Under Cover, or Out of Control? The New York Times November 29, 1987, Sunday, Late City Final Edition (Review of 2 books, including The perfect failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs, only this book review included here)
The torrent of revelations about the Iran-contra affair during the summer's televised hearings, and in the recently released report of the Congressional committees that conducted the hearings, has made Americans aware both of the importance of covert action in the foreign policy of their country and of its risks and costs. These two books do nothing to rehabilitate its reputation or to improve its image...
Both men show how much euphoria about covert action was created by two early successes of the C.I.A.: in Iran in 1953, when Kermit Roosevelt, with the help of what Mr. Treverton calls a ''strange assemblage'' - a pro-Shah mob controlled by one Iranian leader, ''complete with giant . . . weight-lifters recruited from Teheran athletic clubs'' - overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh's Government and consolidated the Shah's shaky power; and in Guatemala in 1954, when the regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was toppled by a small group of rebel soldiers moving in from Honduras. The action in Guatemala led officials to believe that such successes could be repeated elsewhere; it ''consolidated the ascendancy of covert action over espionage, and of operations over intelligence in the CIA,'' in Mr. Treverton's words - and it led directly to the Bay of Pigs and to the later operations in Chile that toppled that country's Government. Most of the men who planned these later activities had been involved in the Guatemalan affair.
''Covert Action'' is valuable not only for its brief, sharp accounts of covert enterprises (the one in Chile was undertaken even though none of the official assessments had concluded that the election of Salvador Allende Gossens in 1970 threatened any vital United States interest), but above all for the lessons Mr. Treverton draws from history, and for his own assessments. The lessons are stark. As the targets of United States action became more formidable (Fidel Castro learned from Arbenz's fate), the chances of success decreased. Success requires bigger operations - and big operations can't remain secret (as the Reagan arms sales to Iran demonstrated).
If the covert activities go on for a long time, as they have in Angola and, since 1981, in Nicaragua, the purposes tend to expand, along with the commitment and public knowledge. When the operations entail the manipulation of foreign elements with their own agenda (the Cuban exiles mobilized for the Bay of Pigs landing, or the Nicaraguan contras, or the anti-Allende factions in the Chilean military), American ability to control them is often limited. In any case, the fine-tuning of covert actions is difficult. In Chile, the United States Government tried to maintain a barrier ''between supporting opposition forces and funding groups trying to promote a military coup,'' but local realities made this ''a distinction built of sand.'' As a result, whatever restrictions and distinctions the United States may have tried to observe, in Chile and elsewhere, it ended up, in the eyes of foreign observers, being seen as responsible for the fall of Allende, or for the acts and fate of the Shah, or as colluding with South Africa against the Marxist regime in Angola.
Mr. Treverton deals at length with the problems of control over covert action. He shows that the enthusiasm shown for it by several Administrations resulted not merely from the ''operational behavior'' of the C.I.A. - its bias for action over mere espionage - but also, frequently, from Presidential pressures (especially from Presidents Nixon and Reagan). But the need to keep operations secret - and the need to protect Presidents by maintaining the possibility of so-called plausible denial - meant that the activities would be discussed only by a small number of people, that insufficient debate and criticism would lead to grievous errors (such as the mistaken belief that the Cuban people would support the invading exiles rather than Mr. Castro) and that only a small proportion of covert-action projects would be reviewed by the National Security Council system.
As for Congress, which went through a long period of complacency and complicity, it tried to reverse course after the Watergate crisis. The Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974 put an end to plausible denial by requiring a Presidential finding that each operation is important to national security, and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 required that Congress be notified of all covert operations. But both laws are full of enough vague terms and escape hatches to allow the executive branch to thwart their authors' intentions, as the Iran-contra affair has shown. Indeed, the members of Congress are in a dilemma, highlighted by Mr. Treverton: when they are informed, they are in no position to stop the action - unless they leak its existence and thereby foreclose ''the option of covertness.''
Thus, covert action raises formidable issues in an open society. Mr. Treverton lists the realists' arguments on behalf of secret operations - especially the need to meet, if not to match, Soviet covert activities and to help one's friends in a harsh and dangerous world. But his own position is closer to that of the idealists. He recognizes that covert operations may be necessary at times. But he doubts they'll remain secret, warns about their unintended effects and long-term costs and argues against having them run from the White House or in contradiction of official policy (as in the case of Irangate). He also shows that much that is done covertly by the C.I.A. could be done overtly by private organizations (he notes the foundations established by West German political parties that have aided democratic forces in such countries as Portugal), and, above all, he concludes that most covert-action successes have been small, ambiguous and transitory (Iran and Guatemala in the 1950's, for example).''Covert Action'' is enlightening, thoughtful and wise.
Mr. Treverton, who writes elegantly, paints an often dirty scene in pastel colors.
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Book recommendations, author interviews, editors' picks, and more. Read it now.
Customers who bought this item also bought
Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1
- The Third Option: Covert Action and American Foreign PolicyHardcoverFREE Shipping on orders over $35 shipped by AmazonGet it as soon as Tuesday, Jan 7Only 15 left in stock (more on the way).
About the author
