- Series: MIT Press
- Paperback: 368 pages
- Publisher: The MIT Press; First Edition, Twelf edition (July 12, 1994)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0262650401
- ISBN-13: 978-0262650403
- Product Dimensions: 6 x 0.8 x 9 inches
- Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
- Average Customer Review: 22 customer reviews
- Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #287,138 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
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A Course in Game Theory (MIT Press) First Edition, Twelf Edition
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Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein have made most of their theoretical contributions on the strategic side, and yet they devote a nice portion of the book to cooperative game theory. I recommend this book highly. It is beautifully done, and it recognized the importance of the cooperative theory.(Robert J. Aumann, Professor of Mathematics, The HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem)
About the Author
Martin J. Osborne is Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto.
Top customer reviews
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The authors (like Myerson's "Game Theory" and unlike both Kreps and Fudenberg and Tirole's "Game Theory") cover both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, with a nice balance.
Two topics not covered in other major texts are "Complexity Considerations In Repeated Games" (Chapter 9) and "Implementation Theory" (Chapter 10). The implementation theory chapter is a wonderful introduction to the topic, but is unfortunately limited to the perfect information case (mechanism design under imperfect information is covered by both Fudenberg-Tirole and Myerson.)
The only application of game theory to which the authors devote considerable space is bargaining (those who know the authors won't be surprised!) - and its treatment could have been a little less abstract.
In sum, it is a very good book that is not dominated by (nor dominates) any of its competitors cited above. If I were to teach a graduate game theory course, I would probably adopt it as the major text and supplement it with papers and parts of the other books.
You can find electronic copies of the book and the solution manual on the authors' website: http://books.osborne.economics.utoronto.ca/. The authors also maintain a very comprehensive errata for all printings of the book: http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/cgt/.
However if you are like me and were looking for a strong book that will help a motivated individual learn game theory this book is not for you. I have tried many of the excersizes and I am still not positive that I my answers are correct. The material in the book is very complex but accessible, that is not the problem. The problem is the lack of development because I can not go over my answers to the excersizes and see what I did right and what I did wrong...