issue was that there were numerous times where he would claim that he hadn't agreed with a decision or a statement but went along with it because he had to do so. Some of the cases may well be true, but many of them sound way too much like someone looking back and disagreeing with something. It made me take just about everything he said with a grain of salt, as the saying goes.
This book is very long and in some spots very hard to get through. Anyone interested in the diplomatic history of the Cold War would probably find this book interesting.
Top reviews from other countries
Dobrynin begins with a brief description of how he, almost accidentally, became a diplomat. Being taken out of a fairly secure engineering position in Moscow during the Second World War and sent to the Higher Diplomatic School, as it was known then, Dobrynin became involved in the world of Soviet diplomacy. First sent to the United States in 1952 as an embassy staffer, he worked for the then ambassador; Georgy Zarubin before going on to be seconded to the United Nations in New York. In 1962, he was made Soviet ambassador to the United States. Something which appeared to surprise him very much.
The ambassador's accounts of his dealings with each President are fascinating. Kennedy, the novice and lightweight, was to become a major challenge to the Soviet Union, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis. LBJ was disorganized and inconsistent. However, it was Nixon who was to begin the real dialogue with the Soviet Union and initiate Detente. Ford was inconsistent and Carter a moralizing and sanctimonious joke !! Indeed, Dobrynin describes how US foreign policy came, in later years, to be almost dictated by two people (Zbignew Brzezinski and Ronald Reagan) who were so driven by ideological nonsense that they come across as being nothing more than demagogues (despite never using this word to describe them). They were to play into Soviet hands too.
Overall, I was impressed by how much each President, with the exception of Reagan, was serious in creating a 'confidential' channel between themselves and the Soviet leaders, using Dobrynin as the lynchpin. There was a clear desire by leaders of both countries to understand and communicate with each other after the complete fiasco of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Dobrynin appeared to be on close and personal terms with many of America's leaders, Secretaries of State, National Security Advisers and other politicians in the Senate. He was highly regarded to by many of his contemporaries and appeared to make firm friends and a positive network of contacts.
Interesting aspects of his memoirs also highlight several key factors in Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War. Firstly, even during the early years, there appears to have been absolutely no serious desire by the Soviets to wage nuclear war against the US at any time. They seem to have been totally frightened of the consequences, as you'd expect. Secondly, despite the persistent belief by the US leadership of Soviet interference abroad, in 1967, Andrei Gromyko issued a statement to the Politburo highlighting how the Soviet Union had no desire to spread communism abroad beyond simply backing existing socialist regimes in Asia. War and ideological expansion appear to have been outside the interests of the Soviet Union, according to Dobrynin. I believe him too. Indeed, the limitations of Soviet aims are repeatedly highlighted. LBJ and Nixon explicitly requested on numerous occasions Soviet assistance in mediating a peace during the Vietnam war between the North Vietnamese and the US. Dobrynin highlights quite clearly how such an option was impossible; they simply lacked the required influence with the NV regime !! Outstanding when thought about. In many ways, the Soviet leaders and the US had much in the way of common ground to build on... so many opportunities missed.
One final point. Dobrynin emphasizes how US/Soviet relations suffered badly in the later stages of the Cold War due to the ideological positions taken by President Ronald Reagan and also by President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbignew Brzezinski. Whilst refraining from personal attacks on the two, Dobrynin repeatedly comments on how their ideological cliches and narrow-minded thinking repeatedly frustrated his attempts to do his job. Indeed, both come out quite dim and limited in the author's analysis with their simplistic ideological rubbish. Clearly, some US and Soviet figures were no better than each other as they repeatedly exchanged verbal attacks !!
This is a brilliant read and one which highlights just how eager both the United States and the Soviet Union were in desiring a stable relationship with each other. A positive and productive outcome always appeared just out of reach and seemed to almost die after the election of the popular yet somewhat dimwitted Ronald Reagan. The rest is history.
Very good. Stick with it and you'll be amazed.

