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A Convenient Spy: Wen Ho Lee and the Politics of Nuclear Espionage Hardcover – January 8, 2002
by
Dan Stober
(Author),
Ian Hoffman
(Author)
|
Dan Stober
(Author)
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Print length384 pages
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LanguageEnglish
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PublisherSimon & Schuster
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Publication dateJanuary 8, 2002
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Dimensions6.28 x 1.15 x 9.42 inches
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ISBN-100743223780
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ISBN-13978-0743223782
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Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Like many spy stories, there's much that's unknown about the case of Wen Ho Lee, the Taiwanese-American scientist jailed for almost a year in 1999 and 2000 on charges of spying for China before being released with the judge's apology. This exemplary investigative report by journalists Stober (a Pulitzer winner who writes for the San Jose Mercury-News) and Hoffman (of the Albuquerque Journal) goes a long way toward filling in the blanks. They first give a biographical sketch of Lee from his childhood in Taiwan to his college days, marriage and up-and-down engineering career before he arrived at New Mexico's Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in 1978. At Los Alamos, he first built computer models of nuclear reactors before creating and maintaining the codes used by bomb designers. The authors also detail the rivalries and confusion among politicians, government investigators and agencies and media outlets exploring the case. Congress and the media, they write, "were locked in a game of one-upsmanship, describing Lee's crime in ever more superlative-laden rhetoric." The authors also show how the case against Lee intersected with the burgeoning political and scientific relationship between the United States and China during the 1980s and 1990s. The book is full of new information, and, to the authors' credit, even where they're unsure of the answer, they soberly explore all the possibilities. Agents, John Brockman, Katinka Matson. (Jan. 14)Forecast: This will run up in bookstores against Wen Ho Lee's own book, also due out in January from Hyperion (and tightly embargoed). Whether that volume spurs sales of this one or each cannibalizes the other may depend on the respective review and media attention each book receives.
Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information, Inc.
From Library Journal
In December 1999, Wen Ho Lee, an immigrant from Taiwan who worked on nuclear weapons research and development at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, was accused of downloading top-secret material and an open-access portion of the lab's computer network onto tapes (which he claimed he destroyed) and then handing them over to Beijing (and perhaps Taipei as well). This convoluted case wound up making Lee into a minor folk hero and leaving the federal government with egg on its face when he was set free in September 2000 after pleading guilty to a minor charge. International, domestic, and bureaucratic politics were all involved in this shadowy scenario, as were personal egos and perceptions. After completing this book by journalists Stober and Hoffman, who relied largely on unattributed interviews, readers will have to decide for themselves whether Lee was a devious spy or an eccentric victim. This title should be placed alongside Wen Ho Lee's forthcoming My Country Versus Me (Hyperion, 2002) and is suitable for public and academic libraries. Daniel K. Blewett, Coll. of DuPage Lib., Glen Ellyn, IL
Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc.
From Booklist
Stober, a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the San Jose Mercury-News, and Hoffman, who reports for the Albuquerque Journal, take a fascinating story from the newspaper headlines and expand it into the first full-length treatment of the subject. Wen Ho Lee was a weapons-code scientist employed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory when, a half-dozen years ago, he was arrested for espionage. Lee, an immigrant from Taiwan, was charged with spying for China, and he was held in detention for nine months for purportedly being a security threat to the entire U.S. weapons system. But after pleading guilty to a single count, he was released from jail with an apology for his treatment by the federal judge who heard the case. What drew Stober and Hoffman to this story--its "intriguing confluence of intelligence, weapons, science, and politics"--will also draw readers to their book. They are balanced in their assessment of this emotion-arousing affair, accusing Lee of "committing an egregious security offense," even if he didn't actually share secrets with the Chinese, but they don't let the FBI off the hook, either. The agency's sloppy investigative work led to "an ugly chapter in U.S. history . . . a time when democratic ideals were forgotten in the name of national security." Certain to be in demand and to cause heated discussions. Brad Hooper
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved
About the Author
Dan Stober reports for the San Jose Mercury-News, where he shared the 1989 Pulitzer Prize for public service for coverage of the Loma Prieta earthquake. He lives in Palo Alto, California.
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Product details
- Publisher : Simon & Schuster; First Edition, First Printing (January 8, 2002)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 384 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0743223780
- ISBN-13 : 978-0743223782
- Item Weight : 0.035 ounces
- Dimensions : 6.28 x 1.15 x 9.42 inches
-
Best Sellers Rank:
#787,869 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #623 in Nuclear Weapons & Warfare History (Books)
- #770 in Espionage True Accounts
- #2,031 in Asian Politics
- Customer Reviews:
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4.3 out of 5
19 global ratings
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Reviewed in the United States on March 28, 2018
Verified Purchase
Good
4.0 out of 5 stars
... followed this affair closely and Stober has done a good job accurately reflecting what happened
Reviewed in the United States on September 6, 2014Verified Purchase
I followed this affair closely and Stober has done a good job accurately reflecting what happened. It is balanced and informative. Well written.
