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Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (Philosophy of Mind Series) 1st Edition
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The second half of the book explores and defends a recently rediscovered theory of fundamental reality―or perhaps rather a grouping of such theories―known as 'Russellian monism.' Russellian monists draw inspiration from a couple of theses defended by Bertrand Russell in The Analysis of Matter in 1927. Russell argued that physics, for all its virtues, gives us a radically incomplete picture of the world. It tells us only about the extrinsic, mathematical features of material entities, and leaves us in the dark about their intrinsic nature, about how they are in and of themselves. Following Russell, Russellian monists suppose that it is this 'hidden' intrinsic nature of matter that explains human and animal consciousness.
Some Russellian monists adopt panpsychism, the view that the intrinsic natures of basic material entities involve consciousness; others hold that basic material entities are proto-conscious rather than conscious. Throughout the second half of the book various forms of Russellian monism are surveyed, and the key challenges facing it are discussed. The penultimate chapter defends a cosmopsychist form of Russellian monism, according to which all facts are grounded in facts about the conscious universe.
- ISBN-109780190677015
- ISBN-13978-0190677015
- Edition1st
- PublisherOxford University Press
- Publication dateAugust 18, 2017
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions9.3 x 1 x 6.1 inches
- Print length304 pages
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- ASIN : 0190677015
- Publisher : Oxford University Press; 1st edition (August 18, 2017)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 304 pages
- ISBN-10 : 9780190677015
- ISBN-13 : 978-0190677015
- Item Weight : 1.47 pounds
- Dimensions : 9.3 x 1 x 6.1 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,293,271 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1,995 in Consciousness & Thought Philosophy
- #2,258 in Philosophy Metaphysics
- #2,944 in Cognitive Psychology (Books)
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A key idea motivating Philip Goff’s position is what he calls the “Consciousness Constraint: Any adequate theory of reality must entail that at least some phenomenal concepts are satisfied” (2). He also gives a lengthy defence of the thesis that when you are having an experience of (say) pain, then the reality of that pain, as an experience, “cannot be doubted” (108). He calls this thesis by the unfortunate name “Revelation” but it is a commonsense truth about the central meaning of the word “pain.” Some hard-line physicalists oppose revelation in an attempt to defend their position. He offers readers a meditation upon pain (108) to motivate them. My (serious) suggestion is that sceptical philosophers should practice the meditation while sitting in a bath filled with bucketfuls of ice.
Goff makes the valid point that, ever since the time of Newton, physics has been framed in the language of mathematics and also in terms of causation (laws of nature). That is to say, physics has an entirely mathematical-nomic[causal law] vocabulary (29-30). The controversial metaphysical position Pure Physicalism attempts to leverage this into the claim that everything – including mind – can be explained in terms of physics. Goff criticises this position and goes on to show that weaker versions of physicalism also fail.
In the Part II, Goff gives an account of Russellian Monism. This involves two theses: (i) matter has an intrinsic nature that is inaccessible to physics; (ii) this nature is such that it can explain consciousness (17-18, 142-144). He describes seven varieties of Russellian monism, including his favourite “A Conscious Universe” (Ch. 9).
Goff is still slightly in the thrall of physicalism, first because he believes in the concrete reality of physical causes per se, second because he assumes that mind is grounded in the physical rather than vice-versa, and third because he confutes idealism with irrealism (about such things as cats and electrons). As a result he rejects idealist variants of Russellian Monism too readily. More properly, idealism is the position that every truth about the world can be satisfactorily accounted for in broadly mentalistic terms – and this need not and should not involve irrealism.
My position is that everything that truly exists is intrinsically a centre of experience, having its own percept. It has volitions to change its percept, and these acts of will are the only authentic causation (in the concrete sense of something making something else happen) in the universe. There is no causal overdetermination problem (153-158) because so-called ‘physical causation’ is just a *description* of the succession of the universe’s goings-on.
Regarding “the tree in the quad” (163): You and I, the cells of the tree, the tree itself and any nearby pebble – all centres have percepts of our situation. These percepts contain structural information which is realised by differences in perceptual qualities. We humans, for example, each experience the lawn as a green quadrilateral in our visual percept, surrounded (otherwise we would not see it) by a different hue.
There is a certain degree of consilience between the percepts of all of the centres of experience inside the quad. This brute fact has no deeper explanation than that we are living in a cosmos with a fair degree of coherence. We can define any given physical fact by identifying it with maximally-reconciled structural information collated from the percepts of *all* centres of experience, no matter how primitive. The distance between you and me may be defined in this manner. (Of course, this is not an operational definition because we do not have epistemic access to the percepts of others.) In a similar way the whole of physics may be reduced to mentalistic terms. [End sketch of my position]
The final chapter argues that we should practice metaphysics with due regard to (i) current physical science (ii) the direct first person access each of us has to the nature of consciousness (272).
In chapter 7 Goff discusses panpsychism’s combination problem: how do many micro-subjects combine into one that is me? He gives William James’ classic formulation (172). In James’ later life, in “A Pluralistic Universe”, he rejected then-current physics, asserting that nature somehow managed the trick anyway. In my view, linking this problem to modern physics is key: this is so for Goff because mind is grounded in physics; and for me because physics is grounded in mind and I hold that no feature of mind is epiphenomenal. Quantum mechanics affirms that particles P1 and P2 can exist in an entangled state P*. Each particle - as observed by a scientist completely without access to the other one - behaves just as if it were unentangled. Their behaviour is correlated, however, in such a way that, in order to describe both requires reference to P*. The pair act as a single entity, and thus combine physically in a manner that is a perfect analogy for the combination of subjects we are seeking. We, as thinking creatures, are organisms, in which entities at all levels (particles, cells, and organs) must inevitably be entangled. This is contrary to Goff’s CIS principle (174).
To sum up, this is a thoroughly stimulating and highly valuable book that should encourage more philosophers, both academics and enthusiasts, to take a closer look at the merits of panpsychism, Russellian Monism, and Philip Goff’s favoured position: a Conscious Universe. No longer should we hear pronouncements akin to: “Metaphysics is dead – and I say that as a physicalist!”; “panpsychism is absurd – it is contrary to science”; and “panpsychism is absurd – it is empirically indistinguishable from physicalism.”



