Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War New Edition
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Douglas Porch
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ISBN-13: 978-1107699847
ISBN-10: 1107699843
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Counterinsurgency has staked its claim in the new century as the new American way of war. Yet, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have revived a historical debate about the costs – monetary, political and moral – of operations designed to eliminate insurgents and build nations. Today's counterinsurgency proponents point to 'small wars' past to support their view that the enemy is 'biddable' if the correct tactical formulas are applied. Douglas Porch's sweeping history of counterinsurgency campaigns carried out by the three 'providential nations' of France, Britain and the United States, ranging from nineteenth-century colonial conquests to General Petraeus's 'Surge' in Iraq, challenges the contemporary mythologising of counterinsurgency as a humane way of war. The reality, he reveals, is that 'hearts and minds' has never been a recipe for lasting stability and that past counterinsurgency campaigns have succeeded not through state-building but by shattering and dividing societies while unsettling civil-military relations.
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"In this brilliant volume master historian Douglas Porch shatters the myth of contemporary counterinsurgency by exposing its raw historical roots. American counterinsurgents often preach moralistic sounding bromides like 'protect and serve the local populations'. Porch deconstructs the mythical universe of counterinsurgency and lays bare the historical truth that they are ultimately wars of death, destruction, and often brute conquest."
Colonel Gian Gentile, United States Military Academy, West Point
"Douglas Porch has written one of the single most outstanding reviews and critiques of the modern theory of counter-insurgency. It fully exposes the myths and legends behind a fundamentally flawed and pernicious approach to conceptualising human conflict. This book should be essential reading for military students, scholars and laymen alike."
Alex Marshall, The Scottish Centre for War Studies, University of Glasgow
"… [an] illuminating and feisty book."
The Chronicle Review
"This is a rich, well supported study of a tendentious topic … it pulls together material on a remarkable variety of cases to make a powerful point that is valuable in the undergraduate and graduate classroom as well as for broader practitioner and public audiences."
Jacqueline L. Hazelton, H-Diplo
Colonel Gian Gentile, United States Military Academy, West Point
"Douglas Porch has written one of the single most outstanding reviews and critiques of the modern theory of counter-insurgency. It fully exposes the myths and legends behind a fundamentally flawed and pernicious approach to conceptualising human conflict. This book should be essential reading for military students, scholars and laymen alike."
Alex Marshall, The Scottish Centre for War Studies, University of Glasgow
"… [an] illuminating and feisty book."
The Chronicle Review
"This is a rich, well supported study of a tendentious topic … it pulls together material on a remarkable variety of cases to make a powerful point that is valuable in the undergraduate and graduate classroom as well as for broader practitioner and public audiences."
Jacqueline L. Hazelton, H-Diplo
Book Description
Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.
About the Author
Douglas Porch is Distinguished Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. A specialist in military history, he advises on security issues all over the world. His most recent book, The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II, received the Award for Excellence in US Army Historical Writing from The Army Historical Foundation.
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Product details
- Publisher : Cambridge University Press; New edition (August 19, 2013)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 445 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1107699843
- ISBN-13 : 978-1107699847
- Item Weight : 1.54 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 1.02 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #480,357 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #122 in Military Sciences
- #324 in Military History (Books)
- #552 in Iraq War History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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Reviewed in the United States on June 19, 2016
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Purchased as a gift to one of my ROTC Cadets to begin their professional library. As part of a class assignment I asked each cadet what book would they no-kidding read, military or not, related to their academic major or not. After I compiled the list of books for the class I went online and ordered all the books from Amazon. I placed them at their seats prior to class and allowed them to enter the room w/o me being present for the first five minutes. It was, and still is, one of the good teaching moments of our time together. Thanks for helping me fulfill a need in their soon-to-be military career.
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Reviewed in the United States on March 16, 2014
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The author has an important perspective that needs to be considered by all military professionals. As a COIN advocate, I'm glad I read it. Some of his arguments hold water and they have changed my mind. However, I had a tough time keeping up with the problems the French and British had conducting COIN. The author assumes the reader is more familiar with the historical colonial insurgencies, which I am somewhat ignorant of. Finally, the author's writing style is wordy. OK if you're an academic type; tough for me to maintain interest (took me about three months to finish). Last chapter is the best, so there's definitely value in finishing the book.