Reviewed in the United States on March 26, 2004
Verified Purchase
Some one has protested that the Authors were biased against Dr. Lee, I don't agree with that point.
The first time I found it two years ago, I immediately fell in love with this book. The beautiful writing, the amazing story and the vivid pictures of distinct characters, all have been inspiring me to think and to change even today.
My own conclusion:
He is not a spy. Why?
As a second generation of Chinese immigrant to Taiwan, Dr. Lee believes in his heart that he is superior to a Chinese, unfortunately (or fortunately), his moral (like majority of the Taiwanese), is as low as an ordinary Chinese in that "we" (Chinese and Taiwanese) both worship no God but money and authority.
Wen Ho Lee's own account ("my country versus me") as to why he wasn't spying for China was simply that China was such poor (at his time) that it wouldn't be wise, honorable or beneficial for him, such a smart guy, to work for the Chinese. This argument makes perfect sense to the majority of Chinese and Taiwanese because "we" are educated to think in this uniform way that I do something only because it is good for my own, "we" don't care whether it is good or evil, in "our" eyes, "we" see only the difference between the smartness and the stupidity, and by smartness, "we" mean specifically, though implicitly, that someone is able to observe the vulnerability of a system or the weakness of other people AND to take the advantage over it by some way no matter what. But his pale explanation does NOT make any sense to the people in this country. In this country, citizens are educated to do something because it is the right thing to do, NOT because he himself would necessarily benefit from doing it. Dr. Lee was unable to understand the way his own brain functions his own thinking style his own philosophy much less the way Americans are thinking, that's why he was so confused and frustrated that the American investigators would have hard time to believe his innocence while ordinary Chinese or Taiwanese would be easily convinced as soon as he speaks out loudly his "concrete" reason.
Surely Wen Ho Lee has broken the honor system, he violated the code of conduct, he destroyed the mutual trust that his colleagues at Los Alamos had graciously laid on him, but
He is not a spy for China; he doesn't have the guts,
He is not a spy for Taiwan; he doesn't have the moral,
He is not a spy for any country; he doesn't have the intelligence, Yet
He is a smart PhD (his own words) as far as "we" are concerned, in the sense of "our" culture and value. Consequently, everything he did was simply for himself, which is the unspoken common sense for both Chinese and Taiwanese, which explains everything!
The first time I found it two years ago, I immediately fell in love with this book. The beautiful writing, the amazing story and the vivid pictures of distinct characters, all have been inspiring me to think and to change even today.
My own conclusion:
He is not a spy. Why?
As a second generation of Chinese immigrant to Taiwan, Dr. Lee believes in his heart that he is superior to a Chinese, unfortunately (or fortunately), his moral (like majority of the Taiwanese), is as low as an ordinary Chinese in that "we" (Chinese and Taiwanese) both worship no God but money and authority.
Wen Ho Lee's own account ("my country versus me") as to why he wasn't spying for China was simply that China was such poor (at his time) that it wouldn't be wise, honorable or beneficial for him, such a smart guy, to work for the Chinese. This argument makes perfect sense to the majority of Chinese and Taiwanese because "we" are educated to think in this uniform way that I do something only because it is good for my own, "we" don't care whether it is good or evil, in "our" eyes, "we" see only the difference between the smartness and the stupidity, and by smartness, "we" mean specifically, though implicitly, that someone is able to observe the vulnerability of a system or the weakness of other people AND to take the advantage over it by some way no matter what. But his pale explanation does NOT make any sense to the people in this country. In this country, citizens are educated to do something because it is the right thing to do, NOT because he himself would necessarily benefit from doing it. Dr. Lee was unable to understand the way his own brain functions his own thinking style his own philosophy much less the way Americans are thinking, that's why he was so confused and frustrated that the American investigators would have hard time to believe his innocence while ordinary Chinese or Taiwanese would be easily convinced as soon as he speaks out loudly his "concrete" reason.
Surely Wen Ho Lee has broken the honor system, he violated the code of conduct, he destroyed the mutual trust that his colleagues at Los Alamos had graciously laid on him, but
He is not a spy for China; he doesn't have the guts,
He is not a spy for Taiwan; he doesn't have the moral,
He is not a spy for any country; he doesn't have the intelligence, Yet
He is a smart PhD (his own words) as far as "we" are concerned, in the sense of "our" culture and value. Consequently, everything he did was simply for himself, which is the unspoken common sense for both Chinese and Taiwanese, which explains everything!