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Reviewed in the United States on March 31, 2014
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This book covers the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in theory, and how it was applied in practice. It starts with the Vendée war during the French Revolution. For those who don’t know, Vendée was a region of France that was staunchly royalist. When the French monarchy was overthrown by revolutionaries and king Louis XVIII was executed, Vendée rose up in rebellion.
What followed was a counterinsurgency war renowned for its savagery.
Why does the author start with this particular conflict? After all, this was hardly the first insurgency in the history of the world. What had changed was the nature of the French political thought. The revolutionaries back in Paris painted themselves as enlightened, liberal thinkers who were going to start a new golden age. Up until that moment insurgencies were normally put down with violence and terror, but such methods were no longer compatible with the image that the new French government was projecting.
So, the war in the Vendée was supposed to be fought accordingly to new humane rules. Except that it wasn’t. The government troops waged a war against the insurgents that was in no way different from the old wars. They fell back on mass violence, mass terror, mass destruction, mass plunder and collective punishments to crush the insurgency.
This became a common recurring theme in all future counterinsurgencies. The author goes over such wars as the Spanish insurrection against Napoleon, conquest of Algeria, colonial wars in Africa and Asia, American invasion of Cuba and Philippines, the Boer war, all the way to current war in Iraq. He focuses on the experiences of the French, British and Americans.
His main thesis, which in my opinion he demonstrates quite well, is that despite the lofty rhetoric about fighting insurgencies in smart and human way, counterinsurgency wars always sooner or later fell back on violence as the solution. While the politicians back home talk about hearts and minds and clean, humane wars, the soldiers on the ground quickly descend into barbarism in order to crush the insurgency.
Aside for the fact that these wars quickly become moral black holes, they bring in two problems. The first one is that counterinsurgency wars often fail. While the insurgents usually do not have the strength to win militarily, they often win politically. Tired of fighting and appalled by reports of atrocities, the government back home usually negotiates some sort of deal with the insurgents, or simply pulls out. When insurgents do lose, it is usually more to do with their mistakes and hopeless strategic situation than any brilliant tactic used by their enemies.
The second problem is that the militaries engaged in counterinsurgency have a tendency to develop deep disdain for the civilian government back home and they bring some of the violence home. The best example is Algeria in 1950s, where the French army started dictating terms to the civilian government in France, and then eventually rebelled and had to be put down with harshness. (Some of the rebellious generals were executed.) In South America, the armies engaged in counterinsurgency warfare became notoriously barbaric (even by “normal” counterinsurgency standards) and often threatened to (and sometimes did) take over the country.
These are extreme cases, but pretty much every society engaged in long-term counterinsurgency sees increased militarization and attack on civil rights. You do not go to a foreign country where you spend a couple of years acting like a savage, and then come back home to civilized society and act as if nothing ever happened. The violence and barbarism soak inside you and stay in your soul.
The author is obviously biased against counterinsurgency war. Yet, this book is not some rant by some left-wing peace activist, but a well researched and well presented academic thesis. I enjoyed reading it, but I have to admit that the author often uses big fancy words, and when he speaks about the French, he likes to use French expressions without translating them. When you are writing a book in English, you are writing a book in English. Please don’t make it multilingual.
The author also does not explain much about the wars he is discussing. For example, when talking about Vietnam, he does not explain the war as a whole, but focuses solely on the American counterinsurgency methods and why they failed. He assumes that the reader already has good knowledge of that war. The same goes to lesser degrees for all the other conflicts he discusses. To truly enjoy this book, you would need to already have solid foundation of historical knowledge.
The author also does not provide much in terms of suggesting on how to resolve the problem of savagery of counterinsurgency war. One solution is obviously not to wage such wars at all. For that matter, I think human race would be better off without waging wars of any kind.
The only hope I see on the horizon lies in the development of mass communications. In the 19th century, when European soldiers were drowning Africa in blood in order to colonize it, news from these wars was rare and took weeks to arrive back home. Today we can have (and we often do) live coverage from any conflict on the planet. We have insurgents reporting their own news on the internet. We have soldiers on both sides speaking up about atrocities that they witness on private blogs. Lack of sources is no longer an excuse for ignorance.
We also have less racism. In 19th century Europeans could butcher Arabs, Indians, Africans and other dark-skinned people all they wanted because dark-skinned foreigners were seen as less than human, if they were seen as human at all. I am not so naïve as to say that racism is dead, but at least it is no longer tolerated in the open. Pale-skinned soldiers cannot anymore go to another country and butcher the dark-skinned natives and then justify themselves in front of cameras by saying that those people were inferior in some way. Don’t take me wrong. Racist killings still go on, but at the very least you can no longer brag about it in the medias.
Human race is slowly getting better. Maybe one day hearts and minds will be an actual method of dealing with insurgencies rather than an empty slogan. Then again, I hope that the day will come when there will be no need for hearts and minds because there will be no war anymore.
What followed was a counterinsurgency war renowned for its savagery.
Why does the author start with this particular conflict? After all, this was hardly the first insurgency in the history of the world. What had changed was the nature of the French political thought. The revolutionaries back in Paris painted themselves as enlightened, liberal thinkers who were going to start a new golden age. Up until that moment insurgencies were normally put down with violence and terror, but such methods were no longer compatible with the image that the new French government was projecting.
So, the war in the Vendée was supposed to be fought accordingly to new humane rules. Except that it wasn’t. The government troops waged a war against the insurgents that was in no way different from the old wars. They fell back on mass violence, mass terror, mass destruction, mass plunder and collective punishments to crush the insurgency.
This became a common recurring theme in all future counterinsurgencies. The author goes over such wars as the Spanish insurrection against Napoleon, conquest of Algeria, colonial wars in Africa and Asia, American invasion of Cuba and Philippines, the Boer war, all the way to current war in Iraq. He focuses on the experiences of the French, British and Americans.
His main thesis, which in my opinion he demonstrates quite well, is that despite the lofty rhetoric about fighting insurgencies in smart and human way, counterinsurgency wars always sooner or later fell back on violence as the solution. While the politicians back home talk about hearts and minds and clean, humane wars, the soldiers on the ground quickly descend into barbarism in order to crush the insurgency.
Aside for the fact that these wars quickly become moral black holes, they bring in two problems. The first one is that counterinsurgency wars often fail. While the insurgents usually do not have the strength to win militarily, they often win politically. Tired of fighting and appalled by reports of atrocities, the government back home usually negotiates some sort of deal with the insurgents, or simply pulls out. When insurgents do lose, it is usually more to do with their mistakes and hopeless strategic situation than any brilliant tactic used by their enemies.
The second problem is that the militaries engaged in counterinsurgency have a tendency to develop deep disdain for the civilian government back home and they bring some of the violence home. The best example is Algeria in 1950s, where the French army started dictating terms to the civilian government in France, and then eventually rebelled and had to be put down with harshness. (Some of the rebellious generals were executed.) In South America, the armies engaged in counterinsurgency warfare became notoriously barbaric (even by “normal” counterinsurgency standards) and often threatened to (and sometimes did) take over the country.
These are extreme cases, but pretty much every society engaged in long-term counterinsurgency sees increased militarization and attack on civil rights. You do not go to a foreign country where you spend a couple of years acting like a savage, and then come back home to civilized society and act as if nothing ever happened. The violence and barbarism soak inside you and stay in your soul.
The author is obviously biased against counterinsurgency war. Yet, this book is not some rant by some left-wing peace activist, but a well researched and well presented academic thesis. I enjoyed reading it, but I have to admit that the author often uses big fancy words, and when he speaks about the French, he likes to use French expressions without translating them. When you are writing a book in English, you are writing a book in English. Please don’t make it multilingual.