3 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on April 6, 2007
Wen Ho Lee, who helped develop the software used to design nuclear bombs at Los Alamos, becomes the target of suspected leaks of national security material. Admittedly he is not without blame for compromising highly classified material, but, according to Stober and Hoffman, it is unlikely he was a Chinese spy. Unfortunately for him Lee becomes the number one suspect in a political witch hunt despite the absence of any credible evidence.
Because President Carter wanted to "cultivate...an Eastern counterweight to Soviet power,"(52) Chinese and American laboratories, once shrouded in the utmost secrecy, were opened to exchange visits of high level weapons experts. Lee and other scientists traveled frequently back and forth between the countries and Lee even began sharing "Applied Technology" to China. This was not secret material but should not have been sent without approval. More troublesome, Lee, apparently for his own personal reasons, also began to shift secret coded material from the secure side to unsecured files in the laboratory's computers. This went undetected for years, but his name only became known to the FBI when he telephoned Gwo Bao Min who was under investigation for espionage under the code name "Tiger Trap." In many ways Lee set himself up for what was to come.
The FBI meanwhile was getting nervous about the freewheeling interactions of scientists and the GAO was concerned with the lack of background checks being performed on visitors. The DOE became involved when Notra Trulock, in charge of intelligence and counterintelligence, embarked on a mission to ferret out the "mole," convinced the design of the nation's most advanced warhead, the W88, had been stolen by the Chinese. Described as "the kind of man who could mistake a possibility for a certainty,"(114) Trulock, ignoring the cautionary advice of others and lied to the FBI to further the investigation. His assistant Dan Bruno was so bumbling that only the people whose travel records from Los Alamos came under investigation, with Lee as the target. The ultimate miscue came as a result of political infighting between President Clinton and the Republican Congress over Clinton's China policy in support of the comprehensive Test ban Treaty.
If this were a script for Peter Sellers playing the role of Inspector Clouseau in the Pink Panther, the humorous miscues of the Wen Ho Lee "investigation" could not get any better. The script would only have to meld the CIA, FBI, DOE actions into the character of Inspector Clouseau to make it work.
Dan Stober and Ian Hoffman raise many questions about the relationship of scientists and their work. In the Wen Ho Lee matter the critical issue was the balance between national security and personal liberty. This and other issues raised in the affair could as easily be applied to industrial, medical, or any other scientific inquiry. Since industrial espionage is as likely as spying, security can be sensitive in any facility, whether public or private, when confidentiality is important.
When it is necessary how do you maintain confidentiality while simultaneously encouraging scientific interchange? This can prove to be a delicate balance. Stober and Hoffman argue that Lee, while charged with spying, was merely eager to "share what he knew."(24) When the rules are too restrictive, scientists may simply chose to ignore them. At Los Alamos, to get around laws they thought to be too restrictive, scientists began to stamp material as "PARD, Protect AS Restricted Data. This was not a security classification, but it allowed easier access and sharing.
Keeping research a secret is always a problem. One way is to compartmentalization the work. This technique was resisted by Oppenheimer during the development of the atom bomb. On the other hand, "China's weapons physicists and academic physicists were separate communities, unknown to each other."(48) Other methods of controlling secret data may be through travel restrictions, implementation of a stringent classification system, limiting the chance of personal contacts (Lee was jailed), or voluntarily limiting publication, as early atom scientists did. Institutional rivalry may even present a serious challenge in maintaining security: "At Livermore there was an expression that said it all: `Always remember, the Soviets are the competition, but Los Alamos is the enemy.'"(40)
Who decides what needs to be secret? Should it be the scientists, politicians, government, contractors, all of them, or others? Scientists themselves do not always agree on what is sensitive. They "warned Congress that the line between basic science and real, practical weapons was blurry."(245) But Stober and Hoffman point out that Von Neumann's work was "mathematics, not nuclear bomb secrets,"(34) yet it was highly classified for years. Fortunately for Lee, John Richter, a renown physicist, provided contradictory testimony that the real nuclear secrets were intuitive knowledge, not the codes that Lee had copied. At Los Alamos, scientists "harbored a growing disdain for government authorities and lawmakers who seemed to think everything about a bomb was a state secret."(35)
Los Alamos security was based on an honor system with ineffective oversight. Prosecutors argued "the system operated on a `sacred' trust and Wen Ho Lee had violated that trust."(262) But compounding the breach, human failure prevented a screening system from catching Lee's transfer of files to an unsecured system. Stober and Hoffman speculate Lee may have wanted to use classified materials in a consulting business he wished to establish though his real reasons remain a mystery.