The author also does not explain much about the wars he is discussing. For example, when talking about Vietnam, he does not explain the war as a whole, but focuses solely on the American counterinsurgency methods and why they failed. He assumes that the reader already has good knowledge of that war. The same goes to lesser degrees for all the other conflicts he discusses. To truly enjoy this book, you would need to already have solid foundation of historical knowledge.
The author also does not provide much in terms of suggesting on how to resolve the problem of savagery of counterinsurgency war. One solution is obviously not to wage such wars at all. For that matter, I think human race would be better off without waging wars of any kind.
The only hope I see on the horizon lies in the development of mass communications. In the 19th century, when European soldiers were drowning Africa in blood in order to colonize it, news from these wars was rare and took weeks to arrive back home. Today we can have (and we often do) live coverage from any conflict on the planet. We have insurgents reporting their own news on the internet. We have soldiers on both sides speaking up about atrocities that they witness on private blogs. Lack of sources is no longer an excuse for ignorance.
We also have less racism. In 19th century Europeans could butcher Arabs, Indians, Africans and other dark-skinned people all they wanted because dark-skinned foreigners were seen as less than human, if they were seen as human at all. I am not so naïve as to say that racism is dead, but at least it is no longer tolerated in the open. Pale-skinned soldiers cannot anymore go to another country and butcher the dark-skinned natives and then justify themselves in front of cameras by saying that those people were inferior in some way. Don’t take me wrong. Racist killings still go on, but at the very least you can no longer brag about it in the medias.
Human race is slowly getting better. Maybe one day hearts and minds will be an actual method of dealing with insurgencies rather than an empty slogan. Then again, I hope that the day will come when there will be no need for hearts and minds because there will be no war anymore.
9 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on February 23, 2015
Verified Purchase
This piece is an essential read that unpacks the historical and cultural legacy that underpins COIN narratives. Porch’s perspective is unflinching and pops the myth and cult-of-personality that undergirds the COIN narrative. As a historian, he writes with a direct perspective that he supports with historical context and fully developed case studies. Yes, he takes COIN to task, and yes, some will quibble about his condensed perspectives on some historical examples (Phoenix Program), but that’s debating the brushstrokes of a great painting.
His argument is clear: COIN is inherently about the tactics of fighting a small war and not about the requisite political strategy or grasping the strategic context in order to win. If you find yourself leaning toward the belief that COIN will work in the long run, then this book is worth a read. The alternative is, of course, to settle in for that long run and to experience the predicted second and third order effects that Porch correctly identifies as recurring themes (regardless of the implementing power) in COIN missions.
The writing style is no-holds-barred and while he has a proclivity toward longer sentences, he always makes his point. Overall, a superb work that provides the context of U.S. COIN and lifts the curtain on the thinking, prejudices, and more-often-than-not-failed approaches that went into making the COIN sausage.
His argument is clear: COIN is inherently about the tactics of fighting a small war and not about the requisite political strategy or grasping the strategic context in order to win. If you find yourself leaning toward the belief that COIN will work in the long run, then this book is worth a read. The alternative is, of course, to settle in for that long run and to experience the predicted second and third order effects that Porch correctly identifies as recurring themes (regardless of the implementing power) in COIN missions.
The writing style is no-holds-barred and while he has a proclivity toward longer sentences, he always makes his point. Overall, a superb work that provides the context of U.S. COIN and lifts the curtain on the thinking, prejudices, and more-often-than-not-failed approaches that went into making the COIN sausage.
4 people found this helpful
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Top reviews from other countries
R. Packham
5.0 out of 5 stars
Douglas porch has written a superb thought provoking account of counterinsurgency
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on October 26, 2013Verified Purchase
Douglas porch has written a superb thought provoking account of counterinsurgency past and present. Again Ive been using this as reference material and further reading for my Masters. A superb read for the general reader and student of warfare.
3 people found this helpful
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Gabriel Stein
5.0 out of 5 stars
interesting
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on March 30, 2014Verified Purchase
An interesting and well-argued book. I don't agree with everything the author says, but he is careful to back up his views with well-reasoned arguments.
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