Some of the problems that may arise in trying to balance the varied interests of scientific research, security, and intelligence are evident in A Convenient Spy. Wen Ho Lee became a scapegoat for the ineptness of those responsible for overseeing security; so much so that Judge Parker was compelled to apologize to Lee. "The Executive branch has enormous power, the abuse of which can be devastating to our citizens....I sincerely apologize to you, Dr. Lee."(330)
Because President Carter wanted to "cultivate...an Eastern counterweight to Soviet power,"(52) Chinese and American laboratories, once shrouded in the utmost secrecy, were opened to exchange visits of high level weapons experts. Lee and other scientists traveled frequently back and forth between the countries and Lee even began sharing "Applied Technology" to China. This was not secret material but should not have been sent without approval. More troublesome, Lee, apparently for his own personal reasons, also began to shift secret coded material from the secure side to unsecured files in the laboratory's computers. This went undetected for years, but his name only became known to the FBI when he telephoned Gwo Bao Min who was under investigation for espionage under the code name "Tiger Trap." In many ways Lee set himself up for what was to come.
The FBI meanwhile was getting nervous about the freewheeling interactions of scientists and the GAO was concerned with the lack of background checks being performed on visitors. The DOE became involved when Notra Trulock, in charge of intelligence and counterintelligence, embarked on a mission to ferret out the "mole," convinced the design of the nation's most advanced warhead, the W88, had been stolen by the Chinese. Described as "the kind of man who could mistake a possibility for a certainty,"(114) Trulock, ignoring the cautionary advice of others and lied to the FBI to further the investigation. His assistant Dan Bruno was so bumbling that only the people whose travel records from Los Alamos came under investigation, with Lee as the target. The ultimate miscue came as a result of political infighting between President Clinton and the Republican Congress over Clinton's China policy in support of the comprehensive Test ban Treaty.
If this were a script for Peter Sellers playing the role of Inspector Clouseau in the Pink Panther, the humorous miscues of the Wen Ho Lee "investigation" could not get any better. The script would only have to meld the CIA, FBI, DOE actions into the character of Inspector Clouseau to make it work.
Dan Stober and Ian Hoffman raise many questions about the relationship of scientists and their work. In the Wen Ho Lee matter the critical issue was the balance between national security and personal liberty. This and other issues raised in the affair could as easily be applied to industrial, medical, or any other scientific inquiry. Since industrial espionage is as likely as spying, security can be sensitive in any facility, whether public or private, when confidentiality is important.
When it is necessary how do you maintain confidentiality while simultaneously encouraging scientific interchange? This can prove to be a delicate balance. Stober and Hoffman argue that Lee, while charged with spying, was merely eager to "share what he knew."(24) When the rules are too restrictive, scientists may simply chose to ignore them. At Los Alamos, to get around laws they thought to be too restrictive, scientists began to stamp material as "PARD, Protect AS Restricted Data. This was not a security classification, but it allowed easier access and sharing.
Keeping research a secret is always a problem. One way is to compartmentalization the work. This technique was resisted by Oppenheimer during the development of the atom bomb. On the other hand, "China's weapons physicists and academic physicists were separate communities, unknown to each other."(48) Other methods of controlling secret data may be through travel restrictions, implementation of a stringent classification system, limiting the chance of personal contacts (Lee was jailed), or voluntarily limiting publication, as early atom scientists did. Institutional rivalry may even present a serious challenge in maintaining security: "At Livermore there was an expression that said it all: `Always remember, the Soviets are the competition, but Los Alamos is the enemy.'"(40)
Who decides what needs to be secret? Should it be the scientists, politicians, government, contractors, all of them, or others? Scientists themselves do not always agree on what is sensitive. They "warned Congress that the line between basic science and real, practical weapons was blurry."(245) But Stober and Hoffman point out that Von Neumann's work was "mathematics, not nuclear bomb secrets,"(34) yet it was highly classified for years. Fortunately for Lee, John Richter, a renown physicist, provided contradictory testimony that the real nuclear secrets were intuitive knowledge, not the codes that Lee had copied. At Los Alamos, scientists "harbored a growing disdain for government authorities and lawmakers who seemed to think everything about a bomb was a state secret."(35)
Los Alamos security was based on an honor system with ineffective oversight. Prosecutors argued "the system operated on a `sacred' trust and Wen Ho Lee had violated that trust."(262) But compounding the breach, human failure prevented a screening system from catching Lee's transfer of files to an unsecured system. Stober and Hoffman speculate Lee may have wanted to use classified materials in a consulting business he wished to establish though his real reasons remain a mystery.
Some of the problems that may arise in trying to balance the varied interests of scientific research, security, and intelligence are evident in A Convenient Spy. Wen Ho Lee became a scapegoat for the ineptness of those responsible for overseeing security; so much so that Judge Parker was compelled to apologize to Lee. "The Executive branch has enormous power, the abuse of which can be devastating to our citizens....I sincerely apologize to you, Dr. Lee."(330)
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